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This research investigates the perceptions of citizens on their rights and liberties in 
Turkey. These perceptions are delineated on the basis of the political party preferences. 
Through a survey influenced by the checklist questions of Freedom House reports and 
applied to a sample of individuals in İstanbul, data on perceptions on civil, political, and 
social citizenship rights are collected. The data is analyzed to assess to what extent 
perceptions on the current state of citizenship rights and liberties are differentiated with 
regards to political party preferences. The findings demonstrate that respondents with 
different political party preferences have distinct perceptions on the current state of their 
rights and liberties. While those who prefer the incumbent party consider civil liberties 
and political rights to be protected in Turkey, those who prefer opposition parties are 
critical of the current state of these rights and liberties. Perceptions on the government 
performance in delivering social services also demonstrate a similar distinction. The only 
instance where differences in political party preferences are not reflected in perceptions 
is the normative statements on social rights. This research sheds light on the segments of 
the electorate who carry the potential to voice demands for improvements of citizenship 
rights and liberties. Those who are outsiders of the official citizenship understanding and 
whose demands for inclusion are delegitimized are more likely to play an active role in 
pushing for improvements in citizenship rights and liberties. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
 
 
 
HAKLARI KİM İSTİYOR? TÜRKİYE’DE VATANDAŞLIK HAK VE 
ÖZGÜRLÜKLERİNE DAİR ALGILAR VE SİYASİ PARTİ TERCİHLERİ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BENGİ RUKEN CENGİZ  
 
 
Doktora Tezi, Mart 2018 
 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Ayşe Kadıoğlu 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Vatandaşlık, algılar, haklar ve özgürlükler, siyasi parti tercihleri 
 
Bu araştırma Türkiye’de vatandaşların hak ve özgürlük algılarını incelemektedir. Söz 
konusu algılar siyasi parti tercihlerine göre değerlendirilmiştir. Freedom House 
kuruluşunun değerlendirme sorularının ilham verdiği bir anket aracılığıyla, İstanbul’da 
bulunan bir örneklem üzerinden sivil özgürlükler, siyasi ve sosyal haklara ilişkin algılara 
dair veri toplanmıştır. Bu veri vatandaşlık hak ve özgürlüklerine ilişkin algıların siyasi 
parti tercihleri temelinde nasıl bir değişim gösterdiğini anlamak maksadıyla 
incelenmiştir. Anket değerlendirme sonuçları farklı siyasi parti tercihlerine sahip 
katılımcıların vatandaşlık hak ve özgürlüklerinin durumuna ilişkin algılarının ayrıştığını 
göstermiştir. İktidar partisini tercih eden katılımcılar sivil özgürlükler ve siyasi hakların 
durumunun iyi olduğunu düşünürken, muhalefet partileri seçmenlerinin daha eleştirel 
algılara sahip oldukları gözlemlenmiştir. Hükümetin sosyal hizmetlere dair performansı 
konusunda da benzer bir ayrışma mevcuttur. Siyasi parti tercihleri arasındaki farkların 
algılar üzerinde yansımasının gözlemlenmediği tek alan sosyal hakların ideal durumuna 
dair sorulardır. Bu araştırma seçmenler arasında hangi grubun vatandaşlık hak ve 
özgürlüklerinin iyileştirilmesi için talepte bulunabileceği konusuna ışık tutmaktadır. 
Resmi vatandaşlık anlayışının dışında kalan ve tanınma talepleri gayri meşru görülen 
kesimlerin vatandaşlık hak ve özgürlüklerinin iyileştirilmesi için itici güç oynama 
potansiyellerinin daha fazla olduğu savunulmaktadır.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
Citizenship is a multidimensional concept that has been approached through various 
angles. Formally it denotes a legal status, which institutionalizes membership to a nation 
state. But this formal understanding of the concept does not prevent citizenship to be a 
topic of philosophical, conceptual and empirical inquiry. In fact, since 1990s, citizenship 
has not only become a highly-debated political issue due to increasing immigration and 
globalization, academic interest on the topic has also revived. The scholarly work on the 
concept has introduced new ways of inquiry, which establish the significance of 
citizenship in the context of rights and liberties. In other words, the academic literature 
on citizenship has offered a new reading of the notion that goes beyond the legal status 
and membership, conceptualizing citizenship as a set of rights and liberties (Turner 1992; 
Isin and Turner 2002).  
This revival within the literature has problematized the links between national 
identity and citizenship, its gendered nature, and the interactions between welfare states 
and citizenship rights (Brubaker 1990, 1992; Dietz 1992; Lister 1990; Fraser and Gordon 
1994; Soysal 1998). With the emergence of the nation state, citizenship had 
conventionally been used interchangeably with national identity. Yet, with waves of 
immigration and cultural heterogeneity, this close link between citizenship and national 
identity began to be challenged. This development has influenced scholars to analyse the 
notion from different angles. While some traced the historical trajectory of the link 
between nationality and citizenship, others offered new conceptualizations of citizenship 
that account for the changes that resulted from immigration, cultural heterogeneity and 
international norms on rights and liberties (Brubaker 1990,1992; Soysal 1998).  
 On the other hand, some feminists have focused on the underlying assumptions of 
the philosophical accounts on membership and have identified the patriarchal dimensions 
of the notion that have effectively excluded women from being equal citizens (Pateman 
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1988,1992). Similarly, the discrepancies between the ideal of equality between male and 
female citizens and their enjoyment of rights and liberties have also brought up as 
significant criticisms by feminist scholars (Dietz 1992; Lister 1990).  
These new perspectives have helped to unearth various aspects of the concept, 
which were largely understudied. In addition, new research into these dimensions have 
caused the literature to acquire an inter-disciplinary character, while the amount of 
empirical works on the concept has multiplied. 
 The literature on Turkish citizenship was also influenced by the revival of 
citizenship literature. Since the 1990s, the construct of Turkish citizenship has been 
investigated in terms of its emergence, its practice, and the changes happened within the 
legal framework (Soyarık 2005, Kadirbeyoğlu 2009, Kadıoğlu 1998a, 1998b, 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010, İnce 2012, Yeğen 1998, 2004, Üstel 1999, 2004, Parla 2011).  
These works demonstrate that the official construct of Turkish citizenship is based 
upon an exclusionary understanding where specific ethnic and religious identities, duties, 
obedience and loyalty to the state, and passive status were promoted. The practice of 
Turkish citizenship has close links with national identity and duties, which prioritize the 
well-being of the state prior to the well-being of the individuals. Given this practice, 
Turkish citizenship is experienced as a duty-laden, passive status with specific ethnic and 
religious connotations.  
Yet, this construct has not remained unchallenged. In fact, similar to the shifts in 
the general citizenship studies, Turkish citizenship studies flourished at the same time 
with the emergence of demands for recognition by various groups in the society. The 
challenges towards this construct have emerged among those who are left outside of this 
definition with demands for inclusion and recognition, especially in the contexts of 
external pressure or influence, such as the EU membership process. The analyses offered 
by students of Turkish citizenship studies have underlined the exclusionary logic on 
which Turkish citizenship has been established and pointed out the dimensions of the 
notion that call for redefinition and revision.  
The field of citizenship studies, including the Turkish citizenship studies, has 
demonstrated that the citizenship goes beyond being a formal status denoting national 
identity and has demonstrated the multidimensional, dynamic and political character of 
it. As a result, the field continues to expand through new research avenues that endeavor 
to analyze different dimensions of this dynamic concept. One such avenue concerns 
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perceptions of citizens themselves concerning their membership status, rights, and 
liberties. This thesis contributes to this new research area.  
1.1 Citizenship Perceptions as a New Research Avenue 
An emerging field of research is on the perceptions of citizens. Acknowledging the 
political, dynamic and multidimensional aspects of citizenship, this newly emerging 
research strand focuses on the way in which citizens perceive and understand their 
citizenship status and corresponding rights and liberties. Studying perceptions allows one 
to go beyond the institutional and legal analyses on citizenship that have dominated the 
field. The reason is that citizenship, as a political and dynamic concept, is also a set of 
“practices” that “define a person as a competent member of society.” (Turner 1993:2) 
Focusing on perceptions provide insight into such practices.  
Investigating perceptions is a fruitful new research arena primarily because of its 
potential for empirically assessing the implications of various philosophical and 
conceptual arguments on citizenship. In addition, investigating perceptions is helpful to 
understand the experiences of citizens concerning their rights and liberties as well as to 
shed light on satisfaction or dissatisfaction with these experiences. The reason is that 
dissatisfaction with the state of citizenship rights and liberties is potentially linked with 
critical perceptions and possible struggles for democratization of such rights and liberties 
(Isin and Wood 1999).  
 As a new topic of investigation, citizenship perceptions are relatively 
understudied. The existent studies focus on the influence of citizenship laws and 
regulations, generational differences, race or contextual factors on the attitudes towards 
citizenship (Levanon and Lewin-Epstein 2010, Dalton 2009, Coffé and Bolzendahl 
2013). There are also studies which focus on positions on the political spectrum and party 
preferences as a dimension of the perceptions regarding citizenship rights and duties. 
While some scholars emphasize the influence of ideology on citizenship understandings, 
others look into the close links between party preferences and perceptions on citizenship 
(Joppke 2003, Kitschelt 1992, Coffé and Bolzendahl 2011, Dalton 2009). More 
specifically, the differences in perceptions on citizenship correspond to distinct normative 
understandings of citizenship where those identify with progressive, leftist political 
parties emphasize their rights more than those who identify with conservative, right-wing 
parties that prioritize authority and order.  
 Within the literature on Turkish citizenship, there are very few studies that 
investigate the perceptions of citizenship and corresponding rights and liberties. The 
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existing studies underline the lingering influence of duty-oriented, passive citizenship 
understanding in Turkey, while age differences and past experiences in enjoying the 
citizenship rights and liberties emerge as differentiating factors. In their empirical study, 
Kardam and Cengiz (2011) observe that those who are younger than 30 put more 
emphasis on rights instead of duties. On the other hand, Caymaz (2007) points out the 
intertwined relation between rights and duties as the respondents of his survey study 
consider enjoyment of rights conditional upon the fulfilment of duties. 
 This research has been influenced by these existing works and aims at furthering 
the inquiry into citizenship perceptions by focusing on political party preferences as a 
differentiating factor. Following T.H. Marshall’s conceptualization of citizenship as a set 
of civil liberties, political rights, and social rights, this study defines citizenship as a 
collection of rights and liberties that are guaranteed in a democratic polity.  
To put it differently, the main research question posed by this study is how Turkish 
citizens with different political party preferences perceive the current state of their civil 
liberties, political rights, and social rights. Given the current political context, it is 
expected from individuals with different political party preferences to have contrasting 
perceptions. Hence, the aim of this research is to identify the dimensions through which 
perceptions differ along the lines of political party preferences.  
Political party preferences are incorporated as a dimension of citizenship 
perceptions because of the mobilizing potential of political parties. As political parties 
are agents of mobilization, it is expected from them to represent different demands or 
interests in the society (Mair 2009, Dunn and Thornton 2016, Harteveld et al. 2017). This 
claim to represent may emerge out of the existing cleavages in the society or through the 
active efforts of political parties to mobilize different groups for vote maximization 
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Kalyvas 1996, De Leon et al. 2009, 2015, Enyedi 2005). The 
practice of mobilization is linked with the correspondence between political parties’ 
positions regarding certain issues and their target electorate. Since citizenship is also a 
politically dynamic issue, it serves as an issue of political mobilization that has been on 
the agenda of political parties. For instance, some studies on the changes in the legal 
framework of citizenship suggest that mobilization of critical understandings of 
citizenship by political parties is related with the direction of change occurring in 
citizenship regimes. If in a given context, far-right parties succeed in mobilizing anti-
immigration sentiments in public opinion, it is more likely for these countries to adopt 
restrictive measures on citizenship acquisition (Howard 2006, 2010).  
 5 
 Acknowledging the findings of these works on the links between citizenship 
understandings and political party preferences, this research investigates the 
correspondence of political party preferences to the differences in perceptions on 
citizenship rights and liberties in Turkey. The aim of the research is to assess whether 
there is such a correspondence and to explore and analyze the differences in perceptions 
on the basis of political party preferences. This research generates hypotheses about the 
relationship between perceptions on citizenship rights and liberties and political party 
preferences, as well as discovering the specific electorate with more potential to voice 
criticism and demand democratization.  
1.2 Expectations Regarding the Main Research Question 
 There are several expectations emerging from the literatures on Turkish 
citizenship and political parties. On the one hand, the exclusionary logic of Turkish 
citizenship has left various identities and practices out of the confines of the official 
understanding of Turkish citizenship. The challenges posed towards this understanding 
have emerged among those who are excluded as they demand recognition and inclusion. 
In other words, the alternative conceptions of citizenship that problematize the duty-
oriented, passive and exclusionary construct of Turkish citizenship are generated and 
voiced by those who demand recognition and inclusion. Hence, their understanding of 
citizenship puts more emphasis on rights and liberties.  
On other hand, such alternative conceptions are influential only when they are 
politically mobilized. Analysis of Turkish political party landscape demonstrates that the 
challenges to this official construct have been mobilized by political actors that are 
outsiders to the political arena dictated by the strong state tradition (Heper 1985). In other 
words, the strong state tradition that was inherited from the Ottoman Empire, determined 
the limits of legitimate political activities, demands, values, and interests which have been 
disputed by political actors that claim to represent the national will against the 
bureaucratic establishment since the introduction of multi-party politics. This 
differentiation has been conceptualized by Şerif Mardin as a dichotomy between center 
and periphery. While center is composed of “those who are able to shape society’s central 
values,” the periphery is a collection of those who are at the receiving end of this value 
transmission (Mardin 1973:170). Mardin’s conceptualization of Turkish political 
landscape as a dichotomy between actors representing center and periphery has been very 
influential within the literature on voting behavior. Within this literature political actors 
and the target electorate of the center emphasize secularism, while the periphery is 
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composed of religious conservative masses who are mobilized by conservative political 
actors (Özbudun 2010, 2013; Kalaycıoğlu 1994, 2002).  
As this study’s focus is on citizenship perceptions, it offers a new interpretation 
of Mardin’s original conceptualization of center-periphery dichotomy through the 
perspective of citizenship understandings. This interpretation goes beyond the differences 
in secularism and religiosity while not rejecting the empirical validity of these differences 
in terms of voting behavior. Instead, this interpretation considers center as a locus of 
power irrespective of its religious and/or secular discourses that provides actors 
controlling it to produce, project and disseminate their own understanding of citizenship, 
which include some members of the society while excluding others. Periphery, on the 
other hand, is a collection of groups, demands, and interests which are excluded or 
delegitimized by the understanding of citizenship imposed by the center. Exclusion of 
these groups implies disregard for their rights and liberties which potentially prompts 
demands for inclusion and recognition. Hence, there is more potential in the periphery to 
challenge the definition of citizenship, or the boundaries of the demos promoted by the 
center.  
When this interpretation is applied to Turkish political landscape, it is observed 
that alternative conceptions of citizenship and demands for rights and liberties arise 
within the periphery and mobilized by political actors claiming to represent the periphery. 
The scope and content of these alternative conceptions vary in terms of the segments of 
the periphery that such political parties choose to mobilize.  This, in turn, underlines the 
differences of political parties in terms of citizenship understandings. Within the current 
composition of the political party landscape in Turkey, the Justice and Development Party 
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) is positioned as a central political actor despite the 
fact that it started as a peripheral political actor mobilizing demands for inclusion and 
recognition. Yet, the current electoral hegemony of AKP indicates control over the center, 
as a locus of power that provides the party to produce, project and disseminate own vision 
of the demos albeit continuing to mobilize its electorate through a discourse that 
instrumentalizes the earlier peripheral status. This control indicates a new configuration 
of center and periphery understood in terms of citizenship understandings. Given this 
configuration, it is expected from AKP and its target electorate to be supportive and 
protective of the status quo as their preferred party determines the legitimacy of political 
activities and demands for rights and liberties. Other political actors and their audience 
carry the potential for generating alternative understandings of demos in response to the 
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projection of AKP as a political actor of the center, especially if their demands and 
interests are marginalized or delegitimized.  
To reiterate, this study investigates the differences in perceptions on the basis of 
political party preferences as it is assumed that party preferences are related with 
citizenship understandings. Utilizing and reinterpreting the center-periphery dichotomy, 
the differences between political parties are analyzed through a perspective of 
understandings of citizenship. This reinterpretation maintains that political actors of the 
center and their electorates are expected to protect the status quo, while those of the 
periphery, who are discursively excluded from the understanding of demos or whose 
rights and liberties are disregarded, carry the potential for developing and mobilizing a 
more rights-oriented conceptualization of citizenship. The survey data will be analyzed 
in the light of these expectations.  
1.3 Research Plan 
This study is organized in six chapters. The first chapter delves into the citizenship 
literature to establish the main approaches and the trends within the literature. The 
primary focus of this first chapter is to demonstrate the multidimensional and dynamic 
nature of citizenship through discussing fundamental works in the literature that analyze 
philosophical, conceptual, or institutional aspects of the concept. In this chapter, newer 
works that focus on perceptions and attitudes are also discussed alongside the 
conventional literature on citizenship.  
The second chapter moves into a detailed analysis of the Turkish citizenship 
literature and reviews the arguments concerning the official construct of Turkish 
citizenship. More specifically, the foundations of Turkish citizenship are discussed by 
reviewing the studies focusing on different dimensions of Turkish citizenship such as its 
legal foundations or historical trajectory. As this research contributes to the Turkish 
citizenship literature by focusing on perceptions on the basis of political party 
preferences, the literature review on Turkish citizenship also points out the gap in research 
on perceptions.  
The third chapter moves into the overview of political party literature with a 
specific focus on differentiation of political parties based on social cleavages and strategic 
position taking. The analyses on political party landscape in Turkey through a perspective 
on citizenship understandings demonstrate the combination of the lingering influence of 
cleavages and the strategic mobilization of them by various political actors. This third 
chapter aims at establishing the theoretical framework that is necessary for linking 
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citizenship literature with the literature on political parties. As the main research question 
investigates perceptions on the basis of political party preferences, it is essential to lay 
out the ways in which political parties differ from each other and mobilize their target 
audiences accordingly. 
After establishing the theoretical background for the political parties in Turkey, the 
fourth chapter focuses specifically on the most recent electoral manifestos of the four 
political parties in the parliament. These electoral manifestos are analyzed with a focus 
on the discourses on citizenship definitions and civil liberties, political rights, and social 
rights. This chapter presents the differentiation between political parties on these grounds, 
which serves as a gateway before the analyses on survey data.  
After discussing the survey design and application processes, as well as the choice 
of instruments for data analyses in chapter five, chapter six presents the survey data. This 
chapter starts by revisiting the arguments that emerge from the literature review on 
citizenship and political party literature and presents the expectations influenced by these 
arguments. The findings of the manifesto analyses are compared and contrasted to the 
perceptions of the respondents to assess the distance between voters of these parties in 
the sample and the arguments in the manifestos. This chapter continues with presentation 
of factor analyses of the survey items and regression analyses investigating the effects of 
demographic variables and party preferences on perceptions. The second part of this 
chapter is dedicated to the detailed analyses of the responses to the questionnaire used in 
the survey. Chapter six concludes with the comparison of survey responses on the basis 
of convergences and dispersions within the sample.  
Finally, in a concluding chapter, the significance and contributions of this research 
and thesis are outlined. 
 
 
 
  
 9 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER 1 
OVERVIEW OF THE CITIZENSHIP LITERATURE 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 
This chapter is an introduction to the normative and historical literature on 
citizenship where major works within the field are introduced and discussed. The main 
purpose of this chapter is to provide a survey of the various dimensions of citizenship as 
debated by scholars from different fields. As the normative and historical arguments 
demonstrate, citizenship is not a unitary concept. Rather it is historically contingent and 
open to changes due to historical, political and social developments. In addition, the 
multiplicity of dimensions that the concept has suggests that it can be approached in 
different ways. Hence, in addition to the philosophical approaches that discuss citizenship 
through a larger perspective incorporating questions on the nature of membership to a 
political authority, citizenship has been discussed through different lenses.  
Citizenship is also an identity, which is historically linked with nationality. 
Historical and sociological approaches that investigate and problematize this connection 
demonstrate the changing nature of citizenship as an identity. In other words, they 
underline the historically contingent character of the notion. 
While citizenship can be described as the formal membership to a polity, the 
multidimensional character of the concept suggests that it is more than just denoting a 
legal status. Citizenship is also about rights and liberties, legitimacy of which is not 
limited to legal membership, but extends beyond the confines of the nation state. 
Historical and sociological accounts focus on the emergence of these rights and liberties, 
their political character as well as the challenges posed against them by immigration and 
globalization.  
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Lastly, there emerges new perspectives within the literature focusing not on 
normative, conceptual or historical aspects but on the empirical perceptions. Analyses of 
citizenship perceptions is a promising area within the general literature for its potential to 
assess observations on citizens’ own understanding of citizenship and its link with the 
social and political contexts. When conceived as a political ideal, citizenship can be 
argued to be the bond that unites different individuals together. In that sense, differences 
in perceptions of this bond and the set of rights, liberties, and duties shared by all display 
the discrepancy between the ideal and the reality, providing clues about the state of 
democracy. Hence, perceptions on citizenship and corresponding rights, liberties, and 
duties carry the potential to analyze the quality of the bond within the society. Utilizing 
different arguments from the literature as their assumptions, the studies on perceptions 
investigate the ways in which perceptions of citizenship differ among citizens as well as 
their implications for democracy. Since this research also investigates the perceptions on 
citizenship rights and liberties, it aims at contributing to the literature in a similar manner.  
 
 
1.2 Philosophical Approaches 
 
 
Citizenship is a political concept about the nature of the relationship between 
members of a polity and the political authority. The philosophical approaches that 
problematize this relationship differ in terms of their understandings of membership. The 
two major approaches that will be discussed in the next subsections have contrasting takes 
on the importance of individualism and the community.  
 
 
1.2.1 Liberal approach 
 
 
 One of the main approach to investigate citizenship considers the concept as a 
status which warrants a set of rights and liberties to the individual. In other words, the 
citizenship status that the individual acquires through the legal bond between the citizens 
and the state provides one with certain rights in addition to responsibilities. Liberal 
approach prioritizes these rights, instead of the responsibilities. In addition, liberal 
approach puts the individual forward instead of the polity or the community. The main 
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reason is that liberalism as a political standpoint situates individual freedom at the center 
of its theoretical framework. An individual, according to this perspective, carries the 
rational faculties to pursue own interests, make decisions and plan own life accordingly, 
and is considered to be “free and equal” (Rawls 1971). Hence, no external actor has the 
legitimacy to force individuals to act in a certain way, as individuals enjoy a sphere of 
action.  
 The philosophical background for this perspective on citizenship goes back to the 
social contract theories. Social contract theory maintains that individuals enter into a 
hypothetical contract with each other to establish a political structure. One of the primary 
thinkers of social contract theory, Thomas Hobbes, argues that in the state of nature 
individuals were living in constant fear because of the brutal competition for survival. 
Because of the unfavorable conditions of the state of nature, individuals gave their 
consent to a separate sovereign, the Leviathan, to have jurisdiction over their affairs. In a 
way, these individuals turned into citizens through the establishment of a sovereign entity. 
This entity designates limits on the rights and liberties of individuals. Thus, for Hobbes, 
citizenship as a legal status has emerged out of the efforts to protect common liberty of 
all by the absolute power of the Leviathan.  
 Hobbes’ account is not the only theoretical foundation of liberal contractualism, 
which is related with an understanding of citizenship as legal status. Another scholar, 
John Locke depicted a different portrait of the foundations of modern state and citizen 
relationship. For Locke, individuals did not establish the state to avoid the brutal 
conditions of the state of nature. Instead, state emerged as an arbiter of the potential 
conflicts over private property between the individuals. Thus, a legal authority was 
necessary for the protection of the basic liberties of the individuals, namely Life, Liberty 
and Private Property. 
 Lockean social contract understanding situates individual liberties at the forefront 
of the legal bond between the citizen and the state. Becoming a citizen automatically 
means being granted protection against any kind of intervention in individual liberties. 
Walzer (1989:215-216) argues that this approach considers political community not as “a 
common life” but rather as “a necessary framework” in which certain rights and liberties 
are protected. Within this perspective, then, a citizen is an individual who has inviolable 
rights and liberties emanating from this status and the role of the state is to guarantee the 
necessary conditions for citizens to enjoy these rights and liberties. Liberal approach, by 
prioritizing the individual over the community, does not put too much emphasis on 
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participation as a virtue. Instead, participation, just as other rights and liberties, is a choice 
for individuals, not an obligation or a duty (İsin and Wood 1999). 
 
 
1.2.2 Civic republican approach 
 
 
 Civic republican approach is one of the philosophical approaches to citizenship 
and it is similar to communitarianism in the sense that it incorporates a critique of the 
liberal understanding of the individual. For communitarians, individuals are embedded in 
the society or community and their identities are formed within and affected by this 
specific context. Prioritizing the general will or common good over individuals’ self-
interests, communitarians underline the interdependence of individuals with each other 
and the community in general. While sharing such arguments of the communitarians, 
civic republican approach does not necessarily consider self-interest of the individual and 
the interests of the community as being antagonistic to each other.  Rather, citizenship is 
defined in terms of individual virtues, which are generated as citizens fulfill their 
individual obligations to participate in the social and political life of the community. 
 The philosophical foundations of the civic republican approach can be traced back 
to Aristotle, Rousseau and Tocqueville who considered participation in the communal 
life as a virtue in the first place. For Rousseau, taking an active part in the Republic was 
the ultimate virtue that a citizen should possess. The reason is that there is a strong link 
between individuals and the community. Thus, the civic virtue that citizens should 
possess is actually an ethos, a way of life. By participating in the public life, with the 
community and for the community, citizens achieve and realize such virtue. Accordingly, 
citizens should have a “commitment to the common good” and they should actively 
participate in public affairs (Dagger 2002:149). This language of commitment entails that 
the legal bond that ties individuals to the state or political community brings about certain 
duties on behalf of the citizens. In other words, according to the communitarian approach, 
a citizen, who has civic virtue, is aware of the responsibilities as much as the rights that 
the legal status of citizenship creates. In addition to being aware of the responsibilities or 
duties, a citizen should also practice them in order to be a good citizen. This practice of 
citizenship is about “a shared responsibility for the identity and continuity of a particular 
political community” (Oldfield 1994:192).   
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 The main difference of civic-republican approach from the liberal approach, is the 
emphasis on the relationship between the citizen and the community. Liberal approach 
has a clear emphasis on rights or “status” as Oldfield argues; but in civic-republican 
tradition citizenship is conceived not as status, but as “practice” (Oldfield 1992: 188). 
This practice is about carrying out the duties of participation that citizens owe to the 
political community. That’s why civic-republican approach is more duty-oriented than 
the liberal approach, which is more rights-oriented. In addition, this approach carries the 
potential for leading into a singular and homogeneous interpretation of the common good 
or general will that it prioritizes.  
 
 
1.3 Citizenship Conceptualized as a Legal Status 
 
 
  One way of approaching citizenship is in its most basic sense: a legal status. In 
Greek city states, a citizen was a person who is a member of a city state. This membership 
had granted that person the right to participate in the process of governing. Citizenship as 
a legal concept, then, is about the embodiment of membership in a political community.  
Michael Walzer (1989) accounts for the origins of citizenship as membership. The 
notion of being a part of the political community and being able to participate in the 
administration was how Greek city states exercised citizenship. Walzer (1989:214) refers 
to Aristotle’s conceptualization of citizenship: “eligibility for office”. For Aristotle, being 
a member of the city state, i.e. being a citizen, entails ruling and being ruled in return. 
Thus, citizenship for Greek city states was about having an executive position in 
governing the city state. In other words, in city states, membership involved having a 
political office. 
 Roman Empire provided the historical ground for citizenship as a legal status, 
rather than a political office as Greek city states. For Roman Empire, the scale of the 
political community was much larger. Different than city states, Roman Empire ruled 
over a vast land and expanded through conquering. Romans granted the inhabitants of 
conquered areas Roman citizenship by law. Thus, in Roman context, citizenship was 
experienced as a legal status, but not as taking a part in governing. Being a Roman citizen 
meant being protected by the Roman law, a rather “passive” status (Walzer 1989:215). 
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Walzer thinks that citizenship in Roman context was more of a legal status than an 
everyday activity.  
 In the modern era, citizenship when conceived as a legal status signifies the formal 
membership that an individual has within a political unit (Joppke 2010). It formally 
defines those who are in the demos and distinguishes them from those who are excluded 
from the demos. Signifying those who are parts of the demos, this legal status designates 
a set of rights, liberties and duties to the individual, which are formally recognized as 
members by the political authority. Conceptualizing citizenship as a legal status has 
obscured various other dimensions of the concept. These dimensions have surfaced 
through the challenges posed by globalization, increasing immigration, demands of 
minority groups, who are not formally recognized as members by the political authorities. 
These challenges have demonstrated that citizenship is not just a legal status. As a result, 
both normative studies and empirical research have started to focus on other dimensions 
of citizenship such as identity and rights.  
 
 
1.4 Citizenship Conceptualized as an Identity: Links Between 
Citizenship and Nationalism 
 
 
1.4.1 Jus soli and jus sanguinis principles 
 
 
 In the modern era, the form of the political community to which citizens are 
legally linked is the nation state. The origins of the nation state and citizenship as 
membership to a nation state go back to the French Revolution. Thus, political 
membership is associated, or almost identical, with national membership. Because of that 
shift, the legal framework concerning membership has changed as well. There have been 
two main principles on how an individual can become a member: jus soli and jus 
sanguinis.  
 The first one, jus soli principle is related with the birthplace of the individual. If 
she is born within the borders of a given nation state, then she can acquire the legal status 
of being a citizen of that state. The other principle, jus sanguinis, links citizenship status 
with the descent of the parents. According to this principle, a person that is born to 
immigrant parents in a host country cannot become a citizen of that country upon birth. 
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Recently another principle, namely jus domicile, has started to emerge as an approach in 
acquisition of citizenship status. The jus domicile principle rests upon place of residence. 
According to Bauder (2012: 188) jus domicile principle works as granting citizenship 
status “based on the community to which they [individuals] belong”. Countries such as 
Australia, Canada or the US have incorporated certain practices that are more or less in 
line with this principle: immigrants in those countries can apply for citizenship when they 
meet certain criteria, including the length of permanent residency (Bauder 2012: 189). 
Although there are various instances where citizenship acquisition has become more 
liberal, i.e. incorporating jus soli or jus domicile principles, citizenship as a legal status is 
still linked with national identity. This subsection delves into the relationship between 
these two notions while addressing challenges and resulting changes in it.  
 
 
1.4.2 Jus soli, jus sanguinis and citizenship policy index 
 
 
 Brubaker (1990:380) argues that the distinctiveness of nationhood traditions in 
France and Germany, has affected their respective citizenship law and policies. As 
Brubaker (1990, 1994) traces the roots of the variation of citizenship policies in France 
and Germany, as being archetypical examples of two different nationhood traditions, he 
demonstrates the way citizenship is linked with national membership. On the one hand, 
citizenship is a legal status designating certain privileges and obligations; on the other 
hand, as French and German examples demonstrate, acquisition of that status is related 
with the limits of demos. 
 Brubaker’s (1990:386) analysis shows that politics of citizenship is not immune 
from the politics of nation building. Since citizenship is “internally inclusive” and 
“externally exclusive”, the determinants of membership also define the boundaries of the 
nation as well (Brubaker 1992:21). In that manner, legal framework concerning 
citizenship status shows variance in terms of the different traditions of nationalism.  
 Although it was not the original intention of the revolutionaries, the French 
Revolution has invented the notion of national citizenry and the foreigner, which have 
turned to be mutually exclusive (Brubaker 1992:46). Since the birth of nation state and 
the birth of the modern notion of citizenship has coincided during the French Revolution, 
“French citizenship has been national, even nationalist, from its inception” (Brubaker 
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1992: 51). Yet, French citizenship has emphasized the principle of conditional jus soli, 
which was linked with being assimilated to the Republican values, more than jus 
sanguinis, while incorporating the latter to a certain extent (Brubaker 1992: 110, 185). 
The primary reason for that preference was the fact that “political, institutional and 
territorial motifs” were stronger than “ethnocultural motifs” in French “understanding of 
nationhood” (Brubaker 1992:91,110).  
 The link that Brubaker discusses in his works is evident in the case of immigrants, 
since they are subject to the differing citizenship acquisition policies. For instance, 
Brubaker (1990:386) states that it is easier to acquire citizenship in France than in 
Germany. The primary reason for this difference is that French nationalism was “political 
and statist” compared to the German nationalism, and thus it was assimilationist towards 
foreigners in terms of Republican ideals (Brubaker 1990:396-397, 1992:51,108). France 
has been more willing to grant the privileges and obligations of citizenship status to 
immigrants than Germany is.  
 German citizenship was more ethno-culturalist until the amendments made in 
German Citizenship Law in 2000. The former idea of ethno-culturalism was crystallized 
in 1913, when a significant immigration wave from Poland had emerged, through a 
definition of citizenship based upon descent (Brubaker 1992:114). In 1913, a law 
regulating citizenship has authorized individuals of German descent to remain German 
citizens, regardless of their place of residence (Brubaker 1992:115). One of the aims of 
such a legal instrument is to facilitate German emigrants’ naturalization into German 
citizenship, while excluding non-Germans from the same process of naturalization 
(Brubaker 1992:116,119). In other words, pure jus sanguinis was the preferred principle 
for the emerging German nation state because the idea of descent was a stronger tie 
between the state and the citizen (Brubaker 1992:123). Since the aim of the law makers 
was to “nationalize the state’s population”, inclusion and exclusion were both based upon 
ethnicity (Brubaker 1992: 137). Yet this outlook has been amended with the new German 
Nationality Law of 2000 (Hailbronner 2012). With this amendment, legal framework 
concerning citizenship acquisition was established upon the jus soli principle as the new 
law leaves room for granting citizenship to the children of foreign born parents on the 
condition that one of them has been legally residing in the country for at least 8 years. 
German case demonstrates both the links between national identity and citizenship status, 
while exemplifying the changes happening in the legal sphere due to challenges such as 
international migration.  
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 Marc Morjé Howard (2006) traces the changes in the wider European context. 
Howard underlines the effects of globalization on nation states, borders of which have 
become less relevant in terms of rights and liberties of individuals. At the same time, 
those borders have been secured by the nation states, especially after the bombing of 
World Trade Center in the US on September, 11 2001, as security has emerged as a 
priority. These contradicting trends have an influence over citizenship policies of 
European countries according to Howard’s analysis. Howard (2006:446) looks at the 
historical variation of citizenship policies in 15 EU states.  
 Howard starts with a typology of different citizenship policies in a historical 
perspective. In order to classify 15 European countries and their citizenship policies, he 
codes these policies according to the following criteria: (1) “Whether or not it grants jus 
soli”, (2) “the minimum length of its residency requirement for naturalization, (3) 
“whether or not naturalized immigrants are allowed to hold dual citizenship” (Howard 
2006: 446). Through coding these countries, Howard develops a “Citizenship Policy 
Index” across the 15 EU countries. According to this Index, there are three categories: 
restrictive, medium, and liberal (Howard 2006:447). During 1980s, those 15 countries 
were divided across these categories as the following: Austria, Spain, Germany, 
Luxembourg, Denmark, and Finland had restrictive policies; Greece, Italy, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, and Portugal were categorized as medium; and Belgium, France, Ireland, 
and the UK had liberal citizenship policies (Howard 2006:447). According to Howard’s 
analysis, existence of colonial legacy and being a democracy since 19th century are two 
determinants of this categorization (Howard 2006:447). Thus, Belgium, France, and the 
UK are in the liberal category because of these two determining factors. 
 Howard then moves on to the analysis of recent changes in the citizenship policies 
of those countries. Given the fact that these countries are all EU members, it is expected 
that their legal frameworks have been harmonized to a certain extent. Ten countries out 
of those fifteen countries have not changed; the rest, i.e. Germany, Luxembourg, Finland, 
Sweden, and the Netherlands, have liberalized their citizenship policies, as their score in 
the Index increased (Howard 2006:448). These five countries have liberalized their 
citizenship acquisition legislation by either legalizing dual citizenship (as Finland, the 
Netherlands and Sweden did) or by “reducing residency requirements” (as in Germany 
and Luxembourg) (Howard 2006:448). Yet, there are still restrictive citizenship policies 
across Europe, as demonstrated by the unchanged Index scores of Austria, Spain, 
Denmark, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Belgium, France, Ireland, and the UK. According to 
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Howard (2006:449), although there are various factors that contribute to the liberalization 
such as economic globalization or the influence of interest group politics on domestic 
level, they are not explaining the relatively less liberal citizenship policies among those 
countries. Howard (2006:450) argues that “mobilization of anti-immigrant sentiments” in 
public opinion in the form of “a successful far right party, a popular movement, or a 
referendum of some kind on the issue of immigration” corresponds with the resistance of 
these countries to liberalize their citizenship policies.  
 In a follow up article, Howard (2010: 736) elaborates on his political explanation 
of lack of liberalization in citizenship policies in Austria, Denmark, Greece, Italy, and 
Spain. With improvements on the Citizenship Policy Index, Howard (2010:736) now 
excludes Belgium, France, Ireland, the UK from the group above because of their 
historically liberal citizenship laws. This time Howard (2010:747) strengthens his 
arguments on the correlation between far-right parties and popular anti-immigrant 
mobilization through statistical evidence. Howard’s model has two parts: firstly, the 
question is whether there is a leftist government in place. If there is a leftist government, 
then citizenship liberalization is expected; if not, liberalization is considered to be 
unlikely. In the second part, the question is whether anti-immigrant sentiments are being 
mobilized by political parties and by public mobilization or not. When such sentiments 
are mobilized, it is unlikely for citizenship policies to be liberalized and vice versa.  
 As an evidence for the first part of his model, Howard states that in Finland, 
Germany, Portugal and Sweden had left-of-center governments at the time of the 
liberalization of citizenship laws. In addition, far-right had not been politically active in 
those countries during citizenship law reforms. Mobilization of far-right emerges 
determining as Luxembourg had also liberalized its citizenship laws while a center-right 
government was in power. The distinguishing factor here was the lack of politically 
mobilized anti-immigrant sentiments.  
 In Austria, Denmark and Italy the far-right parties were more powerful and able 
to mobilize public opinion against immigration and liberalization. As a result, citizenship 
laws in those countries were not liberalized as in other European countries.  
  Hence, changes in the way that nation states incorporate jus soli or jus sanguinis 
principles are related with the political mobilization of exclusionist attitudes. These 
changes demonstrate that governments respond to the political and social developments 
when they are politically mobilized by parties or social movements. On a more general 
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level, citizenship policies are susceptible to the public opinion and political party 
competition. 
 Proposing a more sociological argument, Joppke (2007:41) depicts the effects of 
these changes as such: the rise of identity politics and increasing global immigration has 
caused shifts in the understanding of citizenship. Especially international immigration has 
had an important effect on citizenship policies. According to Joppke (2010: 35) between 
1970 and 2005, “the number of international migrants has grown from 82 million to 200 
million.” 
 For the countries that have had jus soli principle in practice, such as the US or 
Canada, effects of increasing numbers of immigration has not created a significant change 
in citizenship policies, as the underlying principle makes citizenship acquisition easier 
(Joppke 2010:38-39). In continental Europe, on the other hand, citizenship acquisition 
policies were designed to keep migrants out of the demos. Joppke (2010:41) notes the 
difference by stating that between 1990 and 2003, the rate of naturalization in Canada 
was 9,4 times higher than in Germany.1  
 Joppke also underlines the relative liberalization of citizenship laws in European 
citizenship regimes. Citing Howard’s (2006, 2010) study on Citizenship Policy Index, 
Joppke (2010:42) also acknowledges the liberalization trend in Europe concerning the 
citizenship status and he traces the origins of these trends alongside some countertrends, 
such as imposition of new restrictions on citizenship acquisition after September 11 
attacks and re-ethnicization evident in the introduction of citizenship tests across Europe. 
 According to Joppke (2010:44-45) recent trends of liberalization in citizenship 
regimes across Europe are reflecting the tendency of European states to have “mixed” 
regimes. Thus, instead of relying solely on jus sanguini, states such as Germany have 
adopted certain regulations within their citizenship regime that are in line with jus soli 
principles. Interestingly, states, which were more jus soli have adopted some elements of 
jus sanguini principle, and have turned their citizenship regime in a more mixed form 
where elements of blood (jus sanguinis) and soil (jus soli) are incorporated 
simultaneously. More specifically, while liberalization trends had caused citizenship 
regimes to be more open towards newcomers, the backlash against this liberalization has 
also triggered trends of re-ethnicization. As a result, citizenship regimes of different 
countries have become mixtures of jus soli and jus sanguinis principles (Joppke 2007:41). 
                                                 
1 Joppke states that the naturalization rate in Canada was 11,800/100,000 while it was 1,250/100,000 in Germany. 
 20 
The reason for adopting mixed regimes is related with the ever-increasing immigration, 
since it has been causing nation states to keep the balance between the nation and the state 
intact, without being “over-inclusive” or “under-inclusive.” (Joppke 2010:45)   
 In addition, most of the European states have standardized their citizenship 
acquisition procedures by dropping cultural integration requirement and thus foregoing 
homogenization ideal (Joppke 2010:47). To this, increasing tolerance towards dual 
citizenship can also be added as another instance of liberalization. Joppke (2010:48) 
argues that increasing acceptance of dual citizenship exemplifies the trend towards less 
ethnic-oriented more territorial citizenship, since states need to find a way to “integrate 
their growing immigrant populations”.   
 While discussing the origins of the liberalization trend in the citizenship laws, 
Joppke also indicates two countertrends: new restrictions on acquisition and re-
ethnicization of citizenship. The first countertrend to the liberalization of citizenship laws, 
which is new restrictions towards citizenship acquisition emerged after the September 11 
attacks. The attacks happened on September 11, 2001, when the World Trade Center was 
destroyed and almost three thousand people were killed by Al-Qaeda militants. These 
attacks had led to the stigmatization of all Muslim immigrants irrespective of their major 
differences. As a result, there emerged a newer trend in Europe that has made citizenship 
acquisition more difficult than before. Joppke (2010: 53-54) gives the example of civic 
integration and language test requirements for citizenship acquisition, first started by the 
Netherlands in Europe. For instance, in Germany, the tests were accompanied with 
interviews, guidelines of which were designed to assess the degree of liberal attitudes of 
specifically Muslim applicants. In a way, these tests have made citizenship acquisition a 
“first prize.” (Joppke 2010:56) Here, the notion of “first prize”, which was a quote of 
former immigration minister of the Netherlands, suggested that acquisition of Dutch 
nationality is the privilege for those who deserve it through succeeding in those strict 
civic integration tests. These new restrictions run counter to the liberalization trend 
because these states engage in a practice of molding newcomers, as these tests expect 
applicants to know much better and be more virtuous than the existing citizens. This 
practice is not consistent with liberal tradition, which has prioritized individual freedoms 
(Joppke 2010:62).  
 The second countertrend to the liberalization of citizenship laws is re-
ethnicization of the citizenship acquisition processes. An example of this countertrend is 
the tolerance towards, and sometimes encouragement for dual citizenship. Although 
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adoption of dual citizenship is also an example of the liberalization trend, the fact that 
many countries promote dual citizenship for the emigrants that they have sent abroad, 
rather than the incoming immigrants, makes it a countertrend (Joppke 2010: 64-65). In 
other words, dual citizenship is also used as a political tool to create incentive for 
emigrants to return, which creates the possibility for a less territorial but more ethnicized 
citizenship regime (Joppke 2010:66). These trends that emerged as a result of increasing 
immigration have also caused other scholars to argue for new theoretical frameworks 
regarding the link between citizenship status and national identity. The next subsections 
introduce and engage with these contributions to the citizenship literature. 
 
 
1.4.3 Denationalization of citizenship  
 
 
 Citizenship as a legal status has been primarily defined within the confines of the 
nation state. As the nation state is an entity with a predefined nation and borders, the 
framework of citizenship as a status signifies a closed community. In other words, 
citizenship, as defined within the context of nation state, incorporates those who are 
within the nation or the political community. Hence the corresponding rights, liberties, 
obligations, duties and privileges belong to those who are already within that group or 
demos.  
 Citizens, defined as members of the state, are those who are entitled to receive 
guarantees for these rights, liberties and relevant services, while being expected to carry 
out duties and obligations stated by the specific citizenship legislation. With the current 
challenges brought about by immigration, citizenship defined within the confines of a 
single nationality has become problematic as well. According to Isin and Turner (2002:2) 
the understanding of citizenship as a legal status tied to nation state has been “contested 
and broadened” through a series of “political and social struggles…based on identity and 
difference”. When these struggles are taken into account, alongside with globalization 
and immigration, linking citizenship to a legal status turns out to be losing some of its 
explanatory power. 
 Citizenship, then, should also be considered apart from a national context as well, 
even though nation state sovereignty is still dominant. One instance of the process in 
which national citizenship has changed is the increasing numbers of dual citizens in the 
 22 
world. Acceptance of dual citizenship signifies that the link between nationality and 
citizenship as a status has been starting to decline to a certain extent.  
 The divorce of citizenship from national identity has been debated in the literature 
within the context of denationalization. According to Sassen (2002:286), 
denationalization suggests that globalization has influenced change in the “territorial and 
institutional organization of the state” and this change has also affected the “institution 
of citizenship” even though it still is linked with nation state to a certain extent. 
Particularly, Sassen (1996:31) underlines the effects of economic globalization on the 
sovereignty of the nation state, as it leads to “denationalizing of national territory.” 
Although linked with the nation state, the institution of citizenship has been faced with 
challenges brought about by globalization, which, in turn, has affected its evolution. 
According to Sassen (1996:34-35), rise of global capitalism does not lead to universal 
citizenship to spread across the world and with the increasing immigration, the boundaries 
of citizenship as an institution has been challenged.  
 Firstly, Sassen focuses on the impact of economic globalization to assess the 
denationalization processes. Considering economic globalization, Sassen argues that the 
Marshallian narrative of citizenship evolving as a sequence of rights, civil, political, and 
social, should be revisited with a critical understanding. Sassen’s (1996:36-38) argument 
depicts an erosion of the social rights aspect of citizenship resulted from the economic 
globalization and in turn, emergence of “economic citizenship” not for individuals but 
for global financial markets, firms and markets. More specifically, economic 
globalization has caused an erosion of the sovereignty of states by reducing their scope 
of authority over economic and financial matters. In addition, states have started to step 
back from providing social policies and gradually devolve their responsibilities to the 
markets. As states are becoming more intertwined with global financial markets, they also 
need to accommodate their well-being more than their own citizens. In other words, 
economic well-being of the financial markets, firms, and other globalized entities have 
become more important for the states than the economic safety of the citizens (Sassen 
1996:50-51). As a result, while globalization has caused social benefits to decay, citizens 
are gradually losing grounds to demand accountability (Sassen 1996:52).  
 In addition to the process of economic globalization that is contributing to 
denationalization, Sassen also indicates another process, which is immigration. Sassen 
(1996:59-60) argues that immigration signifies a renationalizing trend that is parallel to 
the denationalization of the economic decisions. In other words, immigration is both an 
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“object” and a “tool” for renationalization processes (Sassen 1996: 62). Yet, at the same 
time, international human rights regime that regulates the rights of the immigrants, 
asylum seekers and refugees, also acts as a source of constrain over the sovereignty of 
the state on this matter (Sassen 1996: 69,89). Related to this international regime, there 
arises various social, civil and even political rights entitled to the immigrants, which 
“have diluted the meaning of citizenship and the specialness of the claims citizens can 
make on the state” because it is residence status that matters for acquiring those rights 
(Sassen 1996:95).  
 This process of denationalization in the context of immigrants and citizens have 
also been debated in a different manner by other scholars, arguments of whom will be 
analyzed in the next section. 
 
 
1.4.4 Post-national membership  
 
 
 The effects of immigration have also led newer perspectives regarding citizenship 
as membership. An important example of such a new perspective is Yasemin Soysal’s 
“postnational membership” model (Soysal 1998:189). Soysal begins her inquiry with an 
observation on the evolution of citizenship. On the one hand, citizenship rights have 
expanded gradually to include different segments of population such as workers or 
women, which Soysal calls as “universalizing movement” (Soysal 1998:190). On the 
other hand, those rights have remained to be linked with membership to a nation state, 
which limits this universalizing movement. For Soysal, immigration, and specifically the 
status of guest workers in Europe, has led national bound to be less relevant in practice 
because those who were considered to be “aliens” with respect to their national identity, 
have now acquired certain rights in host countries (Soysal 1998:190). As a result, the 
institution of citizenship has been undergoing a reconfiguration (Soysal 1998: 191).  
 Soysal’s approach to postnational citizenship differs from an understanding of 
national citizenship on numerous grounds. Soysal (1998:192-194) demonstrates that 
national citizenship is marked with a certain time period between 19th to mid 20th 
centuries; it is also limited with a specific territory, i.e. the boundaries of the nation state; 
and the rights attached to that status is legitimized by the nation state. For postnational 
membership model, territorial boundaries are “fluid”, as in the case of guestworkers, who 
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have either dual citizenship or membership privileges in host countries without becoming 
citizens (Soysal 1998:193). In addition, postnational model, as being a postwar 
phenomenon, grounds the legitimacy of rights upon the idea of “universal personhood”, 
in which “the individual transcends the citizen” in terms of increasing acceptance of 
international human rights norms and increasing interconnectedness of the international 
state system (Soysal 1998:194-196). Although the nation state is still responsible for 
providing rights, there are various international conventions, such as the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights2 that grant universal rights regardless of national 
membership (Soysal 1998:196). There are other conventions that grant specific rights to 
guest or migrant workers, such as ILO Convention of 1949, which secures non-
discrimination regarding work place; or UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights 
of All Migrant Workers and Their Families, which “guarantees minimum rights to every 
migrant” (Soysal 1998:197-198).  
 Apart from these international conventions, Soysal’s most striking example of this 
reconfiguration of citizenship is European citizenship. Soysal (1998:199) argues that 
Maastricht Treaty that was signed in 1991, has created the legal framework for 
postnational membership; legitimization of this status lies upon the European 
Communities but actual provision of attached rights and privileges is member states’ 
responsibility. 
 Soysal (1998:206) does not argue that nation state has lost its relevance; on the 
contrary, she observes that there is a “paradox”: postwar international system has been 
strengthening both postnational membership model and the sovereignty of the nation 
state. In other words, while various rights, such as social and cultural rights of minorities, 
have been codified on the international level, the sole provider of these rights is still the 
nation state (Soysal 1998:207). Still, Soysal (1998:211) observes a trend towards 
postnational membership and expects national citizenship to be less and less relevant. 
There are others who argue that the identification of a singular national identity with 
citizenship status is problematic for the case of cultural minorities, ethnic groups and their 
demands for recognition. Posing as a challenge towards the longstanding affinity between 
citizenship status and nationality, these demands call for a new citizenship framework for 
some scholars. The next subsection introduces the main arguments on this front.  
                                                 
2 ICCPR is a multilateral treaty adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1966. 
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1.4.5 Multicultural citizenship and multicultural rights 
 
 
  Among various responses given in the face of challenges of increasing diversity 
caused by international migration, multiculturalism turned out to be one of the most 
debated one.  Multiculturalism can be defined in many ways: it can be understood as 
formal policies of governments; or an ideological position favoring multiplicity of 
identities, including religious, ethnic, racial, and cultural; or as a normative standpoint 
that searches for principles for guiding diversity in society (Bloemraad et al. 2008:159).  
 Scholars such as Kymlicka (1996, 1998) proposed multicultural citizenship to 
meet the demand of inclusion by different groups in the society. This diversity of 
recognition and inclusion demands causes clashes between majority and minority over 
issues such as language rights or autonomy (Kymlicka 1996:1). Kymlicka’s attempt is to 
come up with a new set of principles concerning minority rights, because according to 
his conceptualization, liberal assumption of human rights themselves are not enough to 
accommodate changing needs of minority groups. 
 In order to solve the problem of the tension between particular minority demands 
and outlook of universal human rights, Kymlicka (1996:10-11) suggests a differentiation 
between “multination states” and “polyethnic states,” while at the same time 
distinguishing “national minorities” from “ethnic groups”. According to Kymlicka’s 
differentiation, national minorities are the groups who are incorporated into a larger state, 
whereas ethnic groups emerge out of associations of immigrants within a society. 
National minorities are seeking for autonomy or self-determination, but for ethnic groups, 
demands are usually about “greater recognition” (Kymlicka 1996:11). Kymlicka portrays 
multinational states as those which incorporate more than one national group within its 
boundaries. Although in practice every state incorporates more than one nation, 
multinational states, according to Kymlicka’s (2011:282) analytical distinction, “have 
restructured themselves to accommodate significant sub-state nationalist movements, 
usually through a form of territorial devolution, consociational power-sharing, and/or 
official language status”. In other words, national homogeneity, which is never achieved 
by nation states, has already been challenged in the multinational states thanks to the 
“mobilization by historic regional minorities” (Kymlicka 2011:282). For instance, in 
countries such as US, Spain or Canada, national minorities (such as American Indians or 
Quebec region) have certain privileges within the legal structure. 
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 Different than multinational states, in poly-ethnic states, the origin of ethnic 
groups is immigrants. With increasing immigration, host states have begun to experience 
certain demands for recognition by these groups. Immigrant groups have turned into 
“subcultures” within the larger society because although they want to be integrated and 
remain as such, they also demand more recognition of their ethnic identity (Kymlicka 
1996:15). In other words, they are (or aspire to be) citizens of the poly-ethnic states while 
at the same time preserve their identity and culture. Examples of such states are Germany, 
Great Britain, France and Sweden, as they have received large number of immigrants, 
who have been working and residing in those countries for more than two generations 
(Kymlicka 1996:17).  
 Kymlicka’s (1996:7) aim is to construct a liberal theory of minority rights that is 
advocating “external protections” for minority groups, while being dubious about 
“internal limitations”. External protections are about the specific rights that minority 
groups have which are designed to “protect” them from the larger society (Kymlicka 
1996:36). In other words, with external protections, minority groups can have a certain 
amount of immunity from the “economic or political decisions of the larger society” 
(Kymlicka 1996:35). Thus, through external protections, minority groups (“ethnic or 
national groups” according to Kymlicka’s conceptualization) reassure their 
distinctiveness.  
 Kymlicka’s theory supports external protections because minority groups are 
usually smaller in size compared to the larger society that they live in; this discrepancy 
in size is usually translated into a disparity of power in political or economic decision 
making, which, in turn can make minority groups relatively vulnerable (Kymlicka 
1996:37). Kymlicka (1996:36) gives “special representation rights, land claims, or 
language rights” as examples of external protections, which put minority groups on a 
more equal setting with the rest of the society. That’s why external protections are 
important for Kymlicka’s liberal theory of minority rights. 
 Internal restrictions are related with the internal affairs of the minority group 
(Kymlicka 1996:35). For critics, autonomy granted to the minority groups can lead those 
groups to limit or suppress its members in the name of group identity or culture. In such 
a case, individual rights and liberties are violated to enhance group solidarity. Kymlicka 
(1996:36) uses the term “internal restrictions” for such cases “where the basic civil and 
political liberties of group members are being restricted”. Hence, internal restrictions can 
lead to deliberate restriction of individual rights and liberties of the members (Kymlicka 
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1996:38). This risk of restriction of individual rights and liberties makes Kymlicka to be 
wary of internal restrictions while establishing his liberal theory of minority rights. 
 Within his liberal theory of minority rights, Kymlicka (1996:27) differentiates 
between three types of group-specific rights: “self-government rights, polyethnic rights, 
and special representation rights.” In self-government rights, the focus is upon political 
autonomy or territorial jurisdiction (Kymlicka 1996:27). Political implication of these 
rights is usually federalism, with specific territories or regions being allocated to national 
minorities in the case that they live exclusively on these places. In other words, self-
government rights entail transferring political power to a smaller unit within the territory 
(Kymlicka 1996:30). Polyethnic rights, on the other hand, focus more on “cultural 
particularities” of ethnic or religious minorities and they aim at protecting these 
particularities while, at the same time, securing integration (Kymlicka 1996:31). 
Polyethnic rights are often designed in the form of exemptions from general laws or 
regulations on the grounds of religious and ethnic particularities. Because of their 
characteristics, these two types of rights can be used to “limit the rights of the members 
of the minority group” (Kymlicka 1996: 38). The last category is special representation 
rights, which can be conceptualized as “a form of political ‘affirmative action’” according 
to Kymlicka (1996:32). Special representation rights can emerge out of the problems 
related with representation of certain groups and can be used as a temporary remedy for 
these problems. Yet, these rights are also supported on the grounds of self-government 
rights, which are inherently permanent (Kymlicka 1996:33).  
 For Kymlicka (1998:174), recognizing polyethnic and representation rights as 
citizenship rights can help sustaining integration and maintaining political unity. More 
specifically, he advocates multicultural citizenship within the framework of liberal 
theory. He argues that multicultural rights are necessary for liberal polity to ensure 
freedom and equality of minorities.  
 These accounts all consider the problems of citizenship regime within the scope 
of the legal framework. Yet, citizenship as a historical and political concept encapsulates 
more than the legal framework. Without disregarding its legal aspect, citizenship can be 
defined in terms of normative rights and liberties, as well as practices or “acts” (Isin and 
Nielsen 2008). Moreover, citizenship can also be investigated in terms of its practical 
implications concerning the individuals through their own attitudes. The next sections 
discuss the concept of citizenship beyond the legal status.  
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1.5 Citizenship Conceptualized as a Set of Rights 
 
 
 Primacy of the protection of rights and liberties has always been the central theme 
of liberal approach but the scope of these rights and liberties has been enlarged over the 
years. Walzer (1989:217) describes this process as having two influencing factors. On the 
one hand, he argues, the number of people who are enjoying these liberties have enlarged 
since we are no longer living in city states in which only the propertied male members 
can enjoy the privileges of the status. On the other hand, the scope of the rights and 
liberties has enlarged due to various struggles, such as the ones carried out by labor 
unions, throughout the history. This expansion has changed the understanding of 
citizenship as a legal status; it has adopted a sharper focus on rights. In addition, the liberal 
approach to citizenship has not dwelled much on the conflict between the “formal 
political equality” and “the persistence of extensive social and economic inequality” 
(Turner 1990:190). T.H. Marshall is one of the pioneers of approaching citizenship as a 
collection of rights, scope of which was extended by him to incorporate social rights to 
resolve the above-mentioned conflict. Below his theory on citizenship as a set of rights 
will be discussed. 
 
 
1.6 T.H. Marshall’s Account on Citizenship 
 
 
 In his seminal essay Citizenship and Social Class, T.H. Marshall (1950, 1992) 
focuses on evolution of citizenship rights, albeit conceptualizing citizenship as a legal 
status. In other words, Marshall’s account assumes the legal aspect of the concept while 
emphasizing the rights and liberties being developed in historical stages. For Marshall 
(1950, 1992:8) citizenship is divided into three parts: “civil, political and social.” For 
Marshall (1950,1982:8) civil elements include “freedom of speech, thought and faith, the 
right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice.” In other 
words, civil elements as Marshall describes, correspond to the civil rights that prioritize 
individual freedom in a Lockean sense. Political elements are related with the capacity to 
participate in politics, i.e. political right to participation; either as a member of the 
political entity or as an “elector of the members” of such entity (Marshall, 1950,1992:8). 
The last item, social element signifies “the right to a modicum of economic welfare and 
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security”, “the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a 
civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society.” (Marshall 
1950,1992:8) In other words, social element includes social rights, in which state’s role 
have changed from being a mere arbiter to a more involved one through providing 
services such as health care, education and social security.  
 Marshall’s conceptualization of citizenship in this essay is an attempt at 
explaining the historical evolution of these elements. In feudal times, societal structure 
was primarily based upon stratification, status and class; thus, there was not a collection 
of rights belonging to all individuals. Citizenship rights, as Marshall conceptualized them, 
have emerged on a later date. According to his categorization, civil rights have been 
acknowledged as a separate category of membership privilege in 18th century; political 
rights in the 19th century, and social rights in 20th century (Marshall, 1950,1992:10).  
 The emergence of civil rights corresponded to the struggle between courts and the 
parliament in the UK’s political history. Marshall (1950,1992:11) provides several 
examples about how individual freedoms, such as right to choose one’s preferred 
occupation, had become recognized through specific cases and had entered into the 
Common-Law practice. Although the recognition of individual freedoms such as right to 
choose one’s occupation was not expansive enough to acknowledge women as members 
with civil rights, it was indicative of the process in which citizenship had become a 
“national institution” (Marshall, 1950,1992:12).  
 The emergence of political rights in the 19th century had a slightly different 
character according to Marshall. To be more specific, political rights were not in the form 
of universal suffrage; rather they were recognized as “capacities” 
(Marshall,1950,1992:13). These capacities were already existent for the land owners, but 
with successive reforms in the legal structure they were extended to those who did not 
own property but still had “sufficient economic substance” (Marshall 1950,1992:13). In 
other words, these rights or capacities were acknowledged as a by-product of the civil 
rights, especially the right to have private property.  
 Social rights were more related with the changing societal expectations of the 
capitalist economy. Marshall (1950,1992: 16) argues that the introduction of free and 
compulsory elementary education during the 19th century was related with the need for 
“educated electorate and “educated workers”. Hence, the foundations of social rights, 
which were to become equal with the other two groups of rights in the 20th century, were 
established through such a motivation.  
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 Marshall’s narrative of the evolution of citizenship as a set of rights is parallel 
with the growth of capitalism (Marshall,1950,1992:18). The fact that civil rights, as 
protecting individual autonomy and liberties, including the right to private property, were 
indispensable for capitalist market economy, had made these developments to occur as a 
series of events (Marshall, 1950,1992:21). More specifically, capitalist class structure of 
the society has created certain limits against the enjoyment of political, and especially 
civil rights because of the social and economic inequalities created by the capitalist 
market structure. Because of these obstacles, social rights have also emerged as a remedy 
to them. Marshall (1950,1992:24) argues that, even though social inequality was still 
there during 19th century, full enjoyment of civil and political rights had created the 
necessity to remedy those inequalities in the form of social rights, which were 
institutionalized in 20th century. For instance, trade unions had used civil rights, especially 
the freedom to enter into contracts, as an instrument to claim that they are “entitled to 
certain social rights” (Marshall, 1950,1992:26).  
 For Marshall, importance of social rights in the 20th century was not only related 
with the enjoyment of civil and political rights. Marshall’s emphasis is primarily on the 
outcome of the institutionalization of social rights in terms of social benefits. Social 
benefits, i.e. public education or housing, are essential to complement and enhance 
individual’s status in the society. In other words, with universal social benefits such as 
public education, the hereditary differences between the individuals in the society can be 
reduced to a certain level, making them equal citizens (Marshall, 1950,1992: 38).  Thus, 
the concept of citizenship, composed of civil, political and social elements, has been 
enhanced through “recognition and stabilization of certain status differences” (Marshall, 
1950,1992:44). As a result, according to Marshall (1950,1992: 33), social services or 
benefits cause “a general enrichment of the concrete substance of civilized life,” in which 
there occurs “an equalization” between different classes, or segments within the society.  
 Marshall’s account provides a historical understanding of citizenship. His 
narrative of the introduction of various rights categories into the framework of citizenship 
demonstrates the various social and political struggles for recognition of new rights and 
liberties throughout the history. It also points out the dynamic character of the notion as 
these struggles have caused political entities to develop remedies or reactions towards 
new demands. This dynamic nature of the concept helps one to account for the changes 
and continuities in citizenship regimes across the globe while contextualizing specific 
examples. Conceptualizing citizenship as a set of rights and liberties emerged out of 
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demands of social classes and strategic decisions of political authorities and political 
parties to contain these demands, demonstrates this dynamic nature.  
 At the same time, citizenship is a political concept in the sense that its contours 
are defined by political authority. In other words, defining who is in the demos, and hence 
a citizen, is a dynamic decision that can deliberately include some while excluding others. 
In fact, the historical narrative that Marshall relies his account of the development of 
citizenship rights reflects this political character of the concept. Yet, Marshall’s account 
focuses too much on a specific context, ignoring other struggles and demands for 
inclusion in different contexts. In other words, Marshall’s account does not cover the 
long-lasting struggles of feminists problematizing the patriarchal aspects of state and 
society, as well as the ethnicity-based recognition demands. The next sections will discuss 
criticisms and complementary perspectives concerning the Marshallian conceptualization 
of citizenship.  
 
1.7 Mann’s Critique of Marshall 
 
 
One of the clear criticisms of T.H. Marshall’s account has been put forward by 
Michael Mann. Basing his critique on Marshall’s singular focus on Britain, Mann offers 
an alternative explanation on the emergence of and change in citizenship rights and 
liberties which rests upon a historical analysis of various countries. 
In contrast to Marshall’s evolutionary approach, Mann interprets the emergence of 
and change in citizenship rights and liberties through a perspective based on ruling class 
strategies. These strategies are aimed at managing demands of rising classes and potential 
class conflicts while absorbing or repressing the revolutionary potential of such demands 
through institutionalization of citizenship rights. Different than Marshall, Mann argues 
that the recognition of citizenship rights displayed significant variation across different 
regimes due to distinct strategies they adopted. Accordingly, Mann (1987:340) suggests 
five strategies where ruling elites institutionalize class conflicts through expansion of 
citizenship rights: liberal, reformist, authoritarian monarchist, fascist, and authoritarian 
socialist. 
 For Mann, in the US and British examples civil and political citizenship developed 
due to the impact of liberal strategy of the ruling classes to absorb demands of the 
bourgeoisie and the working classes. In both cases, such groups were recognized as 
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interest groups demanding the recognition of their rights and liberties. In the US case, the 
dominance of the liberal strategy also resulted in the lack of social citizenship as demands 
of labor have never been expressed in terms of class conflicts. In other words, 
institutionalization of civil and political rights was not followed by social rights as 
advocated by Marshall’s account. Yet, in Britain liberal strategy was coupled with 
reformist strategy as labor movement was both an interest group and a class-based 
movement, which necessitated the ruling classes to adopt a mixture of liberal and 
reformist strategies (Mann 1987: 343). This mixture had also caused Britain to 
institutionalize social rights to a larger extent compared to the US. 
 In authoritarian monarchist regimes, the incorporation of bourgeois and labor 
demands was realized in a limited manner within the modernization process to maintain 
the absolutist powers of the ruling elites. While recognition of civil rights such as right to 
private property was easier due to their role in the rise of capitalism, political rights 
emerged as problematic as ruling monarchs did not want to share their decision-making 
powers. As a result, institutionalization of political rights of the bourgeoisie and the 
working class did not grant them real political power. Hence, authoritarian monarchies 
maintained their power through a “divide-and-rule” strategy (Mann 1987: 345). This 
divide-and-rule strategy was carried out by negotiating with moderate groups while 
excluding and repressing more radical ones while preventing these groups to come 
together by using different demands against each other. The result was tactical 
recognition of citizenship rights: while civil rights were recognized to a large extent, 
political rights were limited and social rights were granted in a paternalist manner (Mann 
1987: 348). For Mann (1987: 349), strategies adopted by authoritarian monarchies could 
have been maintained if these regimes had survived the first World War.  
 External events, such as the two World Wars, were not only important in terms of 
the fate of absolute monarchies and their strategies in absorbing the demands for 
recognition; they had influenced other strategies such as Fascism and authoritarian 
socialism to emerge. Culminated in Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany, these two strategies 
were extremely exclusionary and repressive against out-groups such as socialists, Jews, 
and major property-owners while others were incorporated in a limited manner. In both 
of these regimes, civil and political rights were mostly remained unrecognized whereas 
social rights were institutionalized.   
 Mann’s reading of the historical institutionalization of citizenship rights and 
liberties offers a wider perspective than Marshall’s account. He underlines the strategies 
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adopted by the ruling elites to absorb the demands of rising classes by granting them 
rights and liberties. He also points out the impact of two World Wars in the strategies 
adopted and fate of the different regimes, which incorporates another dimension to his 
historical analysis on the emergence and institutionalization of citizenship rights and 
liberties. 
 Yet Mann’s account fails to recognize the impact of grassroots mobilization in the 
expansion of citizenship rights and liberties by focusing primarily on the strategies of the 
ruling classes, while ignoring movements other than class-based ones. Turner’s typology, 
which will be discussed in the next section, focuses on these aspects that are missing in 
Mann’s critique of Marshall. 
 
1.8 Turner’s Typology of Citizenship 
 
 
 Turner (1990:212) considers Marshallian framework of citizenship rights to be 
“evolutionary, analytically vague and ethnocentric” which needs to be expanded. For this 
effort, he engages in a critical attempt at developing a theory of citizenship through a 
sociological perspective. He aims at developing a historically dynamic theory on 
citizenship and rights to account for the weaknesses of Marshall’s theory resulting from 
his exclusive focus on the linear evolution of citizenship rights in the British context. His 
approach suggests that instead of being identified as a unitary concept, citizenship can be 
explained through a typology distilled from a sociological analysis of historical cases.   
 The political sociology of Turner’s suggests that there are two dimensions of 
citizenship institutionalization: the private and public division and the above/below 
distinction (Turner 1990: 200). The private and public distinction is related with the extent 
in which citizenship is developed in the private or public sphere. Turner considers this 
distinction to be based upon the moral superiority of one sphere over the other. When 
private sphere is considered as morally superior and important, the public sphere, defined 
as a political arena, becomes limited (Turner 1993: 9.) 
 For Turner (1990:200), different political contexts display variations of this 
division between public and private spheres, which influence the conception of 
citizenship. In passive democracies or revolutionary frameworks, the private sphere, 
which includes religion and family affairs, is either left aside or considered as a suspicious 
area by the state. In those contexts, citizenship emerges as a public identity and 
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recognized as such by the political authority. The corresponding rights are exercised 
through the public institutions. Private aspects of individual life remain in the private 
sphere and are not recognized as a source of rights within the public sphere.  
 For liberal pluralism or plebiscitary authoritarianism, private sphere remains 
distinct from the public sphere and this separation decreases the emphasis on the public 
identity of the citizen. The enjoyment of citizenship status and corresponding rights 
happen mostly in the private sphere, as the public arena is either underdeveloped or 
limited in terms of political participation. In other words, citizenship emerges as a 
privatized identity.  
 The other dimension called as above/below distinction is about the emergence of 
rights. On the one hand, citizenship rights can be provided after the establishment of the 
state as a tool for absorbing the social conflicts in the society. Expansion of political rights 
to the bourgeoisie was a strategy for the monarchical political authority to preclude a 
conflict. For Marxists, establishment of welfare state is another ruling class strategy 
where the revolutionary potential of the working classes was absorbed within the system 
through the introduction of social rights. Yet, emergence of citizenship rights can also be 
read as an outcome of the struggles of different groups for recognition of their equal rights 
with the other members of the polity. When these struggles are concerned, expansion of 
citizenship rights can be classified as the successful claims of the social movements.  
 These two dimensions of citizenship can be combined in four different ways. 
Through a historical account of the development of citizenship across several European 
contexts, Turner identifies four political environments where these combinations of 
private vs public and above vs below dimensions crystallize.  
 
Table 1 Turner's Typology (Turner 1990:209) 
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 In the first slot of the quadrant resides the revolutionary French tradition which is 
signified by long and bloody struggles culminating into a radical break with the old 
system. The revolutionary mobilization had not just introduced active citizenship and 
institutionalized citizenship rights, it had also expanded scope of the public sphere to 
colonize the private sphere of individuals. In other words, it was the public identity of 
citizenship that had priority over the private identities of individuals. These private 
identities did not have any influence on the conceptualization of citizenship. To ensure 
this, state, as the public actor, granted itself the authority to regulate the private sphere, 
where religion and family matters existed. Hence, French citizenship was conceptualized 
as an active status defined within the public sphere.  
 The second example is Britain where institutions of the absolute monarchy were 
not radically overthrown but gradually incorporated as public institutions of the new 
limited democratic state structure. In that sense, the public sphere constituting the civil 
society was not populated by active or revolutionary actors, but with institutions through 
which citizenship rights were exercised. Hence, within the passive democracy 
represented by the British tradition, citizens were passive in the public sphere compared 
to the French tradition while their rights were granted by the political authority to contain 
potential struggles or because of the lack of serious struggles. In other words, British 
conceptualization of citizenship was passive and defined as a public identity. 
 The third slot of the quadrant is occupied by the American liberalism. American 
liberalism emerged out of the rejection of absolutist monarchy, centralization and subject 
status. The struggles against absolutism had brought individualism and rights emerging 
from below to the forefront. In addition, rejection of centralization had resulted in a 
limited state with a system of checks and balances, while the private life of the individual, 
her privacy and her freedom of opinion were prioritized. The prioritization of the private 
sphere had resulted in a weak public sphere in terms of political participation of the 
citizens. The resulting citizenship conception of American case was an active one with 
rights being developed out of social struggles, while citizenship was defined within the 
private sphere being autonomous from the public sphere’s intrusions. 
 The fourth example is the plebiscitary authoritarianism of German fascism. 
Citizenship is defined as the product of state action in German tradition and state also 
emerges as the sole public authority while private sphere of the individual is heavily 
emphasized. The predominance of state as the embodiment of reason had resulted in 
citizenship rights to be conceptualized as privileges disseminated by the state in a top-
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down (above) manner. While the heavy emphasis on the private life of the individual had 
resulted in an underdeveloped public sphere where state had extensive power over and an 
active notion of citizenship had failed to emerge. As a result, German citizenship was 
conceived as a passive status and defined as a privatized identity. 
 Turner’s typology is helpful to assess the differences in the way citizenship is 
institutionalized in different contexts. When citizenship is institutionalized by the 
political authority and the corresponding rights and liberties are provided from above, 
citizens themselves turn into passive subjects. This passivity is reflected in the nature of 
the relationship between citizens and the state where the former has a subordinate position 
vis-à-vis the latter. When citizenship rights and liberties are institutionalized as a result 
of social struggles, citizens are no longer passive; but are actively involved in the 
decision-making processes and aware of their rights and liberties.   
 Although his typology is helpful to account for different experiences of 
institutionalization of citizenship, there emerges two related problems within Turner’s 
theory. The first one is the relative vagueness of his definition of the public sphere. He 
refers to the institutionalization of Protestant Christianity as introducing the separation 
between private sphere, as the moral sphere, and the public sphere as the political one; 
yet it is not clear how this separation has evolved into a dimension of citizenship. In 
addition, he lists family as one of the components of the private sphere but fails to 
recognize the status of women within the family. This lack of recognition is important 
because family is the space where the patriarchal hierarchy between man and woman is 
produced and reproduced. That’s why feminists have been problematizing the distinction 
(Walby 1994). Turner’s theory, as in the case of Marshall’s theory, has failed to 
incorporate the gender dimension of citizenship. The next section discusses feminist 
perspectives regarding the mainstream understandings of citizenship.  
 
 
1.9 Feminist Contributions towards citizenship defined as rights 
 
 
As it has been discussed in the previous section, the debates around citizenship have 
introduced criticisms especially from feminist scholarship. As Marshall’s formulation has 
been cited and discussed widely, feminists have been criticizing this framework in terms 
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of its historicity or theoretical framework (Voet 1994). These criticisms have sparked 
alternative arguments around citizenship rights.  
First and foremost, feminist scholars have questioned the alleged differentiation 
between the private and the public spheres inherent in the liberal understanding of 
citizenship. As civil rights are the pioneers of the classical tripartite scheme of citizenship 
rights, it can be observed that the private property and its protection from the arbitrary 
use of power by the sovereign has been at the center. In a Lockean sense, private property 
denotes not only the physical belongings of individuals, but also the actual body of the 
individuals. In other words, protection of private property as being the founding ground 
for civil rights and liberties has also legitimized the principle of bodily integrity or habeas 
corpus. In that sense, protection of the contents of the private sphere is closely linked with 
the protection of the individual from the intrusions of the state.  This clear separation of 
private sphere from the public sphere is the foundation for rights and liberties the liberal 
thought.  
Yet, feminists have been questioning the practical implications of this theoretical 
distinction between the private and the public spheres on women’s power and agency. 
Some feminists argue that private sphere has been essentially a male sphere where private 
property belongs to the men (Dietz 1992: 66). For instance, Young (1989:253-254) argues 
that this distinction between the private and the public spheres also corresponds to a moral 
division of labor between “reason and sentiment,” where reason is associated with 
masculinity and sentiment with femininity. As a result of this moral distinction, women 
are considered as care-takers of those in the private sphere who lack the rationality 
required for exercising citizenship in the public sphere. Women, then, are effectively 
excluded from enjoying equal citizenship status with men.  
Hence, it’s the rights and the agency of the men that have been protected through 
civil liberties. This positioning creates a power discrepancy between men and women 
where the latter either has been a latecomer in terms of enjoying these universal 
citizenship rights or has still been struggling to do so. One example of such struggles is 
the right to enter into contract. Interpreting this right as to include the right to name a 
child after the mother’s surname, which is still not that common, Voet (1994:65) argues 
that the practice of rights is still short of reflecting the theoretical equality and universality 
of citizenship rights between men and women. For others, Marshallian framework is 
oblivious not just towards women but also ethnic and racial minorities (Yuval-Davis 
1991; Young 1989).  
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In her critique of the social contract theories, Pateman (1988) argues that normative 
underpinnings of the hypothetical contract ignore the agency of women. More 
specifically, she argues that the hypothetical contract discussed by the political theorists 
such as Locke, Rousseau or Hobbes is “the means through which modern patriarchy is 
constituted.” (Pateman 1988: 2). Hence, the idea of modern state and citizenship assumes 
not only a division between public and private spheres but also a hierarchy between men 
and women which contributes to the discrepancy between theoretical equality between 
citizens and its practice. 
This discrepancy between legal or theoretical equality and the practice of 
citizenship, stemming from the patriarchal structuring of the society, has been preventing 
women from being full citizens (Pateman 1992: 21-25). Women, being reduced to either 
carrying out the patriarchal duty of procreating for the nation or being completely ignored 
in the public sphere, have not been able to fulfill their agency and act as full citizens. To 
overcome this discrepancy, some scholars argue for active engagement of women in the 
public sphere, where others advocate for challenging the common framework of 
citizenship by incorporating the categories neglected by it (Dietz 1992: 76, Yuval-Davis 
1991). For some feminists, interpreting citizenship as rights can be helpful to overcome 
this discrepancy. Lister (2003: 37-39) argues that acting as a citizen, i.e. social and 
political participation, is the key to fulfill the potential of the legal status of citizenship 
for women. As women have been denied the formal status and rights of citizenship, even 
when they actively involved in revolutionary social movements as in the case of French 
Revolution (Lister 2003: 68-69).  
Feminist contributions to citizenship literature demonstrate the inherent problems 
of the existing theories of citizenship. Their critique suggests that gender is another, albeit 
ignored, dimension of citizenship as men and women have different experiences 
concerning the rights and liberties associated with citizenship as well as the access to this 
status (Walby 1994: 391). Hence, feminist contributions challenge the patriarchal 
assumptions of the classical debates of citizenship, starting from the first modern feminist 
manifesto by Mary Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Women in 1791.  
 Although feminist critiques have unearthed the intrinsically gendered nature of 
the concept, Marshall’s account of citizenship composed of civil, political, and social 
rights presents a relevant and useful analytical framework for this study. The reason for 
its relevance lies within its categorization, which is also used for the empirical part of this 
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research as well. His account will be revisited in the Chapter 6 where the survey data is 
analyzed.  
 Before moving onto the other chapters, this chapter will conclude by introducing 
a new perspective concerning citizenship, which has not been adequately studied within 
the literature. This new perspective is about the actual perceptions of citizens themselves 
regarding their rights and liberties. This perspective is important to understand the 
implications of citizenship as a dynamic and political notion. In addition, incorporating 
perceptions on citizenship is helpful to establish the link between the conceptual aspects 
and the empirical observations. The reason is that how citizens experience and perceive 
citizenship is contingent upon the political preferences and developments. By providing 
insight into how citizens, as actors with distinct political preferences, perceive their status, 
research on perceptions carry the potential to contribute to the literature in an empirical 
manner.  
 
1.10 Citizenship Perceptions 
 
 
 Citizenship has been investigated in terms of its legal framework, evolution of 
rights and liberties, balance between duties and rights, its relationship with nationalism 
and national identity, gender roles and other aspects. Most of the literature on citizenship 
primarily focus on legal, institutional, historical or theoretical aspects of the concept. 
Although these are illuminating in terms of understanding the dynamic and political 
nature of the concept, they do not provide much information about the citizens’ own 
conceptualization. Apart from ethnographic studies on attitudes or perceptions, 
mainstream political science perspective regarding citizenship does not focus on 
perceptions of citizens regarding their own status, rights, liberties, or duties.  
 A perspective investigating the perceptions is promising because it provides 
insight into the actual experience of formal rights, which emerge out of the legal status of 
citizenship. Such insight carries the potential to understand whether there is a discrepancy 
between the promises of these formal rights and liberties suggest and the actual 
experience pertaining to them. In addition, perceptions display how citizens think about 
their rights and liberties and how the formal framework of citizenship and the political 
context has primed this thinking. Moreover, analyzing perceptions can also shed light on 
the potential for new demands or struggles to emerge out of the practice of citizenship 
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(İsin and Wood 1999: 14). In that sense, lack of analyses of perceptions is a gap in this 
literature. As this study aims at contributing to the citizenship literature through analyzing 
perceptions on rights and liberties, studies that can be relevant and helpful for this purpose 
will be presented in this section.  
 Although there are numerous studies in the field, there are few which focus on 
actual perceptions of citizens. In an article on the public attitudes regarding the grounds 
of citizenship, the authors argue that there is correspondence between the attitudes of 
residents of a country on right to citizenship and that country’s citizenship regime 
(Levanon and Lewin-Epstein 2010:428). More specifically, some countries have adopted 
the jus soli principle for their policies on entry into citizenship and in those countries 
public opinion is also favoring pluralism. In countries where citizenship regime was 
exclusionary but evolving into a more pluralist stance, inconsistencies between policies 
and public opinion can emerge. In addition, political parties can be determining in terms 
of mobilizing public opinion in either direction. Political parties can mobilize specific 
demands within the society which can either help introducing new rights and liberties or 
imposing restrictions on the existing ones. In fact, given that political parties differentiate 
themselves by prioritizing certain issues, including citizenship and corresponding rights 
and liberties, over the others, there should be an affinity between individuals’ political 
party preferences and their citizenship perceptions.  
 The next section will discuss works on citizenship perceptions and their relations 
with the political party preferences. 
 
1.10.1 Review of Recent Works on Perceptions and Political Party 
Preferences 
 
 
The existent studies on perceptions often utilize public opinion surveys. Russell 
Dalton is one of such scholars who analyzes citizenship perceptions through utilizing 
public opinion research and mass public opinion surveys. Dalton (2009:4) investigates 
the effects of social changes on the perceptions on citizenship norms in the context of 
American politics. Dalton (2009: 5, 21) refers to citizenship norms as being “the 
encapsulation of the nation’s political culture” in a political setting and differentiates 
between two sets of citizenship norms: on the one hand, there is “duty-based citizenship,” 
which is related with norms such as voting, paying taxes; on the other hand, there is 
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“engaged citizenship”, which entail norms such as “assertive role for the citizen, social 
concerns and interest in the welfare of others.”  
According to Dalton’s conceptualization, duty-based citizenship entails a more 
limited understanding on citizenship, focusing on responsibilities towards the state and 
the society, obedience to law, serving in the military, and allegiance to the nation without 
having active citizenship role (Dalton 2009:27-29). Hence citizen duty does not support 
autonomous action or political dissent, while being supportive of a “majoritarian view” 
on society (Dalton 2009:164). Engaged citizenship, on the other hand, overlaps with 
liberal model of citizenship with some influences from the communitarian model as well 
(Dalton 2009: 27-29). Engaged citizenship emphasizes non-electoral participation, 
solidarity with others, being active as a citizen, being more independent and suspicious 
of government or the state, while carrying over a strong disillusionment with and distrust 
in political parties and other machineries of conventional politics (Dalton 2009:167).  
For Dalton (2009:36-48) there are various factors that cause these two sets of 
citizenship norms to emerge, such as: age, education level, gender, ethnicity, race, 
religiosity and partisan differences. For instance, the public opinion surveys he refers to, 
such as General Social Survey or International Social Science Survey, demonstrate the 
differences between Democrats and Republicans on matters such as political participation 
or social rights: duty oriented citizens are against extensive social spending, which is in 
line with Republican Party’s position; whereas Democrat Party’s position on this matter 
is similar to how engaged citizens prioritize solidarity through social rights (Dalton 2009: 
104-108). These examples demonstrate that there is affinity between political party 
preference and perceptions on citizenship norms, as differences in perceptions correspond 
to the party positions on these matters. Another example how various factors affect the 
direction of these norms is the generational differences among citizens. Dalton 
(2009:145) argues that comparing different age groups or generations demonstrate how 
citizenship norms have shifted from duty-oriented to engaged citizenship.  
Dalton (2009:91) argues that those who define or perceive citizenship as “engaged” 
have a more “expansive definition of citizenship” and “political tolerance.” In other 
words, there is a correlation between how an individual defines citizenship and his/her 
level of political tolerance; for instance, engaged citizens are more supportive of issues 
such as respect for minority rights or immigrants than duty-oriented citizens. Dalton 
(2009:95) describes this situation as norms of citizenship influencing “how we apply the 
rights of citizenship to others, even those we dislike the most.”  
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Duty-oriented citizens, on the other hand, are more inclined to support policies 
restricting civil liberties; contrary to the engaged citizens, who have no or negative 
relationship with such policy preferences (Dalton 2009:96). Hence, the perception on 
citizenship has an effect on policy choices of individuals (Dalton 2009:98). In other 
words, Dalton’s analyses of these correlations demonstrate that citizenship perceptions 
are interlinked with “individuals’ political behavior.” (Dalton 2009:115) 
In their study on perceptions of American, Coffé and Bolzendahl (2011) ask 
whether those with different party preferences have contrasting ideas on citizenship rights 
and duties. The political party literature that they utilize suggest that liberals and 
conservatives differ in terms of the norms that they care about where liberals emphasize 
fairness and reciprocity, conservatives prioritize authority (Coffé and Bolzendahl 2011: 
659). More specifically, historical analysis on the political parties demonstrate that 
Democratic Party has taken up the position of defending civil rights and equality, while 
Republican Party refrain from advocating “equality of outcomes.” (Coffé and Bolzendahl 
2011: 660).  
Using the General Social Survey data (2004), the authors find out that there are not 
significant differences between Democrats and Republicans in terms of the support for 
rights concerning equality of treatment and government taking citizens’ views into 
account, while Democrats are more supportive of duties involving helping others (Coffé 
and Bolzendahl 2011: 664). In addition, duty to serve in the military is not considered to 
be important for Democrats, while the reverse is true for Republicans. The rights of equal 
standard of living and minority rights emerge as important for Democrats while 
Republicans do not put much emphasis on them.  
When the authors include socioeconomic and demographic control variables, the 
differences of perceptions based on party identification remains significant. In other 
words, the differences in perceptions reflect the distinct positions taken by the political 
parties that respondents favor (Coffé and Bolzendahl 2011: 669). 
In a follow up study, the authors focus on the impact of racial background in the 
perceptions of citizenship within the American public (Coffé and Bolzendahl 2013: 51). 
The reason for focusing on racial differences is the structural and historical inequalities 
between blacks and whites in the US. Quoting group membership arguments, the authors 
claim that when minority groups cannot enjoy their rights or are denied to have 
fundamental rights, they are more prone to emphasize the importance of them. In other 
words, it is expected from those who cannot exercise their rights to have a more 
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supportive attitude towards rights because they have an interest in “emphasizing equal 
rights.” (Coffé and Bolzendahl 2013: 51). In addition, different socioeconomic statuses 
between these groups and their distinct party preferences can also influence their 
perceptions. For instance, racial minorities have a tendency to support Democratic Party 
as the party has positioned itself as the champion of civil and social rights.  
Using the same data set, GSS 2004 for multivariate analysis, the authors find out 
that racial differences are significant in terms of the support for citizenship rights as non-
Whites are more supportive of these rights, especially the ones concerning protection of 
minorities. Yet, when political party preferences and political and social attitudes are 
added as control variables, racial differences are no longer significant (Coffé and 
Bolzendahl 2013: 56). In other words, non-Whites preference for the Democratic Party 
explains the high support for citizenship rights.  
Hence, these analyses also confirm that there is a close relationship between 
political attitudes, party preferences and perceptions on citizenship. Perceptions, then, do 
not emerge in vacuum but are contingent to the political conditions and preferences.  
 
 
 
1.11 Conclusion 
 
 
This survey of the literature demonstrates the multidimensionality of citizenship. It 
is not only a legal status defining formal membership to a nation state, it is conditional 
upon historical and political developments. This multidimensionality is captured by 
various scholars through normative, historical, conceptual, and critical studies. 
Introducing perceptions to this literature is a promising contribution the literature which 
links above-mentioned aspects of the concept to the empirical observations on citizens 
themselves.  
This study will contribute both to the general literature and the specific literature 
on Turkish studies through analyzing perceptions on the grounds of political party 
preferences. As the political arguments provided by some scholars (Joppke 2003, 2010; 
Howard 2006, 2010) discussed here suggest, there is a link between citizenship regimes 
and practices and the political parties. This study will attempt at investigating a similar 
link between perceptions of Turkish citizens of their rights and liberties and their political 
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party preferences. The ultimate aim is to discover and analyze the segments of the 
electorate who are more aware of their citizenship rights and liberties and their violations 
in contemporary Turkey. Such an endeavor carries the potential to identify the possible 
actors in society and in political sphere to generate demands for further democratization. 
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 CHAPTER 2 
 
DUTIES OVER RIGHTS AND SINGULAR IDENTITY OVER 
PLURALISM: FOUNDATIONS OF TURKISH CITIZENSHIP AND 
CHALLENGES AGAINST IT 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 
 This chapter introduces and discusses the relevant literature on the foundations of 
and changes in the framework of Turkish citizenship. This chapter aims at serving three 
purposes: (1) analyzing the fundamental dimensions of Turkish citizenship envisioned in 
constitutions, relevant legislation, and official school textbooks; (2) presenting challenges 
against this framework; (3) introducing perceptions on citizenship rights and liberties as 
a recent approach within the literature and discussing the findings of existent research. 
For fulfilling the first and second purposes, this chapter will present the foundations of 
the official understanding of citizenship in Turkey and discuss the challenges posed 
against this understanding. The third purpose is about introducing and discussing the 
works on perceptions and presenting the missing aspects of these studies.  
 The status of citizenship indicates membership to a polity within a geographically 
bounded area and most of the time this area coincides with the borders of a nation state. 
Citizens, as legally recognized members, are considered to be members of the nation and 
citizenship is linked with national identity by this logic. In other words, this legal 
recognition makes citizens as parts of the demos or us, while others or them, who are not 
recognized as members, are excluded. In that sense, citizenship involves both inclusion 
and exclusion. This coexistence of inclusion and exclusion makes citizenship a useful 
instrument for determining the borders between those who are in and those who are out.  
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 In addition, citizenship as a status defines the nature of the relationship between 
state and individuals. Since citizenship is also a set of rights and liberties of individuals 
and duties towards the state, the official framework demonstrates the extent of these 
rights, liberties and duties. When the scope of rights and liberties is smaller than the 
emphasis on duties, one can argue for weakness of individual against the state, while the 
reverse suggests a larger sphere of action for individuals vis-à-vis the state. Hence, the 
way citizenship is defined provides clues about the hierarchy between state and 
individuals, or lack thereof.  
 These normative aspects of citizenship, which are the inclusiveness and 
exclusiveness of the concept and the state-individual relations, can be detected through a 
historical analysis of legal texts and educational material. The reason is that legal texts 
and official textbooks are produced by the central political authority. Citizenship, as a 
status recognized by the political authority, is defined and reproduced within those 
spheres either in the form of constitutional articles and legislation or as educational 
material. Thus, these spheres are fruitful for analyzing the official understanding of 
citizenship.  
 Most of the works on the foundations of Turkish citizenship focuses on legal 
documents and official school textbooks to unearth the underlying assumptions of the 
official understanding of Turkish citizenship. These works historicize these assumptions 
through analyzing state and nation building processes as well since citizenship is also a 
political concept.  
 The first three sections introduce the literature on the foundations of Turkish 
citizenship that focus on the role of state and nation building, constitutions and relevant 
legislation, and official textbooks. This tripartite approach will illustrate the underlying 
assumptions of Turkish citizenship, which will be discussed separately. 
 As citizenship is a political concept, its official definition displayed in law and 
school textbooks can be influenced by political and social contexts. Hence, numerous 
scholars analyze the changes in the citizenship regime and official textbooks through 
focusing on the impact of social and political developments. These works, introduced in 
the fourth section, investigate the ways in which political authority has responded to the 
challenges posed by internal and external issues. This section will introduce these works 
and discuss the success of political authority in meeting these challenges.  
 As discussed in the previous chapter, citizenship is a multidimensional concept 
that incorporates normative, conceptual, and historical aspects. All of these aspects are 
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analyzed and discussed by the major works in the literature on Turkish citizenship. Also, 
similar to the trends in the general literature on citizenship, the specific literature on 
Turkey has also started to focus on the practices and perceptions of actual citizens through 
empirical studies. This focus explores the way in which citizens themselves understand 
or perceive citizenship and corresponding rights, liberties and duties, and its link with the 
social and political context. 
 There are relatively few number of studies specifically working on perceptions of 
Turkish citizens but such a perspective is fruitful for two reasons. Firstly, perceptions are 
about how citizens understand their status and corresponding rights, liberties, and duties. 
Since citizens are subjected to the official understanding of citizenship, perceptions of 
them can display the discrepancy between the ideal presented by the official 
understanding and the reality, or lack thereof. The findings of the studies discussed in the 
fifth section are about whether such discrepancy exists or not in the minds of Turkish 
citizens.  
 Secondly, studying perceptions can provide clues about the potential interactions 
between citizens’ understanding of their citizenship rights and liberties and their political 
attitudes and preferences. Such interactions are important for assessing the democratic 
potential of individuals as they display the links between political preferences and the 
extent of the awareness of rights and liberties among citizens. In other words, analyzing 
perceptions through political preferences can illuminate the political party preferences 
that are linked with reformist perceptions on rights and liberties.  Hence, such an analysis 
can shed light on potential for change that these individuals have if their demands are 
mobilized by political parties. As none of the existing works discussed here touch upon 
the relationship between political preferences and perceptions, this research will 
contribute to the literature on this realm.  
 The last section will collate and discuss the arguments and findings of the works 
reviewed throughout the chapter. Through critically engaging with the literature, the 
fundamental aspects of Turkish citizenship will be demonstrated and used as a series of 
theoretical premises that will be delineated in the Chapter 6 where the survey data is 
analyzed.  
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2.2 Historical Foundations of the Official Turkish Citizenship: 
Nationalism, Omnipresence of State and the Miniscule Citizen 
 
 
One of the dimensions of Turkish citizenship is its characterization vis-à-vis the 
state. For some scholars, establishment of Turkish Republic after the demise of the 
Ottoman Empire displays certain continuities regardless of the vision of the clear break 
from the Ottoman era.  
In his seminal work, The State Tradition in Turkey, Metin Heper (1985) argues that 
Turkish Republic has inherited the state tradition of the Ottoman Empire. The earlier 
conception of state for Ottomans was structured on the personality of the Sultan (Heper 
1985: 46). With Tanzimat era (1839-1876), the state had evolved into a structure where 
the civil bureaucracy was at the center instead of the ruler (Heper 1985: 46). This vision 
of the state was “moderately transcendental”, which suggests that the state is 
institutionalized around a set of norms that were not proposed by the civil society (Heper 
1985: 9,12). Instead, these norms, such as moral responsibility towards the community, 
duty and service, are imposed upon the society (Heper 1985: 8).  
This moderately transcendental vision of state was ingrained in the minds of the 
Young Turks. In fact, in Young Turk era (1909-1918), composition of the state elite that 
consisted the center included military officials and the elite of the Committee for Union 
and Progress, as well as the civil bureaucrats of the Ottoman state. This state elite 
combined the strong state tradition with “an impersonal concern with the welfare of 
people,” which legitimized the imposition of modernization (Heper 1985: 46). In that 
vision, civil society was considered with “suspicion and a degree of arbitrariness” by the 
state elite, while state, including the military officials, was considered to be the source 
and guardian of the “ideals of Turkish nation.” (Heper 1985: 53)  
Republican state elite considered state as “vital for holding together the 
community” (Heper 1985:16). More specifically, during the initial years of the new 
Republic, these elites and the founder of Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, 
considered the state to have a mission to modernize, enlighten, and civilize the 
community through top-down reforms. According to this vision, state had “moral 
obligations” towards the community (Heper 1985: 50-51).  
This vision of state with a modernizing mission had prioritized its interests and 
survival over the rights and liberties of the individuals and civil society was perceived 
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with suspicion. This prioritization had resulted in an all-powerful state vis-à-vis a weak 
and disorganized civil society. As individuals were put in a secondary place and state had 
omnipresence, rights and liberties were considered as privileges of citizens that were 
provided by the state. Instead, duties towards the state were emphasized in the official 
conception of citizenship.  
Another dimension of Turkish citizenship is its link with nationalism and nation-
building. Construction of the Turkish nation state is important to understand the 
relationship between citizenship and national identity. Although individuals were 
subjects of the Sultan in the Ottoman social and political system, reforms of the Tanzimat 
era had introduced Ottoman identity as a binding identity in the face of recognition 
demands by various segments of the society, i.e. millets. The set of reforms that Tanzimat 
era introduced was about “secularization of religious laws and implementation of new 
administrative, educational and financial policies” in order to reshape the state structure 
to conform to its Western counterparts (İçduygu et al. 1999: 193). 
The project of Ottoman identity was short-lived against the rapid expansion of 
nationalism and emergence of nation-states. Influenced by the trend of nationalism, the 
elite of the Committee of Union and Progress had started to distill a Turkish national 
identity in order to cultivate a nation state within the weakening Ottoman empire. The 
main motivation for this effort was to anchor state building process to a unifying identity 
that symbolized a break with the Ottoman era. Hence, Turkish nationalism and Turkish 
national identity emerged not as a process of national awakening, but as functional project 
for state and nation building (İçduygu et al 1999: 194).  
Having been constructed in a top-down manner, Turkish nationalism is paradoxical. 
This paradox concerns the impossible balance between “the materiality of the West and 
the spirituality of the East.” (Kadıoğlu 1998: 178) According to this vision, the West 
represents the high level of civilization that the Republican elite aspired to reach through 
modernization process. Yet, the same Western culture is something to be afraid of or 
suspicious about because of its stark differences from the Eastern one. As the East 
represents culture, traditions and values of the nation, preservation and protection of these 
values acts as a shield against cultural decay. The tension between these two perspectives 
constitute the source of this paradox.  
This inconsistent understanding of civilization has caused the state elite and 
intellectuals such as Ziya Gökalp to find a balance between these two perspectives.  Being 
influenced by Islamism, Turkism, and Westernism all at the same time, Gökalp’s solution 
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for this uneasy balance was mechanically imitating the material aspects of Western 
civilization while preserving the local cultural values that are located within the nation 
(Kadıoğlu 1998:184).  
In fact, this paradox of Turkish nationalism had enhanced the strong state vision 
because realization of such a combination can be made possible only through a “social 
engineering from above” as it tries to balance two different and competing perspectives 
(Kadıoğlu 1998: 191).  
Within that context, Turkish Republic was constructed as a nation state with a clear 
break from its Ottoman past. The modernization project carried out by the Republican 
state elite envisioned constructing a nation out of those who were the former subjects of 
the Ottoman Empire. Because of that, manufacturing the Turkish identity as the common 
ground of the nation required a clear emphasis on its differences from the Ottomans 
(Kadıoğlu 1998: 188). State building came before the nation building in Turkish 
modernization (Kadıoğlu 1998: 205). It was the modern Turkish state that initiated the 
nation building process. This interpretation is also related with the strong state argument 
as it was the state elites that initiated and imposed the nation-building process.  
 In that process of constructing the nation, which succeeded the state-building 
process, the Turkish national identity was established upon the concreteness of the 
borders of the country and the indivisibility of state and nation (Kadıoğlu 2008: 174-175). 
This understanding of national identity had gradually transformed into a more ethno-
cultural understanding of citizenship by the end of 1920s (Yıldız 2007). By prioritizing a 
particular identity, citizenship status defined the borders of the demos in the newly 
established nation state by excluding those who did not fit into this definition.  
 
 
2.2.1 Discussion of the historical foundations of Turkish citizenship 
 
 
 Although the official conceptualization of Turkish citizenship has faced various 
challenges and has changed to a certain extent, it is important to look at the historical 
foundations of this conceptualization for several reasons.  
Firstly, analyzing this official conceptualization helps one to understand the limits 
of this conceptualization and motivations of the challenges it faced. More specifically, 
since defining citizenship is about defining the border that separates us from others, and 
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thus constructing the demos, it is bound to exclude some. When this definition provides 
legitimacy or privileges to a specific identity or culture, it automatically excludes others 
in its attempt to govern a society (Dönmez 2011:2). As such exclusion contributes to the 
emergence of challenges towards and some changes in the formal legal sphere, 
delineating the historical foundations is a necessary task. 
Secondly, the official understanding of Turkish citizenship demonstrates the 
underlying codes of citizenship, which portrays the nature of the relationship between 
individuals and the state (Üstel 2004: 95).  Citizens are formally recognized members of 
a polity with a set of rights, liberties, and duties.  The balance between rights, liberties 
and duties provides clues about the power relations between state and individuals. When 
state is constructed along Lockean principles, where the autonomous sphere of the 
individual is protected from the infringements of the political authority, its power is 
limited vis-à-vis the individuals, whose rights and liberties are prioritized and protected. 
Yet, when state is all-powerful, individuals and their rights and liberties can be de-
emphasized or enjoyment of them can be conditional upon fulfilling duties, especially 
those towards the state and the community. By analyzing the historical foundations of 
Turkish citizenship, the literature surveyed in this section portrays the relationship 
between citizens and the state, which had prioritized Turkish state in relation to the 
citizens.  
The literature about the historical foundations of the official understanding of 
Turkish citizenship identifies two dimensions of the ideal of citizenship in the minds of 
Republican elite. First one is the impact of the strong state tradition inherited from the 
Ottoman Empire, and second one, which is also related with the strong state perspective, 
is the impact of Turkish nationalism. 
Heper’s account on the strong state tradition that Turkish Republic inherited from 
the Ottoman Empire displays the omnipresence of the state. This omnipresence had 
influenced the perspective concerning members, as well as the relationship between the 
state and individuals. The vision of strong state has hindered the subjects of the Ottoman 
polity to turn into individuals with a specific set of rights and liberties albeit the reformist 
attempts during the late Ottoman era. Heper argues that inheriting this strong state 
tradition had caused the Republican state elite to consider Turkish Republic to have a 
“moderately transcendental state”, which was established upon norms determined by this 
elite (Heper 1985: 9,12).  
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Such a vision of the state has influenced how citizenship is conceived. Republican 
state elite considered themselves to have a mission, or a “moral obligation” of 
modernizing the nation through a top-down process. This vision allows state to have 
dominance over social and political spheres that minimizes the sphere of action of the 
individual. As a result, these rights and liberties were projected as privileges, instead of 
achievements of popular struggles. In that sense, conception of citizenship in the minds 
of Republican bureaucratic and military elite is similar to “passive citizenship” of 
Turner’s typology where the political authority is “all-powerful” and “the subject is the 
recipient of privileges.” (Turner 1992: 52) 
In addition, when state is omnipresent and citizens are the recipients of privileges, 
it implies that there is a hierarchical relationship between state and citizens. This 
hierarchy suggests that state and its interests have priority over the individual and her 
rights and liberties. When there is such hierarchy, duties towards the state gain 
prominence as conditions under which citizenship rights and liberties can be enjoyed. 
Hence, Turkish citizenship was conceptualized primarily as a status loaded with duties 
towards the state, where rights and liberties were enjoyed as long as these duties were 
fulfilled. In fact, fulfillment of duties requires active involvement of citizens, which 
paradoxically make them “militant” when it comes to duties towards the state but passive 
in the case of their rights and liberties (Keyman and İçduygu 2003: 231).  
As it will be discussed in the upcoming sections, emergence of identity politics and 
demands for recognition in the form of extension of citizenship rights and liberties 
demonstrate that the vision of strong state has been challenged. These challenges suggest 
that the civil society is no longer miniscule or weak in comparison to the strong state and 
has the potential to influence changes in the official understanding of Turkish citizenship. 
Yet, this account still has explanatory power in terms of the foundations of this 
understanding because the empirical studies that will be discussed further in this chapter 
show that duty-laden, passive citizenship conception exists in the perceptions of Turkish 
citizens and the official school textbooks.  
The second dimension of the foundations of the official understanding of Turkish 
citizenship is its close links with Turkish nationalism. As discussed above, Turkish 
nationalism carried the paradox of combining Western materialism and Eastern 
spirituality in the course of modernization. Carried out by the state elite, modernization 
project of the new Republic required the society to have a unified identity. But the content 
of this identity was constructed in a paradoxical manner. The ideal of civilization in the 
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minds of the early Republican state elite and intellectuals was an uneasy combination of 
West and East. These actors promoted Enlightenment values together with a clear 
emphasis on tradition and local/national values. While attainment of the level of Western 
civilization was perceived as the ultimate goal, the West was also treated with suspicion 
for carrying the potential to weaken traditional values. Similarly, while Eastern 
spirituality was considered as a differentiating value that needs to be cherished, it was 
also regarded as a source of backwardness.  
In Gökalp’s mind this uneasy balance could be created through a combination of 
ethnic Turkishness and Islam. The early Republican state elite preferred to bring ethnic 
Turkishness forward while purging Islam out of the public identity of citizens. Yet, the 
wish to preserve national culture had caused specific religious identities to be endorsed 
as a means for enhancing and protecting local identity. For that purpose, the Directorate 
of Religious Affairs was established to “represent a true version of Sunni Islam.” (Saylan 
2014:33) Establishment of this institution signified state support for a particular religious 
identity, which indirectly excluded other religious identities. In fact, the existence of 
Directorate of Religious Affairs within the centralized bureaucracy suggested that the 
state promoted Sunni Islam as a tool for generating “cultural and social solidarity among 
its citizens.” (Koçan and Öncü 2004: 472) For instance, Alevi identity, a sect in Islam 
that has a different interpretation and practice from Sunni Islam, was excluded from this 
definition. Exclusion of Alevi identity, from the ideal of citizenship alongside with other 
religious groups had caused Alevis to avoid disclosing their religious identity in the public 
sphere.   
Another instance where this particular understanding of Turkishness excluded 
others on the basis of religious identity was non-Muslims’ exclusion. Although they were 
citizens of the new Republic, they were not parts of the Turkish nation. In fact, they were 
recognized as “ethnic minorities” in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne with certain special 
rights such as linguistic rights and educational and denominational autonomy (Saylan 
2014: 26-27). 
On the other hand, the prominence of Turkish ethnic identity in the construction of 
the nation by state elites had excluded Kurds as well. In the efforts to create a 
homogeneous and unified nation, Turkishness was the reference point, which had to be 
positioned vis-à-vis an other. Kurdish ethnic minority had become one of the main 
components of this other against which Turkishness was defined and emphasized. In 
other words, emphasizing Turkishness could only be possible through strictly ignoring 
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the existence of Kurdish identity (Yeğen 1998: 216). Exclusion of this identity, then, was 
an outcome of the nation building project. As they will be discussed in the next sections, 
this exclusion was evident in the legal sphere and early Republican policies of regulating 
dissent emerged in areas where Kurdish minority was concentrated.  
The foundations of the official understanding of Turkish citizenship rested upon a 
singular identity that explicitly favored a specific ethnic identity (being Turk) and 
implicitly endorsed a religious identity (being Sunni Muslim). The legacy of strong state 
had caused Turkish citizenship to be conceived as a duty-laden, passive status. These 
dimensions of Turkish citizenship were outcomes of the top-down modernization project 
carried out by a strong state with a mission to construct a homogeneous, unitary nation. 
The ramifications of the strong state and nation-building processes on Turkish citizenship 
will be delineated in the next sections through reviewing the literature that focus on 
constitutions, relevant legislation, and official school textbooks.  
 
 
2.3 Turkish Citizenship Envisioned in the Legal and Educational 
Spheres 
 
 
The foundations of the official understanding of citizenship discussed above display 
that Turkish citizenship was conceptualized around a specific identity and as a passive 
status with heavy emphasis on duties due to the omnipresence of state. For analyzing the 
actual implications of this understanding one needs to look at the spheres where it is 
possible for the political authority to impose this outlook. An example of such spheres is 
the legal arena as it involves binding rules that regulate social and political life. That’s 
why various scholars writing about Turkish citizenship have focused on different 
constitutions or relevant legislation for investigating the impact of this official 
understanding. In addition, since the official understanding on Turkish citizenship was 
imposed upon the society, one also needs to look at official school textbooks as they are 
instruments for transmitting the official understanding.  
 The next subsections will review the literature on Turkish citizenship that focus 
on different constitutions of Turkey, legislation related with citizenship, and official 
school textbooks on citizenship education. 
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2.3.1 Turkish citizenship envisioned in different constitutions 
 
 
Birtek (2008: 18) argues that the common denominator of all constitutions of 
Turkish Republic is the focus on protecting the state instead of the individual. For Soyarık 
(2005) 1924 Constitution was different from the other constitutions in terms of the 
definition of Turkish citizenship. Article 88 of the 1924 Constitution defines Turkish 
citizenship as “the people of Turkey regardless of their religion and race are Turkish in 
terms of citizenship.” (Gözübüyük 1995:76 cited in Soyarık 2005:126) This definition 
denoted a territorial and political identity, instead of a racial one (Soyarık 2005: 127).  
Within the 1924 Constitution, there was a separate chapter dedicated to rights and 
liberties of the citizens but the mechanisms through which these rights and liberties are 
protected were not delineated (Soyarık 2005:127). The Citizenship Law of 1928, which 
was enacted in 1929, laid out the foundations of citizenship status. According to this law, 
“children born from a Turkish father or mother, either in Turkey or in a foreign country, 
are considered as Turkish citizens”, which signifies the jus sanguinis principle’s 
influence. But Soyarık (2005:128) also underlines the rather subtle influence of jus soli 
principle in the rest of the law, which regulates the admission to the citizenship of children 
of foreigners and stateless people.  
1961 Constitution was different primarily because of the context that it had 
emerged. Having been written after the military coup that toppled down Democrat Party’s 
rule, the 1961 Constitution was made with an understanding of limiting the power of the 
elected ones. Although drafted after a military coup, the 1961 Constitution was 
considered to be a liberal one since it was explicitly influenced by international human 
rights documents, such as Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The European Human 
Rights Agreement and the French Declaration of Human and Citizenship Rights (Soyarık 
2005:131). The definition of Turkish citizenship in this constitution was an active one 
whose rights and liberties were defined in more detail (Soyarık 2005:132-133). In 
addition, duties were not as emphasized as the previous definition while state’s 
interference in the individual sphere of action was more limited (İnce 2012: 117). The 
Article 54 of the Constitution defined Turkish citizenship as “everyone who is tied to the 
Turkish state through citizenship ties is a Turk”, which was more inclusive according to 
Soyarık (2005:132). 
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This liberal and active understanding of citizenship had lasted until the 1982 
Constitution, which remarked “a return to the civic republican understanding of 
citizenship” (Soyarık 2005:133-134). 1982 Constitution was made after the military coup 
of 1980. The political and social unrest during the 1970s resulted in military coup 
orchestrated by a group of military officials led by the Head of the General Staff, Kenan 
Evren. After the coup, the National Security Council (NSC) established by the military 
junta had ruled the country for two years until the first civilian elections of 1983. Before 
this election, NSC had commissioned a group of legal scholars to write a new constitution. 
The 1982 Constitution was a product of the coup in that sense (İnce 2012: 141). This 
constitution was different than the previous one remarkably. Its priority was to restore 
and protect authority of the state while maintaining public order (İnce 2012: 141). Article 
66 of the Constitution had a more nationalistic definition of citizenship: “Everyone who 
is annexed to the Turkish State with citizenship ties is a Turk. The child of a Turkish 
father or a mother is a Turk.” (Soyarık 2005:134) In addition, the presence of state 
sponsored religion was more visible this time. The 1982 Constitution did not only make 
religious courses compulsory, it reduced their scope to a specific sect of Islam, i.e. 
Sunnism (İnce 2012: 142). Hence, the ethnicist logic coupled with a specific religious 
identity in this text. 
 
 
2.3.2 Turkish citizenship envisioned in the relevant legislation 
 
 
According to Soyarık’s review of legal texts, 1924 Constitution’s definition of 
Turkish citizenship and the Citizenship Law of 1928 portrayed citizenship in territorial 
and political terms. There are others who disagree with this interpretation. For Yeğen 
(2004: 54), there are four dualities through which Turkish citizenship has been discussed 
in the relevant literature: (1) active vs. passive citizenship, (2) republican/communitarian 
vs. liberal/individualist citizenship, (3) public vs. private sphere, (4) ethnic vs. political 
definition of citizenship (Kadıoğlu 2008: 171-181). Agreeing with the other scholars on 
the passive and republican definition of citizenship where private sphere is invaded, 
Yeğen problematizes the suggested duality between ethnic and political definition of 
citizenship.  
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For Yeğen (2004: 58) legal framework concerning Turkish citizenship could be 
interpreted as political but the actual practice of these laws and regulations was carried 
out with “an ethnicist logic.” A similar observation is made by Kirişçi (2000: 1) as well 
where he argues that although citizenship definition was formal, “actual state practice” 
was leaning towards promotion of Turkish ethnicity. Yıldız (2007) also underlines the 
adoption of ethnicist outlook on Turkish citizenship by 1930s.  
The Law of Settlement No.2510 that was put into practice on June 14, 1934 is an 
example of such ethnicist practice. This law was a continuation of a series of other 
settlement and nationalization laws during early 1930s (Ülker 2008: par.4). The specific 
law that Yeğen refers to was aimed at greater Turkification, with explicit references to 
Turkish language as being the single language spoken in the country, Turkish race and 
Turkish culture as being associated with speaking Turkish (Ülker 2008: pars.9-10). More 
specifically, the Law states that those who speak languages “other than Turkish” and 
belong to religions other than Islam are to be “treated as foreigners” (Ülker 2008: par.13). 
In other words, these groups were not considered to be a part of the Turkish culture 
envisaged by the law makers, and hence were subjected to resettlement to predetermined 
zones.  
 According to the law, there are three zones for relocation of people: in Type One 
Zones, “populations of Turkish culture” will be settled; in Type Two Zones, populations, 
who are planned to be assimilated into Turkish culture, will be relocated; in Type Three 
Zones, there will be no inhabitation (Ülker 2008: pars. 19-21). According to Soyarık’s 
(2005:130) analysis, this Law was a tool in the process of “Turkification” of the nation 
during the late 1930s through various policies on assimilation of individuals with 
different ethnicities and religious convictions. More specifically, the Law targeted Kurds 
and non-Muslim populations by resettling them in areas populated by Turkish and/or 
Muslim populations in order to promote the process of assimilation (İnce 2012: 57). 
Demonstrating the ethnicist logic in legal framework, this law suggested that having a 
legal status as Turkish citizens was not considered to be enough for being Turkish; as the 
latter requires something more than this status (Yeğen 2004: 61).   
Thus, early Republican era’s understanding of citizenship had moved from being 
egalitarian to more unitary and culture-based one. During the single party period (between 
1923 and 1950) when CHP ruled without institutionalized opposition as the state-
founding political party, the process of nation building was epitomized in the framework 
concerning citizenship. Being instrumentalized as an anchor of national belonging and 
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social unity, Turkish citizenship was constructed to represent an individual who is 
patriotic, obedient and loyal to the state, and has a specific ethnic identity. This outlook 
was visible in the party programs as well where ruling CHP’s program explicitly defined 
citizenship in terms of nationality (İnce 2012:42). The heritage of strong state had helped 
the Republican elite to impose this citizenship definition and the specific take on 
“common good and national interest” on to the society (İçduygu et al. 1999: 194). 
 The Citizenship Law of 1964 was more detailed compared to its predecessor in 
terms of limiting the conditions in which one can be expelled from Turkish citizenship to 
dealing with “activities that are not in line with loyalty to the state.” (Soyarık 2005:134) 
The presence of state was evident despite the relatively liberal tone of the Constitution. 
In addition, this Law was more in line with the jus sanguinis principle than the 1928 one, 
despite the fact that the Constitution was more liberal in spirit (İnce 2012: 121). The 
lingering presence of jus sanguinis in the Citizenship Law display the ongoing ethnicist 
logic that Yeğen refers to.   
 The Citizenship Law of 1964 was amended initially in 1981 when dual citizenship 
became available. Yet, despite the introduction of dual citizenship, conditions for losing 
one’s citizenship status were made more expansive and vague at the same time. With an 
amendment made in the Citizenship Law of 1964, these conditions were expanded to 
include “activities violating the internal and external security of the Turkish Republic,” 
which had affected a lot of individuals who fled the country because of the coup and non-
Muslims citizens who were living abroad (Soyarık 2005:136-137; İnce 2012: 146).  
 This brief survey of the legal foundations of citizenship in Turkey demonstrates 
that the understanding of Turkish citizenship has experienced shifts between civic 
republican and liberal perspectives (Soyarık 2005:139). At the same time, the initial 
framework of Turkish citizenship depicted the citizen as being passive, whose rights and 
liberties were granted from above by the state, while the influence of nation building had 
remained in the practice of relevant laws (Yeğen 2004, İnce 2012). Hence this survey 
demonstrates that Turkish citizenship was envisaged with a specific ethnic identity in 
mind, while the omnipresence of state had caused citizen to become passive and obedient 
subjects loaded with duties.  
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2.3.3 Turkish citizenship envisioned in official textbooks 
 
 
 Another way of tracing how Turkish citizenship is defined, depicted and 
transmitted to the public is to look at the school textbooks concerning citizenship 
education. These textbooks display the official understanding of citizenship in Turkey as 
they are produced and disseminated in a centralized manner. As the school curricula is 
determined by the Ministry of Education, the textbooks used at primary and secondary 
levels are supervised by the centralized bureaucracy under this Ministry. This centralized 
nature of education, with curricula and school textbooks being determined by the Ministry 
facilitates the dissemination and promotion of the official understanding of citizenship. 
In other words, the official understanding of Turkish citizenship which emphasized a 
specific ethno-religious identity, was reflected in school textbooks throughout 
Republican history. This section surveys the literature analyzing school textbooks to 
uncover continuities and changes in the way in which official understanding was 
promoted.  
 Üstel (2004:11-13) investigates the textbooks of citizenship education and 
according to her work, citizenship education worth analyzing mainly because of three 
main reasons: (1) with the emergence of modern state, education turned into a means for 
transformation of the public; (2) emergence of modern state coincided with secular 
worldview, which had forced ruling elites to engineer a secular individual; (3) children 
had begun to be recognized as “citizens in the making” and this recognition had created 
a need for specifically designed education for them. 
 The early examples of citizenship education designed to engineer subjects were 
from the late Ottoman era. Citizenship education was introduced for the first time under 
the name Malumat-ı Medeniye during the Second Constitutional Period (II. Meşrutiyet). 
Just as the previous reforms of 1839 Edict of Gülhane (Tanzimat Fermanı) and 
subsequent Edict of Reform (Islahat Fermanı) in 1859, II.Meşrutiyet was an effort of top-
down modernization process initiated by the state. Introduction of the course Malumat-ı 
Medeniye was the first step towards the invention of citizen in Turkish political history 
through education. Considering that the political function of citizenship education is to 
manufacture a shared sense of identity among the public, it is understandable that the 
citizen of Meşrutiyet era was the subject of different attempts of unification. Sometimes 
the imagined bond between the individual and the state was ethnicity (Türkçülük) or 
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religion (İslam), and sometimes it was about Ottomanism (Osmanlıcılık), civic loyalty to 
the Ottoman state (Üstel 2004:95). 
The approach of top-down modernization was something that the founders of the 
Turkish Republic had inherited from the Ottoman reformers. This outlook was observable 
in the field of civic education. At the early stages of the Republic, civic or citizenship 
education was used as a means to create a sense of national bond between the members 
of the society. This attempt is most visible on the very early examples of school textbooks 
on citizenship education. Since the idea of society was also new as the idea of modern 
state, citizenship education was intended to be a tool for generating the citizen himself. 
In other words, education is a tool for raising the awareness of citizenship, which, in turn, 
helps to create and maintain the awareness of national bond between the citizens, who are 
also responsible for their behavior towards their fellow citizens (Üstel 2004: 23).  
 The name of the course Malumat-ı Medeniye was changed into Malumat-ı 
Vataniye in 1924 to teach the pupils their duties towards the nation and the state (Üstel 
2004: 129-130). This course was designed by the bureaucratic elite under CHP rule during 
the single party period and its mission was to create “civilized, modern citizens, who are 
obedient to the state.” (İnce 2012: 77) More specifically, these duties encompassed the 
private sphere of the individual by promoting duties such as observing the rules and 
regulations while using the public transportation, dressing properly or behaving in public 
and private life and so on (İçduygu et al 1999: 197). Hence citizenship education was a 
means to create the proper citizen whose primary duty was to obey the state. Although 
duties were as emphasized as the rights and liberties in this course, Malumat-ı Vataniye 
did not have explicit reference to an ethnic definition of citizenship.  
 The emphasis on duties had become more evident in the subsequent course 
designed in 1927, Yurt Bilgisi, which was thought as a platform for children to socialize 
into the values of the nation state (Üstel 2004:132). Yet, Yurt Bilgisi had a specific 
definition of the nation as signifying “unity in fatherland, language, history, culture, and 
ideal.” (İnce 2012: 81) The fundamental aim of these textbooks was to conceive 
citizenship as a relationship of duty or obedience, rather than a legal and political bond 
(Üstel 2004:142). In other words, definition of citizenship in these books was civic 
republican in the sense that almost all of them reiterated the “importance of living in unity 
in a community” and “citizenship duties and obedience to authority.” (İnce 2012: 83) This 
relationship was also intensified with heavy emphasis on a novel history of Turkish 
ethnicity within these books. Thus, citizenship in the textbooks was envisaged as having 
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two main purposes: Turkish citizen should be civil and should be patriotic (Üstel 
2004:175). Within this framework, the emphasis was predominantly on the ideal 
characteristics of Turkishness and duties towards the state. Especially during 1930s, 
citizenship rights were framed as complementing duties in these textbooks, which were 
the focus of citizenship education in general (Üstel 2004:234).   
 Although there were minor changes in the outlook on citizenship education, early 
Republican tendencies were still influential during the multiparty era; citizenship was still 
framed in a duty-oriented manner (Üstel 2004:247-248). One of the textbooks, titled 
Yurttaşlık Bilgisi published in 1952, made explicit references to the fundamental rights 
and liberties, yet duties towards the fatherland and the state were considered as 
preconditions of the enjoyment of these rights and liberties (İnce 2012: 109). Other books 
published in the second half of 1950s had more detailed definitions of the nation where 
Turkishness was defined as a racial category and non-Muslim and non-Turkish 
communities did not receive any mention (İnce 2012: 110). Hence, although there were 
minor instances of liberalization in school textbooks, DP era was similar to the single 
party period in terms of the understanding of citizenship in terms of its depiction in 
textbooks. In fact, according to Üstel (2004:324), during the multiparty period, the 
understanding of Turkish citizenship was rather communitarian with its emphasis on 
ethnicity (Turkishness) and its claim about individuals sharing a common ideal about the 
future.  
 Üstel (2004:278) argues that textbooks had reflected the characteristics of the 
political atmosphere of the eras that they were published: during the 1960s, for instance, 
the books were influenced by multiparty politics and social dynamism of the era, which 
was evident in the changing emphasis on the value of political parties for democracy and 
political participation. In addition, these textbooks emphasized rights more than their 
predecessors. Yet, despite the change of tone, there were no mention of Kurds, Alevis 
and non-Muslims in those textbooks, which was reflective of the ethno-religious 
foundations of Turkish citizenship (İnce 2012: 133; Kaya 2016:126) 
 For Oğuz (2005:97), up until mid-1970s, citizenship right and liberties were 
taught in a relatively liberal-democratic framework despite the heavy presence of duties. 
The textbooks had specific sections designated to various citizenship rights and liberties, 
including right to life, civil rights, political rights, individual liberties, and political 
liberties (Oğuz 2005: 98-99). Even though references to rights and liberties were more 
extensive and explicit, these books were still cautious as they warn students not to abuse 
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their citizenship rights and liberties. Hence, the liberal-democratic outlook had its own 
limitations put into place.  
 Oğuz (2005:80, 84) underlines the gradual evolution of the reference towards 
Turkishness into an organic and essentialist image of society where the intrinsic 
corporatism of the political culture in Turkey was materialized. This image considered 
citizens as duty-bearers, which became unequivocal in the textbooks published after 1971 
memorandum.  For İnce (2012:135) the constitutional amendments made after this 
memorandum restricted the liberal tone of the 1960 constitution, which was reflected in 
the textbooks as well. The textbooks published after the memorandum resembled the 
earlier books as the excessive emphasis on duties being preconditions for rights had 
returned. For instance, a textbook published in 1972 contains an example of this duty-
laden corporatist outlook by advising pupils to carry out their duties in a perfect manner 
because it is the only what to make sure that everyone is happy (Oğuz 2005:77).  
 The impact of the military coup of 1980 was even more visible in school 
textbooks. For Üstel (2004:278) this influence had made the understanding of citizenship 
more “militant” than before. This time, this militancy was coupled with the “state of 
emergency” of post 1980 coup and with strong motives of threat and dangers (Üstel 
2004:289). Being in line with the political motives of the coup and its aftermath, “Kurds, 
Alevis, radical Islam, the European Community and Christianity” were included in the 
framework of threats and dangers (Kaya 2016: 124). Reflective of the nationalist outlook 
of the era, civic education textbooks published after 1980 began with various nationalist 
symbols such as “the National Anthem”, “the Turkish flag”, “a picture of Atatürk”, and 
his “Address to Turkish Youth.” (İnce 2012: 177) 
 The shift from the earlier liberal-democratic perspective emanating from the 
liberal 1960 Constitution was clearly visible in the 1982 Constitution where most of the 
citizenship rights were limited through numerous exceptions. In fact, the textbooks 
referred to the rights and liberties mentioned in the 1982 Constitution while reiterating 
the numerous exceptions and limitations to these rights existed in the relevant articles. 
Moreover, citizenship rights and liberties had secondary role in these textbooks as “the 
state and national interests are always assigned priority.” (İnce 2012: 178) By way of this 
hierarchy, duties and responsibilities of citizens were more expansive compared to the 
previous civics textbooks. Üstel (2004:279,282) defines this situation as state being the 
subject of rights rather than the citizens, and in return, citizens are recognized as citizens 
as long as they fulfill their duties and responsibilities.  
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 Another differentiating factor was the religious connotations in the textbooks 
published after the coup where one such book suggested that Sunni Muslim identity “as 
the most important part of Turkish culture.” (İnce 2012: 179-180) The ethno-religious 
framework elevating a singular ethnic identity and promoting emotional patriotism with 
strong influence of Sunni Islam evident in the post-1980 citizenship and civics textbooks 
was reflective of the ideal citizen in the minds of state elite. For instance, a textbook 
published in 1984 listed Islam as one of the unifying features of the society, while another 
one published in 1985 had headings such as “Individual Rights and Duties, Social and 
Economic Rights and Duties, Political Rights and Duties” where rights and duties were 
bundled together (Oğuz 2005: 99-100).  
 1990s had witnessed the entrance of human rights activism into the political 
sphere, which had led to the incorporation of human rights education into the curricula 
(Üstel 2004:286-7). In 1998, civics or citizenship education was taught through a 
textbook called Citizenship and Human Rights Education, which was reflective of the 
political and social atmosphere of 1990s (İnce 2012: 180). In this period, the impact of 
globalization and Europeanization were visible in the changes as political parties started 
to respond to the increasing rights-demands3. Yet, the textbooks were still promoting an 
ethnicist communitarianism, which was suggesting an organic bond between the 
individual and the state, contrary to the contractualist outlook of 1950s and 1960s (Üstel 
2004:289). The reason for the resilience of the ethnicist outlook in the textbooks is that, 
the coexistence of rights discourse with duties and the threat perception during the 1980s 
was contradictory and had resulted in “national security citizenship” surpassing the rights 
discourse (Üstel 2004:309). This outlook remained the same throughout 90s and early 
2000s, as new textbooks included emphasis on duties, Turkish ethnicity, and Islam while 
minorities were rarely mentioned (İnce 2012:182).  
 School textbooks on citizenship education had reflected the ideal of citizenship 
defined in terms of a passive status loaded with duties while a specific ethnic and religious 
identity was promoted. In that sense, both legal framework and educational framework 
worked hand in hand to construct the ideal citizen which had excluded various segments 
of the society by definition. Especially after the 1980 coup, the ideal citizen was “a 
Turkish Muslim with a secular lifestyle,” who was subjected to the neoliberal economic 
policies of the era (White 2013: 9). The identity demands mobilized by political parties 
                                                 
3 The specific changes and continuities of the positions of political parties will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
 64 
emerging through and after 1990s had posed significant challenges against this ideal 
reflected both in the legal sphere and educational sphere.  
 
 
2.4 Challenges and Resulting Changes in the Framework of 
Turkish Citizenship 
 
 
 One can observe various changes occurring within the legal framework 
concerning citizenship throughout Republican history. This legal framework was 
debated, criticized and amended in numerous times because of the concerns related with 
modernization, Westernization, and Europeanization (Soyarık 2005, İnce 2012). More 
specifically, the emergence of identity politics embodied in the demands of recognition 
by Kurdish minority, Alevi community and headscarf issue of the pious women was 
critical amongst the challenges to the foundations of Turkish citizenship 
conceptualization. While Kurds has demanded to be recognized as a distinct ethnic group, 
Alevis have asked accommodation of their religious practices by the state. Epitomized in 
the headscarf issue, pious individuals demanded their religious identity to be included in 
public sphere (İçduygu et al. 1999: 201-202). 
 Emergence of such demands in the post-1980 era indicated a significant challenge 
against the legitimacy of strong state in Turkey (Keyman and İçduygu 2003: 223). The 
plurality of identity claims demonstrated the need for a reconfiguration of state and 
society relations. Within that framework, EU accession process emerged as an external 
anchor through which demands for institutional and legal reforms were voiced.  
 The most prominent challenge was posed by the Kurdish minority in Turkey 
(Yeğen 2004: 53).  As the foundations of the Turkish citizenship conceptualization 
denotes a specific ethnicity, i.e. Turkishness, to its members in terms of the practice of 
citizenship, it has created a particular identity in the minds of citizens, which lead them 
to associate their status with a singular national identity. Being excluded from this official 
definition of the ideal citizen since the beginning of the Republic, mobilization of Kurdish 
minorities’ demands for recognition have forced a new citizenship definition to be 
instilled. These demands have challenged not only the identity aspect of the official 
conceptualization, but also the top-down outlook concerning the state-society relations. 
More specifically, although citizenship by definition separates demos from outsiders, 
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grassroots mobilization for recognition of rights and liberties carries the potential to 
change the scope of demos. Hence, such mobilization disputes the omnipresence of state 
in terms of granting rights and liberties and suggests that citizenship is also a status of 
recognition that is demanded by different groups, who were excluded in practice.  
 The issue, then, is whether the state and the official understanding of citizenship 
have been capable of meeting those challenges. İnce (2012: 7-9) argues that Turkish 
citizenship, which is characterized “on the basis of a single religion and single language”, 
needs to be redefined by divorcing from nationality in order to address the demands posed 
by ethnic minorities. A similar observation was made by Kadıoğlu (2007: 291) where she 
argues that the legal framework that regulates citizenship in Turkey has relatively 
“denationalized” through “a move towards group-differentiated citizenship” via the legal 
and institutional reforms initiated by the EU accession process.  In other words, political 
mobilization of identity demands by Kurds and other minority groups and the impact of 
EU process as an anchor for democratic reforms contributed to relative denationalization 
of Turkish citizenship. 
In addition to the domestic identity demands reinforced by the EU-motivated legal 
reforms, external issues such as increasing international migration have caused 
observable changes in the citizenship understanding. For instance, İçduygu et al. (1999: 
198) argue that, international migration had resulted in individuals becoming members to 
more than one nation state. More specifically, the status of guest workers residing in 
Europe who had become members of these countries have influenced the Turkish policy 
makers’ take on citizenship. The status of these individuals has forced policy makers to 
enlarge the scope of laws regulating dual citizenship in order to establish and strengthen 
links with nationals living abroad. The outcome was the legalization of dual citizenship 
in 1981 (Keyman and İçduygu 2003, cited in Kadirbeyoğlu 2009:421). Yet, because of 
the fact that German citizenship law of the time was prohibiting dual citizenship, another 
solution was offered by the Turkish Parliament in 1995: a special non-citizen status for 
the Turkish emigrants in Germany, so-called the “pink card” (Kadirbeyoğlu 2009: 423). 
Pink card provided a privileged non-citizen status those immigrants so that they can 
reside, acquire private property, inherit, open businesses and work in Turkey, while it did 
not grant voting rights (Kadirbeyoğlu 2009: 423). 
  During the parliamentary debates, some of the members of the parliament 
criticized this offer by arguing that such a status would encourage “Armenians, Jews, 
Rums”, who had renounced their Turkish citizenship rights, to reclaim this status 
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(Kadirbeyoğlu 2009: 424). Kadirbeyoğlu argues that such a reaction shows that 
arguments concerning dual citizenship or special non-citizenship status were not designed 
to make Turkish citizenship more inclusive; they were specifically aimed at Turkish 
emigrants. In addition, this example displays the continuity of the exclusionary logic.  
 A similar perspective of exclusionary logic coupled with utilitarianism was in 
place when the Bulgarian Turks were granted Turkish nationality, when there were no 
policies regarding the immigrants in Turkey (Kadirbeyoğlu 2009:425). The process of 
accepting Bulgarian Turks into the Turkish citizenry was related with the changing 
foreign policy priorities; Bulgarian Turks’ mass migration and acquisition of Turkish 
citizenship in 1989 was framed in terms of “kinship”, while in 1991 Iraqi refugees, 
composed mostly of Kurds, were made to wait at the gates (Danış and Parla 2009: 139). 
The kinship argument granted a privileged status to Bulgarian Turks in 1989 while 
practicing the exclusionary logic in the case of Iraqi Kurds. Yet, Danış and Parla (2009: 
141) point out that this privileged status itself is being affected by changing priorities in 
political and economic spheres, which causes any privilege to be fictitious and temporary. 
In fact, later Bulgarian Turk migrants were not incorporated into the citizenship regime 
as swiftly as the 1989 migrants (Danış and Parla 2009: 142).  
 It was during 2000s when the citizenship understanding imposed by 1982 
Constitution started to change. As the EU accession process was considered as a political 
goal during early 2000s by the AKP governments, various legal changes were carried out 
to meet Copenhagen political criteria for membership. For instance, with the amendment 
of Article 13, “safeguarding the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and 
nation” was no longer a ground for restriction of fundamental rights and liberties (İnce 
2012: 142). In addition, children of Turkish mothers and foreign fathers are now granted 
citizenship with the amendment in Article 66, where previously only those with Turkish 
fathers had the privilege. Also, in 2008, conscientious objection was removed from the 
grounds for loss of citizenship. Yet this change did not alter the Criminal Code and 
Military Service Law which effectively penalize conscientious objection. In fact, military 
courts have continued to sentence conscientious objectors albeit numerous decisions of 
the European Court of Human Rights convicting Turkey for violating Article 9 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights4.   
                                                 
4 Such cases include Ülke, Erçep, and Savda, decisions which are discussed in detail in ECtHR fact sheet on this 
issue. Fact sheet was retrieved from: https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Conscientious_objection_ENG.pdf  
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 The most significant change was the amendment made in 2004, which provided 
precedence to international agreements in cases concerning fundamental rights and 
liberties when disputes occur between domestic and international law. This amendment 
was an outcome of the EU process and signified a shift in the state-oriented outlook to a 
more rights-based one in terms of Turkish citizenship. In 2007, AKP government initiated 
a process for a new constitution. The draft was clearly more liberal in terms of citizenship 
definition and rights and liberties. Buried under heavy criticism, this process was short-
lived. In other words, understanding of citizenship in legal and educational spheres did 
not experience a complete overhaul to meet challenges posed by mobilization of identity 
demands and EU membership process. 
 These examples demonstrate how Turkish citizenship framework has tried to 
absorb internal and external challenges in a “pragmatic” manner (Kadirbeyoğlu 2009: 
426). In the case of dual citizenship, for instance, this pragmatic outlook has forced 
political actors to relax the affinity between national identity and citizenship status due to 
economic concerns related with Turkish emigrants in Europe. In other cases, such as the 
partial recognition of identity demands by Kurds, Alevis or non-Muslim groups, the 
changes in the legal framework have happened due to the pressures to conform to the 
international standards (Kadirbeyoğlu 2009: 431-432). At the same time, there is still an 
underlying exclusionary outlook which coincides with the pragmatic perspective.  
 These changes and continuities happen in a context where political landscape is 
influenced by mobilization of demands and alternative conceptualizations by outsider 
groups. It can be argued that political actors have an influence over how these demands 
are organized and mobilized, as well as how they are received. As political parties are 
agents of mobilization of demands in the society, one can establish links between 
positions of political parties and the changes and continuities discussed in this section. 
For instance, Dalton (2009) argues for correspondence of certain understanding of 
citizenship with political party preferences, while Coffé and Bolzendahl (2011, 2013) 
point out to the emphases political parties put on specific citizenship rights and liberties, 
which are reflected in the perceptions of supporters of these political parties. These 
studies suggest that there is a link between how citizens understand citizenship, their party 
preferences and parties’ positions on citizenship and corresponding rights and liberties. 
Turkish political party landscape can also be analyzed through such a perspective, which 
will be discussed in the Chapter 4. 
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 The next section will analyze the existent literature on perceptions in Turkey and 
its findings before moving on the changing positions of political parties. The reason is 
that the existent literature on perceptions confirm the impact of the official understanding 
of citizenship while introducing demographic characteristics as determinants of 
perceptions. This study’s contribution, which concerns the political party preferences, 
will be analyzed in depth in Chapter 6. 
 
 
2.5 Research on Citizenship Perceptions in Turkey 
 
 
The foundations of Turkish citizenship had defined the ideal citizen as someone 
who is loyal to the state and nation, passive in terms of the claims towards rights and 
liberties while burdened by duties, and has a specific ethnic and religious identity. 
Reflections of this particular definition have been depicted in the relevant legal 
framework and in the civics education textbooks. Recognition claims and rights-based 
demands emerging from ethnic and religious groups in addition to the impact of external 
factors such as the EU accession process have influenced various changes in this official 
standpoint, yet they are still short of introducing a new definition of citizenship divorced 
from national identity, loyalty to the state and excessive emphasis on duties. In fact, some 
aspects of the official framework on Turkish citizenship are still intact despite the internal 
and external challenges.  
Citizens’ own understanding of their status, rights, liberties, and duties is another 
sphere where one can trace the impact of the official understanding of citizenship. 
Investigating perceptions of citizenship provides clues about the way in which individuals 
understand the state and society relations, as well as their level of internalization of the 
official understanding through laws and school textbooks. Even though there are 
numerous studies on the foundations of Turkish citizenship and the changes and 
continuities regarding the citizenship regime in Turkey, there are not many works on the 
actual perceptions of citizens themselves within the mainstream political science 
literature on this subject.  
One of the rare works that investigates citizenship perceptions in Turkey is Birol 
Caymaz’s (2007) work. Caymaz conducted a field research to analyze the perceptions of 
Turkish citizens regarding their citizenship in general. For this endeavor, the field 
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research questions are grouped into three categories: what citizenship means for actual 
citizens, feeling as a citizen, and rights and liberties. 
Considering citizenship as a societal role, Caymaz (2007:4) argues that it is 
important to understand citizens’ own perception of their roles, statuses, rights and 
liberties. To trace the roots of dominant conception of citizenship in Turkish state 
discourse, Caymaz (2007) examines national education textbooks, namely Yurt Bilgisi, 
which was used during early Republican era, Yurttaşlık Bilgisi which was used between 
1950s and 1980s, and Vatandaşlık Bilgisi Ana Ders Kitabı, which was used after 1986. 
Through these textbooks, Caymaz traces the ongoing themes in citizenship education in 
the state discourse within the scope of changes in the political landscape of Turkey.  
Caymaz argues that, especially during the early Republican era, citizenship 
education had a political function in terms of establishing the notion of nationhood and a 
particular understanding of citizenship, with heavy emphasis on duties. In other words, 
education materials of that era displayed the state’s own understanding of citizenship 
because education itself was a medium of constructing the Turkish citizen, who is passive 
and realizing himself through the sense of belonging to the nation. Thus, Turkish 
citizenship was taught as duty-oriented bond, with an explicit emphasis on Turkish ethnic 
identity. As a result, any other ethnic and religious identity was suppressed in this process 
of construction of Turkish citizenship. Caymaz concludes this investigation by arguing 
that there is continuity in the state discourse, although some of these textbooks are no 
longer in use. This continuity displays itself in the hierarchical relationship between 
citizen and the state, in which citizen is defined and constructed by the state (Caymaz 
2007:57). Caymaz’s observations on the depiction of Turkish citizen in school textbooks 
are in line with the previous works on this subject (Üstel 2004, Oğuz 2005).  
Caymaz starts his empirical research right at this point. He investigates the 
understanding of citizenship, which is constructed as a role by the official discourse in 
education materials, among ordinary citizens in Turkey. Through in depth interviews, he 
analyzes how ordinary citizens perceive and perform that role. Between 2003 and 2004, 
Caymaz constructed 61 in-depth interviews and 450 surveys. Results of his research are 
grouped into three categories: (1) What do citizens associate citizenship with? (2) How 
and when do they feel as citizens? (3) What do citizens understand from their rights and 
liberties? 
Caymaz’s empirical research finds out that respondents with low level of education 
associate citizenship with duties and they do not refer to rights when asked about the 
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meaning of citizenship. Those who are more educated and have better socio-economic 
status emphasize other normative aspects, such as belonging to the state and nation, virtue 
of the duty of voting, certain rights and liberties…etc. Hence Caymaz argues that level of 
consciousness concerning citizenship rights is linked with level of education and 
socioeconomic status. Although there are differences in the sample, Caymaz states that 
there are common tendencies: for instance, all respondents relate citizenship to a sense of 
belonging to a larger entity, such as state or nation; rather than defining it on the 
individual level. This observation reflects the shared understanding of Turkish citizen as 
a passive and obedient person being loyal to the state in the literature. 
In addition to Caymaz’s study, Kardam and Cengiz’s (2011) empirical study on 
citizenship perceptions based on generational differences can also be listed as another 
effort in understanding perceptions. Together with Caymaz’s findings, Kardam and 
Cengiz’s study also echo Dalton’s (2009) argument on the impact of age in citizenship 
perceptions.  
Kardam and Cengiz (2011) argue that perception of citizenship is associated with 
individual life experiences and specific era when individual worldviews took shape. More 
specifically, the empirical findings suggest that there five profiles of citizenship that the 
perceptions correspond to: (1) republican, (2) socialist/social democrat, (3) 
traditional/conservative, (4) individualistic/liberal, and (5) non-citizens (Kardam and 
Cengiz 2011: 152).  
Among these five profiles, republican understanding emerges as the most visible 
profile among the survey respondents. In line with the theoretical expectations emerging 
from the literature, those within the republican profile consider fulfillment of duties to be 
essential for enjoyment of rights. In addition, for the republican group, active 
participation in public life is a precondition for being a good citizen (Kardam and Cengiz 
2011: 153).  Individuals whose perceptions are in line with the republican category are 
mostly above 66 and highly educated (Kardam and Cengiz 2011: 152). In addition to the 
emphasis on duties, older respondents with republican understanding of citizenship 
believe that women wearing headscarf pose a significant challenge to secularism. This 
specific perception regarding the image of headscarf echoes the strict public-private 
distinction of the Republican modernization project. Symbols indicating religious 
affiliation were thought to be belonging the private sphere of citizens; whom need to be 
displaying a secular presence.  
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Older individuals’ perceptions are reflective of the official understanding on these 
levels mostly because of the time frame when they were socialized into the official 
understanding of citizenship. As a matter of fact, younger republicans aged between 30 
and 65 do not put that much emphasis on state’s authority and duties, which is explained 
by the authors as a result of their early socialization during 1960s and 1970s when 
political activism was its peak (Kardam and Cengiz 2011:156-157). The younger 
respondents, born after 1980, display a more rights-oriented perception regarding 
citizenship, while duties, responsibilities and the importance of state receive much less 
reference compared to the other age groups (Kardam and Cengiz 2011: 159).  
Hence, changing political and social atmosphere has potentially influenced these 
individuals’ perceptions regarding citizenship while the underlying communitarian 
outlook of Turkish citizenship is shared in various degrees among the sample. In other 
words, despite the differences emerging with regards to age, as younger individuals have 
a more rights-oriented perspective compared to the older ones, citizens do not have a 
shared perception on their rights and liberties which prioritizes their enjoyment and 
protection (Kardam and Cengiz 2011: 163). The generational gap in the perceptions is 
similar to Dalton’s (2009) observations and arguments on post-materialism. Inglehart 
(1967: 93-95) argues that in European context, younger generation is more receptive to 
the idea of Europeannness than the older generation because of the relatively more 
inclusive atmosphere that they have lived in. Yet, at the same time, the importance of 
duties emerges as a lingering perception among all age groups in Kardam and Cengiz’s 
study. Confirming this finding, a recent opinion poll5 conducted on a representative, 
random sample in March 2016 found out that fulfilling duties toward the state is still 
considered as a precondition for enjoying fundamental rights by a significant majority of 
the respondents (61%).  
Although there are not a lot of studies analyzing perceptions of Turkish citizens, 
the existent ones suggest that Turkish citizenship is still perceived as a duty-laden, passive 
status with strong links to a specific ethnicity and religious identification. In other words, 
the foundations of official citizenship are still influential in perceptions although there 
have been challenges against it and several legal and institutional changes. The minor 
differences in perceptions are results of age differences, but it is not clear whether these 
can be mobilized for legal and institutional reforms. Turkish citizenship continues to 
                                                 
5 İstanbul Politikalar Merkezi, Denge ve Denetleme Ağı, KONDA (2016) “Vatandaşlık Araştırması” Retrieved from: 
http://konda.com.tr/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/VatandaslikArastirmasiRapor.pdf  
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exclude certain identities, mobilization of which by political parties can result in 
fundamental changes. This possibility will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 that 
focuses on political parties.  
 
 
2.6 Discussion of the Literature and Theoretical Implications 
 
 
The literature on Turkish citizenship agrees upon several points regarding the 
foundations of Turkish citizenship understanding. First of all, Turkish citizenship was 
conceptualized as an instrument for the nation building project of the newly founded, 
modernizing state. In that sense, Turkish citizenship can be understood through the four-
quadrant model that Turner (1992: 55) introduces: 
 
Table 2 Turner's Typology (Turner 1990:209) 
 
 
According to this model, there are two dimensions through which citizenship ideals 
are constructed. One dimension is related with whether citizenship and corresponding 
rights and liberties are products of grassroots demands or granted from above by the state. 
If citizenship emerged out of the demands of various groups and corresponding rights and 
liberties were granted as a result of these demands, then Turner’s typology categorizes 
such process as active citizenship. In the case of citizenship being a part of nation and 
state building process where citizens are considered as subject instead of “active bearer 
of effective claims,” the status is a passive one (Turner 1992: 46).  
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The second dimension is about “the tension between a private realm of the 
individual and the family in relationship to the public arena of political action” (Turner 
1992: 52). In other words, this dimension is related with the scope of state intervention in 
the private sphere. The archetypical examples corresponding to each quadrant are as 
follows: Revolutionary French citizenship was a result of popular mobilization while 
public persona of citizens is emphasized more than individuals’ private sphere of action, 
which is regarded with suspicion (Turner 1992: 46). English case is an example of passive 
citizenship in the sense that citizenship was not associated with revolutionary struggles, 
but considered as a legal personality, whose rights and liberties are granted by the political 
authority and codified through the common-law tradition (Turner 1992: 53). In the third 
quadrant lies American conceptualization of citizenship where the concept emerged out 
of popular struggles but at the same time individual’s private sphere of action is 
considered to be essential so much so that the public sphere “is understood in terms of 
individual involvement in local voluntary associations.” (Turner 1992: 55) The fourth 
quadrant is exemplified by the fascist German tradition where state emerges as an all-
powerful entity and citizen as a subject who “is the recipient of privileges” while state 
emerge “as the moral guardian of the people” dictating the matters of the private realm 
(Turner 1992: 51-52).  
Turkish citizenship conceptualization is similar to both revolutionary French 
tradition in terms of invasion of private sphere by the publicly defined understanding of 
citizenship and German model in terms of the passive position of the citizen whose rights 
and liberties and limits of its autonomous sphere of action were dictated by the state. 
Kadıoğlu (2008: 179) argues that Turkish citizenship is defined within an expansive 
public sphere which invades the private sphere of the individual with her family affairs, 
religious convictions and individual sphere of action resides; at the same time, this public 
defined citizen is also in a passive position as citizenship is defined from above.  
In fact, the fact that Turkish citizenship is defined from above has caused 
individuality to fell short of flourishing in the minds of citizens. In other words, just as 
establishment of the nation state had arrived before the establishment of the nation, 
citizenship as a binding identity was prioritized over individuation of the members of 
Turkish polity. Turkish citizens were constructed as citizens before being individuals 
(Kadıoğlu 2008: 180). Coinciding with this process, rights and liberties with regards to 
citizenship were not acquired through social struggles as in the case of the Marshallian 
narrative, but by the state. Thus, state and its survival were more important than the 
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individual rights and liberties, which had led Turkish citizenship to be defined in terms 
of duties towards the state as the foundations of the official understanding suggest.  
In addition, the foundations of this official understanding were constructed in a 
nationalist manner in which Turkishness was considered to be an integral part of this 
status. Hence other ethnic identities, primarily Kurdishness, were ignored or assimilated 
into this official conceptualization. Although early Republican framework concerning 
citizenship did not refer to religious identity in the public sphere, non-Muslims and Alevis 
were not recognized as such within that understanding, leading these groups to be treated 
with suspicion thanks to the historical baggage carried through the Ottoman past. 
Hence, the ideal citizen has been someone who is ethnically Turk, Sunni Muslim 
and loyal and obedient to the state. As in any definition of citizenship, this one excludes 
some while drawing the borders around the ideal citizen. The ideal citizens, then, are 
those who internalize this official understanding where state is all-powerful, individual is 
miniscule and burdened with duties, and citizenship is defined in an ethno-religious 
manner. The main expectation from Turkish citizens is to be assimilated into the unitary 
definition of citizenship, being loyal and obedient to the state, the prospects for them to 
be vocal about rights violations by the authorities are dim, unless they belong to groups 
whose identities have been excluded.  
More specifically, those who are excluded from the official citizenship 
conceptualization demonstrate the potential to act outside of the obedient stance. Kurds, 
Alevis or non-Muslims as others of Turkish citizenship are more aware of their rights and 
their violations compared to the ideal citizens who internalized the assumptions of 
Turkish citizenship. The existent studies on perceptions display that citizens share these 
assumptions to a large extent, although level of education, age, and socio-economic status 
emerge as differentiating factors in perceptions (Caymaz 2007, Kardam and Cengiz 
2011).  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
 
Turkish citizenship was a construct of the modernizing state elite. It was conceived 
as a passive status with a restricted understanding of private sphere, which is a 
combination of German and French models according to Turner’s (1992) typology. 
Historical foundations of the official understanding of Turkish citizenship reflect the 
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qualities of this construction. Investigated through legislation and official school 
textbooks, these foundations clearly exclude certain identities and practices from the 
official understanding of citizenship. Modernization through a top-down manner had 
created a passive and duty-laden citizenship understanding, while nation-building process 
that came after state-building had prioritized Turkish ethnicity and Sunni Islam at the 
expense of other identities.  
As citizenship is a politically contested concept, definition of which can be 
challenged by internal and external actors. The trajectory of legal changes in Turkish 
citizenship conceptualization demonstrate the impact of EU membership process as an 
external influence while mobilization of identity demands has posed a significant 
domestic challenge. These identity demands came from the groups whose identities have 
been historically excluded from the official understanding of citizenship such as Kurds, 
Alevis and non-Muslims.  
The existent studies on perceptions demonstrate that Turkish citizens internalized 
the duty-laden, passive citizenship understanding to a large extent. Perceptions of 
younger, more educated individuals and those with higher socio-economic status are 
more liberal compared to those who are older, less educated and lower-class. The existent 
studies have not incorporated political party preferences, which are relevant to the 
perceptions as studies in other contexts suggest (Dalton 2009; Coffé and Bolzendahl 
2011, 2013). Since political parties are agents of mobilization, they are potentially 
influential in mobilizing demands in society and causing change in legislation. Hence, 
investigating the relationship between perceptions on citizenship and political party 
preferences will contribute to the literature by identifying the segments in the society that 
carry the potential to change the official understanding of Turkish citizenship. The next 
chapter will analyze this relationship.
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 CHAPTER 3 
 
 
POLITICAL PARTY CLEAVAGES AND CONCEPTIONS OF 
CITIZENSHIP 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 
The literature on citizenship has mainly focused on institutional aspects of the 
status, as well as the trajectory of how the concept has changed in the face of challenges. 
Practice of citizenship and corresponding rights and liberties have remained a relatively 
understudied aspect of the concept, except from several ethnographic studies (Secor 
2004; Parla 2011). Existent studies concerning how citizens themselves perceive 
citizenship, not just as a legal status but as a set of rights and liberties, usually focus on 
the relationship between demographic features and perceptions, or life experiences and 
era in which individuals develop their political attitudes (Caymaz 2007, Kardam and 
Cengiz 2011).  
This study contributes to the general citizenship literature by introducing another 
dimension that is relevant to these perceptions, i.e. political party preferences. Perceptions 
of citizens regarding their rights and liberties are delineated along these preferences, in 
addition to the above-mentioned demographic features. Political party preferences are 
included as a dimension of perceptions because political parties are thought to be 
representing different demands or outlooks in the society. Individuals prefer political 
parties that are close to their beliefs or positions (Dunn and Thornton 2016, Harteveld et 
al. 2017). Political party preferences, then, can be argued to be in line with these 
differences.  
Some scholars argue that differences in party preferences have their reflection on 
the normative perceptions on citizenship, because of an underlying ideological dimension 
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that influence both perceptions and party preferences (Dalton 2009). These preferences, 
when turned into partisanship, can have an effect on social and political attitudes of 
individuals (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996). In addition, political partisanship and 
political ideologies can have an impact on attitudes regarding political system and 
political institutions. More specifically, individuals with leftist ideological stances are 
skeptical about political institutions as they consider them as oppressive and partisans 
supporting the incumbent parties are more prone to have confidence in political 
institutions, such as the government (Aydın and Cenker 2011). 
These accounts suggest that political parties are different from each other in terms 
of issue priorities and policy stances and these differences have a reflection over 
individuals’ beliefs, attitudes, or perceptions. This study does not argue for a specific 
direction in the causal relationship between political parties and citizens’ perceptions on 
their rights and liberties and it does not rule out such possibility. Rather it investigates the 
relationship between perceptions and political party preferences. This chapter particularly 
delves into the political party literature to investigate why and how political parties differ 
from each other while discussing Turkish political party landscape especially in terms of 
their views on citizenship.  
This chapter is organized as follows: The first section discusses the arguments in 
the literature on the emergence and differentiation of political parties. The following 
section takes a closer look at Turkish political party landscape by discussing the 
cleavages, the emergence of parties and their changing positions.  
 
 
3.2 How Do Political Parties Emerge and Differentiate From 
Each Other? 
 
 
According to Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967:4) seminal study “parties have served as 
essential agents of mobilization.” The function of political parties is to translate the 
existing contrasts in the society into “demands and pressures for action or inaction.” 
(Lipset  and  Rokkan, 1967:5) In other words, parties “acted as representatives” in terms 
of “articulating interests, aggregating demands, translating collective preferences into 
distinct policy options.” (Mair, 2009:5) This is also how party linkage argument explains 
the relationship between parties and citizens; citizens/voters go and vote for the political 
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party that represents their policy preference and views (Dalton et al. 2011: 81). Hence, 
parties represent differences in the society. How these differences emerge and get 
translated into the political sphere constitute an important part of the literature.  
One account that seeks to explain emergence of political parties and party systems 
of them is the perspective represented by Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) study titled Party 
Systems and Voter Alignment: Cross-National Perspectives. This study investigates the 
conditions under which Western European party systems emerge through conducting 
historical-sociological analysis on developments during 19th and early 20th century. Due 
to various factors such as the “conditions for the expression of protest and the 
representation of interest,” cleavages influence the structure and characteristics of 
political party systems (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 26-27).  
According to this account, there are four major social cleavages in the European 
party system: central bureaucracy vs. peripheral subjects, church vs. state, rural vs. urban 
interests, and capitalists vs. working class (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 33-34).  For the 
authors, emergence of these cleavages and institutionalization of them as different party 
systems across Europe was determined by “the sequential interactions between” the 
establishment of nation-states and the Industrial Revolution (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 
34; Boix 2007: 502).  
Nationalism and formation of nation states across Europe has brought about 
centralized bureaucracy. Centralized bureaucracy signifies increasing control over the 
territories of the nation state as well as various aspects of administration, including 
taxation, property distribution, and state policies. This process of centralization has 
resulted in a conflict between the bureaucracy and the territorial peripheries, as well as 
the Catholic church.  
Industrial revolution, on the other hand, has resulted in a significant change in terms 
of the means and location of manufacturing. Industrial revolution has made cities as the 
hub of manufacturing, which has decreased the significance of rural areas, as opposed to 
rapidly growing cities. As a result, Industrial Revolution has influenced the emergence of 
two different types of conflicts: between urban and rural and capitalists and workers.  
More specifically, the model that the authors present relates critical junctures to 
these social cleavages. For instance, center-periphery cleavage corresponds to the 
Reformation vs. Counter-Reformation conflict during 16th and 17th centuries, where the 
contested issue was between national or peripheral religion and languages and centralized 
ones. Or, church-state cleavage is linked with the French Revolution and emergence of 
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nation states where these entities ended up clashing with each other over secular vs. 
religious control of education (Lipset  and  Rokkan 1967: 47).   
For Lipset and Rokkan (1967:26), in order to assess the ways in which sociocultural 
cleavages being translated into different political parties, one needs to know “the 
conditions for the expression of protest and the representation of interests” in those 
societies. In other words, the emergence of political parties out of sociocultural conflicts 
are bound by the structural features of a given polity. These features determine the 
opportunities for expressing dissent, establishing political associations, having access to 
decision making processes, and forming alliances. Hence, not every sociocultural 
cleavage automatically turn into a political party.  
For the authors, there are four sequential thresholds for such cleavage structures to 
be translated into the political arena: “(1) the threshold of legitimation, (2) the threshold 
of incorporation, (3) the threshold of representation, and (4) the threshold of majority 
power” (Lipset  and  Rokkan 1967: 27). More specifically, the first threshold is about 
whether there is any recognition of “the right of petition, criticism, and opposition,” as 
without such recognition it is not possible to act within the system as a legitimate political 
actor. The second threshold is related with the existence of political rights of oppositional 
actors, or lack thereof. In other words, this second threshold questions whether members 
of a social group have any right to participate in the political processes, such as voting. 
The third one is linked to the second threshold as it investigates whether the electoral 
system provides opportunities for new groups to “gain representation on their own” or 
they need to join established movements to have “access to representative organs.” 
Lastly, the fourth threshold is related with the institutional setting; whether the system 
allows pure majoritarianism or introduces checks and balances against “numerical 
majority.” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 27) Different degrees of these thresholds end up in 
different types of party systems.  
For others, institutional settings such as electoral or constitutional rules determine 
the number of parties and nature of a party system in a given setting (Duverger 1954). 
Institutional settings, such as electoral systems, may not allow some cleavages to be turn 
into political parties; while they may encourage others. For instance, in his study on the 
party formation in the context of emerging party systems, Kalyvas (1996: 295) argues 
that the existence of a “strong religious faith” does not have to be translated into a 
cleavage or a political party automatically. Emergence of Catholic political identity is not 
a natural outcome of religious differences, as there were also other differences based on 
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ethnicity and class; rather it was an outcome of strategic choices and decisions of political 
actors, namely Catholic movement and subsequent confessional parties (Kalyvas 1996: 
295).  
Qualifying cleavage theory, Kalyvas (1996: 308) argues that “‘critical junctures’ 
do not necessarily ‘produce’ parties.” Instead, the formation of parties can be explained 
through analyzing “contingent outcomes of strategic decisions” of political actors in the 
face of external pressures presented by institutional settings (Kalyvas 1996: 294). In the 
case of Christian Democrat parties, increasing efforts by the Liberals to decrease the 
power of the Church, including legislative reforms decreasing Church’s control over 
education or family in mid 19th century, had triggered Catholic actors to devise strategies 
of survival. More specifically, although neither the Church nor Conservative political 
actors wanted confessional parties to be established, outcomes of their strategic decisions, 
such as emergence of Catholic activists as new political actors as a result of Church’s 
efforts in creating a mass organization, or establishment of “ad hoc electoral coalitions” 
resulting in electoral success, have led to the introduction of Catholic political identity 
(Kalyvas 1996: 297-298, 301).  
Another argument which is similar to yet more sociological than strategic 
interaction argument, focuses on the active efforts of political parties in articulation of 
cleavages. Considering that cleavages do not have political power on their own, de Leon 
et al. (2015: 87) argue that political parties actively contribute to the mobilization of 
cleavages by constructing politics around a set of oppositions. This mechanism is called 
by the authors as “political articulation” and refers to the process through which “party 
practices naturalize class, ethnic, and racial formations as a basis of social division by 
integrating interests and identities into coherent sociopolitical blocs.” (de Leon et al. 
2009: 194-195) Hence, political parties play a decisive role in the articulation of 
cleavages, rather than being mere representatives of existent conflicts.  
In his work on the Hungarian political party Fidesz’s changing ideological position, 
Enyedi (2005: 699) also underlines the role of agency in mobilization of cleavages. 
Similar to the political articulation argument, Enyedi (2005) considers political parties as 
agents who can mold and manipulate existing conflict lines in the society to either shift 
their ideological position or create unified blocs. In Fidesz’s case, where the party has 
changed its ideological position from being pro-market liberal to an authoritarian right-
wing one, it was the party’s active efforts that consolidated a rather fragmented right-
wing electorate (Enyedi 2005: 717). In other words, Fidesz changed its position while 
 81 
influencing the society “to see politics as a struggle between mutually exclusive camps.” 
(Enyedi 2005: 716)  
Relevant political party literature, then, mainly suggests that there are two 
perspectives regarding the emergence of parties and the link between them and their 
constituencies. One of them considers parties as representatives of cleavages in the 
society, which were established through historical junctures and have laid the foundations 
for party systems. Focusing on historical evolution of conflicts into parties, this account 
considers the political party systems as reflections of cleavages that already exist or 
emerge as a result of major historical events. Hence one expects parties to display policy 
tendencies that is in line with the cleavages they claim to represent.  
The other account focuses more on actors and interactions between them within a 
given institutional setting. Although historical junctures are relevant, they are not the sole 
initiators of political party formation and differentiation. Political parties as rational 
actors are interest maximizers so their positioning vis-à-vis other parties and the 
electorate can change according to strategic calculations. At the same time, political 
parties and voters operate within an institutional setting which influences the preferences 
of them. In that case, parties can shift their positions regarding social and political issues 
for voting maximization or mobilization of the electorate within institutional limits. 
Overall it can be argued that there is a dynamic relation between parties and their 
bases. Parties do rely on existent social cleavages that are created by historical conflicts 
as well as critical junctures; yet they are also rational actors that strategically respond to 
the institutional and structural settings in which they operate. In other words, they rely on 
cleavages as bases of support while at the same actively contribute to their solidification 
and manipulate them for vote maximization. Thus, parties can have different positions 
regarding social and political issues due to the existent cleavage structures as well as 
strategic interest maximizing. Their positions can display ruptures and continuities.  
 
 
3.3 How Do Cleavage Structures and Strategic Action Arguments 
Account for Differences in the Understanding of Citizenship? 
 
 
The previous section focused on the different approaches regarding the emergence 
and differentiation of political parties. Before moving on to the Turkish political 
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landscape, it is useful to discuss implications of differences between parties on their 
understanding of citizenship.  
Citizenship is a political concept that defines an ideal relationship between the 
society and the state. Conceptualizations of citizenship matter because the definition of it 
delineates whom will have access to the decision-making processes in a polity (Kitschelt 
1994:296). Different understandings of citizenship exclude or include different groups in 
political decision-making processes. Political parties can adopt different 
conceptualizations of citizenship, i.e. prioritizing certain identities over the others in the 
decision-making processes, in line with the demands of cleavages they claim to represent 
or mobilize. Hence, they can appeal to different constituencies with different 
understandings citizenship.  
 
 
3.3.1 Cleavages and Citizenship Conceptualizations  
 
 
One approach for understanding the emergence and differentiation between 
political parties is the perspective suggested by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). As discussed 
above, they define four main axes of social conflict that has contributed to the Western 
European party system: center vs. periphery, church vs. state, rural vs. urban, and 
capitalists vs. working classes. Emerged via the impact of French Revolution and wave 
of nationalisms across Europe, center vs. periphery and to a certain extent church vs. state 
cleavages are products of the centralization efforts of newly founded nation states.  
Considering the conflict lines through which these cleavages developed, center vs. 
periphery distinction should contribute to a differentiation along national identity and 
national language. More specifically, factions of this cleavage should have different 
understandings of citizenship based on whether they prioritize a singular national identity 
or regional differences as the definition of citizenship. Since the conflict rests upon the 
clash between particular identities (or languages) and the centralization and unification 
efforts, citizenship understanding should reflect this clash as well where actors of the 
center prioritize singular identities while actors of the periphery emphasize regional 
differences against centralization efforts.  
Church vs. state cleavage was also related with this unification attempt where the 
central bureaucratic authorities wanted to have control over education, which in turn 
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threatened the political authority of the Catholic Church. Administrative control over 
education was required for the nation building efforts. Nation building meant to construct 
the citizen who is loyal to the nation and the state instead of the Church. Hence, the 
cleavage turned into a political rivalry between those who had the administrative control 
over secular education and those who had lost their previous social and political 
privileges, i.e. the clergy. That’s why this cleavage should separate those who have a 
more secular understanding of citizenship where religious convictions are confined 
within the private sphere and others who advocate for a more public religious identity 
concerning citizenship.  
When it comes to rural vs. urban and capitalists vs. working classes, the Industrial 
Revolution emerges as the critical juncture through which these social conflicts were 
born. With the development of industrial production, the cities had become increasingly 
important both in terms of work force and also competition between newly-emerged 
capitalists. Hence, rural areas became less populated and less influential 
socioeconomically. In addition, as cities grew, so did their populations, a significant 
amount of which were former peasants who turned into the labor force needed by the 
rapid industrialization. Hence, the conflict had turned into a political antagonism between 
agrarian interests and urban interests. One implication of this conflict was a divide in 
terms of “value orientations” between urban interests and agrarian interests (Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967:21). In Britain, for instance, rural vs. urban divide was culminated in the 
opposition between Conservatives and Liberals, where for the former “status” was 
associated with kinship while for the latter is was related with “enterprise.” (Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967: 19) More specifically, Conservatives defined social status in terms of 
landownership and kinship between landowners, while Liberals prioritized status in the 
city, which was related with entrepreneurship and ownership of capital for industrial 
production. Hence status for Conservatives was conceptualized as a privilege of 
landowners and they did not want to share this, whereas for Liberals status was something 
that was earned through free enterprise and thus connoted freedom and equality. That’s 
why, rural vs. urban dichotomy should result in distinct positions regarding equality and 
freedom in citizenship understanding. 
Although it is related with the rural vs. urban cleavage, the conflict between 
capitalists and working classes were more about economic interests, which turned into 
ideological rivalry between different classes. The clash between economic interests had 
resulted in the social, economic and political exclusion of the working class, while capital 
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owners enjoyed political and social recognition. As T.H. Marshall explains in his 
narrative of the evolution of citizenship rights in Britain, social rights were recognized at 
a later time than civil and political rights, which reflect the impact of this cleavage 
structure. This discrepancy had influenced the evolution of new political parties with 
distinct ideologies representing these cleavages. These political parties differ in terms of 
their ideological perspectives regarding membership and associated rights and liberties. 
Those situated at the working-class end of the conflict have a wider and positive outlook 
on these rights and liberties, as the initial cleavage structure was based upon the conflict 
between disenfranchised, unrecognized working class and the urban industrialists. 
This perspective focusing on cleavages suggests that there are different groups in 
the society with different interests based upon the cleavages which were products of 
historical events and critical junctures. These differences of interests, which sometimes 
correspond to distinct ideological positions, cover differences in the understanding of 
citizenship. Hence, political parties that claim to represent these groups display different 
positions regarding citizenship.  
For instance, on a more general level, left represents a more progressive and 
universalistic outlook concerning the relations between citizens and state, while right 
prioritizes protection of order, values and tradition. Hence, normatively, it is expected 
from “the political left” to advocate a more universalistic outlook on citizenship, while 
“the political right” supports a more ethnicized understanding (Joppke 2003: 431-432). 
Or libertarian6 political preferences have a more inclusive understanding of citizenship, 
while authoritarian preferences correspond to a more restrictive understanding which 
limits certain identities to be included in the scope of citizenship (Kitschelt 1992: 14) 
An example of such a differentiation was the process of change in German 
citizenship legislation. Despite the jus sanguinis-based history of citizenship in Germany, 
parties from each side of the political spectrum had republican outlooks during the 
parliamentary debates on the legal reform (Gerdes et al. 2007: 58). Yet, they differed in 
their definitions of citizenship: Christian Democrats’ rejection of dual citizenship was 
based on their emphasis on the importance of “cultural integration” while the Social 
                                                 
6 “Libertarian” is specifically chosen by Kitschelt and he associates the term with “anarchist and syndicalist theories 
of direct democracy, sympathetic to the self-organization of autonomous individuals and voluntary associations in 
collective decision-making processes.” (Kitschelt 1992: 13). Hence, libertarian here denotes autonomous action of 
individuals or policies promoting and securing such autonomy, instead of the other usage of the term that prioritizes 
markets. Even though my research does not use “libertarian” as a dimension of citizenship understandings, 
Kitschelt’s argument is included to refer to his research on differences in political preferences and their relations to 
citizenship understandings without changing his original wording. That’s why I kept this reference to “libertarian” 
political preferences. 
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Democrats, the Greens and the other leftist political actors prioritized a more legal and 
political understanding of integration (Gerdes et al. 2007: 66-67). 
Cleavages can also be mobilized around specific issues, which may lead different 
groups to act in unison contrary to the assumption of stability of such cleavages. An 
example of this kind of mobilization occurred during the 1988 plebiscite in Chile. While 
there is a clear cleavage between traditional religious conservatives and secular socialists, 
these two groups have come together in the context of 1988 plebiscite. This referendum 
was about whether Pinochet, the leader of the junta that ruled the country since 1973, 
should stay as the president or not. The referendum process brought religious 
conservatives and secular socialists together for a campaign against military rule. This 
coalition had continued after the referendum, which was resulted in the victory of the 
anti-authoritarian group (Valenzuela et al 2007). This anti-authoritarian mobilization of 
religious conservatives and secular socialists against the pro-Pinochet groups had a 
lasting impact causing some to argue for emergence of a new cleavage in Chilean politics 
(Gunther and Hsin-chi 2007; Torcal and Mainwaring 2003). Although Chilean example 
is not directly related with differences in understanding of citizenship, it demonstrates 
how cleavages, which are thought to be irreconcilable, can be mobilized together for a 
specific position. Hence, religious conservative and secular socialist groups may still have 
specific understandings on citizenship but they can shift their positions as well, which 
suggests that cleavages and corresponding positions concerning citizenship are not static. 
This dynamic understanding of cleavages in societies and their mobilization are 
investigated by the literature focusing on strategic positioning, which will be discussed 
in the next section. 
 
 
3.3.2 Strategic Positioning and Citizenship Conceptualizations 
 
 
The other major perspective explaining the differences between political parties is 
related with the strategic actions of these rational actors due to external pressures 
presented by institutional settings (Kalyvas 1996) or their efforts in politically articulating 
cleavages (De Leon et al. 2009, 2015; Enyedi 2005).  
The strategic actions include competing, compromising or coalescing with rival 
actors in the face of external pressures. Hence, even though these actors have certain 
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affinities with specific social conflicts in the society, not every cleavage has to be 
translated into political parties. In fact, these strategic actions can result in the 
development and mobilization of specific cleavages. For proponents of this perspective, 
“the formation and action of the Catholic movement and confessional parties created a 
Catholic political identity”, instead of the process suggested by church vs. state cleavage 
structure argument (Kalyvas 1998: 295).  
In other words, specific cleavages were selected and mobilized by the political 
actors. Once a cleavage was selected to be mobilized and a corresponding political 
identity was created, it became instrumental in mobilizing groups who had differences in 
terms of class or ethnic lines. When this perspective is concerned, the strategic attempts 
at creating and mobilizing differences are expected to be more influential than ideologies 
or cleavage structures initiated by historical junctures. Hence, according to this approach, 
political parties develop understandings on citizenship and the relationship between state 
and society benefitting their own strategic agenda. In any case, such an understanding 
excludes some while incorporating others, i.e. its target audience, into a specific category. 
Thus, if it emerges as beneficial for the actors, polarization can become a useful 
instrument such as in the case of Fidesz, as the party elite consolidated right-wing voters 
through promoting a polarized understanding of politics (Enyedi 2005).  
Immigration emerges as a highly-politicized issue that has been influencing the 
positions of political parties. Recent research demonstrates that the rise of populist right 
wing parties and their success in mobilizing anti-immigrant sentiment in the society are 
associated with the emergence and institutionalization of citizenship tests for 
naturalization across Europe (Howard 2006, 2010). In the face of this mobilization, many 
European governments have engaged in strategic calculations for preserving their vote 
bases and hence introduced such tests as a means of enhancing citizenship as a unifying 
identity (Joppke 2007). For instance, in the Netherlands such tests were introduced as a 
result of the efforts by Christian Democrat and Conservative Liberal parties (Van Oers 
2008: 56).  
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3.3.3 Cleavages and Strategic Action: What Do These Two 
Accounts Suggest About Understandings of Citizenship 
 
 
Although these two approaches seem distinct, taken together, they explain the 
dynamic interactions between political parties and cleavages. There are and will be 
conflicts in society based on clashes of different interests. Yet, it is important to mobilize 
these conflicts so that they can have an impact on political processes. Political parties, as 
rational actors, pick specific cleavages to represent and mobilize or they articulate new 
ones out of the existent cleavages for vote maximization strategies. In other words, they 
rely on existing conflicts in the society but mobilize them in a selective manner. Hence, 
they develop distinct positions which claim to represent the interests of their distinct 
constituencies.  
 This combination suggests that political parties change their positions while 
utilizing the existent cleavage structures, which are not static. They politicize new issues 
in a way that contributes to their claims for representing their constituencies. Hence, they 
can develop specific understandings of citizenship and mobilize their target audience 
accordingly. In addition, these understandings can be changed if and when preferences of 
these constituencies change. Immigration issue is a good example of this as it was used 
for mobilization by different parties in different manners to project their understandings 
of citizenship, which are contingent upon the dynamics of their target electorate. It seems 
both cleavage structures and strategic action are relevant for political parties’ 
understandings of citizenship and their claims for mobilizing the electorate. 
The next section will discuss the historical account of Turkish political parties while 
at the same time, debate the theoretical expectations concerning their differences in terms 
of citizenship. Firstly, the dominant perspective on Turkish political landscape will be 
delineated and then implications of this dominant perspective, i.e. center and periphery 
approach, in the context of citizenship understandings will be discussed. Later, the section 
will discuss the political party history and changing actors and positions in this landscape 
with a specific focus on citizenship policies. The historical evaluation of political party 
landscape suggests that political parties in Turkey have not only mobilized certain 
cleavages, they have also engaged in strategic action for vote maximization. Hence, their 
positions concerning citizenship have changed based on their electoral strategies. 
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3.4 Turkish Political Party Landscape 
 
 
3.4.1 Center and Periphery Approach to Turkish Politics and Its 
Critics   
 
 
According to scholars of Turkish politics, the political landscape in Turkey 
demonstrates continuities with its predecessor, Ottoman Empire, on various grounds. 
Mardin’s (1973: 170) “center-periphery” argument, in his highly influential article titled 
Centre-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics, analyzes the late Ottoman social 
and political history through a dichotomous reading where center signifies “those who 
are able to shape society’s central values” while periphery stands for those who are at the 
receiving end of this value transmission.  
The center vs. periphery dichotomy used by Mardin was borrowed from Shils’ 
conceptualization, yet one can notice certain similarities between Mardin’s take and how 
Lipset and Rokkan define cleavages. For Lipset and Rokkan, center and periphery 
cleavage mainly arises from the clash of interest between centralization of national 
identity and regional identities. Church and state dichotomy, described as a separate 
cleavage by Lipset and Rokkan, suggests the conflict between centralized 
administration’s control over education and Church’s reluctance in giving up on its 
privileges. Mardin’s account on center and periphery cleavage has elements from both of 
these cleavage structures, as his interpretation is related with modernization efforts of the 
newly established, centralized nation state. Yet, Mardin, and Shils (whose account 
inspired Mardin), have a more sociological understanding of this dichotomy that goes 
beyond party systems and voting behavior. That’s how Mardin’s account differ from 
Lipset and Rokkan’s. 
For Shils (1975:3) center is not a specific location, but more as a realm of values 
and beliefs. These values and beliefs are internalized by the society and constitute the 
“central value system.” (Shils 1975:4) In addition, this value system incorporates the 
central institutional system which establishes the foundational institutions of the society 
upon these central values. This central value system espouses authority over the society 
and those who have close ties with authority, namely the elites, are considered to be 
“custodians” of the values of the center and they observe the conformation of these values 
(Shils 1975:9). Shils’ conceptualization suggests that central value system is responsible 
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for integration of the society through values, about which elites, central authority and 
central institutions agree upon.  
Periphery, on the other hand, is the realm where the authority of the center is 
imposed upon. It signifies a certain symbolic distance to the center. Those in the periphery 
differ from the central elites not only in terms of their distance to authority but also the 
level of acceptance of the central value system. Shils does not suggest that periphery is 
in full rejection of central values as modernization has introduced institutions such as 
centralized education, universal franchise and mass communication which contribute to 
the dissemination of central values in modern societies (Shils 1975: 14). Rather, he 
suggests that there can be “a limit to consensus” and those in the periphery may partially 
internalize central values, albeit the impact of modernization (Shils 1975:11, 16).  
 Mardin (1973) applies Shils’ account on the center and periphery relations to 
analyze the modernization processes in the Ottoman Empire and early Turkish Republic.  
The center in this account is represented by the bureaucratic elite, while the remaining 
masses constitute the periphery, upon which the modernization project was imposed. 
During the late Ottoman era, the modernization processes had caused a bureaucratic elite 
to emerge, who tried to impose centralization over the peripheral regions of the Empire. 
Carrying out the same mission, the bureaucratic elite of the early Republican era crafted 
a modernization process which involved stricter measures for centralization of political 
authority. Secularism and Turkish nationalism emerged as central values and institutions 
such as secularized education become the components of central institutional system. In 
that picture, the Republican elite had taken up the role of protecting these values and 
institutions. These values were disseminated through central institutional system so that 
the periphery, as the recipient of these efforts, would be integrated into the modernization 
process and the new central value structure. In that sense, even though the content of 
center had changed from Ottoman Empire to Turkish Republic, the antagonism between 
center and periphery had continued.  
Defining characteristic of this cleavage is suspicion of the center towards the 
periphery, which has its roots at the segregation between ruling elite at the center with 
political and economic control and Muslim population in Anatolia in the Ottoman society 
(Mardin 1973: 171). The conflict between these two factions were cultural, as the subject 
of the conflict was about value orientations (Mardin 1973).  
Mardin does not consider the conflict between center and periphery to emerge out 
of the secular vs. Islamic tendencies. Instead, the periphery constituted those who were 
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excluded or failed to join in the modernization processes and they relied on Islam as their 
value system. In that sense, Islam had become a peripheral value as a result of the secular 
modernization project imposed by the central elites that uprooted Islam from the central 
value system. Peripheral actors’ affinity towards Islam, in that sense, emerged as a 
response to the exclusion that these actors experienced (Mardin 1973: 179). This affinity 
influenced political actors to mobilize peripheral masses through a religious discourse.  
Advocating a more institutionalist analysis, Heper (1985), in his book titled The 
State Tradition in Turkey, considers center to be interchangeable with the notion of state, 
with its bureaucratic and military elite (Özman and Coşar 2001: 86). He considers the 
strong state tradition that came into existence in the center to be the common theme 
between Ottoman and Republican modernization processes. Against this center, there was 
a rural, fragmented, and unorganized periphery, which was seen with a level of suspicion 
because of its low level of integration with the center.  
Heper (1985) argues that there is a “vicious circle” between cleavage structures, i.e. 
central bureaucracy vs. rural periphery, and the state itself. As a product of the top-down 
modernization process, Turkish state was envisaged as a strong entity and incorporated 
by the central bureaucratic elite, who considers itself as having the mission to regulate 
political affairs while protecting the values of the state against intrusions from the 
peripheral value structures.  
Heper’s interpretation of center and periphery conflict prioritizes a different 
dimension where elites of the center, including bureaucracy and military, get into clashes 
with civilian political elites for the control of the strong state. In other words, political 
sphere is an arena where elites compete for the control of the center, which allows one to 
determine the legitimacy of political activities (Özman and Coşar 2001: 88). Here, the 
strong state, dominated by the central elite, emerges as a political actor itself and 
diminishes the sphere of action of civilian politics. 
Similarly, Baban (2008: 77) underlines the role of modernization efforts by the 
Republican project in injecting a common set of values that were assumed to be shared 
by all. Within this framework, state was assumed to be the sole protector of the interests 
of the nation which led to negation of interests other than those disseminated by the 
center. In other words, politics was not a plural, autonomous endeavor because of the 
heavy influence of state elites over this sphere. Instead, political arena was dominated by 
the presence of the state and the values it deemed to be fundamental for its own existence. 
Promotion of other values through political activity was considered to be anti-
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establishment or against the central value structure. In that sense, protection of the state 
and its core values became the most essential aim of political activity.  
In that sense, peripheral political actors who were perceived as disruptive of the 
central value structure because they acted in an excessive manner and fed into the 
suspicions of the central elites, were excluded from the sphere of legitimate political 
activity (Heper 1985). This have caused the conflict between center and periphery to 
deepen according to Heper: the actors of the center who consider themselves as the 
guardians of central value structures determine the limits of political activity which had 
excluded those who failed to or rejected integration into this value structure. In return, 
these peripheral actors had utilized a discourse on national will for injecting legitimacy 
to their political activities, which proved to be a successful strategy for mobilizing 
different societal interests that were lumped together as the periphery. The arguments 
proposed by Mardin and Heper suggest that the foundational value structure of the center 
included strict secularism, nationalism, and primacy of state as its fundamental values.  
There are those who are critical of center and periphery approach in terms of its 
explanatory power either for the current state of Turkish politics or for the voting patterns 
in Turkey. For instance, some scholars consider center and periphery argument to cause 
analyses on Turkish politics to have a dualist character where the political landscape is 
depicted solely as a clash between authoritarian state and democratic-populist masses 
(Açıkel 2006:33-34). This perspective disregards the potential interactions and transitions 
between center and periphery, as well as internal conflicts within them (Açıkel 2006, 
Gönenç 2006).  For others, the dichotomy between center and periphery is just a discourse 
utilized by political elites competing for the control of government and bureaucracy and 
it disguises the socio-economic discrepancy in the society (Demiralp 2012) or power 
struggles between political actors, such as the “secular establishment” populated military, 
judiciary, central bureaucracy and “Islamic actors” referring to pro-Islamist politicians 
(Kandiyoti 2012:528).  
For the critics, it is no longer possible to consider these two spheres as 
homogeneous within themselves. The periphery now includes a variety of different 
demands, interests and actors. For instance, Gönenç (2006: 132-133) offers a more 
nuanced differentiation between distant periphery and close periphery, where the actors 
of the former are in conflict with the central value structures while those of the latter 
reconcile with the center to a certain extent. That differentiation suggests that some actors 
in the periphery are accepted by the center while others, who refuse to reconcile, are 
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delegitimized. This observation is important especially because of demonstrating the 
mobilization capabilities of political parties given the heterogeneity of the periphery. 
Center and periphery perspective is used by many empirical studies on Turkish 
voting behavior. For these studies, Turkey’s political party landscape still reflects this 
dichotomy between different value structures (Kalaycıoğlu 2008, 2012, Hale and 
Özbudun 2010, Aytaç et al. 2017). More specifically, these studies suggest that center 
and periphery cleavage is still relevant for Turkish politics when it is redefined in terms 
of secular vs. religious dichotomy. These empirical studies suggest that secular vs. 
religious dichotomy that drives voter behavior can be interpreted as the current form of 
center vs. periphery cleavage in Turkey. 
There are certain nuances within the empirical studies using the center and 
periphery dichotomy. For instance, Kalaycıoğlu (1994) argues that during 1990s it was 
not possible to argue for a single actor that represented the values and interests of the 
center given the fragmented nature of political party system. Same thing also existed for 
periphery as there was no single representative of that realm. The reason is that in the 
post-1980 political landscape, the meaning of center, which was crystallized in the single-
party era and its aftermath until the 1960 coup, has changed (Kalaycıoğlu 1994:407). For 
the author, the values of center were no longer shared by all actors of the center, which 
made the sphere politically heterogeneous at the elite level.  Therefore, Kalaycıoğlu 
(1994:409) argues that the conflict between religiosity and secularism was “the issue over 
which wide differences persist” within the electorate. That’s why his approach to the issue 
revolves around this dichotomy. In fact, in another article, Kalaycıoğlu (2012:7) reads 
this dichotomy in a more extensive sense where he interprets the partisan differences in 
the context of 2010 constitutional referendum as a kulturkampf between those who have 
a “secular image of good society” and those with a “conservative image.” Hence, he 
projects the elite level differentiation between the value structures of center and periphery 
onto the society with a specific interpretation of the concept as a dichotomy between 
religious and secular individuals. 
Focusing on the voting patterns, Wuthrich criticizes the frequent usage of center 
and periphery in explaining voting behavior in Turkey. For Wuthrich (2015) the 
assumption of center and periphery as a long-lasting, unchanging cleavage structure that 
defines the differentiation of political parties and voters is misleading as it is impossible 
to argue for an all-powerful center against a powerless periphery given the electoral 
dominance of center-right in Turkey, which is considered to be in the periphery.  
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The first reason is the shifting political divisions that demonstrate the plurality of 
interests within both fields which suggests that neither center nor periphery are static 
entities. Secondly, proponents of center and periphery analysis rely more on Lipset and 
Rokkan’s understanding rather than Mardin’s conceptualization, which is influenced by 
Shils. For Shilsian perspective of center and periphery the main fault line is the integration 
into the central value system; periphery is composed of those who failed or rejected to be 
integrated into this system. The basis of the conflict between them is about clashing value 
systems. Yet, Shils underlines the role of education, administrative centralization, 
urbanization as accelerating the process and possibility of integration of the periphery. 
Given that processes such as education, centralization, urbanization are all existent in 
Turkey, it is not possible to argue for a clear differentiation between center and periphery 
today (Wuthrich 2015). In addition, for Wuthrich (2015) voting patterns suggest that the 
political parties of the periphery have been ruling the country for the most of the 
Republican history which challenges the assumption of powerlessness in the periphery. 
Hence, for Wuthrich (2015) it is not the center and periphery that still defines Turkish 
political landscape; rather, it is the success of political parties in strategically utilizing and 
mobilizing material concerns of the voters, which was evident in their campaign 
strategies.  
Although the interpretation of center vs. periphery dichotomy as a rivalry between 
secular vs. religious voters within the voting behavior literature has empirical validity, 
this study interprets center vs. periphery as a differentiation between citizenship 
understandings based on the central value structures and those that pose a challenge 
against them. Main reason for that decision is that this study focuses on citizenship 
perceptions. Since citizenship is about the nature of state and society relations, macro-
level reinterpretation of center and periphery will be more useful. In addition, the 
interpretation of center and periphery in terms of an electoral competition between secular 
and religious votes is not in line with the original perspective suggested by Mardin 
because his account does not take religiosity of the periphery to be a cause; rather it is an 
effect of the imposition of a certain value structure over the periphery.  
Secondly, Mardin (1973:187) argues that there is evidence for “differentiation 
within the periphery” even though some of his critics challenged his account for being 
monolithic. Yet, associating center and periphery with secular vs. religious values, as 
various voting behavior studies do, ignores the multidimensional character of these 
spheres especially in terms of citizenship understanding. Religiosity or secularism are 
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determinants of voting behavior but both center and periphery are now too complex and 
in interaction with each other to be solely defined in terms of them; there are various other 
actors, demands, and interests.  
Lastly, conceptualization of center vs. periphery as secular vs. religious dichotomy 
may cause one to ignore the strategies of political parties use to mobilize different 
interests and their changing positions, as well as the interactions between center and 
periphery. A static understanding of center vs. periphery in the form of secular vs. 
religious cannot account for these changes. 
Hence, center vs. periphery defined in terms of secularism vs. religiosity may be 
relevant for voting behavior in Turkey but it should not be limited to these values. In 
addition, Mardin’s and Heper’s sociological accounts suggest that it is not only 
secularism but also statism and nationalism that are also among the values cherished, 
disseminated and protected by the center. Periphery, as composed of the identities or 
groups that are excluded from the citizenship understanding projected by the central value 
structure, proposes challenges against such understanding. In other words, if the 
periphery includes those who are excluded, then their political mobilization should aim 
at being recognized and included in the definition of demos. For that purpose, they can 
have alternative understandings of citizenship that challenge the definition suggested by 
the central value structure. These alternative understandings can have different priorities 
as the periphery is not a homogeneous realm. For instance, religious political mobilization 
has challenged strict secularism, while refraining from challenging nationalism7 or 
statism per se, signifying that the latter two might be utilized by peripheral actors (Mardin 
2005)8. Moreover, Kurdish political mobilization’s challenge has targeted nationalist and 
statist aspects of the citizenship understanding imposed by the central value structure, as 
their demands for recognition emanated from these values. 
Hence, while this study does not reject the impact of religiosity and secularism on 
voting behavior, which are empirically proven to be significant for party preferences, it 
offers a different interpretation of center and periphery that is related with the competition 
between value structures concerning citizenship. As the definition of citizenship can 
exclude some identities while drawing the boundaries of membership, political actors 
                                                 
7 Except from the case of Kurdish movement which is a part of the sociological periphery.  
8 For Mardin (2005:147) argues that “state was a life-form through which channels all authorities, whether secular or 
religious, operated to achievement and success”. Hence, the idea of state is not something that is rejected by Islamist 
political movement. Rather, it was the specific understanding of state, promoted by the central value structure of the 
Republic, that Islamists argued against. Nationalism is also another value that is shared by Islamist periphery 
especially when it is useful for vote maximization. 
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controlling the center have the power to produce and disseminate the values upon which 
this definition is established. In other words, center is the locus of power where the 
definition of demos is made, including some while excluding others. In response, those 
who are excluded and whose rights and liberties are ignored constitute the periphery. This 
periphery can emerge as the locus of alternative conceptions of citizenship, which pose a 
challenge to the citizenship understanding established and disseminated by the center. 
The scope and content of such challenge can differ as the periphery includes a variety of 
identities, demands, and interests. Thus, the alternative citizenship accounts that are 
promoted by political parties representing the periphery can differ in terms of the 
segments that they claim to mobilize. 
 
 
3.5 Trajectory of Political Party Positions in terms of the 
Understandings of Citizenship in Turkey 
 
 
 Center and periphery approach proposed by Mardin has been very influential for 
understanding Turkish political landscape. For the proponents of this approach, before 
the initiation of multi-party democracy, CHP9 represented the center, which was occupied 
by bureaucracy during the single party period. The success of Democrat Party (DP) in the 
first multi-party elections in 1950 was the first instance where the periphery was 
mobilized in a political manner. For Mardin (1973:185), Democrat Party (DP)’s success 
was a result of re-legitimizing Islam and traditional rural values.  
The experience of democracy was halted with the military coup in 1960. After 
1960s, the actors in the center, such as the bureaucracy, military, and the judiciary 
prioritized preservation of the central value system while actors claiming to represent and 
mobilize the periphery produced a counter-official culture (Mardin 1973:187).  
Post-1960 political landscape was significantly different than the previous periods 
in terms of civil society activism and political mobilization of various interests. In fact, it 
was during the 1960s when the ideological left and right emerged as a determinant of 
voting behavior, as well as a source of differentiation between political parties. Civil 
society activism had turned into street violence during the 1970s, which became the 
pretext for the military to intervene once again in 1980. 
                                                 
9 Tur: “Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi” Eng: “Republican People’s Party” 
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1980 coup’s impact on political life was severe in terms of political pluralism. Not 
only old parties were banned for a couple of years, many activists and politicians were 
jailed. The constitution drafted after the coup was also more authoritarian compared to 
the 1961 Constitution, which had a negative influence over rights and liberties in Turkey. 
1981 Constitution reestablished the center, which had stricter emphasis on Turkish-
Islamic synthesis, with heavier control over religion. 
The emphasis on Turkish-Islamic synthesis as the central value structure had 
corresponded to a more value-based political competition between center and periphery. 
This differentiation was evident in the political competition during the 1990s. Yet, it was 
also during the 1990s when different actors, such as political Islamists, Kurds, or Alevis 
started to emerge within the periphery, which signified the plurality of that realm.  
In addition, during the 1990s, the interactions between center and periphery have 
increased to a level where it is no longer possible to detect such a clear line between them. 
Centralized secular education, urbanization, and globalization have nurtured the actors in 
the periphery, who have become significant players in the political and economic fields. 
In that sense, it is no longer possible to identify periphery as a collection of uneducated, 
poor, traditional groups. Although there are traditional groups with low levels of 
education and socio-economic status, some segments of the periphery have accumulated 
political and economic capital, such as the emergence of small business owners across 
Anatolia. This development suggests that periphery is not a monolithic entity and there 
can emerge centers within the periphery.  
Although the interests of the periphery have diversified over the years, political 
parties have successfully claimed to project a singular understanding of periphery and 
mobilize groups with different interests. Epitomized in the successive victories of AKP10 
since 2002, periphery, composed of distinct groups, has been mobilized as it is a 
homogenous group. 
In fact, the long-run electoral hegemony of AKP had turned into another 
authoritarian project as the party settled in the center and started to build and project its 
own central value structure for the rest of the society to get integrated into (Açıkel 
2006:59-60). This impact of electoral hegemony suggests that once an actor is positioned 
at the center, the focus of political activity is shifted towards preserving the central value 
                                                 
10 Tur: “Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi” Eng: “Justice and Development Party” 
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structure, which can be redefined by the political actors. Hence, AKP’s current position 
as the actor of the center can be interpreted as an authoritarian project.  
The following sections will trace the changes that took place in the Turkish political 
landscape with a focus on the changing nature of the center-periphery cleavage and its 
impact on the changes and continuities of citizenship understandings of various actors.  
 
 
3.5.1 Single Party Era (1923-1946) 
 
 
The center of the center and periphery argument that influenced many students of 
Turkish politics had its most clear representation during the single party era. The founding 
party of the Turkish Republic, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), emerged as the 
political party of the center through which core values were disseminated (Özbudun 2013: 
25-27). The central values of the new regime were strict secularism, nationalism, and 
prioritization of the state.  
During the single party regime, CHP’s take on citizenship rested upon a singular 
national identity, with specific ethnic connotations regarding ethnic identity and 
language. Due to the centralization efforts, citizenship emerged as a political instrument 
to generate a homogeneous society. In addition, the top-down process of state and nation 
building had prioritized state over the individual, which had lead citizenship duties to be 
emphasized more than the rights. In addition, CHP’s policy of administrative control had 
led religious identities to be kept in the private sphere as the early Republican citizen was 
depicted as someone secular. This cultural dominance of the center was implemented at 
the expense of exclusion of the periphery, which had resulted in intensifying “the age-old 
cleavage in Turkish society.” (Özbudun 2013:29)  
Being the political actor representing the center, CHP elite had taken up the role of 
promoting, disseminating and protecting the central values. Alongside with the civil 
bureaucrats, the elite of CHP had also assumed the role of the protector of “the republican 
state.” (Heper 1985: 115) The reason was the “virtual merger” between CHP and the 
bureaucracy in sustaining the reforms made in the modernization process (Heper 1985: 
71). Hence, constitution of 1924 and relevant citizenship legislation during the single 
party era reflect this amalgamation of CHP with the state, which designed, implemented, 
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disseminated and protected the central value structure of the new Republic. CHP’s 
programs and policies during the single party era reflected this perspective. 
 One of the significant aspects of the party position of CHP during the single party 
era was the heavy emphasis on secularism in the electoral manifestos (İnce 2012:41). In 
addition to secularism, Turkishness was identified with Turkish culture and Turkish 
language as 1923 and 1927 programs of the party stated that those who accepted Turkish 
citizenship, defined in terms of being incorporated into Turkish culture and speaking 
Turkish, could join CHP. Hence, CHP during the single party era had an assimilationist 
understanding of nationalism, which recognized non-Turkish Muslims as long as they 
were assimilated into the unitary understanding of citizenship, while non-Muslims were 
not recognized.  
 CHP’s nationalist outlook on citizenship and top-down modernization process 
were also evident in its programs and the policies. While CHP’s programs reflected the 
duty-oriented citizenship understanding in the official school textbooks, nationalist 
perspective was implemented through various policies. For instance, promotion of 
Turkish language was very aggressive as exemplified by the introduction of Turkish 
History and Sun Language Theses. These theses were created within the context of top-
down nation building process in order to generate a new genealogy for the nation which 
was drastically different from the Ottoman historiography. The main assumption was the 
racial superiority of Turks. The theses suggested that Turks were originated from the 
Central Asia and their migration to the rest of the world initiated various civilizations to 
emerge around the world. Hence, the theses assumed many communities in Europe, Asia 
and Middle East were either originated from Turks or influenced by them. In addition, 
Kurds were considered as tribal Turks that were living in remote areas in Anatolia. Sun 
Language Thesis was similar in terms of assuming Turkish language to be one of the first 
systematic languages in the world and the source of many other languages.   
 Among the legislation that reflected the ethno-religious understanding of 
citizenship, the Law on Settlement No.2510 was the most well-known one in terms of the 
attempts of Turkification. Put into practice in 1934, one of the targets of this law was the 
Kurdish population, whom would be relocated to areas populated by Turkish population 
for the purpose of assimilation. This law and other ethnicist policies were results of the 
Kurdish uprisings during the formative years of the Republic. These rebellions, including 
the Sheikh Said uprising in 1925, were considered as religiously-motivated but they were 
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also the first instances where peripheral actors rejected the nationalist integration project 
imposed upon by the central bureaucratic elite (Gönenç 2006: 137).  
 There were other legislations and policies put into practice under CHP 
government during the single party era that reflected the citizenship understanding of the 
central value structure. One of them was the population exchange between Greeks living 
in İstanbul and Muslims living in Thrace. Population exchange agreement that was signed 
in 1923 had resulted in 1,2 million Anatolian Greeks to leave and 400,000 Rumelian 
Muslims to be relocated in Anatolia (İnce 2012:51). The population exchange was framed 
as a step in the unification of the nation which had implicitly acknowledged Islam as a 
shared identity.  
 Another such policy was the Law on Surnames passed in 1934. This law 
prohibited surnames that reflected rank, tribe, foreign race or nationality and allowed only 
those that were Turkish (İnce 2012:61). As a result of this law, many non-Muslim citizens 
had to adopt Turkish surnames or Turkified versions of their family names. Together with 
the “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” campaign, which promoted Turkish as the single language 
and excluded other languages, these policies sparked criticisms and unrest among non-
Muslim citizens. For instance, representatives of the Jewish communities criticized the 
punishments of those who speak other languages in public spaces for treating them as 
half or guest citizens (İnce 2012: 61). These policies demonstrated that the 
interpenetration of CHP and the state during the single party era was reflected in 
citizenship legislation and policies, while relatively weak reactions against them 
suggested the potential for alternative understandings of Turkish citizenship.   
 In addition to the identity aspect, CHP’s understanding of citizenship emphasized 
duties more than rights not just through school textbooks but also via indirect means such 
as establishment of the People’s Houses. These Houses were designed as public spaces 
where citizens were informed about the founding principles of the new nation state. 
Attendance to these spaces was considered to be essential for the creation of the new 
citizen. This new citizen was framed as a duty-bearer, whose rights and liberties were 
conditional upon the fulfilment of duties, according to the journals published by the 
People’s Houses (İnce 2012: 65-66). These Houses were taken over by the DP 
government in 1951 for being “elitist organizations promoting one-party rule and alien to 
the needs of the citizens.” (İnce 2012: 67) 
 The single party era was demonstrative of the establishment of the center and its 
ethno-religious understanding of Turkish citizenship. The scope of this understanding did 
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not include different ethnicities, languages, religious practices unless they were 
assimilated into the official understanding promoted by the central value system and 
institutions represented by CHP and bureaucracy. The Kurdish uprisings were early 
examples of reaction against this understanding emerging from the periphery, which 
continued in different forms throughout the Republican history.   
 The introduction of multi-party politics influenced both the position of CHP and 
the understandings of citizenship during that era. The next subsection focuses on that 
period. 
 
3.5.2 Multi Party Era (1946-1960) 
 
 
The multiparty era between 1946-1960 signified the initiation of political 
competition in Turkish Republic. For citizenship is a politically contested concept, such 
competition led to different understandings of citizenship to emerge.  
This political competition between CHP and DP could be understood as the 
reflection of center and periphery cleavage on to the political landscape as now DP 
emerged as the representative of the “‘democratic’ periphery.” (Mardin 1973:186). For 
some, DP and CHP differed in terms of the interests they represented; while DP’s 
constituency was predominantly rural with agrarian interests, CHP came to represent 
urban populations (Zürcher 2004). For others, actual voting patterns suggest a contrary 
picture. Wuthrich (2015) demonstrates that DP got most of its votes from the coastal 
towns while CHP obtained a lot of votes from the rural areas and Southeastern Anatolia 
in the elections. This observation confirms that center and periphery in Turkey were not 
geographical realms.  
DP’s challenge to CHP was constructed in terms of a clash between “national will” 
and “the bureaucratic elites” as the party elite used this argument for legitimizing its 
political presence while condemning the single party era and its policies. Hence, 
utilization of “national will” was strategic for mobilizing the peripheral votes. 
 Being faced with competition with the establishment of DP in 1946, CHP tried to 
liberalize its position on citizenship rights and liberties as evident in the changes of its 
manifestos. 1947 manifesto of CHP explicitly supported a more extensive outlook on 
rights and liberties (İnce 2012: 90). Another instance of liberalization was the ratification 
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of Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1947 and establishment of Turkish 
Women’s Union for promoting and protecting women’s rights.  
 Being in the opposition during the late 40s, DP argued that these reforms were not 
adequate enough to meet necessary standards for liberalization. In fact, their 1946 
manifesto referred to basic rights and liberties, liberalism and democracy in the context 
of religious liberties for all including non-Muslims as well (İnce 2012: 91).  
 DP’s impact as the sole opposition to CHP was politically influential as its 
continuous emphasis on free and fair elections had forced CHP to initiate a law 
guaranteeing secret ballot system. In addition, in 1946, CHP started to admit non-
Muslims as members while the tight grip over educational rights over non-Muslims were 
relaxed (İnce 2012: 96). Moreover, the understanding of nationalism had become less 
ethnicist in this period. This change of tone was important because DP was already 
defending a less ethnic and less religious understanding of the society and incorporated 
non-Muslims as candidates which had influenced non-Muslims to voice their criticisms 
towards the single party government (İnce 2012:99-100). DP’s less strict nationalism also 
influenced CHP to alter Law on Settlement in 1947 so that previously relocated Kurds 
can return to their homes (İnce 2012: 107). Hence, DP’s rhetoric in the opposition was 
influential for future liberalization of citizenship rights and liberties. 
 The initial years of DP governments, between 1950 and 1955, was reflective of 
its earlier promises for more liberalization, which could be interpreted as a peripheral 
challenge to the central value structure. Thanks to its relatively inclusive outlook on 
citizenship, non-Muslims supported DP in 1950 elections (İnce 2012: 101). The instances 
of liberalization in citizenship could be found in the school textbooks. They started to 
emphasize democracy, political participation, and political pluralism. In addition, 
mentions of citizenship rights and liberties increased, while significance of duties 
remained intact (İnce 2012: 109).  
 Yet, nationalist undertones were still in effect as accepting Turkish culture was 
one of the prerequisites for DP party membership. In addition, nationalist outlook was 
already incorporated in the social and political culture which had resulted in the 6-7 
September events in 1955. Started with a newspaper article stating that Atatürk’s house 
was bombed in Thessalonica, anti-Greek rallies were arranged and had resulted in violent 
riots destructing houses and businesses of non-Muslims. These events led to heavy 
criticisms against the government with a specific discourse of equal citizenship but did 
not improve the conditions of non-Muslim minorities.  
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 In addition, DP had promises for Kurdish minority as its first congress explicitly 
stated that all citizens have the same rights and liberties. Yet, policy-wise DP was not that 
reformist when it comes to non-Turkish Muslims (İnce 2012: 108). In other words, Kurds 
continued to be the others of Turkish citizenship discourse during the multiparty era. DP 
incorporated and reproduced the nationalist discourse in a less ethnic manner, while 
failing to deliver its promises for liberalization (İnce 2012: 97-100).  
 In fact, the second period of DP governments between 1955 and 1960 was more 
authoritarian which was reflected in the textbooks. Similar to the single-party 
governments, textbooks of DP’s later years in government demonstrated the urge for 
constructing the citizen as these books had sections about lifestyle, health and exercise, 
educative activities.  
 Increasing authoritarianism of DP was related with its heavy emphasis on 
representing the periphery, which was defined as the national will. DP parliamentarians 
considered themselves as representing the majority in the society and interpreted their 
seat share as license to put any policy into practice (Zürcher 2004: 324). Historians point 
out that DP’s understanding of democracy was clearly majoritarian with heavy emphasis 
on them being representing the “national will.” (Ahmad 1993: 110) This tendency, 
alongside with heavy distrust towards the military and bureaucracy on the side of DP 
cadres had paved the way for increasing authoritarianism, exemplified by the overt 
suppression of criticism of various segments of the society. Towards the end of its rule 
DP had increased the instance of repressive laws that curb political freedoms (Ahmad 
1993: 111).  
Heper (1985) explains DP’s increasing authoritarianism by the tendency of 
peripheral actors to be excessive while challenging the state elite, which in turn intensified 
the prejudices of the center. This excessiveness was a result of DP’s misguided attempts 
at establishing a party-based political regime, instead of society-based one while 
challenging the presence of strong state and center in political life (Heper 1985). For 
Gönenç (2006:140) DP’s authoritarianism demonstrates that the party has moved to the 
center, while Wuthrich (2015) argues that DP did not reject the central value structure; 
their critical stance was a strategic position for mobilizing peripheral votes. 
 In fact, the failure of implementing a more liberal and inclusive citizenship 
understanding and increasing authoritarianism suggest that there was a peripheral 
challenge against the central value structure promoting a strictly secular and ethnicist 
citizenship understanding. DP mobilized these demands by claiming to represent the 
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periphery but failed to deliver them when in government. This experience suggests that 
mobilizing periphery does not necessarily contribute to democracy especially when 
peripheral interests were instrumentalized. 
 The era under DP governments started with promises and minor instances of 
liberalization yet they had failed to institutionalize a new citizenship understanding. 
Instead, DP governments returned back to the strategies of CHP during the single party 
era to sustain and impose a specific understanding of citizenship through authoritarian 
policies. In other words, the potential for liberalization emerged when DP was in 
opposition had disappeared by the end of 1950s.  
More specifically, there was not a strong difference between the citizenship 
understandings of CHP and DP, even though DP mobilized its electorate through a claim 
for representing a peripheral challenge, which was supposed to promote an alternative 
understanding of citizenship. In other words, the difference between center and periphery 
in terms of citizenship understanding should be reflected in the dichotomy between 
adherence to the definition of citizenship promoted by center and challenging this 
definition through advocating alternative accounts. Lack of difference between CHP and 
DP in terms of citizenship understanding was contrary to what would normally be 
expected from a political party claiming to represent the periphery. DP seemed to remain 
loyal to the central value structure while instrumentalizing peripheral interests for vote 
maximization.  
The authoritarian policies of DP had served as a pretext for a group of lower rank 
army officials to stage a coup which had halted the civilian politics in 1960 (Ahmad 1993: 
121). Post-1960 political landscape and citizenship understandings reflected changes in 
the center and periphery cleavage as well as the positions of political parties regarding 
citizenship. The next subsection focuses on that era. 
 
3.5.3 Between Two Coups (1960-1980) 
 
The crystallized image of center and periphery during the two-party system until 
1960s started to turn into a more complex one after the 1960 coup with the new 
constitution and emerging political parties. Especially during the 1970s the number of 
actors representing and mobilizing different interests both in the center and periphery 
increased. Center and periphery, understood as a determinant of voting behavior, became 
less homogeneous as well.  
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Drafted after the 1960 coup, 1961 Constitution was considered to be the most liberal 
constitution in Turkish political history. It had a significantly different understanding on 
rights and liberties. Incorporating various individual and collective rights, the 
Constitution paved the way for a more active civil and political sphere to emerge, despite 
the fact that DP was dissolved and its leaders, including former prime minister Adnan 
Menderes were executed.  
In the first elections aftermath the 1960 coup, CHP got 36.7% of the vote while 
AP11, as being the successor of dissolved DP, got 34.7% of the vote. Adding up the 
conservative YTP’s12 and CKMP’s13 vote shares, one could observe that periphery 
maintained its power in numbers (Zürcher 2004: 358).  
AP was considered to be a successor of DP yet there were differences in terms of 
its cadre as well as constituency. AP’s politicians were mostly self-made men with rural 
backgrounds, whereas DP’s politicians were largely urbanites (Zürcher 2004: 363). 
Embodied in the persona of AP’s leader Demirel, this self-made man with rural 
background was also the dominant part of the constituency of AP (Ahmad 1993: 139). 
Hence, what AP was representing during 1960s was a coalition of farmers and small 
business owners from villages and small towns, religious conservatives and liberals, as 
well as former constituency of DP.  
The fact that AP was primarily a mass coalition of different interests, made it 
difficult for the party to develop a coherent position regarding citizenship, apart from 
some references promoting religious liberties and its repressive stance towards some 
social rights of the workers. Although the party was a coalition of various interests, its 
position as the successor of DP caused the party to claim representing peripheral 
demands.  
 AP elite demonstrated a similar strategy to DP politicians. Electoral campaigns 
before the elections emphasized rights and liberties while actual policies fell short of 
implementing electoral promises. For instance, 1965 manifesto of AP clearly stated that 
enhancing rights and liberties was amongst the fundamental duties of the party, while its 
politicians declared that 1961 constitution was too liberal for the country when AP took 
over the government (İnce 2012:116). This rhetoric signified a continuation of statist 
                                                 
11 Tur: “Adalet Partisi” Eng: “Justice Party” 
12 Tur: “Yeni Türkiye Partisi” Eng: “New Turkey Party” 
13 Tur: “Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi” Eng: “Republican Peasants’ Nation Party” 
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outlook as the party elite made repeated references to the threats posed by extensive 
liberties to the unity of the state.  
 In addition, AP targeted the conservative segments of the electorate by mobilizing 
them through a discourse favoring religious freedoms while implementing policies that 
curb other rights and liberties (İnce 2012: 116). Hence, AP’s understanding of citizenship 
rights and liberties was instrumental for vote maximization: it emphasized issues that 
could mobilize peripheral voters while restoring the official foundations of Turkish 
citizenship in other issues.  
The liberal outlook of 1961 Constitution influenced the political sphere as class-
based political activism heightened. Under these circumstances, CHP had decided to 
change its rhetoric and situated itself at the left-of-center by mid-1960s. For some 
scholars, this shift demonstrated the changing position of CHP regarding its vision 
concerning the relationship between state and society, where the party attempted at 
divorcing from its pro-establishment image (Ayata and Güneş-Ayata 2007: 213; Heper 
2006). In other words, CHP of 1960s was distancing from its earlier image of representing 
and protecting the central value structures, promoting a discourse focusing on labor and 
landless peasants (Kalaycıoğlu 1994: 406). For Ahmad (1993: 157), CHP’s move towards 
social democracy that started in mid 1960s became more evident after the ideological 
vacuum created by the dissolution of TİP14.  
The 1965 elections, which had resulted in the victory of AP, introduced TİP to the 
political landscape. TİP was the first socialist party to enter into the TGNA with 14 
parliamentarians. TİP had a drastically different take on citizenship as it explicitly 
recognized Kurdish issue in terms of cultural rights and advocated an extensive 
understanding on rights and liberties (İnce 2012: 123). In addition, its manifestos did not 
prioritize a single ethnicity or religion. TİP’s emphasis was about equal citizenship for all 
ethnic and religious minorities by implementing constitutional rights. In fact, the focus 
on Kurdish issue had continued through 60s when the party enhanced its critical stance 
towards the ethno-religious understanding of citizenship of the regime. When this critical 
stance is considered, it can be argued that TİP was not a party of the center. Its rhetoric 
prioritized peripheral interests in a different manner than DP or AP. While DP or AP 
claimed to mobilize peripheral interests with an emphasis on religious and conservative 
values, TİP prioritized socio-economic issues and rights of ethnic and religious 
                                                 
14 Tur: “Türkiye İşçi Partisi” Eng: “Turkish Worker’s Party”. TİP was a leftist party representing interests of the 
workers, yet it was dissolved in 1971. 
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minorities. This differentiation suggested that peripheral interests were diversified. 
Although TİP was closed down in 1971 due to its recognition of Kurdish issue, the 
historical other of the official understanding of citizenship in Turkey, its critical stance 
had an influence over the changing conceptualizations of citizenship. 
 The most significant change in political position influenced by TİP’s rhetoric in 
terms of citizenship was CHP’s. The party official adopted a left-of-center position which 
had advocated a more moderate nationalism and secularism (İnce 2012: 124-125). In fact, 
CHP at the left of center criticized the assimilationist policies of the single-party era CHP. 
Yet, these criticisms did not exceed those of TİP because minority issues were still 
defined in terms of social and economic development, instead of cultural recognition. 
This new CHP was more supportive of religious liberties and freedom of thought, which 
signified a less strict understanding of secularism. 
CHP’s changing position also influenced its take on the balance between rights and 
duties where the party had clear emphasis on rights, albeit its continuing disregard of 
minority problems, especially those of the Kurdish minority. This move towards left-of-
center had made Bülent Ecevit the chairman of CHP after the resignation of İnönü, who 
was once named as National Chef. The resulting electoral victory in the 1973 general 
elections (CHP got 33.3% of the votes) was also reflective of the class-based demands 
influencing the political landscape. This electoral success of the left-of-the-center 
discourse and policies of CHP indicated a shift towards a more “functional” class-based 
cleavage structure (Özbudun 2013: 45). For some this shift signified a class-based, left-
right dichotomy emerged alongside with the center and periphery cleavage (Zürcher 
2004: 381). For Gönenç (2006: 144) 1973 elections signified CHP’s attempts to distance 
itself from the center and become closer to the periphery than before. In addition, CHP’s 
new distance to the center meant the sphere to be occupied primarily by the bureaucracy 
and the military (Gönenç 2006:145).  
 In any case, what was happening in the streets had an influence on the parties’ 
positions to a certain extent. CHP’s move towards a more social democratic position 
could be considered as an example to this process. In fact, this move itself display how 
political parties can change their positions to reflect societal trends to maximize their vote 
shares. Hence, CHP acted strategically to capture the class-based demands by the public, 
while trying to challenge its earlier image.  
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Meanwhile, former CKMP15, which was established first in 1958 and entered into 
the parliament in 1961 elections, had become MHP16 in 1969, as a candidate for 
representing religious, nationalist agrarian segments of the society. Alparslan Türkeş, a 
former army official who was a part of the 1960 military coup, started his political career 
at the ranks of CKMP. In 1965, he became the leader of CKMP and in 1969 led CKMP 
to change its name to MHP while unchanging party’s electoral appeals towards nationalist 
segments of the society. 
MHP’s position regarding rights were against “cosmopolitan values of the urban 
life style.” (Yavuz 2002: 206) In addition, the party had an affirmative stance towards the 
omnipresence of state while its definition of membership was based upon Turkish-
Islamist synthesis (Yavuz 2002: 211). Despite its agrarian appeal, MHP was not a 
peripheral party in terms of citizenship understandings. MHP had a clearly nationalistic 
understanding of Turkish citizenship, as it emphasized Turkishness while ignoring 
minority rights. This emphasis on Turkish nationalism is one of the key tenets of the 
official foundations of Turkish citizenship. In that sense, MHP’s position regarding 
citizenship was mainly in line with the central value structure concerning citizenship. 
MHP’s difference from the central value structure was about its promotion of religious 
liberties and religious education, which were dominated by Sunni Islamist and nationalist 
rhetoric (İnce 2012:126). Hence, MHP’s position was discursively in line with the central 
value structure while it aimed at mobilizing rural segments of the population. 
 Against this arguments for continuation of ethno-religious understanding of 
citizenship, there were proposals for religious pluralism in school curricula by BP17 
(Unity Party, Birlik Partisi), which was founded by Alevi politicians in 1966. Throughout 
its political life, which lasted until 1977 when it failed to enter into the parliament, the 
party advocated for incorporation of different sects into the understanding of citizenship 
in Turkey. Both BP and TİP were short-lived examples of mobilization of peripheral 
minorities in a bottom-up manner via defending alternative conceptualizations of Turkish 
citizenship.   
Previously represented by the center-right political actors such as DP and AP, 
Islamists started to emerge as politically active and establish their own party platforms, 
starting with MNP18. Islamist political parties were explicitly supportive of religious 
                                                 
15 Tur: “Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi” Eng: “Republican Villagers Nation Party” 
16 Tur: “Milliyeçi Hareket Partisi” Eng: “Nationalist Action Party” 
17 Tur: “Birlik Partisi” Eng: “Unity Party” 
18 Tur: “Milli Nizam Partisi” Eng: “National Order Party” 
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rights and freedoms in the public sphere, while self-proclaimed left-of-center CHP was 
positioned at the secular end of this conflict. MNP was replaced by MSP19 in 1972, as the 
former was dissolved in 1971 on the grounds that its activities were against secularism 
principle. Dissolution of MNP could be considered as a reaction of the center against a 
peripheral challenger. Another conflict dimension was in the making as Kurds were 
becoming politically active in leftist civil society organizations and political parties such 
as TİP.  
Hence, during 1960s different demands including class-based and religious ones 
had found ground both in political and public sphere. Existence of class-based and 
religious mobilization were examples of the diversification of interests within the 
periphery.  
The heightened dynamism in the civil society was interrupted with the military 
memorandum on March 12th, 1971, after which violence between different political 
fractions on the streets had escalated. Mobilization of leftists, Alevis and Kurds coincided 
with mobilization of extreme right-wing and nationalist groups. The antagonism between 
these groups had turned into clashes on the streets resulting in many deaths and injuries. 
Using social unrest, political violence, and politicians’ inability to de-escalate the tension 
as a pretext, the army intervened once again on September 12th, 1980. The National 
Security Council, composed of five generals that carried out the coup, had assumed 
government and ruled until 1983 under martial law.  
 The 1980 coup violently repressed the political activism of the 1970s and 
reestablished the top-down citizenship understanding, which was duty-oriented and 
reflective of the transcendental state understanding, as well as explicitly promoting 
Turkishness and Sunni Islam. In that sense, the coup restored the center and entrenched 
the influence of the army as the protector of the central value structure. 
 
3.5.4 Post-1980 Era 
 
Class-based differentiation among political parties and also within civil society was 
short-lived as the military coup in 1980 had resulted in closure of all political parties, 
leftist organizations, and labor unions. The putschists considered all political parties and 
civil society actors to be responsible for the state of violence prior to the coup, which 
                                                 
19 “Milli Selamet Partisi” “National Salvation Party” 
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demonstrated the army’s self-positioning as the sole protector of the center (Gönenç 
2006: 146). Thus, the primary aim of these officials was to restore the center. In addition, 
the 10% electoral threshold was introduced after the 1980 coup, which had a significant 
impact on the plurality of representation in the parliament. The threshold served the 
function of deterring smaller, niche parties from being represented in the parliament and 
in practice, it impacted Kurdish and far-left political representation the most. 
The constitution drafted after the coup signified restoration of the early Republican 
notion of citizenship in terms of the heavy emphasis on duties and responsibilities, as well 
as the passive status of the citizen. In addition, the citizenship definition included not only 
an explicit reference to Turkish ethnic identity, but also references towards Sunni Islam. 
In other words, post 1980 citizenship understanding was based upon the Turkish-Islamic 
synthesis on which the constitution rested upon.  
 The coup was followed by some amendments within the citizenship law reflecting 
the citizenship understanding of the era. With a new addition to the citizenship law, those 
who had fled the country and were to be arrested due to their activities violating the 
integrity of the state would lose their citizenship if they failed to return in three months. 
This amendment targeted those who were against the coup and military rule as it excluded 
them from the confines of citizenship, which was defined in terms of the security of the 
state. The same amendment also cancelled citizenship of those who acquired citizenship 
of a foreign country without permission, men who failed to perform their obligatory 
military service within the three months-time limit provided by authorities, and non-
Muslims who left the country without permission (İnce 2012:147). These changes 
enhanced the understanding of citizenship that was bound to the integrity and security of 
state. In fact, the restored center after the 1980 coup emphasized integrity and security of 
the state as central values more than the single-party era. 
When civilian politics were resumed in 1983, because of the ban on old political 
actors, there were only three political parties that were permitted to compete by the 
National Security Council (NSC): ANAP20, a center-right party founded by Turgut Özal, 
deputy prime minister of National Security Council cabinet; MDP21 led by retired general 
Turgut Sunalp and supported by the Council, and HP22, located on center-left and led by 
bureaucrat Necdet Calp. There were also two other parties: DYP23, which was positioned 
                                                 
20 “Anavatan Partisi,” “Motherland Party” 
21 “Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi” “Nationalist Democracy Party” 
22 “Halkçı Parti” “Populist Party” 
23 “Doğru Yol Partisi” “True Path Party” 
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as a successor of AP and located on center-right and SODEP24 as a successor of CHP. 
Yet, these two parties were not permitted to run in the elections by the NSC. The parties 
that competed in the elections did not emerge out of mobilization of specific cleavages; 
they were the only actors permitted within the political sphere. Army, as the protector of 
the center, had drawn the boundaries of legitimate political activity with this decision.  
Özal claimed that ANAP combined the four main axes of political conflict in 
Turkey: nationalism, Islamism, conservatism and market liberalism. More specifically, 
the party’s position promoted economic liberalism with limited role for the state, while 
emphasizing religious conservative values (Kalaycıoğlu 2002: 46). Although this rhetoric 
can be argued to be in line with peripheral values, ANAP’s position was not influenced 
by the demands of a specific political cleavage; rather, it was Özal’s charismatic 
leadership that maintained ANAP’s political position. This position was ambivalent 
towards Turkish citizenship: on the one hand it promoted nationalism, which was less 
state-based than the nationalism of the center occupied by the military, bureaucracy and 
judiciary. On the other hand, it had included individual rights and liberties in its rhetoric. 
As it did no explicitly challenged the official understanding of citizenship, ANAP’s 
position on citizenship was not far away from the center’s. 
Özal’s ANAP was the victor of 1983 elections.  ANAP’s main competitor was 
DYP. DYP had more appeal in the rural segments of the society compared to ANAP. 
Cizre (2002: 85-87) argues that, DYP targeted the electoral base of DP and AP, but it had 
tried to combine market liberalism with social welfare provisions under Demirel’s term. 
When Çiller assumed leadership, party’s position became more pro-market liberalism, 
while its stance towards rights and liberties was clearly nationalistic compared to ANAP. 
In that sense, DYP under Çiller’s leadership became the representative of the nationalist 
understanding of citizenship during 1990s (Özman and Coşar 2007).  
By early 80s there were multiple actors on the center-left including SHP25 (which 
emerged after SODEP and HP merged) and DSP26, led by former CHP leader Bülent 
Ecevit. SHP’s target audience was the working class and it represented a more social 
liberal position within the center-left where its discourse explicitly recognized civil, 
political, and social rights, as well as the cultural rights of Kurds and Alevis (Ayata and 
Güneş-Ayata 2007: 217). DSP’s position was more appealing for secular urban 
                                                 
24 “Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi” “Social Democracy Party” 
25 “Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti” “Social Democrat Populist Party” 
26 “Demokratik Sol Parti” “Democratic Leftist Party” 
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populations while it tried to establish a balanced position between market liberalism and 
social welfare state. Yet, DSP did not have a clearly liberal position regarding rights and 
freedoms as in the case of SHP. It was not responsive to the demands of the Kurdish 
minority, although its outlook concerning religious freedoms was more moderate than 
CHP’s strict position (Kınıklıoğlu 2002:16).  
For instance, when an amendment of citizenship law that cause those who fled the 
country to lose their citizenship was proposed, it was SHP who challenged this decision. 
In line with its position recognizing rights and liberties, SHP members suggested to 
remove revocation of citizenship altogether as this was used against leftists who had left 
Turkey after the coup. Yet, this suggestion was rejected and the proposed amendment 
was ratified. Other members of TGNA rejected SHP’s suggestion as they considered 
annulment of citizenship in cases where citizens acted against the “loyalty to the country” 
necessary (İnce 2012: 147).  
In the 1987 elections, DSP could not get enough votes to pass 10% electoral 
threshold introduced after the coup, while ANAP won once again. In addition to DSP, 
there were other political parties which failed to pass the 10% threshold in 1987 elections. 
Most significant ones were MÇP27, which would later become MHP28, representing 
nationalist far-right and RP29, an Islamist conservative political party founded by 
Necmettin Erbakan in 1983 as the successor of MSP.  
With the establishment of RP in 1983, Islamist movement had found its successor. 
Although RP was in this family of parties and founded by more or less the same cadre, 
its take on Islamism was different than MNP and MSP. RP’s rhetoric regarding Islamism 
and the alliances it had forged at its initiation was less radical than MNP and MSP (de 
Leon et al. 2009: 208). In 1992, the NSC decision on prohibiting banned political parties 
from reestablishing themselves was lifted and thus CHP was reopened. In 1995, SHP had 
merged with CHP and reduced the parties competing for center-left voters to two: CHP 
and DSP.  
Islamist RP’s rise in consecutive local and general elections generated secular 
backlash, influencing CHP’s position as well. Its previous left-of-center stance gave way 
to a more culturalist one where the party defined its position as defending and promoting 
a strict understanding of secularism (Ayata and Güneş-Ayata 2007: 218). Although there 
                                                 
27 “Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi” “Nationalist Task Party” 
28 “Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi” “Nationalist Movement Party” 
29 “Refah Partisi” “Welfare Party” 
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were not significant moves concerning citizenship, CHP’s stance in the face of the rapid 
mobilization of periphery through a religious discourse signified restoration of single-
party era’s conception of strictly secular and nationalist citizenship. In fact, the secular 
backlash could be interpreted as a reaction of the center against a significant challenger 
mobilizing the periphery because RP headed government was forced to resign by the 
military on February 28, 1997. Subsequently the Constitutional Court banned RP in 1998 
on the grounds of violating secularism principle of the Republic. Hence, the restored 
center, which included military, bureaucracy and judiciary, as well as CHP of 1990s, was 
actively promoting and protecting values such as strict secularism and nationalism.  
The political landscape during 1990s was interpreted as a renewal of center-
periphery cleavage by Özbudun (2013: 51). In this view, center was characterized by the 
nationalist, secular establishment composed of military, central bureaucracy, and 
judiciary, while periphery was a combination of poor rural conservative population with 
rising Islamic bourgeoisie, as well as Kurds, urban poor and lower classes, who had 
distinct interests and conceptions of citizenship. Kalaycıoğlu (1994:407-408) argues that 
the renewed center and periphery distinction should be qualified. The reason is that 
political party system was highly volatile during 1990s, which made it hard to find a 
single, coherent political actor that represented a homogeneous center in the party system. 
Yet, he agrees with Özbudun in terms of the plurality of demands and interests within the 
periphery. Not only there were ethnic and religious demands within the periphery, there 
were also “post-material values” emerging as new indicators of voting behavior 
(Kalaycıoğlu 2002: 56).  
This combination constituting the periphery reflected the mixture of strategies that 
RP used to create its own base by incorporating Islamist constituency and rising Anatolian 
bourgeoisie as well as the urban and rural poor through economic policies based upon a 
“market bound by morality.” (de Leon et al. 2009: 209) Hence, RP’s position displayed 
continuities with its predecessor as a party mobilizing the periphery with a religious 
discourse while at the same devising strategies to enlarge its constituency, such as arguing 
for cultural rights and liberties in its electoral campaigns. In that sense, the high vote 
shares of Islamist line demonstrated a shift within the electorate as the older center-right 
actors were abandoned for nationalist or Islamist ones (Yeşilada 2002: 74). 
RP’s difference from its predecessors can be observed through some of the 
parliamentary debates. The amendment on citizenship law that revokes citizenship of 
those who left the country after the 1980 coup was annulled in 1992, influenced by 
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external factors such as the EU. During the parliamentary debates, RP parliamentarians30 
displayed active support for the annulment arguing that this change was necessary to 
protect fundamental rights and liberties.  
 Yet, RP politicians also demonstrated statist reactions against other amendments 
to the citizenship law. The citizenship law was amended several times in 1995 within the 
context of Customs Union agreement. Hence, these reforms were made in connection 
with the influence of an external leverage. With these amendments, there occurred several 
changes:  
 First, voluntary acquisition of foreign citizenship was recognized and was no 
longer a cause for automatic loss of Turkish citizenship albeit requirement for permission 
was still in effect.  
 Second, performing compulsory military service was no longer a requirement of 
permission for renouncing Turkish citizenship. The amendment annulling the 
requirement of military service for renunciation of citizenship received criticism. One RP 
parliamentarian stated that this change could lead many to renounce Turkish citizenship 
to avoid compulsory military service31.  
 Third, Turkish citizens who renounced their citizenship because of the 
requirements posed by obtaining another citizenship were to have a special foreigner 
status, so that they could enjoy residence and private property rights (İnce 2012:148). 
This change was made in the context of Turkish guest workers in Germany, who faced 
with a choice between Turkish citizenship and German citizenship due to the 
requirements posed by German law. Hence, those who spoke in favor of the amendment 
referred to the potential benefits of Turkish workers to obtain German citizenship rights 
such as voting, signifying a pragmatic outlook. MPs who talked in favor in the 
parliamentary debates suggested that voting rights of Turks in Germany were politically 
beneficial for Turkish state interests in Europe, as these individuals were considered as 
loyal to Turkey although they would no longer be citizens32. Yet, this amendment, 
proposed by the DYP-SHP33 coalition government, was responded with criticisms on 
                                                 
30 It was Bahattin Elçi, Bayburt representative of RP, who took the floor during the parliamentary vote. The short 
speech can be found on page 54 of the minutes dated May 27, 1992. Retrieved from: 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d19/c012/tbmm19012081.pdf  
31 Cavit Ayhan, Sakarya MP of RP and Hasan Korkmazcan, Denizli MP of ANAP. Their speechs could be found 
between pages 98 and 100 of the same parliamentary minutes.  
32 It was Abdullah Gül, RP’s Kayseri representative, who referred to these points in his speech. The speech can be 
found on pages 90 and 91 of the parliamentary minutes. In fact, DYP and CHP representatives also spoke in favor, 
which could be found in following pages. Retrieved from: 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d19/c088/tbmm19088120.pdf  
33 SHP was rejoined with CHP in February 1995. 
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grounds for allowing former non-Muslim citizens to reclaim residence and property rights 
in Turkey34. Voiced by RP representatives, this reaction was reflective of the party’s 
religious perspective concerning citizenship. In addition, it echoed the exclusionary 
foundations of Turkish citizenship as non-Muslims were still considered as threats. The 
understanding of citizenship of this RP representative prioritized Sunni Islam as a 
dimension of Turkish citizenship. But, as exclusion of non-Muslim identity from the 
definition of citizenship was one of the aspects of the foundations of Turkish citizenship, 
it emerged as a common point between RP’s stance and the official account concerning 
membership.  
The conception of citizenship and the restored center institutionalized with the 1980 
coup was challenged by various outsiders, such as Alevis, non-Muslims, and Kurds with 
identity claims. These identities were historically excluded from the official 
understanding of citizenship and their mobilization could be considered as peripheral 
challenges against the restored center. Although these could be categorized as peripheral 
challenges, there were differences in their stances concerning citizenship and their 
mobilization.  
 Two issues led to mobilization of Alevis as an identity group in the 1990s. The 
first issue was the Sunni Islamist tone of the post-1980 politics as the new constitution 
had a pro-Sunni Islam understanding of citizenship. The second issue was the rapid 
mobilization of Sunni Islamists35. These two issues had caused Alevis to mobilize around 
secularism and recognition of their rights and liberties as a minority group.  This emphasis 
on secularism was in line with Alevis’ historical support to CHP, albeit there were 
experiences of Alevi political parties. In return of this support, CHP included Alevi 
demands regarding the annulment of compulsory religious education in its manifestos 
during 2000s.  
 Non-Muslim’s identity demands were mainly voiced through religious 
communities and civil society organizations within the context of EU process, instead of 
political parties. Minor steps towards recognition of these communities on an institutional 
level happened during 2000s when officials of AKP governments publicly promoted 
                                                 
34 It was Ali Oğuz and İbrahim Halil Çelik , RP’s İstanbul and Şanlıurfa representatives, that voiced this concern. His 
speech could be found on pages 94 and 95 of the same parliamentary minutes. 
35 This mobilization posed a significant threat to Alevis, especially because of the Madımak Hotel incident where 37 
people were murdered by an Islamists mob who burnt down the hotel in 1993. In 1995, Gaziosmanpaşa incidents 
happened. These incidents were sparked by armed attacks at Alevi coffee houses and resulting death of 22 people. In 
the aftermath of this event, a riot broke out which was suppressed by the army.  
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freedom of religion for non-Muslims in a context of attacks against their worship places 
(İnce 2012:158).  
 Rise of Kurdish identity claims on the conventional political arena added another 
dimension to the cleavage structure based upon Turkish vs. Kurdish identity dichotomy. 
Kurdish demands were incorporated in the leftist parties and organizations during 1970s. 
By mid 1980s, with the emergence of PKK as an armed struggle against the Turkish 
Armed Forces, Kurdish mobilization obtained a new character. Yet, during 1990s, Kurds 
started to mobilize around pro-Kurdish political parties. Being the historical other of 
Turkish citizenship, Kurdish demands focused on recognition of their identities during 
this era. The series of political parties banned and reopened under different names 
politicized these demands of recognition on the parliamentary level.  
What was new in this dimension was the emergence of distinct demands of the 
Kurdish minority regarding their collective identity. The Kurdish political movements’ 
institutionalization as political parties demonstrates this trend as well. The very first 
representation of Kurds in the TGNA in modern Turkish history was with TİP’s entrance 
into the parliament in 1961. At the beginning, Kurdish political movement had a class-
based rhetoric which was in line with TİP’s stance back then. The movement radicalized 
during late 70s and early 80s when the Kurdish insurgency was initiated with the 
establishment of PKK36. With 1990s, identity demands were intensified and had 
influenced Kurds to establish their own political parties. This trend started with the 
establishment of HEP37 in 1990. Establishing electoral alliance with SHP, 21 HEP 
politicians had become members of the parliament. Reflective of the dichotomy between 
Turkish vs. Kurdish identity, the party was closed down in 1993 by the Constitutional 
Court for threatening national unity of Turkey. Meanwhile, the party cadre established 
another party under the name DEP38 in 1991 as a backup of HEP in a case of closure. 
With HEP’s closure its MPs transferred to DEP. Yet one year later, DEP was also closed 
down by the Constitutional Court citing the same reasons with HEP’s case. Prior to DEP’s 
closure, the impunity of six parliamentarians39 of the party were lifted by the TGNA in 
March 1994 and they were jailed for 15 years.  
                                                 
36 Kurdistan’s Workers Party, an armed insurgency movement 
37 “Halkın Emek Partisi” “People’s Labor Party” 
38 “Demokrasi Partisi” “Democracy Party” 
39 These parliamentarians were Hatip Dicle, Orhan Doğan, Leyla Zana, Ahmet Türk, Sırrı Sakık and Mahmut Alınak. 
Hatip Dicle and Orhan Doğan were immediately detained after the impunity decision and all of them were tried and 
jailed in the subsequent weeks. This decision, together with the closure of DEP, created international criticism against 
Turkey. These parliamentarians took their case to European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court decided 
that Turkey violated right to fair trial and sentenced Turkey to pay 140,000 USD as immaterial compensation. This 
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Subsequently, the founders established another political party named HADEP40 in 
1994. With HADEP’s closure in 2003, its activists had moved to DEHAP41, which was 
established in 1997. DEHAP dissolved itself for the establishment of DTP42 in 2005, 
which was banned by the Constitutional Court in 2009. The last successor of the 
movement was BDP43 which was established in 2008 and had lived until its members 
joined the ranks of HDP in 2014. Before HDP, none of these parties managed to pass the 
10% electoral threshold; instead they had forged alliances with social democrats for party 
lists. The series of party closures and continuous efforts by the Kurdish activists to 
institutionalize their movement demonstrate the relevance of the ethnic identity cleavage 
during the era. In other words, center-periphery cleavage may not be the only one defining 
party system as Turkish vs. Kurdish dichotomy has become institutionalized (Hale and 
Özbudun 2010: 33). Hence in 1990s Turkish political party landscape has consolidated 
along multiple cleavages: a renewed center and periphery cleavage emphasizing 
secularism or religious identity and ethnic cleavage in the form of Turkish vs. Kurdish 
identity dichotomy. 
 Kurdish mobilization and demands were issues of political conflict between 
parties, which strategically altered their positions for vote maximization. For instance, 
DYP had a nationalist position during 1990s albeit occasional recognition of Kurdish 
demands only in terms of socio-economic development; whereas MHP under Bahçeli’s 
leadership became more moderate than its position under Alparslan Türkeş, while still 
rejecting minority demands. DSP had an ambivalent position that framed the issue in 
terms of socio-economic development while getting more nationalist by the end of 90s. 
CHP also referred to the issue but did not recognize the cultural rights demands and 
continued to voice nationalist concerns at the same time. It was Islamist RP who were 
very critical of the treatment of Kurds and they succeeded at mobilizing Kurdish voters 
in Southeastern Anatolia in early 1990s. Although RP mobilized Kurds through a 
religiously-motivated campaign rhetoric, the party programs included recognition of 
cultural rights. It seems Kurdish mobilization through 1990s had an impact of 
conceptualizations of citizenship rights and liberties of political parties. 
                                                 
ECtHR decision paved the way for appeal process and the 9th Penal Department of the Court of Cassation decided to 
release these parliamentarians.  
40 “Halkın Demokrasi Partisi” “People’s Democracy Party” 
41 “Demokratik Halk Partisi” “Democratic People’s Party” 
42 “Demokratik Toplum Partisi” “Democratic Society Party” 
43 “Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi” “Peace and Democracy Party” 
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3.5.5 Post-2002 Era 
 
When AKP44 entered into the political sphere in 2002, these underlying cleavage 
structures did not disappear but were strategically combined within AKP’s discourse. 
AKP emerged as a peripheral challenger against the central value structure, which 
attracted both center-right and religious voters, claimed to represent the peripheral values 
while displaying a liberal perspective towards right and liberties and market economy. 
Especially the discourse on rights and liberties and market liberalism were the main 
differences of AKP from its center-right and religious predecessors. AKP’s clear 
differences from the National Outlook perspective represented by RP and its successors 
also suggested a fragmentation within the periphery, which made AKP’s position closer 
to the center compared to RP (Gönenç 2006: 148).  
 Although the emphasis on market liberalism has made AKP considerably more 
neo-liberal than its center-right predecessors (Coşar and Özman 2004), its discourse on 
rights and liberties led many to consider the earlier periods of AKP rule promoted the 
most comprehensive understanding of citizenship. For instance, AKP governments 
initiated the most extensive reform process regarding Kurdish issue. In fact, the party’s 
earlier stance towards the issue was very critical of the nationalistic understanding of 
citizenship, which led to a series of legal reforms in the context of EU process. These 
reforms included lifting the broadcasting ban in Kurdish and permitting private language 
courses.   
 AKP also carried out reforms concerning rights and liberties of non-Muslims. In 
2002, their de facto ignored right to have properties through foundations was recognized 
and in 2003, they obtained the right to build worship places. In 2008, a new, more rights-
oriented Foundations Law was drafted by AKP government, which was passed in the 
parliament despite heavy criticisms by CHP and MHP members. The reactions of CHP 
and MHP were reflective of their positions as parties promoting the values of the center, 
as non-Muslims were historically excluded from the official understanding of citizenship. 
These reforms might be interpreted as AKP’s challenge against this historical exclusion 
as a peripheral actor; but at the same time, such reforms were carried out within the EU 
membership context, which displayed the party’s strategic calculations for vote 
maximization. Regardless of the underlying motivations, years between 2002 and 2007 
                                                 
44 “Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi” “Justice and Development Party” 
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are considered as the era in which AKP governments maintained a liberal democrat 
outlook on citizenship (Öniş 2015). 
Consecutive electoral victories in 2007, 2011, 2015 general elections and 2004, 
2009, and 2014 local elections entrenched AKP’s electoral hegemony, which led some 
scholars to argue that the dominance of the party in the political and administrate spheres 
and emergence of its own elite have situated the party at the center (Öniş 2015: 33). In 
fact, since 2010, AKP’s hegemony within the political sphere constructed an image of the 
political terrain divided between AKP and others45. For some scholars, this was a strategy 
similar to the one developed by DP in 1950s and RP in 1990s when they portrayed 
themselves as the true representatives of the national will (Çınar 2011: 122). 
In fact, AKP is the only peripheral actor that has established its singular electoral 
hegemony in the political sphere. This electoral hegemony disrupted the center 
established in the early years of the Republic, which is started to be occupied by AKP 
(Öniş 2015: 25). Yet, AKP still projects itself as a peripheral actor, although the party has 
started to establish its hegemony. This is a strategic maneuver for continuing to appeal 
different interests at the same time. As the party continues to define itself as an outsider 
and its electorate as the historically excluded, religious conservative periphery, it helps 
the party to mobilize and consolidate its supporters.  
CHP has tried to meet this challenge by changing its leadership and discourse in the 
face of the hegemony created by AKP. Starting with the 2011 electoral campaign, CHP 
developed a more liberal outlook incorporating individual rights and liberties and the 
Kurdish issue, as well as significant emphasis on social rights and welfare state policies 
(Uysal 2011: 135). This shift demonstrated a move towards a more pluralistic stance 
concerning citizenship but CHP’s elite was also trying to please its nationalist electorate, 
which caused ambivalence in its practice.  
 Although it is not possible to argue for homogeneity within each group, for many 
scholars, center vs. periphery dichotomy, described through religiosity is still one of the 
underlying cleavage structures that structure voting behavior of the electorate (Özbudun 
2013, Kalaycıoğlu 1994, Aytaç et al. 2017). In other words, center and periphery, as value 
                                                 
45 For some scholars, one of the motivations for the liberal discourse on rights and liberties during the initial years of 
AKP governments was its struggle against the military tutelage (Çınar and Saykan 2014; Cizre 2011). Once the 
military’s role in politics was practically reduced through the controversial court cases between 2007 and 2010 
known as Ergenekon and Balyoz, which had caused numerous army officials with various rankings to be jailed under 
the accussations of coup-plotting, AKP’s main motivation for promoting democracy was lost. In that sense, existence 
of tutelary actors could have been a determinant of the liberal-democrat position of AKP during its early years, while 
removal of such actors might have triggered the authoritarian shift in party’s position, which became visible after 
2010. 
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structures, are mobilized for electoral gains and since 1990s the way in which they have 
been mobilized corresponds to the differences between religiosity and secularism. This 
division is reflected in the political level where AKP and CHP came to represent religious 
conservative and secular populations with almost no swing voters between them (Işık 
2017). In addition, the ethnic identity cleavage is reflected through HDP and its 
predecessors representing Kurdish identity, where MHP representing Turkish 
nationalism. Positioned in this manner, CHP and AKP should have separate 
understandings on citizenship differentiating on the basis of the clash between religious, 
conservative and secular values, whereas MHP and HDP should differ in terms of their 
stances towards the definition of national identity and citizenship, as well as cultural 
rights of minorities.  
Yet, it is important to see that political parties are rational actors, strategically acting 
to consolidate or expand their constituencies. AKP’s electoral hegemony has caused the 
party to settle itself at the center, which can now be redefined by the party elite. Hence, 
AKP, as the electoral hegemon, have and project a specific understanding of citizenship 
and corresponding rights and liberties. More specifically, the party continues to mobilize 
its constituency by defining them as the excluded religious masses representing the 
national will, while potentially treating other demands for rights and liberties to be 
illegitimate since it AKP that defines the boundaries of political competition now.  
Given this situation, CHP, as the representative of the older center, moves beyond 
its historical constituency to counter this hegemony. Hence, it has to establish a delicate 
balance. On the one hand, there is the core electorate who prioritized secularism and 
nationalism, which were the values promoted by the older center. As CHP was 
historically positioned as the protector of those values, and AKP’s electoral hegemony 
signifies establishment of a new center that may cause these voters to feel excluded, they 
stayed with the party. On the other hand, CHP has remained in the opposition for a long 
time, which signifies that it needs to go beyond its core electorate. The change of tone in 
1960s and subsequent electoral victory of 1973 suggested that the party can mobilize 
different segments in the population. Hence, although the party promoted a dated position 
during 90s that was reminiscent of the single party era, it has started to incorporate a more 
rights and liberties-oriented discourse after 2010. Yet, promotion of rights and liberties 
necessitates the party to appeal to the historically excluded identities, who were the 
outsiders of the central value structure that promoted strict secularism, nationalism and 
statism. Hence, CHP’s strategic move to go beyond its image of the guardian of these 
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values may cause its core electorate to become dissatisfied. That’s why it would not be 
surprising to see CHP to display an inhibited stance concerning citizenship rights and 
liberties, especially in terms of nationalism. 
 HDP experience was also an example of a strategic shift in a party’s position for 
vote maximization. Although HDP is a part of the Kurdish political movement, it was 
different from its dissolved predecessors in terms of its rhetoric, which targeted the 
electorate beyond Kurds. Because of this shift, HDP develops its position around the 
promotion of an extensive scheme of rights and liberties, while its predecessors’ 
campaigns mainly targeted Kurdish minority. This shift in tone was also in line with 
coalition of interests within the party. HDP contained not only Kurdish activists, but also 
leftist organizations, smaller far-left parties, and feminist activists. Hence, its position of 
citizenship should reflect a variety of interests of identity groups in the periphery, who 
were historically excluded from the official understanding of citizenship.  
 MHP has not changed its emphasis on nationalism, statism and conservative 
outlook. Yet, given that Kurdish political activism together with leftists started to 
mobilize a larger segment of the peripheral voters, it is reasonable for MHP to try to 
consolidate its core constituency. At the same time, AKP’s discourse, apart from its 
electoral manifestos, has become more conservative and nationalist compared to its 
earlier stance, which might cause MHP to lose its ground as the age-old representative of 
conservative-nationalist segment of the population. If that’s the case, MHP would want 
to signal its nationalist stance concerning citizenship even more to secure its position as 
the representative of Turkish nationalism, while incorporating new issues such as socio-
economic inequalities in its agenda to appeal to different priorities of the electorate. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
 
The literature on political party formation and differentiation mainly suggests two 
accounts. One of them is based upon sociological cleavage structures and their impact on 
party systems. The other account focuses on the agency of political actors to articulate 
and mobilize cleavages for strategic vote maximization. Given that political party and 
society relations are dynamic, one can argue that arguments of these two accounts can be 
combined to understand Turkish political party landscape. Although there are historical 
cleavages having an impact on political preferences, political parties act strategically to 
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mobilize different parts of these cleavages for vote maximization, which also points out 
the dynamic nature of such cleavages. 
Even though this chapter specifically focuses on center and periphery as a cleavage 
between different citizenship understandings, there are alternative accounts on the 
cleavage structures influencing voting behavior in Turkey that incorporate additional 
dimensions while recognizing the center-periphery dichotomy. Secor (2001: 547) argues 
that the political parties in Turkey differentiate along four dimensions: (i) western vs. 
eastern orientation; (ii) secularism vs. Islamism; (iii) collectivism vs. pluralism; and (iv) 
supporting market economy vs. supporting political redistribution. The second dimension 
corresponds to the renewed center-periphery cleavage as argued by Özbudun and others. 
Öniş (2007: 260)’s conceptualization of the existing cleavage structure as a clash between 
“conservative globalists,” who support EU membership, including AKP of early 2000s 
and “defensive nationalists,” who are against European integration is another example of 
emphasizing different dimensions. Keyman (2010: 319) identifies four main cleavages 
coexisting within the political sphere in 2000s Turkey: (i) the center vs. periphery as 
conceptualizing politics with reference to the question of secularism starting from 1923; 
(ii) left vs. right cleavage starting from 1950s where notions such as liberty, rights, social 
justice have been debated; (iii) global vs. national cleavage emerging in 1980s which is 
related with the responses towards globalization; and (iv) starting with 2000s, a new 
cleavage based upon identity politics and the reactions towards it. Although these 
accounts draw attention to different dimensions of political competition, none of these 
studies leave aside the relevance of historical cleavages. Hence, historical cleavage 
structures are still important for the political landscape in Turkey. 
 In addition to the historical cleavage structures having an impact on the positions 
of political parties, they also act strategically to maximize their vote shares as well as 
entrenching their electorate. Establishment of AKP as an alliance between former 
National Outlook activists, as well as center-right and liberal figures is a good example 
of this strategic positioning. Although the party displays continuities with the Islamist 
MNP-MSP-RP line and appeals to the religious conservative electorate, its neoliberal 
economic outlook, pro-EU stance and policies attempting to resolve Kurdish issue 
demonstrate a rather strategic shift, especially during its earlier years (De Leon et al 2009: 
209-210). For instance, while the line of political parties varying from MNP to SP46 
                                                 
46 Saadet Partisi, Felicity Party 
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promoted an Islamic vision of society coupled with anti-Western values, anti-Semitism, 
Turkish nationalism and glorification of the Ottoman past, the “reformist” wing 
represented first by FP47 and culminated in the foundation of AKP has been promoting a 
rather eclectic ideology combining liberalism, democracy, Islamic values, and acceptance 
of free market (Hale and Özbudun 2010: 5-9). In fact, with AKP this eclecticism has 
turned into a pragmatic mixture of conservative democracy, emphasis on social justice, 
and reformism until 2007 (Hale and Özbudun 2010: 20-21).  
The long-run electoral hegemony of AKP suggests that the power hierarchy 
between center and periphery has turned upside down. Instead of triggering 
democratization, settlement of periphery in the center has initiated another authoritarian 
project that aims at claiming the center to disseminate its own value structure (Açıkel 
2006:59-60). In fact, Shils’ conceptualization of periphery foresees such a shift. Being in 
the periphery was experienced as being the outsiders of the central value system, which 
had created resentment among those who consider themselves as outsiders. According to 
Shils, the feeling of exclusion is accompanied with a significant attraction towards the 
center (Shils 1975:13-14). Hence, while being resentful towards the center for being 
excluded, those in periphery long for being a part of the central value system.  
The authoritarian discourse, coupled with promotion of religious conservative and 
nationalist arguments, became prominent in the course of June 7th elections and has been 
continuing since. This shift corresponded to AKP’s dominance in the political sphere, 
which may prompt the party to project its own understanding of citizenship, which 
signifies another dichotomy (Demiralp 2012). In other words, as AKP settles into the 
center, it has more chance to produce, disseminate, and protect own central values that 
can exclude some while incorporating others on the grounds of its definition of demos as 
“Black Turks.” (Demiralp 2012, Çınar and Sayın 2014). 
The claim on representing the periphery still exists but AKP mobilizes religious, 
conservative and nationalist sentiments instead of demands for rights and liberties of 
excluded minorities, composition of which has also changed. Hence, periphery was 
continued to be instrumentalized as AKP entrenches its position at the center.  
Similarly, HDP’s decision to compete in 2015 June elections as a party, rather than 
through independent candidates is another instance of utilizing different strategies rather 
than merely representing historical cleavages. This decision is significant because 
                                                 
47 Fazilet Partisi, Virtue Party 
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Kurdish political movement had either joined forces with other leftist parties48, or 
competed in elections as independent candidates49. The reason for these strategies was 
the 10% national electoral threshold which necessitates parties to get at least 10% of the 
national vote to have seats in the parliament.  As pro-Kurdish parties’ vote shares stayed 
below the electoral threshold, they had utilized different strategies. Thus, HDP’s decision 
to compete as a party was significant as it was a first in Kurdish political movement’s 
history. In addition, since HDP was actually an alliance of socialists, Kurds, and women’s 
organizations, and its new rhetoric of representing the peoples of Turkey instead of Kurds 
and their demands exemplifies a different strategy than merely reflecting cleavage 
structures.  
 Hence, historical cleavages are relevant but also strategically mobilized by 
political actors in Turkey. When center vs. periphery is understood as a competition 
between citizenship understandings, AKP’s early years in government can be 
conceptualized as a peripheral alternative to the official citizenship understanding of the 
historical center. Yet, AKP has become the electoral hegemon, which has situated the 
party at the center while it continues to mobilize its electorate by a rhetoric based on 
representing the periphery. The party claims to represent the national will, definition of 
which is subject to change based on strategic calculations. This claim also suggests that 
AKP now has the capability to develop and disseminate its own value structure. In that 
sense, AKP is the new inhabitant of the center, when it is defined as the locus of value 
structures that are disseminated to the society at large. 
 CHP, on the other hand, is no longer the representative of the center both because 
of its electoral weakness to do so and the dismantling of the center that it has been 
historically representing especially during the single party era. As a result, the party has 
changed its rhetoric on state and society relations, developing a more rights-oriented 
discourse targeting different segments of the society significantly after 2010. Its new 
relatively liberal and social democratic understanding of citizenship signifies a clear 
differentiation from its earlier stance as the guardian of the center. In that sense, CHP 
mobilizes a novel periphery, composed of those who are recently excluded from the 
developing central value structure. It is significant because such mobilization is a first for 
                                                 
48 In 1991 elections, HEP and SHP established an electoral alliance.  
49 In 2007 elections, DTP politicians competed as independent candidates and managed to have 20 seats in the 
parliament. These 20 parliamentarians subsequently they established the DTP group in the parliament. 
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the party. Yet, this mobilization poses a partial challenge in terms of citizenship because 
CHP still has an inhibited position concerning Turkish nationalism. 
 MHP’s position concerning citizenship has always been in line with the 
nationalist, statist dimensions of the citizenship understanding of the center, while its 
emphasis on religious and conservative values was not strong enough to challenge strict 
secularism. Hence, MHP seems to pose a rather consistent stance towards Turkish 
citizenship. Yet, electoral competition may have influenced the party to incorporate 
different issues such as socio-economic inequalities without changing its nationalist and 
statist discourse on citizenship. 
 HDP’s core electorate, which is primarily composed of Kurdish minority, has 
been the historical other of Turkish citizenship mainly because of the primacy of Turkish 
ethnicity and state vis-à-vis individual rights. In that sense, HDP and its predecessors 
have been at the periphery, posing significant challenge against the citizenship 
understanding promoted by the center. Different than the challenge posed by religious 
conservative political mobilization that emphasized religious liberties, Kurdish challenge 
prioritized cultural recognition. Yet, the strategic shift demonstrated by the coalition with 
the leftist organizations suggests that HDP now incorporates other groups, such as 
LGBTQ individuals, whose rights and liberties are violated. Hence, HDP’s alternative 
citizenship conceptualization includes more than cultural recognition, differentiating 
HDP from its political predecessors. 
 The next chapter will trace these argument through an analysis of most recent 
electoral manifestos of these four parties with a specific focus on relevant citizenship 
rights and liberties. 
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 CHAPTER 4 
 
 
POSITIONS OF TURKISH POLITICAL PARTIES REGARDING 
CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 
The previous chapter focused on the arguments concerning political party 
differentiation and mobilization in the literature on political parties. In addition, the 
previous chapter attempted to provide a historical analysis of political party positions in 
Turkey with a specific focus on competing citizenship understandings. Reinterpreting the 
center vs. periphery dichotomy that has been extensively used in the literature, the 
previous chapter offers a different reading of this dichotomy. This reading suggests that 
center vs. periphery dichotomy can be understood in an extensive manner going beyond 
a secular vs. religious differentiation. This extensive reading incorporates challenges 
posed by peripheral political actors in terms of alternative citizenship understandings and 
reaction of the central actors to such challenges. Peripheral actors have mobilized 
different segments of the society and their demands for inclusion, while central actors 
have adopted a stance that protects the status quo concerning Turkish citizenship. 
AKP’s early years exemplified such a challenge to the official construct of 
citizenship as a peripheral actor. But since 2011, when the party has won its third 
consecutive national elections, AKP has started to become more authoritarian as it has 
established its electoral hegemony. This hegemony has resulted in the settlement of AKP 
in the center as the political actor capable of producing and disseminating its own value 
structures. In other words, the center and its values represented primarily by CHP has 
dismantled. Dismantling of the center by AKP’s electoral hegemony has put those who 
identify with its values at the periphery, when the concept is understood as the locus of 
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excluded values. To meet this challenge, CHP has adopted a more rights-oriented 
discourse, which signified a shift in its position regarding Turkish citizenship.  
In the light of these arguments, this chapter will focus on the electoral manifestos 
of the four political parties in the TGNA to assess their recent positions vis-à-vis 
citizenship rights and liberties. The analyses will be limited to the most recent electoral 
manifestos of these parties for both June and November 2015 elections to cover the latest 
official documents that the survey respondents are exposed to. In order to account for the 
shifts occurred prior to these manifestos, two different datasets will be utilized.  
This chapter starts with introducing these two datasets which have different 
methods of compiling data on political party positions. Next, the continuities and changes 
occurred in political party positions along several dimensions that are related to the 
citizenship rights and liberties used in this research will be documented. Following this 
analysis, the most recent electoral manifestos of these four parties will be analyzed 
through the citizenship rights and liberties categories used in this research. This chapter 
will conclude with a comparison of the positions of these parties in terms of civil liberties, 
political rights, and social rights. 
 
 
4.2 Determining Positions of Political Parties: Methodological 
Differences 
 
 
As parties are agents of mobilization, it is necessary to understand how they 
position themselves while competing with other parties in the race of mobilization of the 
electorate. Hence, within the general literature on political parties, one strand focuses on 
positions of political parties regarding various issues. Party position research is mainly 
about making sense of the political arena through a spatial model of politics. Parties can 
be located in this space through identifying party families and social cleavages (Lipset 
and Rokkan 1967; Duverger 1954). Policy space can also be researched through 
secondary resources, such as texts or accounts of other scholars.  
Generally, political arena is considered to be ideological that can be understood as 
the left-right ideological dimension (Mair 2001: 11). For Benoit and Laver (2006: 132) 
this left-right dimension is related with the socio-economic policies, including public 
spending and taxation. Yet, the meaning of the traditional left or right positions are also 
 127 
changing with the emergence of new issues (Benoit and Laver 2006: 136). Recently, the 
classical left-right dimension is being qualified by including issues such as 
environmentalism or liberal social values, and being called as social left-right dimension 
(Marks and Steenbergen 2004). Moreover, there can also be other dimensions depending 
on the policy space that is being researched and the model that is operationalized (Benoit 
and Laver 2006:46, 59).  
While estimating positions, there are a couple of methods, including mass surveys, 
politician surveys, roll call surveys and so on. being used in the literature. Two methods 
have proved to be popular among others: expert surveys and manifesto research.  
The next sections will first introduce these methods and then discuss positions of 
Turkish political parties according to them. Then, the most recent electoral manifestos of 
the four political parties in the parliament will be discussed with a specific focus on 
citizenship rights and liberties used in this research. 
 
 
4.3 Expert Surveys for Positioning Political Parties 
 
 
In expert survey method, country experts, who have “expertise in party politics in 
their own national contexts,” are given surveys asking them to position political parties 
on a scale of various policy positions (Benoit and Laver 2006: 72). For their expert 
survey, Benoit and Laver (2006: 85) identified four core policy dimensions: economic 
policy, social policy, the decentralization of decision making, and environmental policy. 
In addition to these, they have added country and region specific dimensions as well 
(Benoit and Laver 2006: 173-175). 
According to Benoit and Laver (2006:76), where they use expert surveys to 
estimate party policy positions, expert surveys are advantageous for a couple of reasons: 
they are economic and accessible, they allow for estimating key policy dimensions before 
positioning political parties through informal surveys, they have controllable sample sizes 
for country experts, and they carry the potential to create consensus. For some, expert 
survey method can be “limited and contingent.” (Mair 2001: 19) They can be contingent 
because they tend to provide a snapshot of the time period when the survey was applied 
and this snapshot may not be enough to estimate policy outputs or coalitions. 
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4.3.1 Positions of Turkish political parties according to expert 
survey method 
 
 
 Although the expert survey method is not very popular in Turkish party position 
research, it is heavily used for the positions of political parties across Europe concerning 
a variety of different issues.  
 The primary data source for this method is the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) 
project carried out by University of North Carolina. The first expert survey was conducted 
in 1999 and it has been ongoing since then. This survey is designed to estimate party 
positions regarding European integration, ideology, and policy issues of political parties 
in a variety of countries. The first survey included 14 countries but the most current wave 
incorporates 31 countries that also includes Turkish political parties50. 
 Since the literature on Turkish political parties does not seem to have specific 
empirical studies using CHES data, there will not be a discussion of secondary resources. 
Instead, the 2007, 2010, and 2014 survey data will be presented to demonstrate the shifts 
in positions of political parties in Turkey concerning the issues relevant to the objects of 
this research. This effort will substantiate the arguments on changing positions of political 
parties in Turkey that were presented in the previous chapter.  
 
 
 Positions on the Ideological Spectrum According to CHES Data 
 
 One of the critical aspects of party positions is about the ideological spectrum. 
The CHES data has two different conceptualizations of ideological positions. The first 
one is the classical left-right scale and the second one is called “GAL/TAN” scale, which 
incorporates post-materialist issues such as environmentalism, minority rights, cultural 
and identity issues. The classical left-right scale has been criticized by some students of 
Turkish politics for being inadequate to capture nuances in Turkish politics (Çarkoğlu 
1998, Çarkoğlu 2007, Kalaycıoğlu 2010, Özbudun 2013, Öniş 2007). These criticisms 
will be discussed in the next section regarding the different examples on manifesto 
research in Turkey. Yet, it is important to investigate the data concerning ideological left-
                                                 
50 Information concerning UNC Chapel Hill Expert Surveys can be found at: https://www.chesdata.eu/  
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right to see potential correspondence between this scale and other interpretations, such as 
GAL/TAN.  
 The graph below displays the changes in left-right positions between 2007 and 
2014 of the four political parties of interest51. The graph shows that experts placement of 
AKP moved to the right over the years, while CHP’s position drastically changed between 
2010 and 2014. This observation is in line with the discussion on CHP in the previous 
chapter which argued that the party’s emphasis on rights and liberties has become more 
pronounced especially after 2010. MHP moved slightly to the left, possibly because of its 
recent adoption of more social-democratic language in its electoral campaigning. HDP is 
positioned at far-left by the experts compared to its predecessor, BDP. The reason might 
be the coalition of interests that HDP claims to represent. While BDP was primarily a 
pro-Kurdish party, HDP incorporated leftist groups as well. This might have caused 
experts to situate HDP at far-left.  
 
Graph 1 Mean scores for lrgen variable of 2007, 2010, and 2014 CHES 
 
Note: The scale is between 0 and 10 where 0 represents extreme left and 10 represents extreme right. Source 
CHES data. 
                                                 
51 HDP’s predecessor is BDP (Peace and Democracy Party) and its position in the 2010 survey is used to make sense 
of HDP’s position in 2014. No observation for pro-Kurdish party in the data set of the 2007 wave of the survey. 
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 The second scale, i.e. GAL/TAN, incorporates post-materialist dimensions and 
positions political parties accordingly. This scale is considered as a revised left-right 
ideological scale, where GAL represents Green, Alternative and Liberal positions that 
prioritize post-materialist values, personal rights and freedoms; whereas TAN stands for 
a combination of Traditional, Nationalist positions that emphasize order and authority 
(Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002: 967,977). Since main fault-lines of political 
competition in Turkey are more cultural and identity-related, this differentiation will 
provide a more nuanced outlook in terms of party positions in Turkey. 
 The graph below displays the variations of political party positions on GAL/TAN 
scale. The left-end of the scale represents the libertarian/postmaterialist position, while 
the right-end represents the traditional/authoritarian one. One striking difference from the 
ideological left-right scale is the position of AKP. While the Graph 1 positions MHP to 
the right of AKP, GAL/TAN scale displays that AKP has moved to a more traditional, 
authoritarian position than MHP in 2014. The shift occurred in CHP’s position is also 
surprising: for the experts, CHP’s position on GAL/TAN scale displays significant 
variation. CHP shifted from slightly central position to a more traditional authoritarian 
one and then became closer to the Green, Alternative, Liberal end of the scale in 2014. 
HDP is positioned at the left-end of the scale signifying a clear GAL position, which is 
potentially related with the interest coalitions it represented. MHP’s positions displayed 
less variation, suggesting that the party has more or less stayed as a traditional, 
authoritarian party prioritizing order and security.  
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Graph 2 Mean scores for galtan variable of 2007, 2010, and 2014 CHES 
 
Source CHES data. 
 
 Positions Concerning Civil Liberties, Religion, and Social 
Norms 
 
 In addition to ideological spectrum, there are more specific variables measuring 
parties’ positions regarding a variety of social issues in CHES data. Separate graphs 
that are relevant to the objectives of this research and Turkish context will be discussed 
below. 
 The first graph displays the positions regarding the positions on support for civil 
liberties and support for tough measures concerning law and order. The relevant variable 
“civlib_laworder” concerns 0 to signify strong support for civil liberties while 10 signifies 
strong support for tough measures to fight crime and promote law and order. Since one 
of the citizenship rights used in this research concerns civil liberties, this data provides a 
proxy for parties’ changing positions vis-à-vis protection of civil liberties. 
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Graph 3 Mean scores for civlib_laworder variable in 2010 and 2014 CHES. 
 
Note: This variable does not exist in 2007 survey. Source CHES data. 
 
 According to the Graph 3, most visible shifts happened for AKP and CHP in terms 
of the clash between support for civil liberties and support for tough measures for fighting 
crime and sustaining law and order. While AKP is positioned closer to the right-end, 
which signifies support for tough measures, CHP has moved closer to the left-end, 
signifying that the party has adopted a more supportive stance towards civil liberties. 
MHP’s position has more or less stayed the same between 2010 and 2014; displaying 
strong support for tough measures. HDP is positioned at the left-end of the spectrum, 
which displays continuity with its predecessor, BDP. 
 In Graph 4, two variables are used for displaying changing positions regarding 
lifestyle and emphasis on religious principles in politics. Although these variables are 
distinct, there is a common underlying dimension that relates them. The variable 
“sociallifestyle" demonstrates parties’ positions regarding lifestyle preferences such as 
homosexuality, while “religious_principle” is about saliency of religious issues in 
political life in party positions. The common point between them is that they display 
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differences in terms of religious/conservative and secular/liberal positions. That’s why 
using these two variables in the same graph is logical. 
 
Graph 4 Mean scores for sociallifestyle and religious_principle.  
 
Note: These variables do not exist in 2007 survey. Source CHES data. 
 
Graph 4 demonstrates that AKP’s position regarding lifestyle issues has remained 
conservative, while it has adopted a more religious outlook of politics in 2014, compared 
to 2010. MHP has moved to the liberal end in both of the variables, yet still at the 
conservative end compared to the other parties. CHP’s stance towards religious principles 
has stayed the same between 2010 and 2014 displaying that party’s stance towards 
secularism has not changed. Yet, in 2014, experts have positioned CHP at a more liberal 
point concerning lifestyle issues, which suggests that the party has adopted a more liberal 
stance. HDP has also emerged as a more liberal/secular party compared to BDP. 
 
 Positions Concerning Nationalism 
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 The last items that will be demonstrated are about the issue of nationalism. There 
are two variables that are related with nationalism. These are: “ethnic_minorities” and 
“nationalism.” While the former measures positions regarding the rights of ethnic 
minorities, the latter concerns the image of society. For the “ethnic_minorities” high 
scores display opposition to the rights of ethnic minorities, while low scores display 
support for these rights. For “nationalism”, low scores display support for a cosmopolitan 
image of society, while high scores display support for a nationalist image. The variable 
“nationalism” does not exist in 2010 survey, but it exists in 2007 survey, while 
“ethnic_minorities” does not exist in 2007 survey. Still, as these two variables both 
display positions regarding a unitary, nationalistic outlook concerning the society, it is 
logical to use them together in a single graph.  
 
Graph 5 Mean scores of ethnic_minorities and nationalism in 2007, 2010, and 2014 
surveys. 
 
Source CHES data. 
 
 According to Graph 5, MHP’s position regarding rights of ethnic minorities and 
nationalism does not display much variation, which is expected given that MHP openly 
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advocates a nationalist stance and does not recognize rights of ethnic minorities. AKP’s 
position on rights of ethnic minorities has slightly moved to the right between 2010 and 
2014, which suggests that the party advocates less support for rights of ethnic minorities. 
With relation to nationalism, AKP has moved to the right according to the experts 
suggesting that the party has adopted a more nationalist position in 2014 compared to 
2007. This is significant because it demonstrates the clear shift in party’s position on 
nationalism. While AKP was promoting policies for cultural rights during its early years, 
its position was considered to be at the center between strong support for ethnic minority 
rights and opposition to it. Yet, as discussed in the previous chapter, AKP has stopped 
putting pro-multicultural policies in its later years in government. CHP, on the other hand, 
has become less nationalist between 2007 and 2014, while more supportive of rights of 
ethnic minorities between 2010 and 2014. HDP’s relatively stable position is similar to 
MHP’s in the sense that the party displays clear continuity with its predecessor BDP in 
terms of the support for the rights of ethnic minorities, i.e. the Kurdish minority. In 
addition, party is positioned as a cosmopolitan party.  
 
 
 Positions Concerning Welfare 
 
In order to assess the positions concerning welfare, the variable called 
“spendvtax” in CHES data will be used. This variable measures positions on 
improving public services or reducing taxes and ranges from 0 to 10. According to 
the codebook, 0 signifies a position that is fully in favor of raising taxes for funding 
public services while 10 displays a position favoring cutting public services and 
taxes. Since this variable is related with positions concerning public services, it is 
a good proxy for stances regarding welfare.  
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Graph 6 Mean scores of spendvtax in 2010 and 2014 
 
Source CHES data. 
 
 It is interesting to see that in 2014 experts positioned AKP closer to the right-end 
of the spectrum given that the party promotes its past policies concerning public services. 
This shift from 2010 to 2014 can be related with the neoliberal healthcare policies of the 
party discussed in the seconday literature (Eder 2010, Bozkurt 2013, Kartal 2009). While 
CHP’s position remained the same, MHP has moved towards a less-welfarist position 
according to the experts. 
To conclude, these graphs demonstrate the shifts in the positions of the four political 
parties that are currently in the parliament. It seems while claiming to mobilize different 
segments of the population, these political parties also engage in strategic decisions to 
change their policy positions regarding matters relevant to citizenship. For instance, while 
AKP had a more liberal approach towards rights and liberties, it had become more 
nationalist, less multiculturalist and pro-state over the years, CHP’s position had become 
more liberal vis-à-vis rights, liberties, and nationalism albeit inclining towards a clearer 
secular position. 
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4.4 Manifesto Analysis for Positioning Political Parties 
 
 
The other method being used for estimating positions of political parties is 
analyzing party manifestos. In this method, contents of the party manifestos are coded 
and they are analyzed through various content analytic methods by counting and 
associating words or statements. Manifestos are analyzed through discourse analytic 
perspective where party discourses on specific issues are used to assess party positions. 
For this strand of research, party manifestos signal a specific stance on various policy 
dimensions and thus analysis of them can provide insight into the positions of political 
parties in a given political context. Moreover, signaling their positions through the 
manifestos, parties also expose their stance in the competition with each other.  
In party manifesto research, the policy spectrum is usually one-dimensional, i.e. 
parties are positioned on a left-right ideological space (Volkens 2007: 109). One of the 
most established currents within that field is the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) 
data compiled and maintained by Manifesto Research Group. The project is continuing 
since late 1970s and currently covers manifestos of more than 1000 political parties since 
1945 in over 50 countries. In that sense, CMP data has the advantage of offering cross-
national and longitudinal data on political parties, which makes comparative research 
possible and easier. Relying on a system of coding sentences in a manifesto, CMP method 
assumes an ideological left-right spectrum and positions political parties along that 
spectrum.  
There are various criticisms targeted towards the CMP data. In addition to the ones 
pointing out the problems related with human coders and inter-coder reliability, there are 
scholars arguing that what CMP data measures is not the policy positions but the “issue 
saliency,” which is about the preferences of political parties in emphasizing certain 
policies or concerns over the others (Pennings and Keman 2002: 57). For critics, 
measuring “party-specific saliency weights of different policy dimensions” is not helpful 
for estimating party positions on policy dimensions (Benoit and Laver 2006: 65). CMP’s 
left-right scale is also criticized for assuming that left and right mean the same thing 
across time and space (Benoit and Laver 2006). 
The coding scheme is also being criticized for having certain internal validity 
problems when it comes to focusing on specific policy dimensions. Pennings and Keman 
(2002: 66) point out the lack of certain categories such as feminism in the coding scheme, 
 138 
as well as the general problem of inter-subjective coding. Others argue that specific policy 
dimensions may have misleading results. Protsky and Garaz (2011: 300-303), in their 
empirical research on politicization of ethnicity, argue that ethnicity-related statements 
are either undercounted as those statements are usually coded under non-ethnicity related 
categories; or these statements are not distinguished adequately from each other, i.e. it is 
not possible to designate statements focusing on protection or limitation of minority to 
one of the CMP’s ethnicity related categories52. 
Although there are such problems concerning the CMP method, its dataset is useful 
for tracing the change of positions over the years. The next section will present the 
positions of the four political parties in the parliament concerning issues relevant to the 
objectives of this research. 
 
4.4.1 Positions of Turkish Political Parties According to Manifesto 
Analyses 
 
There are a lot of studies aiming at positioning political parties in Turkey but a 
relatively small number of them uses CMP data. As it will be argued in the following 
pages, the main criticism towards CMP data is its ideological left-right scale, which is 
criticized by not accounting for the peculiarity of Turkish political landscape. Instead, 
many scholars either used specific policy dimensions of the CMP data or preferred 
discourse analysis. Before dwelling on these secondary sources, it is better to look at the 
data itself as it provides cross-time evaluation of changes in the positions of political 
parties in relevant issue dimensions. 
 
 Positions Concerning Ideological Left-Right Scale 
 
CMP data has the variable “rile53” which measures the position of political parties 
across a right-left ideological dimension. It is calculated by the difference (in percentages) 
between the mentions of issues associated with right and issues associated with left. The 
variables used in the calculation of “rile” include both economical and welfare related 
items, as well as social and cultural items. Hence, this variable is designed to measure a 
more complex kind of ideological spectrum.  
                                                 
52 Such as: multiculturalims: positive or multiculturalism: negative 
53 The variable “rile” has a standard deviation of 19.6398 for Turkish political parties.  
 139 
The scale of “rile” ranges between -100 to + 100, where the former denotes far- left 
and the latter denotes far-right. The first graph below shows CHP’s changing positions 
across the ideological right-left scale.  
 
Graph 7 Ideological position of CHP between 1950 and 2015. 
 
Note: The scale is between -20 to +20 signifying that CHP’s ideological position has changed a lot during its 
political life. The standard deviation of CHP’s position on rile index is 11.723. Source: Comparative Manifesto Project 
data 
 
 Graph 7 displays that for the most part of its life, CHP was on the left side of the 
ideological spectrum. Yet, its position on the left demonstrates high volatility: while its 
manifestos during 70s were at the far-left, its position became closer to the center during 
90s and early 2000s. In 2015, its electoral manifestos for both of the elections position 
the party on a far-left position that is unprecedented in its history.  
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Graph 8 Ideological position of AKP between 2002 and 2015. 
 
Note: The scale is between -10 to +5, signifying that AKP manifestos were closer to the center on rile index. 
Standard deviation of AKP’s position on rile index is 7.011. Source: Comparative Manifesto Project data 
 
 Graph 8 displays the ideological position of AKP between 2002 and 2015. It has 
moved significantly to the left over the years according to CMP data. This result is 
different than the CHES data results and the reason might to be that CHES uses experts’ 
positioning of political parties where CMP data uses party manifestos, which include 
parties’ self-definitions instead of third-party assessments.  
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Graph 9 Ideological position of MHP between 1961 and 2015. 
 
Note: The scale is between -10 to +30 and standard deviation of MHP’s position on rile index is 11.367. Source: 
Comparative Manifesto Project data 
 
 Graph 9 displays the ideological positioning of MHP (and its predecessor 
CKMP54). It is remarkable to see that party’s position stayed the same until 1977. Since 
1999, MHP manifestos has been displaying a more centrist tone according to the graph 
as MHP’s position was slightly left-of-center by 2015.  
                                                 
54 Since CKMP changed its name to MHP in 1969, the dataset gave them the same party code. Hence, CKMP is also 
included in this graph 
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Graph 10 Ideological positions of HDP and its predecessors between 2007 and 2015. 
 
Note: The scale is between -36 and -32, signifying small variation. Source: Comparative Manifesto Project data 
 
 When it comes to HDP and its predecessors55, it is clear that they are at the left of 
other parties. It seems HDP is closer to the center in relation to its predecessors while 
retaining its position on the left compared to other parties in the parliament.  
 Positions Concerning Rights and Liberties, Nationalism, and 
Morality 
 
 The literature on Turkish political parties suggests that the ideological differences 
between parties are based more on cultural terms than economic issues (Özbudun 2013). 
Hence, it makes sense to investigate stances concerning rights and liberties, nationalism, 
and morality for a more nuanced understanding of party positions. 
 The first item in CMP data tapping rights and liberties is called “per201: Freedom 
and Human Rights.” Positive scores on this item suggests that party manifestos include 
favorable mentions of personal freedoms and civil rights. The range of the variable is 
                                                 
55 Although there are some differences between these parties, they can be considered to be successive as BDP was 
established when DTP was dissolved by the Constitutional Court and HDP was established after BDP was dissolved 
by the party cadre. 
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between 0 and 17 indicating the favorable mentions. Hence, if a party’s position is closer 
to 0, there are not much favorable mentions of freedom and human rights and vice versa.  
 
Graph 11 Favorable mentions of “Freedom and Human Rights” in manifestos between 
2002 and 2015 
 
Note: DTP and BDP were included to account for the changes in pro-Kurdish political parties. Source: 
Comparative Manifesto Project data 
 
 Most significant change occurred in CHP manifestos according to Graph 11; 
favorable mentions of freedom and human rights have increased a lot between 2007 and 
2011 general elections. In fact, it is interesting to see that in 2007, all parties had relatively 
few mentions of freedom and human rights, which had improved in 2011 elections in 
various degrees. In addition, HDP’s manifestos for 2015 June and November elections 
were significantly different from the other manifestos in terms of the high level of 
favorable mentions. It seems, it was HDP that had the most extensive approach towards 
rights and liberties in its manifestos in 2015 elections, while AKP was left behind of CHP 
in both of the elections in 2015.  
 Another relevant dimension along which political parties change their positions is 
nationalism. Given that nationalism is one of the key issues concerning citizenship 
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understanding, it is important to see how political parties display their positions regarding 
this issue. There are two variables that measures favorable and unfavorable mentions of 
nationalism56. The graph below displays the distribution of political party positions along 
a new variable called “nationalism” that was created for this research by subtracting 
per601 (favorable mentions) from per602 (unfavorable mentions). Positive scores of this 
variable demonstrate a nationalist position, while negative scores demonstrate non-
nationalist position. The values of “nationalism” ranges from -3.077 to 16.8.  
 
Graph 12 Favorable mentions of nationalism in manifestos between 2002 and 2015 
 
Note: DTP and BDP were included to account for the changes in pro-Kurdish political parties. Source: 
Comparative Manifesto Project data 
 
 Graph 12 demonstrates that MHP and pro-Kurdish parties are situated at the 
opposite ends on the nationalism variable; while MHP clearly has a nationalist position, 
                                                 
56 These variables are per601 "National Way of Life: Positive”: Favorable mentions of manifesto country’s nation, 
history, and general appeals. May include: support for established national ideas, general appeals to pride of 
citizenship, appeals to patriotism, appeals to nationalism, suspension of some freedoms in order to protect the state 
against subversion. 
per 602 “National Way of Life: Negative”: Unfavorable mentions of manifesto country’s nation and history. May 
include: opposition to patriotism, opposition to nationalism, opposition to the existing national state, national pride, 
and national ideas. 
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pro-Kurdish parties have negative values, displaying their position against Turkish 
nationalism. Compared to 2002, AKP’s manifestos in 2015 are at the right of point 0, 
signifying a shift towards a more nationalist position, while CHP’s position does not 
change that much. HDP’s and BDP’s position being close to 0 results from the lack of 
mentions of Turkish nationalism, either supporting or opposing it.  
 “Traditional Morality” is another variable that manifestos display differences. 
According to the codebook of CMP data, there are two variables that measure the 
positions concerning morality and a new variable is created by subtracting these two to 
display the favorable mentions of traditional morality57. Scores of this variable ranges 
from -3.292 to 9.2. The positive scores signify a position emphasizing modern values and 
secularism, while negative values emphasizing conservative values and importance of 
religious institutions in state and society affairs.  
                                                 
57 The relevant variables are per603 “Traditional Morality: Positive”: Favorable mentions of Traditional and/or 
religious moral values. May include: prohibition, censorship and suppression of immorality and unseemly behavior, 
maintenance and stability of the traditional family as a value, support for the role of religious institutions in state and 
society.  
per604 “Traditional Morality: Negative”: Opposition to traditional and/or religious moral values. May include: 
support for divorce, abortion etc., general support for modern family composition, calls for separation of church and 
state.  
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Graph 13 Favorable mentions of traditional morality in manifestos between 2002 and 
2015. 
 
Note: DTP and BDP were included to account for the changes in pro-Kurdish political parties. Source: 
Comparative Manifesto Project data. 
 
 According to the results, it is CHP’s position that displays the most significant 
shifts. CHP’s position started from a relatively less secularist position in 2002 to a 
significantly stricter secularist one in 2007, with higher number of mentions opposing 
religious and/or moral values. Then the party moved to a more neutral position in 2011 
and 2015. In fact, its manifestos in both of the elections in 2015 carry more favorable 
mentions of traditional morality compared to its earlier manifestos. It seems CHP has 
decreased its emphasis on secularism compared to 2007. On the other hand, AKP’s 
position is relatively stable, moving slightly towards a more conservative position. One 
interesting difference from the earlier distribution of positions is how AKP’s manifestos 
has become more conservative than MHP’s. As MHP has moved to a more secularist 
position, AKP has ended up on a more conservative position. HDP’s predecessors had a 
more critical stance towards conservative and pro-religious values in their manifestos 
while HDP’s 2015 manifestos are neutral. This is another unexpected finding because the 
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voting behavior literature argues that HDP’s predecessors appealed to a more religious 
electorate compared to HDP. It is probable that HDP manifestos do not include favorable 
or unfavorable mentions of traditional morality, while its predecessors had relatively 
more unfavorable mentions.  
 
 Positions Concerning Welfare 
 
 CMP dataset includes a predetermined variable called “welfare” which is 
calculated by adding up two variables58. As these two variables include both normative 
commitment to social justice and policy suggestions reflecting these commitments, it 
incorporates both normative and practical aspects of welfare state. The scores of 
“welfare” ranges from 0 to 25.086 and high scores signify more mentions of welfare in 
manifestos while 0 signify no mention.  
                                                 
58 The variables are per503 “Equality: Positive”: Concept of social justice and the need for fair treatment of all 
people. This may include: special protection for underprivileged groups, removal of class barriers, need for fair 
distribution of resources, the end of discrimination (e.g. racial or sexual discrimination). 
per504 “Welfare State Expansion”: Favorable mentions of need to introduce, maintain or expand any public social 
service or social security scheme. This includes, for example, government funding of: health care, child care, elder 
care and pensions, housing. 
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Graph 14 Favorable mentions of welfare (favorable mentions of social justice and welfare 
state expansion) in manifestos between 2002 and 2015. 
 
Note: DTP and BDP were included to account for the changes in pro-Kurdish political parties. Source: 
Comparative Manifesto Project data. 
 
 Graph 14 demonstrates that all parties have favorable mentions of welfare in their 
manifestos since 2002. These favorable mentions increased in CHP’s manifestos after 
2007 elections significantly, positioning the party at a more pro-welfare position over the 
years. AKP’s and MHP’s manifestos have also become more pro-welfare compared to 
2002 and 2007 respectively but these shifts were not as significant as CHP’s. HDP is also 
ahead of its predecessors in terms of favorable mentions of welfare as the party's 
manifesto for June 2015 elections is positioned at the maximum score.  
 Both CHES and CMP data display not only the differences between parties in 
terms of ideological positioning and other issue areas, but also the shifts the party 
positions experienced over the years. Hence, one can argue for significant changes in 
policy positions which suggest that parties do not represent frozen cleavages but are either 
responsive to changing preferences of electorate or change their positions to extend their 
appeal.  
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 After taking a look at the most widely-used datasets in party positioning literature 
to investigate the shifts of positions, the next section will introduce the secondary 
literature on party positions in Turkey to discuss other findings.  
  
4.4.2 Secondary Literature Analyzing Electoral Manifestos of 
Turkish Political Parties 
 
 
Within the literature on positions of Turkish political parties there are empirical 
studies making use of electoral manifestos either through referring to specific issues 
within CMP data or discourse analysis. Those who use other methods do so because of 
their criticisms concerning the ideological scale used by CMP data.  
Although party positioning studies usually make use of left-right axis, there are 
scholars who argue that this axis may not be adequate to explain the political cleavages 
in Turkey (Çarkoğlu 1998: 561). For these scholars, left and right in Turkey are 
influenced by the historical cleavage structures, namely center-periphery divide measured 
by religiosity, education levels and ethnic differences, so that Western European accounts 
of left-right axis can be problematic (Çarkoğlu 2007, Kalaycıoğlu 2010). Similarly, 
Özbudun (2013: 87) argues that left-right ideological spectrum may be inadequate to 
explain the differentiation between the political parties in Turkey because the polarization 
in the party system is more “cultural and psychological” than the ideological, class-based 
distance suggested by left-right scale. According to Özbudun left and right have different 
meanings in Turkish context than in Western democracies, where these positions 
correspond to parties’ positions regarding government’s role in economy and emphasis 
on public welfare. In Turkish context, the meanings of left and right are differentiated in 
cultural terms where right corresponds to “a commitment to religious, conservative and 
nationalist views” while left is defined “primarily in terms of secularism.” (Hale and 
Özbudun 2010: 35) In addition, low income groups have been voting for parties that can 
be positioned at cultural right, as these parties, such as AKP, have heavily targeted low 
income groups both in terms of policies and discourse (Hale and Özbudun 2010: 35-36). 
Whereas CHP, albeit representing left, has failed to reproduce its appeal within the 
working class after 1980. Instead the party has been preferred by urban, educated, secular 
segments of the society. Öniş (2007: 249) also points out the considerable interest in 
issues of social justice among right-wing and Islamist parties, although there are 
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important differences across parties in this tradition. Instead of left-right as a 
differentiating feature, Öniş (2007: 260) proposes a different categorization that cuts 
across left-right ideological spectrum: “conservative globalists vs. defensive nationalists” 
in the context of EU membership. Thus, if left-right scale is being reinterpreted in Turkish 
context, it would be based upon a cultural differentiation rather than a class-based 
conflict, while ethnicity emerges as the additional dimension of party competition in 
Turkey.   
Hence specific historical trajectories of main social cleavages in Turkey makes 
implementation of classical left-right scale difficult to interpret. This has influenced 
scholars to focus on specific issue areas in manifestos, either through utilizing CMP data 
or conducting discourse analysis. 
Focusing on the general political party space in Turkey, Bayram (2015: 5) uses 
CMP data to compare AKP with center-right and Islamist parties. The center-right parties 
in his model are DP, AP, ANAP and DYP and the Islamist parties are MSP and RP. 
Through utilizing inverse factor analysis on CMP data of the above-mentioned political 
party manifestos, Bayram (2015: 7) finds out that AKP is grouped together with center-
right rather than the Islamist parties. This finding is in line with the distinct position of 
AKP within the Islamist tradition. When Bayram performs factor analysis on all of the 
manifestos of Turkish political parties within the CMP data, he finds out that AKP 
manifestos so far has a technocratic and nationalist tone compared to others. Focusing on 
a specific issue area, Hatipoğlu et al. (2015: 20) have used CMP’s coding scheme to 
analyze the changes in Turkish foreign policy through election manifestos of AKP, CHP, 
and MHP for the 2002, 2007 and 2011 elections. According to Hatipoğlu et al. (2015: 
32), the saliency of foreign policy issues is influenced by external events and 
interventions and they change the foreign policy preferences. In other words, parties 
respond to the external events and adjust their policy positions accordingly. Moreover, 
these changing preferences have certain implications in the domestic policy issues. 
There are other studies analyzing manifestos without relying on CMP data. Instead, 
these works rely on discourse analysis of the electoral manifestos, focusing on specific 
policy or issue areas. In his article analyzing six election manifestos of the two main 
opposition parties, CHP and MHP, through discourse analysis, Kıratlı (2015:262-263) 
investigates how these parties position themselves regarding European integration. Kıratlı 
(2015: 275) argues that both parties’ positions regarding European integration correspond 
with their places in the revised left-right ideological scale; TAN/GAL scale. According 
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to this revised scale, Green, Alternative, Liberal (GAL) position emphasizes post-
materialist values, personal rights and freedoms, whereas Traditional, Authoritarian, 
Nationalist (TAN) position prioritizes order and authority (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 
2002: 967,977). For Kıratlı (2015: 275) CHP, as a social democratic political party is 
mainly supportive of European integration, MHP, as a nationalist party is highly critical 
of it. This analysis, then, suggests that parties reflect the historical cleavage that they 
claim to represent. Başkan and Gümrükçü (2012) carried out a similar research 
demonstrating strategic position taking in the case of EU membership. They have applied 
discourse analysis on the election manifestos of political parties competed in 2002, 2007, 
and 2011 elections to analyze their positions regarding Turkey’s EU membership. For 
Başkan and Gümrükçü (2012: 40), Turkish political parties vary in terms of their positions 
regarding European integration: there are Eurosceptics and Euroreject parties, as well as 
Euroenthusiastic parties. Moreover, these positions do not correspond with the positions 
of these parties on the left-right ideological scale: right-wing AKP and left-wing DSP are 
both positioned as Euroenthusiast. Bilgin’s (2008) analysis on foreign policy orientations 
of Islamist parties is another work that focuses on manifestos through discourse analysis. 
Bilgin (2008: 408) looks at RP’s and AKP’s manifestos for the periods between 1996 and 
1997 for RP, and 2002 and 2007 for AKP. Bilgin (2008: 417-418) argues that in terms of 
Islamist elements in foreign policy, RP’s manifestos were more demonstrative than 
AKP’s. RP’s efforts for establishing an Islamist outlook for foreign policy had been 
hampered by the military-bureaucratic elite, which may have caused AKP to adopt a more 
pragmatic and cautious approach towards foreign policy, at least during its formative 
years.  
In a more recent article based on electoral manifestos, Bilgin (2017) underlines the 
role of pragmatism in center-right and pro-religious parties in Turkish political party 
system concerning the EU membership. While center-left parties have consistently 
referred to Europeanization as an extension of Republican modernization process with 
some reservations related with security concerns, center-right and pro-religious parties 
were more pragmatic: on the one hand, they have tried to balance their appeal towards 
conservative electorate; on the other hand, they have emphasized potential economic 
benefits when advocating EU membership (Bilgin 2017: 205). Hence, the way such issues 
are framed in manifestos is also related with strategic concerns. 
Analyzing election manifestos within a specific issue area, Nil Satana (2012) 
focuses on the Kurdish issue. According to Satana’s (2012: 177) research, which looks at 
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the portrayal of Kurdish issue in the election manifestos of major parties before 2011 
elections, AKP’s stance has changed from 2007 elections to 2011 elections. Backing her 
argument with examples of speeches of the party’s then-leader, Erdoğan, Satana (2012: 
179) underlines the efforts of AKP and Erdoğan to capture not just Kurdish votes but also 
the support of nationalists at the same time during this period. This vote maximization 
strategy adopted by AKP is also documented by Arıkan Akdağ (2016: 133) where she 
argues that AKP’s Kurdish opening was a rational strategy to craft “potential swing 
voters” among Kurdish electorate. Between 2007 and 2011, BDP’s position regarding the 
Kurdish issue has evolved to be a more religiously conservative and nationalistic, whereas 
CHP has remained rather “inconsistent” without a clear stance towards the issue (Satana 
2012: 182). MHP’s position in its manifestos and Bahçeli’s discourses were more 
consistent with the party’s traditional position (Satana 2012: 184).  
These studies seem to suggest that positioning political parties in Turkey is a 
different effort than doing the same thing for the established democracies in Europe 
mainly because of differences in the contents of left and right and changing positions due 
to strategic vote maximization strategies. It seems that the secular vs religious values, in 
addition to the ethnic nationalisms are relevant in the positions of political parties in 
Turkey, while parties can change their positions for vote maximization and electoral 
appeal.  
The next section focuses on the most recent electoral manifestos of the four political 
parties in the parliament. The reason for focusing on most recent manifestos is two-fold. 
Firstly, the primary data source of this research is the survey conducted on April 2016, 
which was approximately five months after the November 2015 snap elections and ten 
months after June 2015 elections.  So, the survey respondents are assumed to be exposed 
to the most recent electoral manifestos disseminated before November and June 2015 
elections. Secondly, since survey responses provide a snapshot, it is logical to analyze 
most recent electoral manifestos that can have an immediate influence over the 
respondents as they are more likely to be familiar with most recent electoral discourses. 
That’s why this research will engage with the most recent manifestos of the four political 
parties in the parliament through a specific focus on their stances concerning citizenship 
rights and liberties. The next section demonstrates the relevant arguments in those 
manifestos. 
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4.5 Empirical Analysis of Current Manifestos of Four Political 
Parties 
 
 
Overall, political party position research is vast and is expanding to cover various 
policy areas or societal issues. Although there are now a multitude of methods to analyze 
the positions, manifestos are still relevant for identifying where political parties stand 
regarding certain issue areas. As the agents of societal mobilization and interest-
aggregation, political parties still use electoral manifestos to signal their policy positions 
to the general public. As Wessels (1995: 148) argues election manifestos can have 
influence over the ideas of the public through their visibility in the mass media, which in 
turn inform the electorate about their policy position. In other words, party manifestos 
and election manifestos can be used as sources to position political parties along 
ideological lines. The reason is that election manifestos act as the promotional material 
of the political party and they can prioritize certain issues over others depending on their 
ideological status or the societal cleavage that they aim at representing or attracting. 
Hence, election manifestos provide rich material for analyzing how political parties differ 
from (or approximate to) each other.  
 Electoral manifestos of Turkish political parties also serve a similar purpose in 
signaling parties’ positions regarding various issues to their audience. They can be used 
to solidify the core electorate or to appeal new segments of the society. The primary 
reason for including analysis of electoral manifestos of political parties in the TGNA to 
understand their arguments and approach towards citizenship rights and liberties. More 
specifically, as the survey data displays the perceptions of a sample of individuals voted 
for these parties, electoral manifestos can illuminate potential discrepancies or 
concordance between these perceptions and the parties’ positions. Hence, the next section 
will discuss the most recent electoral manifestos of the four political parties in the TGNA 
in order to map the political parties in terms of their stance towards the rights and liberties 
used in the survey questions.  
This section focuses on the electoral manifestos of AKP, CHP, MHP and HDP 
specifically for the 2015 June and 2015 November elections. The analysis will be based 
on the specific statements concerning the citizenship rights and liberties that this research 
investigates. The datasets introduced and discussed in previous sections are more 
comprehensive and provide the opportunity to compare different manifestos across time 
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but the aim of this research is to understand specific positions regarding civil, political 
and social citizenship rights and a more focused analysis will be more beneficial at this 
point. 
The most recent manifestos of 2015 June and November elections are chosen for 
two reasons. Firstly, since the sample of the survey was categorized according to the 
participants’ political party identification, which was assessed through their vote choices 
for the most recent general elections, only these manifestos of political parties in the 
parliament were included. 2015 June election was the first time when HDP managed to 
overcome 10% threshold and got into the TGNA as a political party, instead of competing 
as a group of independent candidates. That’s why electoral manifestos for the 2015 June 
election were included. As AKP could not establish a government in the legally 
designated time frame, snap election was held in November 2015. Because of this 
development, electoral manifestos for the 2015 November election were also included in 
the analysis. In addition, as the survey provides a snapshot of the perceptions of 
respondents in a given context, it is logical to include the most recent manifestos that 
these respondents are expected to encounter.  
The following empirical analyses focus specifically on the discourses regarding the 
citizenship rights that were used in the survey questions. Main purpose here is to highlight 
the differences between these parties in terms of the three groups of citizenship rights and 
liberties: civil rights, political rights and social rights as they were reflected in their most 
recent party manifestos. Since electoral manifestos can be treated as signifiers of political 
parties’ positions regarding the issues they aim at putting forward, they provide clues for 
how these parties discuss or mention these rights and liberties. In other words, views of 
the citizenship rights by these political parties will be the primary focus of the following 
section. In lieu of locating these political parties along an ideological spectrum as the 
major manifesto research methods, such as CMP dataset and CHES dataset try to do, the 
following section aims at providing a more focused and systematic analysis on the views 
of citizenship rights by these political parties. Main argument here is that these political 
parties differ in terms of their positions regarding citizenship rights and liberties, as well 
as the definition of citizenship. These differences result from the parties’ efforts in 
representing and mobilizing historical cleavages, while at the same time their strategic 
position taking for maximizing votes and forging electoral alliances. This analysis will 
be of help when the actual perceptions are analyzed, as they can illuminate the ways in 
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which respondents’ perceptions on these rights differ from or coincide with their party’s 
arguments on the same set of rights.  
 
4.5.1 AKP’s Electoral Manifestos for June and November Elections 
 
 
AKP’s electoral manifesto for the elections on June 7th, 2015 had 6 headings. Since 
this section focuses on the positions of political parties regarding specific citizenship 
rights and liberties, this subsection will elaborate on the relevant headings in the 
manifesto, i.e. the ones titled “Fundamental Rights and Freedoms,” “New Constitution,” 
“Presidential System,” “Reform in Judiciary,” “Governance,” and “Transparency” under 
the main segment titled “Democratization and New Constitutional System.”  
The subsection titled “Fundamental Rights and Freedoms” lays out the outlook, the 
previous and future actions on matters regarding this topic. Since one of the major 
references in the manifesto is about the new constitution, statements regarding 
fundamental rights and freedoms are framed within that topic, with a specific emphasis 
on the definition of citizenship.  
 
 Definition of Citizenship 
 
 
In the statements concerning citizenship there is a double reference for universal 
values and national values. On the one hand, fundamental rights and freedoms are situated 
within the framework of universal values. For instance, the manifesto states that AKP 
will rely on “international norms concerning fundamental rights and freedoms” while 
designing policies regarding these matters (p.25). Yet, in other statements, national values 
are also portrayed as being the source of the unity that is being sought for and maintained 
through “equal citizenship.” (p.25) In fact, in a couple places in this section, one can find 
references to the ethnic, religious, or sectarian plurality in Turkey and how individuals 
should and will benefit from the fundamental rights and freedoms. At the same time, AKP 
underlines that it stands at an equal distance to all of these different identities by 
promoting an understanding of “equal citizenship.” Hence, their proposed definition of 
citizenship in the new constitution is said to have no reference to ethnicity or religious 
identity.  
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 Civil Liberties and Political Rights 
 
 
Concerning civil liberties and political rights, there are specific references to 
freedom of expression and freedom of the press in four different sentences. In all of these 
statements, AKP’s various policies concerning these rights are referred to as 
accomplishments. To put it differently, freedom of expression and freedom of the press 
are framed as improving during AKP governments in the manifesto. When it comes to 
freedom of belief, AKP’s manifesto reminds various policies that have made it easier to 
enjoy freedom of belief. In fact, the manifesto suggests that right to belief is a natural 
right for citizens (p.19).  
In line with the overall atmosphere, “Çözüm Süreci”59 was also included among the 
projects that are designed to “overcome long-lasting problems.” (p.19) Here, manifesto 
drafters establish Kurdish issue as one of the historical problems of Turkey and portrays 
AKP as providing towards a resolution of it through “Çözüm Süreci” reforms.  
The same outlook is existent in the case of freedom of assembly and demonstrate. 
There, the manifesto praises AKP’s past policies that liberalized the laws regarding these 
freedoms. With political rights, there are not much clear references. Rather there are 
statements about ratifying ICCPR60 and ICESCR61 and enhancing labor freedoms by 
making it possible for multiple union membership.  
Multicultural rights, on the other hand, have been mentioned quite a lot. Since this 
manifesto portrays “Çözüm Süreci” as an official project of the government, it has a lot 
of statements referring to the issue and relevant policies. For instance, the manifesto 
underlines the amendments that made possible to use mother tongue in prisons, 
universities and academic research, broadcasting, and as a language of instruction in 
private language courses. All these past policies are presented in a framework of rights, 
which the manifesto describes as “rights that our citizens deserve to have.” (p.21) This 
explicit emphasis on Kurdish citizens’ rights and liberties and past policies regarding the 
enjoyment of them display how AKP acts strategically to appeal to those voters, as the 
sole actor who can and did deliver reforms concerning the enjoyment of these rights. By 
                                                 
59 “Çözüm Süreci” (“Resolution Process”) is the name of the series of negotiations between the Kurdish insurgency 
and the Turkish state started in 2012. The negotiations were aimed at starting a peace process between these parties 
and conducted between the imprisoned leader of PKK, Abdullah Öcalan and government officials. The process 
gradually deteriorated within the context of Syrian civil war and its spillover effects in the region. The armed conflict 
between the parties has resumed in the summer of 2015.  
60 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
61 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
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emphasizing these policies, the manifestos signals that AKP represents the interests of 
ethnic minorities better than pro-Kurdish parties. Yet, since AKP acts as a catch-all party, 
it wants to appeal to the nationalist segments of the society. This creates inconsistencies 
in his position regarding the Kurdish issue as the party leaders’ discourses have become 
nationalistic, while manifestos praise previous reforms (Çınar and Sayin 2014: 378).  
Women’s rights do not have specific emphasis throughout these two manifestos 
except from the mentions discussed in the next section. Yet, violence against women has 
received some attention. Similar to the other civil liberties and political rights items, 
violence against women are mentioned through past policies and reforms made under 
AKP governments. Both the June and November manifestos pledge to end violence 
against women.  
 
 Social Rights 
 
 
Social rights consist of the majority of the fundamental rights and freedoms 
segment. For education, the manifesto points out the headscarf liberalization for 
educators, teachers and students and improvements in the quality and regional 
distribution of educational human resources. Equality of opportunity is counted as one of 
the aims of the party and in line with that, the manifesto promises to support pre-school 
education of children with poor families (p.80). In this part, education itself is not framed 
as a social right, per se. Rather, the educational policies are framed in terms of equality 
of opportunity and “societal equality and justice.” (p.80) 
Same argument exists for health topic. The policies regarding healthcare are 
presented as improvements in the sense that they target the poor, the old, and the 
bedbound. This part also includes statements about social services. Here, social services 
are depicted to include social assistance, housing, education and social security policies 
and its primary target is said to be the family. There are multiple references to the concept 
of ‘strong family’. According to the drafters of the manifesto, ‘strong family’ is an 
important feature of Turkish society, which creates an advantage for Turkey as opposed 
to other countries. The reason is that strong family is the carrier of “the values that make 
us” and it functions as “a bridge between the individual and the society.” (p.91) Hence, 
social services primarily target the family in order to empower it and maintain its 
“integrity.” (p.92) This part suggests a different understanding of social rights in general 
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since it prioritizes the family as a bridge between the individual and society, instead of 
emphasizing social rights as a dimension of individual rights and liberties. Considering 
the fact that the specific statements regarding health and education do not refer to them 
as rights of the citizens or rights of the individuals, while making family as the ultimate 
receiver of these services, AKP’s manifesto shows that it does not stand in an 
individualistic position about this matter. Rather, it has an outlook of maintaining and 
strengthening the family as opposed to the individual when it comes to social rights. This 
outlook is in line with the conservative understanding of society that emphasizes family. 
In that sense, the concept of social rights found in the manifesto is based upon a 
communitarian take on social justice.  
AKP’s electoral manifesto for the snap elections on November 2015 is almost the 
same with the previous one. Within the sections investigated for this research, there are 
additional statements regarding “Çözüm Süreci,” which was initiated by the previous 
government as a set of policies to resolve ongoing conflict with the Kurdish armed 
insurgency, i.e. PKK. In addition, there are specific references towards Roma 
communities and their cultural rights in the November manifesto.  
Constructing its position concerning social rights in a family-oriented manner and 
mentioning past policies regarding freedom of belief, AKP appeals to the peripheral value 
structures. At the same time, it engages in strategic actions to consolidate the Kurdish 
voters within its electorate by mentioning the peace process and refraining from using 
ethnic references in its understanding of citizenship. While the emphasis on policies in 
the context of peace process with Kurdish insurgency demonstrates the party’s 
representation of itself as being capable of delivering for the demands of Kurdish minority 
and hence appealing them, the emphasis on freedom of belief is in line with the religious 
electorate that it tries to consolidate. Thus, these two manifestos display the combination 
of vote-maximization strategies and mobilization of historical cleavage structures.  
 
4.5.2 CHP’s Electoral Manifestos for June and November Elections 
 
 
CHP’s electoral manifesto for June elections starts with explicit references 
regarding “human development,” “fundamental rights and liberties” as well as “social 
state.” (p. 1) In fact, there is a separate section titled “Freedom, Rule of Law and 
Democracy” where liberties, democracy and rule of law are listed as requirements for 
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social justice and economic development (p.4). Being the main oppositional party, CHP 
positions itself as the champion of these values in the face of AKP governments’ role in 
“institutionalizing arbitrariness disguised as ruling the state.” (p.4) Hence, the main 
promise of this manifesto is to offer a new outlook in democracy guaranteeing rule of 
law, citizens’ rights and institutional autonomy. For this, CHP’s manifesto promises to 
empower TGNA’s monitoring powers, as well as changing the current law on political 
parties and lowering the electoral threshold. These promises signify that CHP’s position 
explicitly favors political pluralism since the current system is being criticized for letting 
the political system to turn into a “one man rule” and “single party state.” (p.5) This 
manifesto can be considered as a continuation of CHP’s strategic efforts to enlarge their 
voter base. As Uysal (2011) demonstrates in her analysis on 2011 elections, the party has 
been transforming itself to become a catch-all party.  
 
 Definition of Citizenship 
 
 
In the manifesto, CHP proposes a form of politics that is named as “politics of rights 
and liberties,” which aims at protecting all citizens against all kinds of domination 
including ethnic, religious, class based and sexual forms. Related to this statement, the 
manifesto defines citizenship not as a “symbolic legal status” but as a “political 
opportunity that empowers individuals in terms of democratic transformation and 
solidarity” and citizens as individuals who choose “peaceful and democratic future 
through solidarity.” (p.6-7) In addition, the manifesto qualifies the definition of 
citizenship by highlighting social citizenship as much as democratic citizenship and 
underlines the importance of “economic liberties complementing political liberties” in 
securing individual freedom (p.7).  
 
 Civil Liberties and Political Rights 
 
 
A subsection in the June manifesto is titled “Liberties and Human Rights,” where 
CHP promises to establish a “Republic of Liberties.” (p.6) Within that scheme “right to 
protest” seems to receive specific attention in the manifesto. According to the drafters of 
the manifesto, enjoying right to protest has become difficult since Gezi protests in 2013. 
Cases of profiling on social media, mass detentions, disproportionate use of force by the 
 160 
police are all listed as examples of the current situation in Turkey. The fact that there is a 
separate reference to this right suggests that the party wants the public to know about its 
stance. In fact, freedom of expression, as being related with right to protest, is also 
advocated specifically in the document. In addition to those CHP promises to guarantee 
right to life, right to bodily integrity and being free from torture, right to protest and 
ending profiling of citizens attending protests, right of privacy of individuals, freedom of 
expression, and political, social and cultural rights of all citizens (p. 11, 13,14). Another 
topic of reference that is significant is the visible emphasis on gender equality and 
women’s position especially in workforce and education opportunities (p.20). In addition, 
violence against women is depicted as one of the issues threatening gender equality, while 
the manifestos pledging to catalog violence against women with the crimes requiring 
heavier penalties (p. 45, 102). These references are not just signal a social democratic 
position but also differentiates CHP as focusing heavily on individual rights and liberties.  
CHP’s June manifesto does not focus too much on cultural rights, especially 
Kurdish minorities’ rights. Cultural or religious identities are promised to be left alone 
without any specific policy proposals regarding their enjoyment. Instead there are 
numerous references towards recognizing differences and combating discrimination on 
the grounds of such differences. More specifically, the manifesto suggests its citizenship 
definition as being the “common ground” for all regardless of differences in mother 
tongue, religion, and life style while promising helping those with different ethnic origin 
to “learn about their language and culture if they want to.” (p.18) A similar argument is 
put forward for those “with different sexual orientations and sexual identity” (p.18).   
 
 Social Rights  
 
 
Self-proclaimed “social democrat” CHP aims at establishing a strong social state 
safe guarding the individual through observing “right to fair minimum wage,” “right to 
social security,” “right to healthcare and education” and claims that providing political 
and economic liberties is the duty of social state (p.7, 45). This subsection has a very 
social democrat language as it prioritizes social rights as well as individual rights and 
freedoms. The promised policies are all framed within a framework based upon individual 
rights and liberties with explicit references to specific rights such as right to minimum 
wage. In another instance, it is argued that citizens are afraid of the social aid being cut 
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and several policies, including “family insurance” are offered as possible solutions to this 
observation (p.45, 48). Both right to education and right to healthcare are heavily 
promoted in the manifesto in terms of their role in preventing discrimination and 
establishing “human development and social justice.” (p.71)  
These instances show that the party wants to put certain issues forward in a specific 
manner. The manifesto describes CHP as a “social democrat” party and devotes a 
significant segment to the proposed social democrat policies, which denote that the 
party’s outlook for June 2015 elections was visibly social democratic and rights-based. 
At the same time, the manifesto also has a specific subsection on “Secularism,” which is 
in line with CHP’s position in the historical cleavage structure of Turkish politics.  
CHP’s electoral manifesto for snap election on November 2015 is almost the same 
as the one for June elections. One difference that attracts attention is the increasing 
references to Kurdish issue. The manifesto for November election includes more details 
about the conflict between Turkish Armed Forces and Kurdish insurgency but policy 
proposals remain the same. It is highly probable that the escalating armed conflict 
between these parties over the period between June 2015 to November 2015 influenced 
manifesto drafters to respond with more emphasis on this issue. In fact, while CHP’s June 
2015 manifesto used the slogan “A Liveable Turkey”62, the November 2015 manifesto 
used a different slogan: “Human First, Union First, Turkey First.”63This new slogan 
suggests that CHP has prioritized unity and security slightly more than before due to the 
escalated conflict occurred in Turkey between June and November 2015 elections. 
CHP’s most recent manifestos display a significant strategic shift to reposition the 
party in the center-left opposition through utilizing social democratic and clearly anti-
government discourses. Yet, the aversion of the manifesto from discussing Kurdish issue 
in detail demonstrates the lingering influence of the statist and nationalist discourse of the 
center. In addition, the emphasis on secularism is another instance of the relevance of 
central value structures.  
 
 
 
                                                 
62 Turkish version of the slogan was “Yaşanacak Bir Türkiye” 
63 Turkish version was “Önce İnsan, Önce Birlik, Önce Türkiye” 
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4.5.3 MHP’s Electoral Manifestos for June and November 
Elections 
 
 
MHP’s electoral manifesto for the June election starts with specific references 
towards the party’s understanding of “nationalist action,” which include “the will to 
realize and maintain one motherland, one flag, one nation, one state, one language” and 
“a new civilization centered around morality.” (p.5) These references in the introduction 
establishes the party’s position as a nationalist and conservative party. In fact, the party 
seems to appeal to its traditional audience. At the same time, there are references to 
democratic values and compromise, as well as individual rights and liberties (p.7). As in 
CHP’s manifesto, MHP’s manifesto includes criticisms towards the government on a 
variety of different issues but the main emphasis is on the rise of threats against “national 
unity” and attacks towards “national and moral values of the nation.” (p.17). One 
noticeable change between June and November elections was in the slogans: MHP’s June 
2015 manifesto had a slogan stating “Societal Restoration and Peaceful Future”64 while 
in November 2015 manifesto it was changed into “Peaceful and Secure Future”65, 
indicating a clearer focus on security after the heightened violence and bombed attacks 
occurred between two elections. 
 
 Definition of Citizenship 
 
 
In line with the tone set at the beginning of the text, MHP’s manifesto criticizes 
certain government policies for degrading the inclusivity of the name “Turk” by 
mentioning other ethnic groups as “nationalities.” (p.18) The text describes the word 
“Turk” as having a universal framework, through which “citizens establish emotional 
ties” with each other. This understanding provides hints for the MHP’s stance towards 
citizenship and its definition, as the manifesto itself does not have a specific section on 
these issues. The only one instance where these issues come up is the new constitution. 
The manifesto declares that MHP will not accept a citizenship definition that aims at 
replacing “Turkishness” as the bond between the individuals and the nation state (p.63). 
In fact, the “new civilization” frame introduced in the beginning has unfolded to be based 
                                                 
64 Turkish version was “Toplumsal Oranım ve Huzurlu Gelecek” 
65 Turkish version was “Huzurlu ve Güvenli Gelecek” 
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upon “Turkish-Islam roots” which is considered as a “shared characteristic of the nation.” 
(p.19-21) These references suggest that MHP’s stance towards citizenship is explicitly 
related with ethnicity and religiosity, verifying the expectations emerge from the identity 
cleavage in Turkey that MHP claims to represent and mobilize. 
 
 Civil Liberties and Political Rights 
 
 
There is a specific section dedicated to MHP’s “Understanding on Democracy and 
Fundamental Rights,” where the manifesto cites free press, individual liberties, civil 
society, freedom of speech and religious liberties separately. For both freedom of speech 
and press freedom, MHP’s manifesto rejects censorship unless these liberties are used 
against “national unity, national security, public order, and common morality.” (p. 57, 
60). In fact, the manifesto proposes for empowerment of individual liberties and 
fundamental rights by identifying state’s responsibility in eliminating all obstacles; yet, 
at the same time actual enjoyment of freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom 
of assembly and protest are all conditional to “national unity, national security, public 
order, common morality.” (p.59) Within this section, only right to bodily integrity and 
protection against torture, right to privacy and religious liberties are listed without 
references to the same set of values.  
In addition, women’s rights are coupled with children’s rights, emphasizing 
discrimination and abuse. More specifically, women’s well-being is framed within the 
context of family, which is considered to be essential for “protecting, maintaining and 
transmitting national and moral values.” (p. 189) Hence, women’s empowerment is 
coupled with family’s in the manifesto. There are specific policy proposals for realizing 
gender equality, including equal opportunities in education and in workforce, and parental 
leave (p.191). Moreover, both of the manifestos have specific emphasis on violence 
against women and policy proposals on preventing such acts. Yet, this issue is mentioned 
together with violence against minors, the disabled and the elderly within the context of 
protection of the family. Also, these proposals are also nested under the heading “Women, 
Children, and Family.” (p.189)  
Throughout the manifesto reestablishing the rule of law and combatting against 
corruption emerge as recurring themes (p.49-50). Apart from these, there are not specific 
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arguments concerning functioning of the government, fair representation or electoral 
process, which are among the political rights the survey includes. 
 
 Social Rights 
 
 
Similar to CHP’s manifestos, social rights and policies regarding those rights make 
up a significant portion of MHP’s June manifesto. There are specific sections dedicated 
to fight against poverty, social protection, social security and pensioners, education, and 
health. The section on poverty and related policy proposals are framed within social 
welfare. The manifesto proposes targeting those with low levels of education and skills 
through special training programs. There are also policy proposals regarding social aid in 
the manifesto but these are mostly conditional upon being “in need” or “poor.” (p.175-
177) In other words, social aid is not explicitly framed as a social citizenship right in this 
section. The only instances where “social right” as a concept emerges are disabled care 
and old-age social aid payments (p.180). Here, care for the disabled and payments made 
to the elderly are clearly defined as a social right existing within the social security 
scheme.  
Education is another area of social policy where MHP’s manifesto focuses on. Here, 
the proposals aim at achieving equality of opportunity among the children, regardless of 
their “religious beliefs, ethnic origin and philosophical thoughts.” (p.193) Yet, right after 
this statement, it is declared that Turkish is the language of instruction on every level 
(p.194). This is a clear demonstration of party’s stance towards the demands of Kurds to 
have education in their mother tongue. Similarly, the manifesto promises to provide 
religious education by the state, as religion has an important role in establishing “national 
unity and integrity” and “convergence between citizen and state” (p.194). There are other 
references to educational policies aiming at teaching “national and spiritual values of 
Turkishness and Islam.” (p.195) In other words, ethnicity and religiosity, which are 
understood in a specific manner, turn out to be key issues that MHP’s manifesto comes 
back to. The last item relevant to this study is healthcare. In the manifesto, healthcare is 
not explicitly defined as a social right, but all of the policy proposals, including free 
preventive health services, are framed within a framework of equality and fairness (p.213-
214).  
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MHP’s November manifesto is almost the same as its June manifesto. The new 
statements are related with the ongoing clashes between PKK and the Turkish Armed 
Forces, as well as the “Çözüm Süreci” between the Kurds and the state. The additional 
material mostly deal with the threats posed by the “Çözüm Süreci” and its negative effects 
on the “national unity.” (p.18-19) Hence the position of the party portrayed by the 2015 
electoral manifestos is in line with the expectations arising from the identity cleavage as 
well as promoting a cultural conservative and statist outlook on rights and liberties, while 
situating itself in opposition to the government.  
 
4.5.4 HDP’s Electoral Manifestos for June and November Elections 
 
 
At the very beginning of the manifesto, HDP defines itself as a radical democrat 
party, which puts forward “equality, freedom and equal citizenship” as the grounds for 
empowering the society (p.3). By this way, HDP labels its own position on the ideological 
spectrum. In addition, the manifesto’s proposal for a new constitution is argued to reflect 
the plurality of “identities, beliefs, cultures and languages” in Turkey (p.7). Hence HDP’s 
proposed vision on Turkey is clearly different than MHP in terms of recognition of 
differences. Also, HDP’s manifesto displays a more pluralistic stance towards rights and 
liberties, without focusing solely on the Kurdish issue. This stance suggests that the party 
has developed a strategy to appeal to a larger audience than the Kurdish minority. More 
specifically, HDP’s position is also strategically calculated in terms of appealing to 
different segments of the society. On the one hand the manifestos display a very liberal 
stance towards rights and liberties, including sexual orientation and women’s rights; on 
the other hand, the party competes with AKP for the religious conservative voters among 
the Kurdish minority. Hence the party has included conservative candidates in its lists 
both in 2011 and 2015 elections (Satana 2012; Kemahlıoğlu 2015).  
 
 Definition of Citizenship 
 
 
In line with its self-positioning on the ideological spectrum, HDP’s manifesto 
makes a clear emphasis on “equal and free” citizenship with guaranteeing “all 
fundamental rights and liberties” as well as promising protection of ecological entities’ 
rights (p.7). More specifically, there are numerous references to multiculturalism and 
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recognition of cultural rights of Kurdish minority. In addition, participation to decision 
making processes is included in the definition of citizenship. Liberties and rights of 
LGBTQ individuals are also covered within the scheme of equal citizenship in the 
manifesto. These references make the definition of citizenship in this manifesto having 
the most liberal and rights-oriented one among the other parties.  
 
 Civil Liberties and Political Rights 
 
 
The fundamental rights and liberties are understood in their most extensive way 
including more specific rights such as “right to peace, right to truth, right to conscientious 
objection” in addition to freedom of expression and speech, freedom of belief and 
freedom of assembly (p.7). The manifesto promises to remove all the obstacles barring 
enjoyment of these rights either through removing restrictive legislation or implementing 
new policies (p.6). In terms of freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, freedom of press 
HDP’s manifesto is similar to CHP’s as both parties criticize current situation and 
promise to liberalize citizenship rights regime. Freedom of belief is referred to a lot but 
is framed in a way to include nonbelievers as well, whom are not referred to as clearly in 
CHP’s manifesto (p.19). HDP’s manifesto goes further to include specific references to 
arbitrary arrests, violation of right to privacy via illegal phone tapping, right to life of 
prisoners and hate speech among the liberties and rights to be prioritized (p. 9-15). 
Moreover, there are dedicated subsections on forced migration and conscientious 
objection (p.14-15).  
Women’s rights and gender equality are discussed in a separate subsection where 
manifesto drafters address women directly. In this subsection, various civil liberties and 
political rights, such as freedom of speech, right to bodily integrity, political participation, 
are presented through a gendered perspective (p.20-22). Moreover, violence against 
women is framed in a way that extends beyond domestic violence. Applying a feminist 
approach, violence against women is analyzed within the context of patriarchy and policy 
proposals are made accordingly. This feminist approach confirms the expectations in the 
literature which argues that left-wing political parties have more “comprehensive and 
consistent” positions regarding gender equality and women’s rights (Kabasakal-Arat 
2017: 252).  
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This feminist perspective exists in almost every section of the manifesto. For 
instance, educational policy proposals include introducing a gender equality lesson into 
the official curricula and getting rid of sexist content in educational material (p.47-48). 
Same outlook exists for policy proposals concerning LGBTQ individuals’ access to 
education and healthcare (p.26). In terms of political rights, the manifesto refers to 
electoral threshold a couple of times, as an impediment against representation of 
minorities, as well as representation of women in politics (p. 8). In addition, the manifesto 
conceptualizes HDP’s understanding on democracy as “enabling society to monitor 
administration on every level”, which signifies a more participatory, direct form of 
democracy (p.5).  
 
 Social Rights 
 
 
HDP’s position on social rights are presented under the heading “Economy” where 
the party’s economic policies are described as “egalitarian, ecological” and open to 
participation of all as well as observing “gender equality.” (p.27) Poverty is defined as 
lack of access to education, health and “other rights” in life (p. 28).  The manifesto also 
has a dedicated subsection titled “Social Right, not Social Aid” where it is argued that 
securing fundamental needs of life is a right of all citizens. In line with this 
conceptualization, social assistance policies are argued to be targeting everyone, with 
specific focus on those who are in need and the disabled. In addition, HDP’s manifesto 
advocates guaranteeing social security for all women, who are “independent citizens.” (p. 
41) This is another instance where women are depicted as individual right-bearers in the 
manifesto.  
Other social right topics that are relevant to this study are right to education and 
right to healthcare. The manifesto defends state sponsored public education. HDP 
proposes quota policies that favor disadvantaged segments of the society, including 
women and the poor. In this section, language in mother tongue is covered, which is a 
clear reflection of the demands of HDP’s electorate. Lastly, healthcare is addressed as a 
“societal right” in the manifesto and free healthcare services are advocated explicitly 
(p.49). Here, the manifesto drafters also refer to capitalism, as a threat violating the right 
to healthcare. This mention is also demonstrative of HDP’s ideological self-positioning. 
Healthcare services are proposed to be accessible for all, including women, the elderly, 
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and LGBTQ individuals. In addition, providing healthcare in different mother tongues 
emerges as a policy proposal, which is in line with the ethnic identity demands of the 
party’s electorate.  
 HDP is also at a clear opposition to the governing party, while trying to compete 
with it for the pious Kurdish electorate according to the manifesto. Without abandoning 
its discourse on pro-Kurdish rights, the party tries to expand its appeal to other segments 
of the society. In that sense, the expectation of identity cleavage is met through mobilizing 
Kurdish demands while strategic discourses are utilized to cover other oppositional 
demands and interests. 
 
4.6 Comparing and Contrasting the Electoral Manifestos 
 
 
4.6.1 Definition of Citizenship 
 
 
The parties’ manifestos have different understanding of citizenship. AKP’s 
manifestos seem to be in-between two perspectives: on the one hand the party considers 
international norms about fundamental rights as guiding principles for citizenship 
definition, on the other hand national values and national unity are referred to as building 
blocks of equal citizenship. It can be argued that the manifesto is reflecting the strategic 
dilemma that AKP has been facing since 2011; appealing to nationalist votes and Kurdish 
votes.  
Being much more explicit and clear than AKP in terms of its stance, MHP’s 
manifestos describe Turkish citizenship as an ethno-religious identity. The manifesto 
considers mentioning of other group identities as threatening the national unity and refers 
to Turkish-Islam roots as the fundamental value of which Turkish society relies on. 
Hence, MHP’s clearly nationalistic understanding of citizenship is reflective of the 
party’s position within the identity cleavage in Turkish politics.  
CHP and HDP, on the other hand, argue for a more liberal and rights-oriented 
perspectives regarding citizenship. While both the parties’ manifestos describe 
citizenship as a set of rights, liberties and equality, HDP’s manifestos make clear 
references to minority rights, especially the demands of the Kurdish minority. Here, both 
cleavage structures and strategic position taking seem to influence CHP and HDP’s party 
positions. CHP’s definition of citizenship refers to social rights and social justice and 
 169 
complementing political liberties with economic liberties which invokes the party’s 
stance in late 1970s. This resemblance is important for demonstrating CHP’s efforts in 
updating its policies to extend its electoral. At the same time the party retains its position 
concerning secularism and to a certain extent nationalism, which signifies continuation 
of its claim to represent its core electorate.   
HDP’s manifesto extends the scope of party’s target audience beyond Kurds to 
include other minorities and discriminated groups such as LGBTQ individuals, while 
Kurdish minority’s demands have found adequate space as well.  
 
4.6.2 Civil Liberties and Political Rights 
 
 
AKP’s manifesto drafters frame the current state of civil liberties and political rights 
as accomplishment of previous AKP governments, while all other oppositional parties 
consider the current situation as in violation of these rights and liberties.  
Considering the perspectives concerning fundamental rights and liberties of these 
parties, one visible difference is the amount of references to gender and women’s rights 
in CHP’s and HDP’s manifestos compared to the AKP and MHP’s manifestos. Not only 
women’s rights have their own specific heading in both of CHP’s and HDP’s manifestos, 
almost every right category includes specific policy proposals regarding women. In fact, 
HDP’s manifesto has a specific section with an explicitly gendered perspective regarding 
rights and liberties. In addition, both of these parties’ manifestos include references to 
LGBTQ individuals and their rights. MHP’s and AKP’s manifesto also underlines women 
but mostly in the context of social security and aid, as well as right to education in terms 
of the abolished headscarf ban in AKP’s case.  Sexual orientation is not a part of the 
fundamental rights and liberties scheme of AKP and MHP’s manifestos.  
Among the parties, MHP’s stance towards civil liberties and political rights emerge 
as the most limited one. MHP’s manifesto refers to a series of civil liberties but foresees 
limits to their actual enjoyment. Almost for every civil liberty, the manifesto refers to 
order and national security as legitimate limitations. Religious liberties are among the 
ones that the manifestos do not put any limits on. AKP’s position in this regard is more 
relaxed as the party portrays itself as the champion of these liberties through referencing 
to past policies. In other words, AKP’s manifesto claims that the party has improved 
enjoyment of civil liberties and political rights. Yet, AKP manifestos’ coverage of civil 
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liberties and political rights are not as extensive as CHP and HDP’s. Manifestos of CHP 
and HDP include a variety of civil liberties and political rights categories, with heavy 
emphasis on freedom of expression and thought. Both of these parties’ manifestos 
criticize the current practices of these liberties and advocate a very extensive set of rights 
and liberties. Different than CHP’s manifestos, HDP manifestos include specific policy 
proposals for cultural rights, such as education in mother tongue. Kurdish issue and other 
minority issues have not found that much space in CHP’s manifestos. 
 
4.6.3 Social Rights 
 
 
When it comes to social rights, AKP’s manifesto once again lists previous policies 
but also promises further improvements. Education and healthcare receives specific 
reference but neither of them are conceptualized as social rights. AKP’s manifestos 
conceptualizes the party’s ongoing policies and its promises concerning social aid more 
in terms of supporting those in need. MHP’s manifestos also have a similar perspective 
as social policy programs are designed to target the poor and those in need with a 
perspective prioritizing family instead of individuals. Both parties consider social policies 
as essential but decoupled from individual rights and liberties and not as social rights.  
In contrast, CHP’s and HDP’s manifestos display a more programmatic outlook on 
social rights than AKP’s and MHP’s manifestos as they lay out specific policy proposals 
targeting not just the ones who need social aid but everyone. Moreover, both HDP and 
CHP’s manifestos frame social policies as social rights. The visible emphasis on family 
in MHP’s and AKP’s manifestos especially within the context of social rights is another 
point of difference from HDP’s and CHP’s manifestos. This emphasis on family as the 
“bridge between the individual and the society” in AKP’s manifestos (p.91) is a 
conservative trait which does not exist in CHP and HDP’s manifesto. In fact, HDP’s 
manifestos put specific emphasis on the conditions of women, underlying the gendered 
perspective of the party.  
 The most recent electoral manifestos of the four political parties demonstrate the 
differences between them in terms of their positions regarding citizenship rights and 
liberties. These differences are not just based upon the existent cleavages concerning 
voting behavior in Turkish society, namely center vs. periphery defined as the conflict 
between the religious and the secular segments of the society and Turkish vs. Kurdish 
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identity cleavage. They are also related with the strategic decisions of the parties to appeal 
to larger audiences, which sometimes contribute to ambiguity. While CHP tries to go 
beyond representing secular establishment by appealing to social rights, such as family 
income and a liberal outlook on rights and liberties, its avoidance of addressing Kurdish 
issue signifies the underlying nationalist sentiments. AKP, on the other hand, is portrayed 
by its manifestos as the champion of rights and liberties while at the same time 
incorporating a more conservative tone compared to HDP’s and CHP’s manifestos. 
Especially in the case of women’s rights and gender equality, HDP and CHP’s manifestos 
have a clearly liberal stance compared to AKP and MHP’s emphasis on family and 
traditional values. MHP’s position is more traditional, statist and nationalist compared to 
the other parties as evident from the recurrent references to tradition, national security, 
Turkishness and order. This position is in line with MHP’s own historical policy 
positioning as the party has been defining itself as nationalist and conservative.  
 
4.7 Conclusion  
 
 
This chapter focused on political party positions both through revisiting the relevant 
literature and empirically engaging with the manifestos and relevant datasets. While those 
datasets helped to trace changes in positions across time, secondary literature and the 
focused investigation of most recent electoral manifestos provided insight into how 
parties position themselves in terms of citizenship rights and liberties and other relevant 
issues. 
 Firstly, the analysis of CHES and CMP data provided empirical support for the 
strategic positioning arguments suggested in previous chapter as they display the changes 
occurred in parties’ positions over time. It seems political parties are active in terms of 
their stances regarding political issues and prone to change their positions vis-à-vis each 
other and social issues. One demonstrative example is the increase in welfare state-related 
tone of most recent manifestos. Yet, these changes are not made at the expense of parties’ 
claims to represent historical cleavages of values such as secularism, nationalism, 
multicultural rights or religious liberties. These political parties still project certain values 
to signal their core electorates. 
Secondly, a specific focus on parties’ stances regarding citizenship rights and 
liberties demonstrate implications of historical cleavages to a certain extent. For instance, 
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although CHP’s manifestos have been emphasizing social rights more in tone and its 
citizenship definition more liberal, secularism is still one of the key issues, while HDP’s 
manifestos include the most visible arguments concerning minority rights. Similarly, 
AKP’s and MHP’s manifestos conceptualize citizenship rights and liberties in a slightly 
more conservative way as the manifestos of the former put policies related with religious 
liberties forward and manifestos of the latter display a citizenship understanding 
prioritizing order in the context of rights and liberties.  
Revisiting the arguments proposed in the previous chapter, the analyses provided 
in this chapter suggests several conclusions. Firstly, AKP’s claim to represent the 
periphery, which is defined by the party as the excluded, religious masses, continues, in 
spite of the fact that the party has established its electoral hegemony. Secondly, CHP’s 
most recent manifestos demonstrate its departure from the old center, which has been 
dismantled through the electoral hegemony of AKP and has caused CHP to adopt a 
citizenship understanding emphasizing social rights and to attempt at mobilizing a larger 
electorate than its core voters. MHP’s manifestos still reflect the statist, nationalist 
citizenship understanding, signifying that the party’s stance has remained relatively the 
same albeit occasional references towards social rights. Lastly, HDP’s manifestos provide 
an alternative take on Turkish citizenship that is sharper than CHP’s as the manifesto 
incorporate not just multicultural rights but also a gendered perspective on social rights 
and they recognize rights of other excluded groups such as LGBTQ individuals.  
When periphery is defined as a composition of identities and groups excluded from 
the demos by the actors occupying and controlling the center, the analyses of 2015 
electoral manifestos suggest two arguments. One of them argues that it is mostly HDP 
that poses a challenge to this particular definition of demos as the actor mobilizing the 
historical others in terms of citizenship. The other argument maintains that CHP’s core 
voters are the new others and the party tries to mobilize this new periphery while 
appealing to socio-economically disadvantaged groups with a new discourse based on 
social upholding social rights. As it is expected from those who are excluded, i.e. those 
in the periphery to be more aware of violations of rights and liberties, it is not surprising 
that HDP and CHP voters have similar perceptions regarding their citizenship rights and 
liberties.  
The next chapter will discuss the findings of the survey designed specifically for 
this research through the arguments provided by the chapters so far and will 
systematically analyze the differences in perceptions. 
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 CHAPTER 5 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 
This research focuses on the perceptions regarding citizenship rights and liberties 
and delineates them on the basis of political party preferences. The main question of this 
research is how citizens with different political party preferences perceive their civil 
liberties, political rights, and social rights. The aim of the research is to identify the 
differences in perceptions emanating from the political party preferences. As the 
questions of the original survey designed for this study assume an unproblematic 
atmosphere for citizenship rights and liberties in Turkey, the differences in perceptions 
will be related with the awareness of such rights and liberties and their violations. If these 
differences correspond to the political party preferences, the specific electorates who have 
issues with the current state of citizenship rights and liberties will be identified. 
This chapter will present the reasons for focusing on citizenship rights and liberties, 
as well as the process in which they are operationalized. In addition, the steps taken during 
the generation of the survey questionnaire and its application will be disclosed. Moreover, 
the specific analyses chosen to investigate the data generated through the survey 
responses will be introduced. Lastly, the limitations of the research and ethical 
considerations will be presented.  
 
 
5.2 Why Citizenship Rights and Liberties? Operationalization of 
the Main Issue of Interest in this Research 
 
In previous chapters, various conceptualizations of citizenship are discussed to lay 
out the conceptual map of the literature. When understood as a legal status, citizenship 
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denotes a codified relationship between the individual and the sovereignty of the state in 
which s/he lives in. This legal status signifies that this specific individual is a part of the 
demos that constitute the nation state. Janoski (1998:9) argues that citizenship is 
membership in a nation state “with certain universalistic rights and obligations at a 
specified level of equality.” Once individuals turn into citizens, they are equals in terms 
of status. This political unit, i.e. the state, creates the boundaries of demos through law 
and determines those who are members, hence citizens. By determining who’s inside the 
borders, i.e. the citizens, state simultaneously determines who’s outside, i.e. aliens or non-
citizens.  
Understanding citizenship as a legal status has also been linked to membership to a 
nation state. From the state’s perspective, this membership denotes a degree of loyalty to 
the nation and to the state; and this perspective is usually codified within the legal 
structure. Yet, considering citizenship as “a certificate of loyalty” is problematic in terms 
of deemphasizing citizenship rights (Davis 1997: 27). Hence, in addition to being 
conceived as a legal status, citizenship is also a “set of rights” (Barbalet 1994:227).  
Conceptualizing citizenship as a set of rights has political significance in the sense 
that these rights “attach a particular capacity to persons by virtue of a legal or 
conventional status” (Barbalet 1994: 227).  In other words, obtaining legal status in the 
eyes of the political entity empowers the individual vis-à-vis this entity. Hence, in 
Cohen’s (2009:64) words, citizenship rights emerge out of the mere fact that citizens are 
“political members,” which make them conceptually different from other types of rights, 
such as human rights. Normatively speaking, human rights do not rely on a political entity 
or a political status to acquire legitimacy; individuals have human rights just because of 
being human. Yet, citizenship rights, albeit sharing certain features with human rights, 
are products of the legal and political links between the individuals and the sovereign 
state.  
Citizenship and citizenship rights are meaningful in the context of a political 
organization since they are unenforced “entitlements” or “claims” made by individuals in 
the absence of their recognition by a state as members (Tilly 1998:56). In other words, 
citizenship rights can exist only when this political organization, the nation-state in 
general, “validates citizenship norms as officially legal and then takes steps to implement 
them” (Janoski 1998:11). This line of argumentation is also parallel with the idea of 
historical development of citizenship rights, which will be discussed in detail in the next 
section.  
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Hence citizenship can be understood as a set of rights, but it is also a set of duties 
as well. Focusing more on duties, civic-republican understanding argues that citizenship 
involves being an active member of the society, with a firm knowledge and fulfillment of 
certain duties towards the rest of the society and the state. Citizens, in this understanding, 
become as one not just because of the legal status but because of their active participation 
in the public life as well. In fact, actual enjoyment of rights is possible in the context of 
individuals being aware and accepting “certain civic duties.” (Bellamy 2008:15) Thus, 
duties of citizens are the obligations of them to the rest of the society and the state.  
In liberal contractual understanding, citizenship rights emerge out of the 
hypothetical social contract among the parties. Because of the capacity generated by the 
legal status of the citizen, those citizenship rights structure the relationship between the 
individual and the state (Cohen 2009: 65). As privileges granted as a result of the legal 
status, citizenship rights create “limitations on the state’s sovereign authority.” (Barbalet 
1994: 229). 
Although the liberal approach considers the relationship between the state and the 
individual to be a contractual one that forces parties to honor the agreement, citizenship 
rights and liberties are not always respected and delivered in reality. The reality of how 
these rights are being perceived, used, enjoyed, and understood by citizens is a different 
issue. Different from the actual codification of these rights in the legal framework, a 
perspective questioning the actual experience of citizenship aims at identifying the limits 
of this normative framework. Such a perspective can also be helpful to shed light on the 
ways in which state acts as the other end of the contractual relationship. To what extent 
the mutual commitments are understood and rights and liberties being enjoyed by the 
citizenry?  
These questions are important in terms of understanding the actual practice of these 
rights, which are entitlements of citizens. In other words, these are shared privileges of 
these individuals because of the fact that they are legal, political members of a demos, 
boundaries of which are clearly defined. Defining citizenship as a set of rights and 
liberties, the main issue of inquiry of this research is the perceptions on citizenship rights 
and liberties on the basis of political party preferences. With relation to this purpose, this 
section will establish the conceptual framework for answering the question of how 
citizens themselves perceive their rights. In the first section, scholarly arguments on 
citizenship as a set of rights are introduced. Following sections delineate the categories 
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of citizenship rights and lay out the basis for their operationalization for the purposes of 
this research. 
 
5.3 Citizenship as a Set of Rights and Liberties 
 
 
5.3.1 Categories and Development of Citizenship Rights and 
Liberties 
 
 According to T.H. Marshall’s (1950, 1992:8) seminal essay, citizenship is divided 
into three elements: “civil, political and social.” Marshall’s conceptualization of 
citizenship in this essay is an attempt at explaining the historical evolution of these 
elements. According to his categorization, emergence of civil liberties corresponded to 
18th century; political rights in the 19th century, and social rights in 20th century (Marshall, 
1950,1992:10). While civil liberties are related with the individual’s freedom of action, 
political rights are about citizens’ capacity to participate in the decision-making 
mechanisms. Social rights, which emerged at a later stage, are primarily about mitigating 
the impact of social and economic inequalities created by rapid industrialization. 
Marshall’s inclusion of social rights into his tripartite conceptualization of citizenship is 
related with the interdependence of these categories of rights since grave inequalities in 
the society affect the enjoyment of civil liberties or political rights. In that sense, social 
benefits reducing the impact of inequalities in the society are important for the practice 
of other citizenship rights and liberties. Hence, citizenship status, composed of civil, 
political and social elements, has been enhanced through “recognition and stabilization 
of certain status differences.” (Marshall, 1950,1992:44). As a result, social services or 
benefits cause “a general enrichment of the concrete substance of civilized life,” in which 
there occurs “an equalization” between different classes, or segments within the society 
(Marshall 1950,1992:33).  
 Another author that provides an alternative explanation to Marshallian narrative 
on rights is Janoski (1998). According to his conceptualization, there are four factors that 
can explain the expansion of citizenship rights: (1) social movements based on class and 
status solidarity, (2) the role of state in inhibiting or promoting citizenship rights, (3) the 
role of political parties and the ideology of rights, and lastly, (4) external factors, such as 
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world politics and influx of immigration (Janoski 1998:171). With the help of these 
factors, Janoski also suggests a chronology of rights that spans across 1200s to 1990s.  
Different than Marshall, Janoski (1998:183) suggests that each of the rights 
categories of his conceptualization, i.e. legal, political, social, and participation rights, 
have continued to develop throughout this long period. In other words, although the most 
important developments for legal and political rights had occurred between 13th and 19th 
centuries, they have changed during the late 19th century to early 20th century, when social 
and participation rights had emerged and extended. Janoski’s take on the development 
and sequencing of different categories of citizenship rights resemble Marshall’s but it has 
a firmer perspective on social movements. Also, Janoski points out that there are certain 
outliers concerning the historical sequencing of rights. For instance, Janoski argues that 
Marshall’s sequencing of rights was not entirely accurate for social democratic states 
where social rights came earlier than political rights. Similarly, in traditional regimes, 
legal and political rights were considerably late comers than social and participation 
rights (Janoski 1998:212).  
Although there are differences in explaining how citizenship rights emerged and 
expanded, both Marshall’s tripartite conceptualization of civil, political, and social rights 
and Janoski’s approach are useful for operationalizing the categories of citizenship rights 
and liberties to be used in this research. The next sections will discuss these categories 
separately.  
 
 Civil Liberties 
 
This study relies on Marshallian tripartite understanding of citizenship rights in 
operationalizing civil liberties. Among the original three, civil liberties were 
institutionalized first. For Marshall (1950,1982:8) civil liberties of citizenship include 
“freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid 
contracts, and the right to justice.” In other words, civil elements as Marshall describes, 
correspond to the civil liberties that prioritize individual freedom in a Lockean sense. 
Institutionally speaking they are associated with the legal system, courts etc. 
Since it is the oldest citizenship rights in terms of institutionalization, it is expected 
for civil liberties to be entrenched in democratic settings. According to Moller and 
Skaaning’s (2014:1085) empirical study in which the authors have presented and tested 
an original global dataset on civil liberties (CLD) between 1979 and 2010, corresponding 
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to the third wave of democratization, “political liberties have generally been repressed 
more than private liberties.” Moller and Skaaning’s (2014:1073) dataset includes four 
civil liberties: freedom of expression and freedom of assembly as political liberties and 
freedom of religion and freedom of movement as private liberties. Their empirical 
analysis shows that civil liberties such as freedom of expression and freedom of assembly 
have been repressed more than the other kinds of civil liberties.  
There are authors who indicate that civil liberties are more essential for sustaining 
electoral democracy. Ben Yishay and Betancourt (2014) conducted an empirical study 
relying on Freedom House’s categorization of civil liberties and political rights. 
According to their study, promoting civil liberties is more efficient than political rights 
because the after-effect of these rights on citizens are more important for the overall 
health of democracy (Ben Yishay and Betancourt 2014: 566). In other words, 
guaranteeing the right to vote, a political right according to Freedom House’s 
categorization, is not sufficient in the absence of freedom of expression, a civil liberty 
according to the same categorization.  
 
 Political Rights 
 
Political elements of citizenship are related with the capacity to participate in 
politics, i.e. political right to participation; either as a member of the political entity or as 
an “elector of the members” of such entity (Marshall, 1950,1992:8). Hence, parliaments, 
political parties, electoral systems, and any other form of representative organization are 
the institutional aspects of this category of rights. Understanding citizenship in an 
Aristotelian fashion, political rights are described in ICCPR as ensuring the rights of 
individuals to vote and participate in the public life, as well as guaranteeing their freedom 
of expression, assembly, freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Conte and Burchill 
2009:3-4). Janoski (1998:38) also acknowledges that political rights are about 
participating in the public arena.  
A similar approach to Skaaning and Moller’s classification of civil liberties has 
been adopted by Chilton and Versteeg (2015:6), where they investigate the impact of 
constitutional entrenchment of political rights on “de facto respect for rights in practice.” 
Authors have chosen six political rights and conceptualized them as follows: right to 
establish political parties and right to unionize as “organizational rights,” freedom of 
expression and freedom of movement as “individual rights,” right to association as being 
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closer to organizational rights, and freedom of religion as being closer to individual rights 
(Chilton and Versteeg 2015: 5). They have found that the organizational rights, such as 
right to establish political parties, are more effective in terms of respecting those rights 
as they “establish organizations with the incentives and means to protect the rights” 
(Chilton and Versteeg 2015: 12).  
 
 Social Rights 
 
T.H. Marshall is considered as the pioneer of the idea of “social citizenship” or 
“social rights” (King and Waldron 1988: 418). According to this scheme, the social 
element of citizenship signifies “the right to a modicum of economic welfare and 
security,” “the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a 
civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society.” (Marshall 
1950,1992:8) In other words, social element includes economic and welfare rights, in 
which state’s role have changed from being a mere arbiter to a more involved one through 
providing services such as health care, education and social security. Hence, welfare state 
services such as public education, public health or social assistance services are among 
the institutional aspects of these rights. 
Janoski (1998:32) agrees with this position by arguing that social rights are “public 
interventions into private spheres to support citizens’ claims to economic subsistence and 
social existence.” While the indicators Marshall’s conceptualization of social rights are 
not very clear, Janoski (1998: 32) offers a list for social rights: “enabling rights” 
concerning health and family services, “opportunity rights” concerning skills training and 
cultural participation through educational assistance, “distributive rights” involving 
transfer of payments to citizens in need of economic subsistence, such as retirees or the 
disabled, “compensatory rights” as in the case of payments of compensation for the 
injured or veterans.  
 
5.4 Operationalization of Citizenship Rights and Liberties 
 
 
5.4.1 Design of the Questionnaire 
 
 Given that previous studies on citizenship perceptions are based on in-depth 
interviews, there is not a sample questionnaire upon which I can establish my own. Since 
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the research aim is to delineate citizenship perceptions on three categories of rights and 
liberties, it is necessary to clearly define the citizenship rights that are utilized. This 
definition guides the design of the questionnaire. 
The citizenship rights and liberties categories that needed to be included in the 
survey were civil liberties, political rights and social rights. For the category of social 
rights, T.H. Marshall’s and Janoski’s conceptualizations of social rights have served as 
reference for questions. While Marshall’s account has a specific focus on well-being of 
citizens, Janoski’s categorization incorporates distributive rights into the overall 
framework on social rights. In order to ensure survey economy and simplicity, right to 
healthcare and right to education are chosen as social rights reflecting Marshall’s 
framework. Items on social aid and employment assistance are included to incorporate 
the distributive rights classification of Janoski.  
For creating the survey items on civil liberties and political rights, Freedom House’s 
checklist of questions has served as the reference source. Being established in 1941, 
Freedom House has been working as an independent organization producing annual 
reports on matters of civil liberties and political rights across the world. The first of such 
reports, titled “Freedom in the World,” was launched in 1973. Designed as an annual 
survey of the state of global political rights and civil liberties, these reports analyze and 
rate countries in terms of the practices of these two categories of rights. These reports 
compile news about violations of these rights, as well as expert opinions to finalize the 
ratings. The 2016 edition of this report, on which the survey items on civil liberties and 
political rights are established, covers 195 countries and 15 territories from January 1, 
2015, through December 31, 2015.66 
The methodology of the Freedom in the World report is primarily based on the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Through a categorization of civil liberties and 
political rights inspired by this Declaration, these reports assess the actual state of these 
liberties and rights, rather than evaluating governments’ performance. These reports 
analyze the real-life liberties and rights with the help of analysts, academics, and experts.  
According to the institution’s methodology, there are two categories of rights: civil 
liberties and political rights. Civil liberties have four subcategories: (1) freedom of 
expression and belief, (2) associational and organizational rights, (3) rule of law, and (4) 
personal autonomy and individual rights. Political rights have three subcategories: (1) 
                                                 
66 Information retrieved from Freedom House’s web page: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-
2016/methodology (Retrieved on March 10, 2016). 
 181 
electoral process, (2) political pluralism and participation, and (3) functioning of 
government. There are 25 checklist questions concerning these seven subcategories. For 
civil liberties, the highest score is 60, whereas for political rights the highest scope is 40. 
These scores compose one of the three components of Freedom House’s methodology; 
the other two are ratings and statuses. After the scores are assigned, these scores are then 
translated into ratings, separate for civil liberties and political rights. For each of these 
categories, the ratings span between 1 to 7, where 1 signifies the highest degree of 
freedom. Once these ratings are determined, their averages are calculated and these 
averages create the ultimate status of the country in question. There are three statuses in 
Freedom House’s methodology: status of Free (for ratings between 1.0 to 2.5), status of 
Partly Free (for ratings between 3.0 to 5.0), and status of Not Free (for ratings between 
5.5 to 7.0). The table below summarizes the steps through which total scores are translated 
into ratings and combined ratings into overall freedom status67.   
 
Table 3 Freedom House's Scoring System 
Political Rights (PR) 
Total Scores PR Rating 
36-40 1 
30-35 2 
24-29 3 
18-23 4 
12-17 5 
6-11 6 
0-5 7 
Civil Liberties (CL) 
Total Scores CL Rating 
53-60 1 
44-52 2 
35-43 3 
26-34 4 
17-25 5 
                                                 
67 Retrieved from: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2016/methodology. (Retrieved on March 10, 
2016.) 
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8-16 6 
0-7 7 
Freedom Rating (Combined Average of the PR 
and CL Ratings) Freedom Status 
1.0 to 2.5 Free 
3.0 to 5.0 Partly Free 
5.5 to 7.0 Not Free 
 
 
Although Freedom House’s methodology has been criticized by some scholars in 
terms of the process through which civil liberties and political rights index is aggregated 
(Munck and Verkuilen 2002), the index has been used to assess level of democracy and 
has been considered to one of the well-established indices by policy makers. In addition, 
Freedom House’s classification is also in line with the theoretical framework of 
Marshall’s tripartite construct of citizenship rights. Hence, for the purpose of 
operationalization in this research, Freedom House’s categories of civil liberties and 
political rights will be utilized. 
Hence, the survey items on civil liberties are constructed through referring to the 
four subcategories under the checklist of civil liberties. To ensure that there is at least one 
survey item corresponding to each of these subcategories, freedom of expression and 
belief; freedom of assembly and protest, rule of law indicating due process and freedom 
from discrimination in courts; and individual rights such as freedom of travel, 
employment, education and right to private property, as well as gender equality are all 
covered through relevant survey items. 
For political rights, there are three subcategories and survey items are constructed 
to reflect all of them. More specifically, free and fair elections, equal political 
participation of all, political pluralism referring to representation of minorities, and 
functioning and monitoring of the government are included as separate survey items.68  
 The initial version of the questionnaire was discussed with KONDA employees 
and after some refinements, a pilot study was applied to assess the format of survey items 
in March 2016. The wording of these items was refined according to the results of the 
pilot study and the questionnaire was finalized. The final version of the questionnaire 
                                                 
68 The questionnaire can be found in the Appendix. 
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includes 18 items tapping the demographic qualities of the sample and 35 items on 
citizenship rights and liberties. Responses are constructed as a Likert-type scale where 
there are 6 response categories ranging from 1, which denotes “strongly disagree” and 6 
denotes “strongly agree.” The other categories are “disagree, partially disagree, partially 
agree, agree.” The individual analyses on survey items focus on “strongly agree, agree,” 
or “strongly disagree, disagree.” The other response categories are reported but not 
analyzed as they indicate indecisiveness.  
 
 
5.5 Application of the Survey 
 
 Since the primary aim of this research is to investigate perceptions on citizenship 
rights and liberties on the basis of political party preferences, a specific survey was 
designed and implemented on a non-representative sample of 466 individuals in İstanbul. 
Given that the perceptions are analyzed on the basis of political party preferences, the 
sample includes equal number of individuals who voted for one of the political parties 
currently in the parliament and others who did not vote or were ineligible to vote in last 
national elections. To ensure comparability between different party voters, only those 
who voted in last national elections are included in survey data analyses, which reduced 
the size of the sample. Hence, the effective sample includes 400 respondents who voted 
for AKP, MHP, CHP or HDP.  
 KONDA Research Company administered the survey in April 2016. In order to 
find equal number of respondents who voted for one of the four parties in the parliament 
in İstanbul, the latest national elections results, i.e. November 1st elections were 
investigated. The electoral districts in İstanbul were each of these parties obtained the 
most votes were identified to determine the neighborhoods where it is more likely to find 
individuals who voted for one of these parties. The table below displays the districts and 
neighborhoods where each of these four political parties got the most votes. 
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Table 4 Vote shares of four parties in selected neighborhoods of İstanbul in the 
elections on November 1, 2015 National Elections 
District Neighborhood AKP % CHP % MHP% HDP% 
BEŞİKTAŞ ABBASAĞA 22 54 9 13 
BEYLİKDÜZÜ 
ADNAN 
KAHVECİ 37 43 12 7 
BEYLİKDÜZÜ 
ADNAN 
KAHVECİ 37 43 12 7 
BEYOĞLU HACIAHMET 26 23 4 46 
BEYOĞLU ÇUKUR 21 12 3 62 
FATİH YEDİKULE 45 35 8 10 
FATİH SİLİVRİKAPI 42 38 11 7 
FATİH 
MOLLA 
GÜRANİ 41 38 10 8 
FATİH TOPKAPI 41 39 9 9 
KADIKÖY FİKİRTEPE 57 22 8 10 
KARTAL ORHANTEPE 48 34 11 5 
KARTAL 
GÜMÜŞPINA
R 47 29 11 10 
KARTAL 
UĞURMUMC
U 35 45 10 8 
ŞİŞLİ GÜLBAHAR 36 45 10 8 
ZEYTİNBURNU 
MERKEZEFE
NDİ 56 23 10 8 
ZEYTİNBURNU SÜMER 47 29 11 11 
ZEYTİNBURNU YENİDOĞAN 53 24 12 9 
            
Neighborhood Averages 41 34 10 14 
Results of November 1st, 2015 
elections for İstanbul 49 30 8 10 
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 The table displays that there is not a neighborhood where MHP got the majority 
of the vote. As a result, the number of MHP voters remained below 100 in the initial 
application of survey. In addition, in each of these neighborhoods interviewers had met 
more AKP voters than the other party voters, which caused the number of HDP voters to 
remain lower than desired. Hence, to ensure including 100 participants from each political 
party group, pollsters visited the neighborhoods where CHP, MHP, and HDP got more 
votes. The adequate number was reached after three cycles of visits during April 2016.  
 
5.6 Demographic Profile of the Sample69 
 
 
 There are 466 respondents in the original sample. The distribution of males and 
females are balanced: 53.5% of the sample is male and 46,5 of the sample is female. The 
average age is 38, indicating that there are a lot of young individuals in the sample. 34% 
of the sample is aged between 18 and 28, while 32% is between 29 and 43 and 33% is 
above 44. Also, 8 individuals did not report their age. The education level of the majority 
of the sample is below high school (40%), those with high school diploma constitute 31% 
of the sample and those with higher levels of education make up 28% of the sample. Since 
the sample is drawn from individuals living in İstanbul, it is not surprising to see that 46% 
of them have grown up in a metropolitan area. 18% of them have grown up in cities, 16% 
in villages, 14% in counties and 4% in towns. 64% of the sample reported their ethnic 
identity as Turkish, while 22% as Kurdish. Those who choose Zaza and Arab constitute 
2% of the sample each. 8% of the sample chose the option “Other” among the responses, 
while 5 individuals did not answer. An overwhelming majority of the sample identify as 
Sunni Muslim (71%), while 7% of them identify as Alevi. In addition, 21% chose the 
option “Other” and 27 individuals did not respond. In terms of self-placement on the 
ideological spectrum, more individuals have placed themselves on the left than on the 
right. 36% define themselves as left-wing, 28% are at the center, and 25% are at the right. 
54 individuals did not answer this question and they constitute 11% of the sample. In 
terms of income levels, 28% declare their house hold income as between 1200 and 2000 
TL, 24% as between 2001 and 3000 TL, and 23% as 3001 and 5000 TL. Those with 
household income above 5000 TL constitute 7% and those with less than 1200 TL 
                                                 
69 The detailed list of the demographic profile of the sample can be found in the Appendix. 
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constitute 6% of the sample. 53 individuals did not report their household income, which 
is above 10% of the whole sample. 
 
Table 5 Demographic Characteristics of the Sample (N=466) 
  Variables Frequency  (%) Mean (SD)   
     
 
Age 
 
38,01 (14,5)  
 
Respondent's gender (1 missing) 
   
 
Male 249 (53,5%) 
  
 
Female 216 (46,5%) 
  
  
 
  
 
Education Level (4 missing)  
  
 
Illiterate 11 (2,4%) 
  
 
Literate, no diploma 12 (2,6%) 
  
 
Primary school 103 (22,3%) 
  
 
Secondary School 59 (12,8%) 
  
 
High school 144 (31,2%) 
  
 
Bachelor Degree 120 (26%) 
  
 
Postgraduate Degree 13 (2,8%) 
  
  
 
  
 
Place where respondent is raised 
(2 miss.) 
 
  
 
Village 76 (16,4%) 
  
 
Town 18 (3,9%) 
  
 
County 67 (14,4%) 
  
 
City 88 (19%) 
  
 
Metropolis 215 (46,3%) 
  
  
 
  
 
Respondent's Ethnicity (5 miss.)  
  
 
Turkish 298 (64,6%) 
  
 
Kurdish 104 (22,6%) 
  
 
Zaza 12 (2,6%) 
  
 
Arab 10 (2,2%) 
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Other 37 (8%) 
  
  
 
  
 
Respondent's Religious 
Conviction (27 miss.) 
 
  
 
Sunni Muslim 314 (71,5%) 
  
 
Alevi Muslim 31 (7,1) 
  
 
Other 94 (21,4%) 
  
  
 
  
 
Self-Placement on the Ideological 
Spectrum (54 miss.) 
 
  
 
1- Far Left 82 (19,9%) 
  
 
2 40 (9,7%) 
  
 
3 43 (10,4%) 
  
 
4 20 (4,8%) 
  
 
5 43 (10,4%) 
  
 
6 40 (9,7%) 
  
 
7 29 (7%) 
  
 
8 31 (7,5%) 
  
 
9 31 (7,5%) 
  
 
10- Far Right 53 (12,9%) 
  
  
 
  
 
Respondent's Income Level (53 
miss.) 
 
  
 
Below 700 TL 2 (0.4%) 
  
 
701-1200 TL 28 (6%) 
  
 
1201-2000 TL 133 (28,5%) 
  
 
2001-3000 TL 108 (23,2%) 
  
 
3001-5000 TL 108 (23,2%) 
  
 
5001 TL and above 34 (7,3%) 
  
 
  
  
 
Respondent's Occupation (4 miss.)  
  
 
Public employee 11 (2,4%) 
  
 
Private Sector 65 (14%) 
  
 
Blue collar worker 74 (15,9%) 
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Artisan 35 (7,51%) 
  
 
Businessmen 5 (1,1%) 
  
 
Self-employed (doctor, 
lawyer,..etc.) 
6 (1,3%) 
  
 
Agriculture 1 (0,2%) 
  
 
Other 30 (6,4%) 
  
 
Retired 54 (11,6%) 
  
 
Housewife 92 (19,7%) 
  
 
Student 60 (12,9%) 
  
 
Unemployed 29 (6,2%) 
  
 
 In addition to these demographic variables, there are items that tap into additional 
features of the sample profile. Level of religiosity is among them. Within the sample, 
13% declare that they do not believe in religion, 23% are believers but they are not 
practicing, 51% are both believers and carry out religious practices, and 10% define 
themselves as devoutly religious. 18 individuals did not respond to this question. Another 
such survey item concerns lifestyles of the respondents. This is a question that KONDA 
uses frequently in its surveys and it is associated with self-placement on the political 
spectrum and political party preferences. That’s why I decided to include a question on 
lifestyle. 40% of the sample identify their lifestyles as modern, while 39% as traditional 
conservative and 15% as religious conservative. 25 individuals did not provide an answer 
to this question. Lastly, respondents are asked to identify themselves with a political 
identity among the predetermined options. Within the sample, 15% have chosen 
“Ülkücü”, 14% “Nationalist”, and 14% “Conservative”, 13% “Kemalist”, and 12% 
“Democrat.” Apart from these, 9% have chosen Socialist, while 10% did not answer (51 
individuals).  
 
Table 6 Additional Demographic Characteristics of the Sample (N=466) 
  Variables Frequency (%) 
    
 
Level of Religiosity (18 missing) 
  
 
Not a believer 60 (13,4%) 
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Believer, not carryingout religious 
practices 
107 (23,9%) 
 
 
Religious, practising  232 (51,8%) 
 
 
Devoutly religious 49 (10,9%) 
 
    
 
Respondent's Lifestyle (25 missing)  
 
 
Modern 188 (42,6%) 
 
 
Traditional Conservative 183 (41,5%) 
 
 
Religious Conservative  70 (15,9%) 
 
    
 
Political Identity Preferences (51 
missing) 
 
 
 
Idealist (Ülkücü) 72 (15,5%) 
 
 
Nationalist 69 (14,8%) 
 
 
Conservative  66 (14,2%) 
 
 
Islamist  14 (3%) 
 
 
Democrat  57 (12,2%) 
 
 
Liberal 6 (1,3%) 
 
 
Kemalist (Atatürkçü) 62 (13,3%) 
 
 
Neo-Nationalist (Ulusalcı) 2 (0,4%) 
 
 
Social Democrat 22 (4,7%) 
 
 
Socialist 45 (9,7%) 
 
    
        
 
5.7 Data Analysis 
 
 
 The data generated through the application of survey are analyzed through several 
methods. The survey responses are individually analyzed through interpreting cross 
tabulations of survey items and political party preferences. In addition to cross tabs, 
exploratory factor analysis is performed and simple regression analyses are conducted by 
using retained factors as dependent variables. 
5.7.1 Factor Analysis 
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 Factor analysis is a data reduction technique that is used to simplify the 
complexity of dimensions in a given dataset. Kline (1993:5) defines factor as a 
“dimension or construct which is a condensed statement of the relationships between a 
set of variables.” Factor analysis is used to reduce the dimensions of data and provides 
explanation for the patterns through a smaller number of factors.   
 Since the aim of data analysis is to explore and interpret the latent variables, factor 
analysis was performed, with iterated principal factors (ipf) option in Stata. The option 
ipf was preferred as this option improves the estimates of communality, i.e. proportion of 
variance that is shared with other variables by repeating the process (Rencher and 
Christensen 201270).  
As the wordings of the questions differentiate between the statements on the current 
state of citizenship rights and liberties and the normative statements on social rights, I 
made a priori decision to limit factor analyses to two factors. For that purpose, ipf option 
was used with “factors (2).”71  
Initially, all survey items are included in the factor analyses. But loadings of two 
variables turned out to be very low on each of the factors (<.30) and their uniqueness are 
high (>.90). These loadings suggest that these two variables do not fit into either of the 
factors, implying that they are outliers or there may be another dimension that explains 
the variation in them. Since their loadings are not significant, another factor analysis was 
performed without these variables.72  
After conducting the factor analyses, the results are rotated. Rotating the factor 
scores are necessary to interpret the factor loadings. There are fundamentally two rotation 
methods: orthogonal and oblique. In orthogonal rotation (Varimax rotation), the 
assumption is that there is no correlation between factors; they are orthogonal to each 
other. This method is widely used in the literature and it is the default option in statistical 
software. Yet, since the survey questionnaire investigates perceptions on citizenship 
                                                 
70 Rencher, A, and Christensen, W.F.. (2012) Methods of Multivariate Analysis Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley. 
71 Separate analyses were also performed without specifiying the number of factors and the outputs were similar. 
These analyses can be found in the Appendix. 
72 The questions on external pressure while voting (vote_pressure) and biased media broadcasting prior to elections 
(biased_media) are removed from the first factor because the loadings of these two are very low (<30). Omitting them 
does not change loadings of other factors significantly. Only major change occurs for the variable on monitoring of the 
government (gov_monitored). In the factor analyses with iterated principal factors with two factors and varimax 
rotation, gov_monitored loads on the second factor, while with promax rotation, gov_monitored loads on the first 
factor. Since the variables on the second factor (with varimax rotation) are about the normative perceptions on social 
rights except from gov_monitored, the promax rotation where this variable loads in the first factor makes interpretation 
of factors easier as gov_monitored also indicates the current state of political rights. Because of simplicity and 
interpretability, promax rotation is preferred.  Output of the factor analyses including these two variables can be found 
in the Appendix. 
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rights and liberties, it is not possible to assume no correlations between factors. Even 
though there are different types of questions measuring perceptions on their current state 
and on their ideal state, they target the same notion, which is the framework of citizenship 
rights and liberties. For that reason, the factor scores are rotated through oblique solutions 
(Promax rotation), since the assumption of oblique solutions is that there can be 
correlations between factors. In addition, the aim of factor analyses is to reduce the 
complexity of the data and obtain a simpler interpretation. The results of the promax 
rotation provided a cleaner structure. 73  
Through promax rotation, the eigenvalues, which displays the amount of variance 
explained by the factors, are plotted. This screeplot demonstrates that there are two points 
before the plot line becomes flatter and these points represent the factors retained.  
 
Graph 15 Screeplot after factor analysis with promax rotation 
 
 
 The resulting output can be seen in the table below. The variables loaded in the 
first factor measures the perceptions on the actual state of citizenship rights and liberties, 
while the ones loaded in the second factor measure the normative perceptions on social 
                                                 
73 Varimax rotation is also performed to compare the results, which are not significantly different from Promax 
rotation. 
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rights.74 Although the variance explained by the first factor is large enough to be used on 
its own, the variables loaded on the second factor indicate normative perceptions and 
hence may provide different information about the perceptions. Thus, the second factor 
will also be retained. As a rule of thumb, loadings over .4 on a factor is considered as a 
good indicator of that factor (Acock 201475). The column “Uniqueness” displays the 
unexplained variance by the set of factors in each item. The factor loadings are regression 
coefficients as an oblique rotation method is utilized.76  
 
Table 7 Factor Loadings (with ipf option and promax rotation) 
Variables  Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness 
I believe in the honesty of 
vote count after elections 
0.6600 -0.1087 0.5485 
10% electoral threshold is 
necessary 
0.6082 0.2173 0.5904 
I think the current electoral 
system allows Kurds, Alevis and 
non-Muslims to be represented 
fairly 
0.6645 0.2847 0.4882 
I think protests can be 
organized without any repression 
0.6738 -0.1507 0.5175 
Governments cannot do 
their jobs because of obstacles 
0.4609 -0.0898 0.7772 
Citizens can receive social 
aid even if they do not vote for 
the incumbent party 
0.6834 0.1769 0.5086 
I think protesters's lives are 
protected 
0.6013 -0.0825 0.6288 
                                                 
74 The items “I try not to talk about political issues on the phone because I think my phone is tapped”, “processes of 
detention and arrest violate citizenship rights”, “citizens in Turkey experienced forced migration”, “I think 
government meddles with the number of children families will have”,”I think children are steered towards a specific 
religious understanding in schools” are recoded to ensure they have the same direction as with the other statements. 
While agreement with other statements suggest uncritical perceptions, agreement with these items suggest the 
contrary. Hence, they are recoded in reverse to ensure same answers to reflect the same perceptions.  
75 Acock, A. (2014) A Gentle Introduction to Stata, Fourth Edition Texas: State Press. 
76 In orthogonal rotation, such as Varimax, the loadings are correlations. 
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I believe that government's 
actions are monitored 
0.7774 -0.3218 0.2777 
Journalists can publish 
stories about every subject freely  
0.7800 -0.1536 0.3612 
Artists, musicians, literati 
can freely express themselves 
through their art  
0.7999 -0.0531 0.3550 
Different religious practices 
can be carried out freely in 
Turkey 
0.7758 0.2463 0.3483 
I try not to talk about 
political issues on the phone 
because I think my phone is 
tapped 
0.4174 0.1527 0.8061 
Freedom of expression of 
protesters is protected 
0.7143 -0.2228 0.4310 
I think judicial institutions 
are independent of politics 
0.7119 -0.3150 0.3811 
I don't think individuals 
with different religious 
convictions are discriminated 
against by the courts 
0.6655 0.1852 0.5298 
State fulfills its job to 
provide free education 
0.6129 0.0500 0.6236 
I don't think individuals 
with different ethnicities are 
discriminated against by the 
courts 
0.7399 0.1660 0.4320 
State fulfills its job to 
provide free healthcare 
0.6814 0.0743 0.5330 
Processes of detention and 
arrest violate citizenship rights 
0.4903 -0.0037 0.7594 
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Citizens in Turkey 
experienced forced migration 
0.4964 0.0247 0.7537 
I think state policies protect 
women's individual rights 
0.7898 -0.0680 0.3685 
I think women can vote 
freely without pressure from their 
spouses or families 
0.6853 -0.1592 0.4988 
I believe that judicial 
organs punish perpetrators of 
violence against women 
adequately 
0.5134 -0.3244 0.6217 
I think government meddles 
with the number of children 
families will have 
0.4836 0.0575 0.7644 
I think children are steered 
towards a specific religious 
understanding in schools 
0.5601 0.0985 0.6797 
State fulfills its job to 
provide occassional aid in kind 
0.6416 0.1111 0.5800 
I think private property is 
secure  
0.7385 -0.0684 0.4471 
State fulfills its job to find 
jobs for the unemployed 
0.7178 -0.2038 0.4348 
I consider aid in kind 
distributed by political parties 
prior to elections as a social right 
0.5352 -0.0915 0.7024 
I think public education free 
of cost at every level is a social 
right 
-0.1126 0.4378 0.7928 
I think finding jobs for the 
unemployed is a social right 
-0.1018 0.3073 0.8934 
I consider free healthcare as 
a social right 
-0.0436 0.5460 0.6986 
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I want entrenched social 
rights instead of receiving 
occassional aid in kind 
-0.1709 0.4669 0.7482 
  
% of variance 88,16% 12,08%   
Extraction Method: Iterated principal factor with two factors 
Rotation Method: Promax Rotation 
 
 
5.7.2 Multiple Regression Analyses 
 
 After factor analysis was performed, the scores of the retained factors were 
predicted. These predicted factors are continuous variables that can be used as dependent 
variables in regression analyses. 
 Regression models are used to explain the change in a certain dependent variable 
in terms one or more variables. They help to describe and predict the relations between 
such variables. When more than one independent variables are used, it becomes possible 
to control the effect of other factors other than the main independent variable. In addition, 
including more variables also allow explaining more of the variation in the dependent 
variable.  
The predicted factor scores are used as continuous, dependent variables, where the 
scores of the first factor signify the perceptions on the current state of citizenship rights 
and the scores of the second factor concern the normative perceptions on social rights.  
 The main independent variable of interest is the party preference of the 
respondents as the analyses are conducted to measure the partial effects of party 
preference over the perceptions on citizenship rights and liberties. To control for the effect 
of demographic variables, age, gender, level of education, self-placement on the 
ideological spectrum, ethnicity, and income levels are used as control variables77. In 
                                                 
77 In initial analyses, lifestyle, preferred political identity, and religious identity were also included as covariates. Yet, 
there are a lot of missing values for these variables which decrease the number of observations. They are omitted 
from the regressions after checking for whether high number of missing values make a difference in the coefficients. 
Since no major change has happened, these variables are omitted. Income and self-placement on the political 
spectrum have also a lot of missing values but they are kept as control variables. When the effect of missing values of 
those variables is checked by running the regression with and without including missing values, there occurs a minor 
change in some of the standardized coefficients. In addition, these two variables are used in the literature as control 
variables and they are meaningful in terms of the dependent variables. Hence, even though their inclusion reduced the 
overall number of observations, they are kept in the analyses. Additional regressions with other variables can be 
found in the Appendix. 
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addition, level of religiosity is included as another control variable since it is used in the 
voting behavior literature as a determinant of party preference.  
 Some of these control variables are recoded versions of the original variables. 
Gender is recoded as a dummy variable where 1 denotes being male and 0 denotes being 
female. Ethnicity is also recoded as a dummy variable; 1 denotes being Turkish and 0 
denotes other responses. Since being ethnically Turkish is a dimension of the official 
construct of Turkish citizenship, its effect on the perceptions is measured by using being 
Turkish as a dummy variable, where 1 denotes being Turkish, 0 denotes all other 
responses. In addition, party identifiers are included as dummy variables.  
 
Table 8 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Factor 1 
    
     
      
 Percentiles Smallest    
1% -1.327367 -1.375602    
5% -1.286889 -1.375602    
10% -1.199827 -1.344303  Obs 323 
25% -.8769139 -1.327367  Sum of Wgt 323 
      
50% -.0828545   Mean 1.47e-09 
  Largest  Std. Dev. .9814137 
75% .6928139 2.050973    
90% 1.44757 2.070081  Variance .9631728 
95% 1.725583 2.147248  Skewness .3852586 
99% 2.050973 2.205171  Kurtosis 1.99729 
      
 
Factor 2 
    
     
      
 Percentiles Smallest    
1% -3.725535 -4.937155    
5% -1.357569 -4.871637    
10% -.8814635 -4.001929  Obs 323 
25% -.2983661 -3.725535  Sum of Wgt 323 
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50% .0571351   Mean 4.80e-10 
  Largest  Std. Dev. .8624 
75% .4867675 1.676916    
90% .869904 1.755904  Variance .7437338 
95% 1.087073 1.776504  Skewness 
-
1923631 
99% 1.676916 1.953744  Kurtosis 11.3103 
      
 
Age (in years) 
    
     
      
 Percentiles Smallest    
1% 18 18    
5% 20 18    
10% 22 18  Obs 392 
25% 25 18  Sum of Wgt 392 
      
50% 36 Mean  Mean 38.21429 
 Largest Std.  Std. Dev. 14.67046 
75% 48 78    
90% 60 78  Variance 215.2225 
95% 66 78  Skewness .6870567 
99% 78 89  Kurtosis 2.702636 
      
 Male=1 (dummy 
variable) 
    
     
      
 Percentiles Smallest    
1% 0 0    
5% 0 0    
10% 0 0  Obs 399 
25% 0 0  Sum of Wgt 399 
      
50% 1   Mean 551378 
 Largest Std.  Std. Dev. .4979777 
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75% 1 1    
90% 1 1  Variance .2479818 
95% 1 1  Skewness 
-
.2066075 
99% 1 1  Kurtosis 1.042687 
      
 Level of 
Education 
    
     
      
 Percentiles Smallest    
1% 1 1    
5% 2 1    
10% 2 1  Obs 396 
25% 2 1  Sum of Wgt 396 
      
50% 4   Mean 3.573232 
 Largest Std.  Std. Dev. 1.225134 
75% 5 5    
90% 5 5  Variance 1.500953 
95% 5 5  Skewness -.42617 
99% 5 5  Kurtosis 1.965029 
      
 Turkish=1 
(dummy 
variable) 
    
     
      
 Percentiles Smallest    
1% 0 0    
5% 0 0    
10% 0 0  Obs 400 
25% 0 0  Sum of Wgt 400 
      
50% 1   Mean .6475 
 Largest Std.  Std. Dev. .4783469 
75% 1 1    
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90% 1 1  Variance .2288158 
95% 1 1  Skewness 
-
.6174795 
99% 1 1  Kurtosis 1.381281 
      
 Level of 
Religiosity 
    
     
      
 Percentiles Smallest    
1% 1 1    
5% 1 1    
10% 1 1  Obs 387 
25% 2 1  Sum of Wgt 387 
      
50% 3   Mean 2.586563 
 Largest   Std. Dev. .8635541 
75% 3 4    
90% 4 4  Variance .7457257 
95% 4 4  Skewness 
-
.4254848 
99% 4 4  Kurtosis 2.488518 
      
 Self-Placement 
on the Left-Right 
Spectrum 
(Left=1 
Right=10) 
    
     
      
 Percentiles Smallest    
1% 1 1    
5% 1 1    
10% 1 1  Obs 364 
25% 2 1  Sum of Wgt 364 
      
 200 
50% 5   Mean 4.986264 
 Largest   Std. Dev. 3.199919 
75% 8 10    
90% 10 10  Variance 10.23948 
95% 10 10  Skewness .1907948 
99% 10 10  Kurtosis 1.626597 
      
 Household 
Income 
    
     
      
 Percentiles Smallest    
1% 900 500    
5% 1000 750    
10% 1300 800  Obs 357 
25% 2000 900  Sum of Wgt 357 
      
50% 2700   Mean 3174.342 
    Std. Dev. 2149.485 
75% 4000 10000    
90% 5000 15000  Variance 4620285 
95% 7000 15000  Skewness 3.057384 
99% 10000 20000  Kurtosis 18.33142 
      
      
      
 
AKP 
Identifier 
    
      
      
 Percentiles Smallest    
1% 0 0    
5% 0 0    
10% 0 0  Obs 400 
25% 0 0  Sum of Wgt 400 
      
50% 0   Mean .25 
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    Std. Dev. .433555 
75% .5 1    
90% 1 1  Variance .1879699 
95% 1 1  Skewness 1.154701 
99% 1 1  Kurtosis 2.333333 
      
      
      
 
CHP 
Identifier 
    
      
      
 Percentiles Smallest    
1% 0 0    
5% 0 0    
10% 0 0  Obs 400 
25% 0 0  
Sum of 
Wgt 
400 
      
50% 0   Mean .25 
    Std. Dev. .433555 
75% .5 1    
90% 1 1  Variance .1879699 
95% 1 1  Skewness 1.154701 
99% 1 1  Kurtosis 2.333333 
      
      
      
 
MHP 
Identifier 
    
      
      
 Percentiles Smallest    
1% 0 0    
5% 0 0    
10% 0 0  Obs 400 
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25% 0 0  
Sum of 
Wgt 
400 
      
50% 0   Mean .25 
    Std. Dev. .433555 
75% .5 1    
90% 1 1  Variance .1879699 
95% 1 1  Skewness 1.154701 
99% 1 1  Kurtosis 2.333333 
      
      
      
 
HDP 
identifier 
    
      
      
 Percentiles Smallest    
1% 0 0    
5% 0 0    
10% 0 0  Obs 400 
25% 0 0  Sum of Wgt 400 
      
50% 0   Mean .25 
    Std. Dev. .433555 
75% .5 1    
90% 1 1  Variance .1879699 
95% 1 1  Skewness 1.154701 
99% 1 1  Kurtosis 2.333333 
      
      
 
 Since the sample is composed of 400 individuals who have voted for one of the 
political parties in the parliament in November 1st, 2015 elections, using all of them as 
separate independent variables lead to perfect multicollinearity and Stata drops one of 
them from the analyses. Perfect multicollinearity happens when one independent variable 
is an exact linear combination of other independent variables. For instance, if “one 
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independent variable can be expressed as an exact linear function of two or more of the 
independent variables”, then that variable is perfectly collinear (Wooldridge 2013:85)78.  
In order to demonstrate the effect of demographic variables, opposition party identifiers 
and AKP identifier together, three separate regressions were run. The first model includes 
only the demographic variables. In the second model, opposition party identifiers are 
included to see the effect of voting one of them instead of AKP on perceptions. In the 
third model, only AKP identifier is used to see the effect of voting for AKP instead of 
one of the opposition parties. For all of these models only standardized coefficients and 
standard errors (in parenthesis) are reported. P values, significance levels, and confidence 
intervals are left out because the sample is not representative of the population of Turkish 
voters and population mean cannot be estimated with this sample. Hence, standardized 
coefficients are reported to assess the magnitude of the effect of independent variables 
and to determine whether the relationship between independent variables and the 
dependent variable is positive or negative. The regression models are displayed below.  
 
Table 9 Three models using Factor 1 as dependent variable 
DV = Factor1 (Perceptions on the 
current state of citizenship rights and 
liberties 
(1) (2) (3) 
beta/se beta/se beta/se 
        
 
   
DV for male=1 0.05 0.07 0.06 
 
(0.08) (0.06) (0.07) 
Age in years -0.00 -0.02 -0.05 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education Level (1=no education, 5=uni 
graduate) 
-0.12 -0.00 -0.02 
 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Left-Right Self-Placement (1=Left 
10=Right) 
0.50 0.13 0.27 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
DV for Turkish=1 0.18 0.12 0.23 
                                                 
78 Wooldridge, J.M. (2013) Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach 5th Edition South-Western CENGAGE 
Learning 
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(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
Level of Religiosity (1=not religious 
4=very religious) 
0.25 0.14 0.21 
 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Household income in TL 0.09 0.06 0.05 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CHP identifier  -0.61  
 
 (0.13)  
HDP identifier  -0.81  
 
 (0.14)  
MHP identifier  -0.44  
 
 (0.10)  
AKP identifier   0.46 
 
  (0.10) 
Constant    
 
(0.26) (0.24) (0.21) 
 
   
N 257 247 257 
R squared 0.60 0.77 0.73 
Degrees of freedom 249 246 248 
        
 
  
These models demonstrate that voting for opposition parties instead of AKP is 
associated with critical perceptions when other variables are held constant. Whereas 
voting for AKP instead of other parties is associated with positive perceptions, when 
everything else is controlled for. In the base model, being older and having a high level 
of education are associated with critical perceptions and their signs remain the same in 
other models, which imply that the negative relationship between each of them with the 
dependent variable does not change by including party identifiers. Similarly, being 
Turkish, male, right-wing, religious and having high income are associated with uncritical 
perceptions and their signs remain the same in other models.  
Three separate models are also performed for Factor 2 as well following the same 
logic. The results are on below. 
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Table 10 Three Regression Models Using Factor 2 as Dependent Variable 
        
DV = Factor2 (Normative Perceptions 
on Social Rights) 
(4) (5) (6) 
 
beta/se beta/se beta/se 
    
        
DV for male=1 0.05 0.07 0.05 
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Age in years 0.04 -0.02 0.03 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education Level (1=no education, 5=uni 
graduate) 0.03 0.03 0.04 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Left-Right Self-Placement (1=Left 
10=Right) -0.18 -0.14 -0.21 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
DV for Turkish=1 0.08 0.02 0.09 
 
(0.12) (0.14) (0.12) 
Level of Religiosity (1=not religious 
4=very religious) 0.20 0.19 0.20 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Household income in TL -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CHP identifier 
 
0.13 
 
  
(0.21) 
 
HDP identifier 
 
-0.09 
 
  
(0.24) 
 
MHP identifier 
 
-0.08 
 
  
(0.17) 
 
AKP identifier 
  
0.04 
   
(0.16) 
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Constant 
   
 
(0.34) (0.41) (0.34) 
    
N 257 257 257 
R squared 0.02 0.04 0.02 
Degrees of freedom 249 246 248 
 
  
These models demonstrate that voting for AKP instead of other parties is related 
with agreement with normative statements on social rights. Moreover, voting for HDP 
and MHP is associated with disagreement or lesser agreement with these statements, 
while the standardized coefficient of CHP identifier is positive. This positive sign means 
that voting for CHP is related with agreement with the normative statements.  
 According to the base model with only demographic variables, being on the right 
side of the ideological spectrum and having higher income are related with disagreement 
or lesser agreement with normative items and their signs remain the same in other models. 
Whereas being male, older, educated, Turkish and religious indicate agreement with the 
same statements. Sign of age becomes negative in the second model, meaning that when 
other variables are held constant, being older is associated with disagreement with the 
normative perceptions in the model with opposition party identifiers.  
In the data analyses chapter the model with the opposition party identifiers will be 
reported and discussed. 
 
 
5.8 Limitations  
 
One major limitation of this study is related with its external validity. Since the 
sample is not representative of the voter population in Turkey, it is not possible to make 
inferences regarding the population characteristics. In other words, the findings of this 
survey cannot be generalized to the overall population. Instead the interpretations of the 
findings are made only for the subjects in the sample. By way of analyzing the perceptions 
of the respondents only, this study can produce hypotheses to be tested in representative 
samples in the futures. 
 207 
Another limitation of this study emerges out of its nature. Since the questions are 
about perceptions regarding the issues that have been politically salient, the respondents 
may not report their true perceptions if they consider expressing their opinions risky in 
the highly polarized political atmosphere in Turkey. To meet this challenge, the survey 
items are worded in a neutral way without referring to exact events or remarks by political 
leaders. Still, the contextual factors are not easy to control. The best solution would be 
applying the questionnaire in different times to control for the effects of political and 
social contexts.   
 
 
5.9 Ethical Considerations 
 
 In surveys, ethical issues are very important in order to ensure voluntary 
participation of the respondents. Not only the questionnaire has been revised with 
KONDA and the supervisor to eliminate discomforting items, it was submitted to the 
Ethics Board affiliated with Sabancı University to have clearance. The Ethics Board 
approved the final version of the questionnaire and permitted its application. In addition, 
a special notification was added at the top of the questionnaire. The notification informs 
the respondents about the aim of the survey, the principal investigator of the TUBİTAK 
project through which the survey is funded, and their rights of anonymity and withdrawal 
from the survey. The pollsters were required to read this notification to the respondents 
and to obtain their verbal confirmation.   
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 CHAPTER 6 
  
 ANALYSES OF THE SURVEY DATA ON PERCEPTIONS 
REGARDING CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 
 
 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
 
This chapter focuses primarily on the survey designed specifically for this research. 
It will start by revisiting the arguments of the literatures on Turkish citizenship and the 
political parties in Turkey. Then the profile of the effective sample, whose responses 
provide the main data source of this research, will be presented. The following section 
will compare the perceptions on civil liberties, political rights, and social rights of the 
respondents with the positions of their preferred political parties on these categories of 
rights and liberties. The chapter will continue with presenting and discussion both the 
factor analyses and regression analyses, followed by the analyses of specific survey items 
through cross-tabulations. The chapter will conclude with presenting the convergences 
and divergences of perceptions among the sample.  
 
9.2 Factors That Influence Citizenship Perceptions 
 
This research is situated within the literature on citizenship studies with a specific 
focus on Turkish citizenship while incorporating several arguments from the political 
party literature. Even though the target of research is the perceptions of citizens, political 
party literature is useful as these perceptions are analyzed on the basis of political party 
preferences. The underlying assumption here is that the differences in political party 
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preferences are based on differences in perspectives regarding social and political issues. 
As political parties represent, construct and mobilize these differences, some of which 
have historical backgrounds, understanding the mechanisms through which they differ is 
important. That’s why the political party literature focusing on emergence and 
differentiation of political parties was incorporated into this study. Just as the citizenship 
literature, relevant political party literature generates some expectations regarding the 
notion of citizenship and corresponding rights and liberties.  
In the following sections, each of these factors that influence the perceptions will 
be delineated separately. Firstly, the influence of the omnipresence of state will be 
discussed. Then, the influence of Turkish nationalism will be analyzed. Lastly, the 
findings of the political party chapter will be revisited.  
 
9.2.1 Implications of the Strong State on Perceptions 
 
The conceptual literature on Turkish citizenship suggests that the ideal of Turkish 
citizenship was built upon civic-republican premises, where duties towards the state are 
prioritized over rights and liberties (Üstel 2004, İnce 2010). More specifically, the 
literature demonstrates that the state and nation building processes and underlying 
outlook on state-society relations imply a specific understanding on Turkish citizenship. 
As the initiator and carrier of modernization process, state has predominance and priority 
over the individuals, who are subjects of this modernization process. This understanding 
suggests that the ideal citizen is someone whose status and corresponding rights and 
liberties are provided from above by the political authority; who has a passive stance 
towards her rights and liberties; and emphasizes duties as a result of the top-down 
transmission of rights and liberties as discussed by Turner (1992).  
Turner’s (1992) typology of citizenship makes a differentiation between active and 
passive citizenship in terms of how rights and liberties are associated with the status of 
citizenship. While active citizenship emerges in contexts where rights and liberties are 
acquired through revolutionary struggles on the grassroots level, passive citizenship is a 
result of the process in which rights and liberties are granted by the political authority. 
Lack of popular mobilization for rights and liberties of citizenship makes subjects of a 
polity who are passive in terms of defending these rights and liberties against violations 
and demands for liberalization or democratization.  
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This image of the ideal Turkish citizen has been promoted by relevant legislation 
as well as the school curricula throughout the Republican history where duties and 
prominence of state have been emphasized (Üstel 2004). As a result, the ideal Turkish 
citizen is projected as someone who is duty-oriented, passive and defines her citizenship 
status in terms of loyalty to the nation and the state, regardless of her political preferences. 
The previous studies on perceptions verify this ideal of citizenship understanding as they 
find out that their samples share the communitarian, loyal and obedient citizenship 
framework to varying degrees (Caymaz 2007, Kardam and Cengiz 2011). This emphasis 
on duties, loyalty and obedience suggest that this ideal citizen does not demand rights and 
liberties and does not react against the violations of these rights and liberties. In other 
words, the ideal citizen is not an individual, but a subject.  
 
9.2.2 Implications of Turkish Nationalism on Perceptions 
 
In addition to the impact of the predominance of state that prioritize duties over 
rights, there is another factor that influences the construct of Turkish citizenship. This 
factor is Turkish nationalism.  
The ideal of Turkish citizenship prioritizes Turkishness as the common identity of 
Turkish citizens. Although Turkishness is projected as a civic identity, in practice, the 
prioritization of Turkishness has resulted in the exclusion of certain identities from the 
definition of Turkish citizenship. The only way to be included in this definition was to be 
assimilated into the official understanding of Turkish citizenship and Turkishness. One 
state policy that was geared in this direction was the Law on Settlement of 1934.  
The Law on Settlement of 1934 was designed to relocate non-Turkish subjects to 
areas populated by ethnic Turks to ensure their assimilation. The Law arranged three 
different settlement zones: (1) areas where the density of culturally Turkish population to 
be intensified; (2) areas where groups that had to be assimilated into Turkish culture were 
to be settled; (3) areas that should be evacuated and prohibited for settlement for military, 
security, public health or economic or political reasons. Proposed by the Ministry of 
Interior, the Law provided authority to official to resettle groups who did not have 
adequate level of “Turkishness” to be settled in 2nd type of zones for assimilation 
purposes. The geographical and demographic reorganization that this Law contained a 
clear aim of assimilation of non-Turkish elements, such as the Kurds in the society into 
Turkish culture (Yeğen 2004: 57).  
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This exclusion is not solely based on ethnicity. The definition of Turkishness within 
the ideal of citizenship also has a clear emphasis on secularism, which is understood and 
practiced in a specific way. This specific idea of secularism, or laicité is based on state’s 
control over religion that particularly legitimizes state’s definition of religion. Since the 
Republican modernization project aimed at incorporating the secular elements of Western 
civilization albeit under state control, independent religious elements in education, 
legislation and everyday life that are not controlled by the state were deemed as 
reactionary. Yet, at the same time, modernization project also wanted the new Republic 
and its society to be protected from degenerative aspects of Western civilization, which 
created the need for a “strong cultural anchor.” (Mardin 1994:163) This anchor was Sunni 
Islam but its manifestations were strictly controlled by the central authority to ensure a 
unified practice of religion. The Directorate of Religious Affairs was established for that 
purpose in 1924 (Gözaydın 2008). Hence, secularism, or laicité in the minds of 
Republican modernizers includes connotations of Sunni Muslim identity, practice of 
which is confined within the private sphere.  
The population exchange treaty between Greece and Turkey in 1923 provides 
another instance of the intertwined relation between Turkishness and Sunni Muslim 
identity. The treaty between Greece and Turkey was signed and ratified as an addendum 
to the Lausanne Treaty in 1923. According to the Treaty, Orthodox Greeks in Turkish 
territories and Muslim Turkish individuals living in Greek territories would be exchanged 
between countries. The primary criterion for exchange was religious identity. This 
exchange was not based on voluntary participation of affected individuals; it was 
mandatory for them to migrate. The treaty granted these individuals citizenship of the 
country of arrival and automatically revoked their previous citizenship. It is estimated 
that 1.2 million Orthodox Greeks were forced to migrate to Greece and 500,000 Muslim 
Turks were forced to migrate to Turkey as a result of this Treaty.  
The population exchange agreement was based on religious identity, instead of 
ethnicity or language. This criterion was significant because the Treaty forced Turkish-
speaking non-Muslims to move out of the country, while admitted non-Turkish speaking 
Muslims in. For Yeğen (2004: 58) this Treaty demonstrates the logic of Turkish 
authorities at the time which considered Muslimhood “to be the key to achieving 
Turkishness”, while being non-Muslim emerged as “the natural obstacle to achieving 
Turkishness.” Taken together, these examples of legislation and practices demonstrate 
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that the official construct of Turkish citizenship considered Kurds as “Muslim others” to 
be assimilated, while excluding non-Muslims from this definition altogether. 
Given this construct, those who are excluded from the confines of the ideal of 
Turkish citizenship will have alternative understandings of citizenship. In other words, 
excluded groups such as Kurds, Alevis, non-Muslims, pious individuals who want to 
practice their religion outside of the private sphere have a more rights-oriented and active 
citizenship understanding with less reference to loyalty or obedience to the nation or state, 
as they have been excluded from the official narrative.  
 
9.3 Implications of the Citizenship Understandings of Political 
Parties on Perceptions 
 
 
9.3.1 Center vs. Periphery in terms of the Citizenship 
Understandings 
 
The ideal citizenship understanding was defined on the basis of the role and 
function of state in Turkish politics. The understanding of citizenship was associated with 
loyalty and obedience to the nation-state, which had its influence over the political sphere 
as well.  
Mardin’s (1973) highly influential conceptualization of center-periphery cleavage 
suggested this dichotomy to be one of the most entrenched cleavages in Turkish society. 
Heper, by focusing on the sources and implications of the notion of strong state in Turkey, 
provides an institutional reading of the center and periphery dichotomy suggested by 
Mardin (1973). According to Heper’s (1992) analysis, the strong image of the state and 
weakness of intermediary actors such as “entrepreneurial middle class” had caused the 
political sphere to be dominated by the bureaucratic elite constituting the center. Within 
that framework, the state emerged as an entity that defines the limits of politics. The 
interests and survival of state had priority over other matters. While these interests were 
represented by the bureaucratic center, the excluded or ignored demands were brought 
into the political sphere by the peripheral actors. In other words, the center vs. periphery 
cleavage in the political sphere had been influenced by the strong state tradition in Turkey 
(Heper 1992, Heper 2006).  
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In that sense, the official narrative of citizenship reflects values established and 
protected by the central bureaucratic elite. As discussed in previous chapters, these values 
upon which Turkish citizenship was established constitute the perspective of “center” 
when one reinterprets center-periphery cleavage explained by Mardin (1973) in terms of 
distinct understandings of citizenship. Political actors of the center and periphery are 
expected to have different understandings concerning the notion of citizenship and 
corresponding rights, liberties and duties.  
According to this interpretation of center-periphery cleavage based on diverging 
understandings of citizenship, the values of citizenship produced and disseminated by the 
bureaucracy and the political actors of the center are Turkish nationalism, priority of the 
state, Sunni Islam practiced within the confines of private sphere. The political actors in 
the periphery constituted of those who are excluded, on the other hand, challenged 
different aspects of this understanding of citizenship. While some peripheral actors 
challenged secularism that was understood as the strict control of state over religion and 
referred as laicité rather than secularism, others challenge the predominance of an ethnic 
understanding of Turkishness by demanding recognition.  
Given this complexity, it is meaningful to distinguish the political party positions 
regarding citizenship understandings based on the demands and interests that they 
mobilize. Firstly, it can be argued that parties representing the center have a secular view 
citizenship where religious identity is confined within the private sphere. In addition, they 
have a nationalist perspective where citizenship is associated with Turkishness, while 
loyalty to and obedience towards the indivisibility of the nation and state are essential 
qualities of this status.  
Peripheral political actors also challenged laicité by promoting religious identity 
and relevant rights and liberties in their understanding of citizenship. Here one needs to 
distinguish secularism and laicité or laicism. The former denotes separation of state 
affairs from religious affairs and these spheres have their own autonomy. Laicism refers 
to state’s control over religious affairs. In Turkish experience, the Republican 
modernization adopted laicism, which resulted in religion being “subservient to the state.” 
(Kadıoğlu 2010: 493) The control over religion promoted a unitary practice of Islam, 
while excluding other practices. In addition, Republican laicism considered religion to be 
a private matter and was against manifestations of religious identity in the public sphere. 
The challenge posed by AKP, at the beginning of its political life, was against this laicist 
perspective and state’s strict control over religion. Other peripheral political actors 
 214 
mobilized sentiments against the predominance of Turkishness in the definition of 
citizenship that led to the exclusion of other identities. Ethnic political mobilization that 
has been carried out by pro-Kurdish political parties pose a challenge along these lines.  
It is important to delineate the challenge posed by pro-Kurdish parties further 
because of the nature of the conflict between Turkish and Kurdish identities. The history 
of armed conflict between PKK79 and the Turkish army has caused the Kurdish issue to 
have a distinct character differentiating it from other peripheral identities. Kurdish 
citizens of Turkey have their own set of demands on the basis of cultural and political 
recognition posing an essential challenge to the foundations of Turkish citizenship. These 
demands do not only challenge the dominance of Turkish ethnic identity, but also the 
predominance of state as the provider of rights and liberties as they are organized and 
mobilized at the grassroots level. This mobilization proposes a more active, rights-
oriented understanding of citizenship as opposed to the ideal of Turkish citizenship that 
promotes passive, obedient, and duty-oriented understanding.  
Hence it can be argued that, the representatives of Kurdish demands have a 
citizenship understanding that is rights-oriented, active in terms of the demands regarding 
rights and liberties, and sensitive to their violation. In addition, these actors have a critical 
stance towards the omnipresence of state. This critical stance is exemplified in a study on 
opinion poll where those who prefer pro-Kurdish parties and speak Kurdish are more 
likely to support rights of difference and dissent (Candaş and Yılmaz 2014:337). 
Meanwhile, representatives of the Turkish nationalist sentiments prioritize Turkishness, 
loyalty to the nation and state, and a passive status burdened with duties towards the 
nation and state in their depiction of citizenship instead of a rights-oriented one. In other 
words, they internalize and reproduce the foundational pillars of Turkish citizenship 
represented by the political actors of the center.  
According to the arguments above, there emerges several expectations: Those who 
prefer parties representing the foundational pillars of Turkish citizenship prioritize 
Turkish ethnic identity, loyalty and obedience to the nation and state, and duties over 
rights. They have a passive understanding of citizenship, which lessens the chance of 
reacting against violations of rights and liberties. Whereas, those who identify with 
parties representing the peripheral identities that have been excluded from the official 
                                                 
79 Kur: “Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê”, Eng: “Kurdistan Workers’ Party”, an armed organization founded in 1974 by 
Abdullah Öcalan with the aim of establishing independent Kurdistan. The organization has been active in Turkey, 
Iraq, Syria and Iran.  
 215 
narrative of Turkish citizenship have a more rights-oriented, active understanding of 
citizenship challenging the omnipresence of the state. They are more sensitive to and 
aware of violations of rights and liberties.  
 
9.3.2 Changing Political Party Positions Along the Center-
Periphery Cleavage  
 
The political party chapter discussed not only the foundations of Turkish political 
landscape but also the impact of external and internal challenges on political party 
positions. Given that political parties are rational actors that seek to maximize their vote 
shares, they can form alliances with different groups in the society or adjust their political 
positions to consolidate their electorate. This framework is crucial to understand the 
volatility in the positions of political parties in today’s Turkey. Even though they 
represent and mobilize the historical cleavage structures, political parties also engage 
with strategic position taking. 
As discussed in the manifesto analysis section, AKP’s position concerning 
citizenship was not overtly nationalistic because of the party’s strategic decision to attract 
pious Kurds’ votes, while promoting a religious conservative outlook. Yet, the party 
elites, including its leader Erdoğan, has incorporated nationalistic discourses to attract 
conservative and nationalist voters occasionally. In that sense, AKP’s policies have 
demonstrated volatility as well. While, on the one hand, party’s official documents 
suggest a less nationalistic understanding of citizenship, the party elites, on the other 
hand, utilize a nationalistic discourse when they need it (Satana 2012). 
Although AKP claims to represent the periphery, its electoral hegemony and 
dominant party status have prompted many to argue that AKP has been positioning itself 
at the center by cultivating its own elites and own value structures (Öniş 2015: 33). In 
fact, electoral hegemony is utilized to establish and disseminate the party’s own 
understanding of national will and democracy in a majoritarian and populist manner 
(Çınar and Sayın 2014: 378-379). In other words, the claim to represent the religious 
conservative periphery has been used to establish a discursive hegemony that depicted 
the political sphere in terms of a clash of values between us and them. This hegemony 
has allowed AKP elites to prioritize some forms of demands and interests while 
marginalizing others in the name of the national will defined by the elites as the religious 
conservative masses. In other words, the dichotomy between Islamists and seculars is 
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instrumentalized for delegitimizing “alternative battles for recognition and rights.” 
(Kandiyoti 2012: 527-528) More specifically, the electoral hegemony provides a platform 
for AKP to constantly emphasize its efficiency in representing certain values and norms, 
while delegitimizing the oppositional actors (Gümüşçü 2013: 233-234). When these 
arguments are considered, it can be expected from AKP voters to consider AKP as the 
occupant of the center, defined in terms of the mechanism through which certain values 
are reproduced and disseminated to the society.  
In addition, it is expected from the voters of AKP to support policies of the 
government while those who support opposition to “feel increasingly disgruntled, 
unfairly treated and marginalized.” (Öniş 2015: 27) In other words, supporting the 
incumbent that occupies the center and has enough power to establish and disseminate 
own values concerning citizenship can influence AKP voters to be more supportive of 
parties’ policies and be more protective of the status quo. Hence, their stance towards 
citizenship rights and liberties reflects the hegemony created by their preferred party. 
In response, it is expected from the delegitimized or excluded political parties and 
their supporters to situate themselves in direct opposition to AKP and its policies, which 
prompt divergence in perceptions concerning the state of citizenship rights and liberties. 
For instance, CHP supporters become the new periphery to AKP’s center and its values 
because of their identification with the old center, which was dismantled. The exclusion 
they feel or experience leads to more awareness of rights, liberties and their violations, as 
now they need to struggle for inclusion. In addition, CHP’s most recent electoral 
manifestos carry emphasis on social rights, which is a strategic attempt at reaching out to 
the socio-economically disadvantaged and excluded groups in the society. If that appeal 
is successful, then demands of members of such excluded groups may contribute to the 
rights awareness and potential for demands for the protection of citizenship rights and 
liberties. 
Moreover, Kurdish supporters of HDP are the historical others of the official 
understanding of Turkish citizenship, which situated them in the periphery as the 
historically excluded group. This historical exclusion and disregard for their rights and 
liberties created a sense of awareness concerning these rights and liberties and their 
violations. In addition, HDP’s strategic appeal towards other disadvantaged groups in its 
most recent electoral manifestos for June and November 2015 elections also suggests that 
party’s electorate may include members of such groups who have a certain level of 
awareness concerning citizenship rights and liberties, as well as their violations.  
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The changing political landscape suggests that MHP supporters are at an ambiguous 
position80. On the one hand, the citizenship understanding that MHP promotes is in line 
with the foundations of Turkish citizenship with its emphasis on Turkishness, loyalty, 
obedience and duties. Nevertheless, MHP supporters can also feel excluded as the center 
that they identify with is now occupied by AKP. This may arouse feelings of exclusion 
among its supporters. MHP voters may have an awareness of rights, liberties and their 
violations if they consider themselves as excluded by the electoral hegemony of AKP, or 
they may consider AKP to strategically getting closer to MHP’s position in terms of 
citizenship and perceive the state of their rights and liberties accordingly. Hence, MHP 
voters may display divergent perceptions concerning the state of citizenship rights and 
liberties in the recent social and political environment in Turkey. 
Overall, the literature on Turkish citizenship suggests that the official 
understanding of the notion has excluded certain identities and denied their rights and 
liberties. The literature on political landscape in Turkey suggests that center-periphery 
cleavage is a long-lasting dichotomy that informs the differences among political parties. 
As this study is about citizenship perceptions, I offer a reinterpretation of center-periphery 
cleavage in terms of citizenship understandings. This reinterpretation suggests that center 
is the locus of power through which a specific understanding of demos and citizenship is 
produced, projected and maintained. This specific understanding of citizenship excludes 
some identities and demands, while those who are excluded have demands for inclusion 
and recognition of rights and liberties. Such demands are actually alternative 
understandings of citizenship challenging the perspective of the center.  
Currently the periphery includes all the historically or newly excluded groups with 
their various demands, interests and identities. The composition of the periphery has 
changed due to the electoral hegemony of AKP, which has situated CHP and its 
supporters within the periphery as newly excluded segments of the society in addition to 
the historically excluded groups represented by HDP while settling itself into the center. 
                                                 
80 In fact, this ambiguity was detected at the elite level by Aydın-Düzgit and Balta (2017). In their research on 
polarization after the July 15th coup attempt, they find out that CHP and HDP elite agree upon the polarized political 
environment between the ruling party and oppositional parties, whereas AKP and MHP elites disagree. The reaction 
of MHP elites is surprising because MHP’s electoral manifestos include criticisms towards AKP and display 
significant effort in distinguishing itself from AKP, while elite reactions after the July 15th coup attempt suggest a 
close relation between party positions. One reason for this newly-emerged proximity is the predominance of order for 
MHP which may have influenced the party elite to emphasize unity of the state in the face of the coup attempt and 
forego its criticisms in the most recent electoral manifestos. See Aydın-Düzgit, S. And E. Balta (2017) “Turkey after 
the July 15th Coup Attempt: When Elites Polarize over Polarization” IPC-Istanbul Policy Center Retrieved from: 
http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Turkey-after-the-July-15-Coup-Attempt_Senem-Aydin-
Duzgit_Evren-Balta.pdf  
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The significance of the periphery in terms of citizenship is its potential of demanding 
democratization and protection of rights and liberties. Acknowledging this significance, 
I argue that it is those who are excluded have the potential to demand recognition, 
liberalization, and protection of their rights and liberties and they are more alert to the 
violations of their rights and liberties.  
The findings about perceptions survey will be discussed in the following section 
where the responses will be evaluated on the basis of the arguments presented in this 
section. 
 
9.4 Analysis of the Perceptions Survey Data 
 
The sections in this part will start by demonstrating the profile of the sample in 
terms of the distribution of demographic characteristics and comparing the sample 
characteristics with other nationally representative samples.  
The following section will compare the perceptions on civil liberties, political 
rights, and social rights with the arguments in the most recent electoral manifestos of the 
political parties of interest.  
The last section will start by reporting the results of factor analyses and simple 
regressions investigating the effects of political party identifiers and several demographic 
variables. This section will be followed by the detailed analyses of survey items in each 
rights and liberties category to provide closer look at the survey items and investigate the 
differences or similarities of respondents’ perceptions on the basis of their political party 
preferences.  
 
9.4.1 Profile of the Sample 
 
Before dwelling on the perceptions, it is better to provide a general picture of the 
sample. The sample is not representative of the whole population, thus, descriptive data 
of the IPC Citizenship Survey conducted in 2016 will be utilized as a reference point to 
demonstrate the extent that this sample deviates from the general population81.  
                                                 
81 Istanbul Policy Center (IPC) conducted a survey on citizenship perceptions in March 2016. The survey was applied 
on a stratified, quota sample composed of 2587 individuals. 
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The distribution of men and women are different across the four political parties. 
For AKP and CHP, more than 50% of the respondents are women, but for MHP and HDP 
the ratio of women to men is less than 50%.  
Graph 16 Distribution of Women and Men in the sample of the Perceptions Survey 
 
 
IPC study sample, which is consisted of 2587 participants, displays similar 
percentages when it comes to the gender dimension. 
 
Graph 17 Distribution of Women and Men in the sample of IPC 2016 survey 
 
 
Another demographic criterion is the level of education of the respondents. More 
than half of the AKP voters don’t have high school diploma and this is the case for 39% 
of the HPD voters as well. Yet, for HPD voters, university graduates make up 35% of the 
sample, whereas for AKP voters this ratio is only 9%. For CHP voters, the distribution of 
education levels is more balanced than the other parties. MHP voters on the other hand, 
are mostly high school or university graduates. 
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Graph 18 Distribution of Levels of Education in the sample of Perceptions Survey 
 
 
The sample used for this research seems to oversample those with university degree 
or above for CHP, MHP and HDP voters, while under sampling the amount of those with 
less than high school education among MHP, CHP and HDP voters when it is compared 
to the IPC study’s representative random sample. The overall distribution is still similar 
to the IPC survey sample 
 
Graph 19 Distribution of Levels of Education in the sample of IPC 2016 survey 
 
 
Age is also an important demographic characteristic. Average age of the AKP 
voters is 41,5, for CHP voters it is 44,3, for MHP voters it is 29,2 and for HDP voters it 
is 37,3.  
The IPC survey displays different averages for these parties. AKP voters in IPC 
sample are 42 years old on average, while CHP voters are 42, MHP voters are 36 and 
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HDP voters are 34 years old on average. It seems this sample’s age averages are similar 
to the IPC survey sample, apart from MHP voters, whose average is smaller in my sample.  
Ethnic identity and religious convictions are also included among the demographic 
variables. Significant majorities among AKP, MHP and CHP groups define their ethnicity 
as Turkish, while the majority of HDP voters in the sample are Kurdish. The distribution 
of ethnic identity in the sample of IPC survey demonstrates a similar outcome. 
 
Graph 20 Distribution of ethnic background in the sample of Perceptions survey 
 
 
 
Graph 21 Distribution of ethnic background in the sample of IPC Citizenship Study 
  
 The distribution of respondents’ declared religious convictions display that 
majority of AKP, MHP, and CHP groups are Sunni Muslim. Those who declare their 
religious conviction as Alevi constitute 18% of CHP group while there are less Alevis in 
other groups. Interestingly, 42% of HDP group prefer the option “Other”, which does not 
indicate a specific religious identity. It is possible that these individuals do not want to 
prefer one of the religious convictions offered in the responses.  
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 Overall the distribution of responses is similar to those of IPC survey sample but 
the amount of those who prefer “Other” among HDP voters is a lot higher than in the IPC 
sample.  
Graph 22 Distribution of religious conviction in the sample of Perceptions survey 
 
 
 
Graph 23 Distribution of religious conviction in the sample of IPC Citizenship Study 
 
 Lastly, level of religiosity is asked to the respondents. Majority of AKP and MHP 
groups self-define their level of religiosity as being religious and practicing to a large 
extent. Those who define themselves very religious constitute 21% of AKP group. In 
CHP group, those who believe but not practice and those who are religious and practicing 
are similar in numbers. The majority in HDP group declare that they do not have religious 
beliefs, while approximately 30% believe but do not practice.   
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Graph 24 Level of religiosity of the sample of Perceptions survey 
 
 
 The distribution of responses within the IPC survey sample is similar for AKP, 
MHP, and CHP groups but non-believers in HDP group are oversampled in my sample. 
In IPC study’s sample, majority of HDP voters declare that they believe in religion, while 
only 15% of them define themselves as non-believer. 
 
Graph 25 Level of religiosity of the sample of IPC Citizenship Study 
 
 
The survey also included the question of self-positioning on the ideological 
spectrum. The response scale is between 1 to 10 where 1 indicates the most left position 
and 10 indicates the most right. The answers demonstrate that AKP voters position 
themselves on a place that is far right than MHP voters and HDP voters position 
themselves to the left more than CHP voters. ISSP’s representative, random sample 
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displays that AKP voters in my sample reflect the overall population, while HDP and 
CHP voters are in my sample are more left leaning.  
Graph 26 Respondents’ Self-Position on the Political Spectrum. Source: Perceptions 
Survey (2016) 
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Graph 27 Respondents’ Self-Position on the Political Spectrum. Source ISSP Citizenship 
II (2014) 
 
 
 
9.5 Perceptions and Political Party Manifestos 
 
The previous chapter on political party positions devote a specific section on the 
analysis of the most recent electoral manifestos of the four political parties in the 
parliament. Manifestos are chosen for their function in signaling party positions regarding 
various issues. Although it is possible for parties to deviate from the position they 
promoted in electoral manifestos, these documents inform the public about the specific 
policy positions of political parties given that they find visibility in the mass media 
(Wessels 1995).  
The analysis on electoral manifestos is limited to those published by political parties 
for June and November 2015 elections. The reason for this time-limit is two-fold. Firstly, 
the survey was administered after the November 2015 elections and it is assumed that 
these voters were exposed to the most recent electoral manifestos then. Secondly, 2015 
June elections were the first time that HDP managed to obtain seats in the parliament as 
a political party, instead of establishing a parliamentary group through independent MPs. 
June 2015 elections is significant because of this development. Hence, electoral 
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manifestos of the four parties in the parliament for June 2015 elections are also included 
in the analysis. 
Moreover, the analysis on electoral manifestos focus specifically on discourses 
regarding the citizenship rights and liberties used in the survey. Since the main aim of 
this research is to shed light on perceptions on citizenship rights and liberties based on 
political party preferences, the differences or similarities in the views of citizenship rights 
of these political parties are also important. When the signaling function of electoral 
manifestos is concerned, the way in which civil, political, and social rights of citizens are 
framed and discussed in those documents provides information on the specific positions 
of these parties.  
For comparative datasets on party positions, differences among electoral manifestos 
provide information about the position of parties along the ideological spectrum. The 
same argument may also be correct for political parties in Turkey. Yet, instead of using 
electoral manifestos for determining the ideological positions of parties, the analysis 
presented in the previous chapter focuses specifically on citizenship rights and liberties, 
as well as the definition of citizenship.  
The next subsections will compare the arguments in the manifestos concerning 
definition of citizenship, civil liberties, political rights, and social rights with the 
perceptions of the voters of these parties.  
 
9.5.1 Definition of Citizenship in Manifestos and Perceptions 
 
In terms of the definition of citizenship, AKP’s electoral manifestos for June and 
November 2015 elections demonstrate an ambiguous position. On the one hand the party 
refers to international norms about fundamental human rights, on the other hand national 
values and national unity are considered as building blocks of Turkish citizenship. MHP’s 
manifestos represent a more coherent picture in terms of the definition of citizenship. 
Group identities are framed as threats against national unity and Turkish-Islamic values 
are prioritized as the foundational pillars of Turkish society. CHP and HDP’s manifestos 
have clear emphases on rights, liberties and equality in their definition of citizenship. 
While CHP manifestos underline social rights and socio-economic equalities, HDP’s 
manifestos include sections concerning cultural rights of minorities in Turkey.  
The survey data analyzed here does not include statements on the definition of 
citizenship. But, another relevant public opinion study conducted by IPC contains items 
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on this matter. Hence, the findings of this research will be used as a proxy for definition 
of citizenship. 
The IPC study includes various items on the perceptions concerning the normative 
definition of citizenship. One of them asks respondents what do they recall when asked 
about citizenship82. The distribution of the responses demonstrates that associating the 
notion of citizenship with rights defined in laws is more prevalent among CHP and HDP 
voters, while there are more individuals that consider citizenship as a set duties or 
membership to the state within MHP and AKP groups. These findings are in line with the 
tone of the party manifestos in terms of the definition of citizenship. 
Yet, the fact that the majority in each group associate “rights defined by laws” with 
the notion of citizenship more than the other options implies that the duty-oriented 
understanding of citizenship has begun to change.  
 
Graph 28 Notions Associated by Citizenship. (IPC Citizenship Survey 2016) 
 
 
 The second item measuring the understandings on citizenship asks the common 
ground for Turkish citizenship.83 While majority of opposition party voters refers to 
common traditions and culture as the bonding factor for Turkish citizenship, more than 
half of AKP voters prefer common religion. In addition, there are more individuals in 
                                                 
82 Question 8: “Vatandaşlık ifadesi size aşağıdakilerden hangisini çağrıştırıyor? Devlete üyelik; yasalarda ifade edilen 
haklara; yasalarda ifade edilen vazifeler”  
83 Question 9: “Türkiye’de insanları ortak bir Vatandaşlık bağı ile birbirine aşağıdakilerden hangisi bağlıyor? Din 
birliği; Ortak gelenekler ve kültür; Herkesi bağlayan Yasalar; Dil Birliği” 
35.6%
27.3%
17.7%
17.4%
39.9%
47.7%
63.3%
65.2%
20.9%
21.8%
16.8%
11.8%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
AKP
MHP
CHP
HDP
What Does Citizenship Bring To Your Mind? 
Membership to the state Rights defined by laws Duties defined by laws N/A
 228 
CHP and HDP groups compared to the other groups that consider laws binding all as the 
common ground of Turkish citizenship. Yet, at the same time, almost half of CHP voters 
consider common traditions and culture as the bond between citizens in Turkey, which is 
a higher percentage than those who prefer this response within MHP group. It is not clear 
whether these voters have similar understandings of traditions or culture; but this 
similarity calls for further research. Yet, the relatively high amount of those who consider 
religion to be the common ground of Turkish citizenship among AKP and MHP voters is 
demonstrative of the competing citizenship understandings that is also visible in the 
manifestos to some extent. 
Graph 29  Common Ground of Turkish Citizenship (IPC Citizenship Survey 2016) 
 
 
Within the survey there are four other normative statements on Turkish citizenship. 
These statements depict Turkish citizen as someone who is ethnically Turkish, Muslim 
and knows and speaks Turkish. The table below displays the percentages in each party 
group who agree and strongly agree with these statements.  
For each category, the highest level of agreement exists within MHP voters. They 
agree more with the definition Turkish citizen as someone who ethnically Turk, Muslim, 
knows and speaks Turkish. AKP voters come second in agreement with these statements, 
while except from the item on speaking Turkish, CHP voters’ level of agreement is closer 
to those of HDP voters.  
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Graph 30 Definitions of Citizenship. (IPC Citizenship Survey 2016) 
 
 
According to the findings of IPC data, MHP voters’ understanding of citizenship 
displays a similar perspective to their party’s electoral manifestos. Akin to MHP’s 
emphases on traditions, Turkishness, religious values, and its criticism towards cultural 
rights, MHP voters in the IPC study’s sample prioritize traditions and culture, as well as 
Turkish-Muslim identity in their definition of citizenship. 
AKP voters also seem to give importance to Turkish-Muslim identity to lesser 
extent and they associate citizenship more with membership to the state compared to 
others. The most recent electoral manifestos of the party suggest a definition of 
citizenship that is devoid of references to ethnicity or religious identity, while referring 
to national values as the source of the societal unity. Hence, on the one hand, voters’ clear 
preference for Turkishness and Muslim identity does not directly mirror the position 
stated in party’s electoral manifestos. On the other hand, ongoing references of national 
unity and prioritization of religious liberties may resonate in the perceptions of voters as 
they associate Turkish citizenship with having a common religion and common traditions 
and culture, as well as being Turkish and Muslim. 
CHP and HDP voters prioritize rights more than duties and membership to the state 
compared to the rest of the group, while there are more individuals who consider laws 
applied to all as the bond between Turkish citizens among the voters of these two parties. 
This emphases on rights and laws are parallel to their most recent electoral manifestos as 
both of these parties firmly assert the importance of rights.  
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
Those who do not know
Turkish should not be
Turkish citizens
It is necessary to speak
Turkish for being a
Turkish citizen
It is necesary to be a
Muslim for being a
Turkish citizen
It is necessary to be
ethnically Turk for being
a Turkish citizen
Definition of Citizenship (% of Agree and Strongly Agree Source: IPC 
Citizenship Study 2016)
MHP AKP CHP HDP
 230 
When the definition of Turkish citizenship is concerned, differences emerge 
between CHP and HDP groups. In each of the normative proposition on Turkish 
citizenship, CHP voters display greater agreement than HDP voters. Given that there is 
not much emphasis on minority rights in CHP’s most recent electoral manifestos, it is 
possible to argue for a correspondence between the perceptions of voters and party 
manifestos. Similarly, HDP voters’ low levels of agreement in the items on the normative 
definition of Turkish citizenship and their high level of associating Turkish citizenship 
with rights defined by laws are reflective of the tone of the party’s most recent electoral 
manifestos. 
 
9.5.2 Civil Liberties and Political Rights in Manifestos and 
Perceptions 
 
 
 AKP Manifestos and Perceptions of AKP Voters in the Sample 
 
 
One of the major differences between the most recent electoral manifestos of AKP 
and other parties in terms of civil liberties and political rights is the emphasis of the former 
on policies of past AKP governments. Majority of the mentions on civil liberties and 
political rights are framed within a narrative of accomplishments of the past AKP 
governments. Various policies and legal changes are presented as reforms which have 
improved the conditions of civil liberties and political rights in Turkey. In other words, 
the state of civil liberties and political rights are considered as problematic in the past and 
the legal reforms and new policies are introduced in the electoral manifestos as causes of 
improvements. Reforms concerning freedom of expression, freedom of the press, 
freedom of belief, assembly and demonstration are among the rights and liberties that the 
most recent electoral manifestos of AKP mentions as past governments’ achievements. 
These manifestos depict a situation where civil liberties and political rights are 
enjoyed without problems. When the perceptions of AKP supporters on the civil liberties 
and political rights that are mentioned in the manifestos are concerned, there emerges a 
similarity. Since the survey items are judgments that imply lack of violations, agreement 
with them indicate affirmative perceptions. In other words, those who agree with the 
survey items do not perceive the violations of these rights and liberties. 
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Below there is a graph of the responses given by AKP voters to the survey items on 
civil liberties and political rights. It demonstrates the percentages of those who agree and 
strongly agree with the relevant statements84.  
 
Graph 31 Percent of agreement and strong agreement in selected civil liberties and 
political rights items within AKP voters in the sample 
 
 
 In all of these items, at least more than half AKP voters in the sample have positive 
perceptions. For instance, almost all of the group think that different religious practices 
can be carried out without any issues and there does not happen ethnic or religious 
                                                 
84 The wording of “processes of detention and arrest are not violating citizenship rights” is different from the wording 
of survey because the question was reverse coded and the percentage shows those who disagree with the original 
survey item. The wording is changed here to make the table coherent. The same logic also applies to “don’t think my 
phone is tapped” question; its wording is different than the . In addition, only the survey items that are related to the 
discourses found in the manifestos are included in these tables. 
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discriminations. In addition, AKP voters in the sample do not think there are major 
problems related with freedom of expression and freedom to protest.  
 For independence of the judiciary, phone tapping, ease of holding demonstrations 
and lives and freedom of expression of protesters, and detention and arrest policies, less 
than half of the voters within AKP group have positive perceptions. Yet, compared to the 
other groups, there are more within AKP voters that consider current state of these rights 
and liberties to be acceptable.  
Although it is unclear whether they think AKP governments improved the 
conditions of civil liberties and political rights, AKP voters in the sample have similar 
perceptions to the image of Turkey depicted in the party’s most recent electoral 
manifestos.  
Within the scheme of civil liberties, women’s rights receive comparatively less 
amount of mentions in AKP’s electoral manifestos. The only specific instance where the 
conditions of women’s rights are referred to is the issue of right to education of women 
wearing headscarf. The electoral manifestos frame the issue as another problem area 
where legal and institutional reforms have resulted in improvements. The manifesto 
drafters refer to the headscarf ban that prohibited female students with headscarf to enter 
into the universities and was effectively applied in public universities during the late 
1990s, as a limitation of right to education of female students.85 In 2007, a change in the 
presidency of the Council of Higher Education (YÖK) had resulted in lifting of the ban 
in practice. The overall ban on headscarf in public institutions was also lifted in 2013. 
Referring to those past policies, AKP’s most recent electoral manifestos promote past 
governments’ accomplishments on this front. 
The other instance where women’s rights are mentioned is the framework of social 
rights. Yet, social rights are framed with an emphasis on family and reference to women’s 
rights within that sphere suggests that these rights are confined within the context of 
family. In other words, different than CHP’s and HDP’s most recent electoral manifestos, 
women’s individual rights do not receive specific attention within the AKP manifestos. 
This absence implies that women’s individual rights are not salient for the party’s current 
position projected by its electoral manifestos.  
On the other hand, more than half of AKP voters in the sample think that women’s 
individual rights are protected by state’s policies and women’s voting decisions are 
                                                 
85 The ban was introduced after the 1980 coup and was applied in all public institutions.  
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independent of any external pressure86. The positive perceptions concerning state policies 
protecting women’s rights suggest that for more than half of the AKP voters, there are no 
problems related with the enjoyment of such rights. If this is the case, absence of women’s 
individual rights in AKP’s manifestos does not indicate a discrepancy between 
perceptions and party’s position stated in the manifestos. Or it is also possible that the 
voters in the sample have similar understandings of women’s rights as presented in the 
manifestos and they affirm government’s performance on this front. These results require 
further analyses.   
 
Graph 32 Percent of agreement and strong agreement in items on women's rights within 
AKP voters in the sample 
 
 
 
 The low level of agreement concerning the court decisions on cases of violence 
against women is a rare case where AKP voters in the sample do not evaluate government 
performance positively. While 26% of AKP voters in the sample consider court decisions 
as satisfactory, the disagreement among women within AKP group (61%) reflects the 
findings of a recent study which demonstrates that only a minority of women think courts 
are successful in preventing violence against women in a nationally representative sample 
(Altınay  and  Arat 2009). 
                                                 
86 50% of female AKP voters and 60% of male AKP voters think that state policies protect individual rights of 
Women, while the level of agreement is 53% for women and 53% for men in the item on women’s autonomy of 
voting. 
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According to this study, most women consider state’s performance in preventing 
violence against women unsatisfactory. Among the state institutions responsible for 
preventing violence against women, courts are perceived as carrying out their 
responsibility by 28% of the women in the sample. In addition, 92,2% of survey 
respondents think courts should penalize men who beat their wives, while 44,7% of them 
think giving heavy sentences to offenders can prevent men’s violence against their 
spouses (Altınay and Arat 2009: 59-62). These findings suggest that prevention of 
violence against women is considered to be state’s responsibility but not found as 
successful by women. 
Similar to the general public, then, female AKP voters are dissatisfied with courts’ 
decisions. The fact that this issue finds room in AKP’s electoral manifestos signifies a 
similarity between the perceptions and issues underlined in the manifestos.  
 
 CHP Manifestos and the Perceptions of CHP Voters  
 
 In terms of civil liberties and political rights, CHP manifestos are more extensive 
than AKP and MHP manifestos. There are significant and recurring emphases on freedom 
of expression, freedom of thought and right to protest throughout the manifestos 
published for 2015 June and November elections. In addition, government’s performance 
concerning civil liberties and political rights is heavily criticized and there are numerous 
policy proposals for protecting these rights and liberties and extending their scope. For 
instance, in CHP manifestos, women’s rights are covered in a separate section and in a 
detailed manner. 
 The graph below displays the percentages of those who disagree and strongly 
disagree with the statements relevant to the issues mentioned in the most recent electoral 
manifestos of CHP. An overwhelming majority of CHP voters in the sample consider 
rights to protest, freedom of expression, judiciary’s independence and monitoring of the 
government to be problematic, which is in line with the arguments in the party’s 
manifestos. For issues related with pluralism in political representation and religious 
practice and discrimination on ethnic and religious grounds, level of disagreement is 
lower but still indicate a critical stance. These issues are also touched upon in the 
manifestos but do not occupy as much space as the other civil liberties and political rights.  
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Graph 33 Percent of disagreement and strong disagreement in selected civil liberties and 
political rights items within CHP voters in the sample 
 
  
Compared to AKP’s manifestos, CHP’s manifestos put more emphasis on women’s 
rights while violence against women is addressed as an imminent issue. Perceptions of 
the CHP supporters in the sample reflect this stance as significant majority of the group 
do not think women’s rights are protected by state policies and women are independent 
from external pressure while voting. More specifically, 82% of women and 78% of men 
within CHP group are dissatisfied with state’s policies concerning women’s rights, while 
69% of women and 73% of men within the same group do not think women make 
autonomous voting decisions. In addition, 90% of CHP voters are dissatisfied with court 
decisions on cases about violence against women, which is significantly higher than the 
AKP voters who disagree and strongly disagree (55,1%). In other words, although more 
than half of the AKP voters do not think court decisions are satisfactory, those with 
similar perceptions constitute a larger segment within the CHP group. In fact, more 
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women within the group consider court decisions to be unsatisfactory (92 %) than men 
(86%). Given that the electoral manifestos of CHP openly criticize violence against 
women and promises institutional reforms, there is a convergence between perceptions 
and party positions stated in the manifestos concerning this issue.  
 
Graph 34 Percent of agreement and strong agreement in items on women's rights within 
CHP voters in the sample 
 
 
 MHP Manifestos and the Perceptions of MHP Voters  
 
 
 MHP manifestos’ coverage of civil liberties and political rights is not as extensive 
as CHP and HDP’s manifestos. Although manifestos of MHP include criticisms 
concerning the current status of these rights and liberties, relevant arguments are stated 
within the context of national order, national unity, and common morality, except for 
religious liberties. In other words, MHP’s framing of civil liberties and political rights 
depicts a regime of rights and liberties that is bounded by concerns of security, order and 
morality. This limitation makes MHP’s criticisms on this front to be limited and to a 
certain extent ambiguous. 
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Graph 35 Percents of agreement and disagreement in selected civil liberties and political 
rights items within MHP voters in the sample 
 
 
 When the responses on the items relevant to the issues discussed in the electoral 
manifestos, it emerges as the level of disagreement among MHP voters is lower than 
those of CHP voters. In fact, for issues concerning fair representation and freedom of 
different religious practices, percent of those who agree is clearly higher than those whose 
disagree. These perceptions are in line with the tone of MHP’s electoral manifestos as the 
party’s stance towards citizenship, as it is against recognition and representation on 
cultural differences.  
 The party’s observance of concerns on national security, order and morality as the 
legitimate limits of civil liberties and political rights makes MHP’s criticisms towards the 
state of these rights and liberties ambiguous. This ambiguity is reflected in the perceptions 
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concerning issues on process of detention and arrest. The amount of agreement and 
disagreement are almost the same. Also, the exemption of religious liberties from the 
limited understanding of civil liberties is reflected on the perceptions on religious 
influence in schools. Since religious liberties are not framed in the same way as other 
civil liberties, which are subjected to limits posed by national security, order and morality, 
they are prioritized over others within the manifesto. This prioritization is reflected in the 
perceptions as more individuals within the MHP group consider that there is no religious 
influence in the schools than those who disagree with the statement. These individuals 
probably consider religious influence in schools to be acceptable. In addition, the lower 
level of disagreement on items about protests and freedom of expression compared to 
CHP and HDP groups also signifies this ambiguity.  
 The way in which women’s rights are framed within the electoral manifestos of 
MHP is more traditional compared to CHP and HDP’s manifestos. The heavy emphasis 
on family, common morality, traditions and national unity differentiates MHP’s position 
on gender equality from other oppositional parties. Not only women’s rights do not 
receive specific attention, violence against women is stated to be an issue threatening 
unity of the family and categorized together with violence against the minors, the disabled 
and the elderly. 
 More than half of MHP voters consider state policies to fail at protecting women’s 
rights, while approximately 27% of them find such policies adequate. It is mostly women 
within this group that do not consider state policies to be successful compared to men 
(66% and 59% respectively).  The percentages get closer for women’s autonomous voting 
decisions: while women tend to disagree instead of agreeing with the statement (50% and 
27% respectively), there are equal number of agreeing and disagreeing male voters for 
this statement (for both response categories, the percentages are 37%). Yet, MHP voters’ 
perceptions are similar to those of other parties where the court decisions on cases of 
violence against women are concerned. Within MHP group 73% of males and 61% of 
females display dissatisfaction.  
 These responses suggest that for women’s rights, MHP voters, especially those 
who are female have different perceptions than the party’s arguments. As MHP’s 
electoral manifestos do not have specific emphasis on women’s rights apart from the 
context of family, the dissatisfaction of its voters in the sample demonstrate that there is 
a discrepancy between perceptions and the manifestos. The MHP voters in the sample 
care more about the state of women’s rights than the space their party reserve for these 
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issues in its manifestos. Moreover, for the case of violence against women, there are 
parallels between perceptions and the arguments in the manifestos as the latter include 
specific policy proposals concerning this issue albeit coupling it with violence against 
disadvantaged groups.  
 
Graph 36 Percent of agreement and disagreement in items on women's rights within MHP 
voters in the sample 
 
 
 HDP Manifestos and the Perceptions of HDP Voters  
 
 
 The scope of civil liberties and political rights is significantly large within the 
electoral manifestos of HDP compared to other parties. Not only freedom of expression, 
thought, and right to protest receive a lot of emphasis, specific issues such as forced 
migration, arbitrary arrests, sexual orientation and LGBTQ rights, education in mother 
tongue and freedoms of non-believers are also mentioned in both of the manifestos. 
 The responses to the survey items corresponding to the issues mentioned in HDP’s 
electoral manifestos demonstrate that perceptions of HDP voters share the severity of the 
criticisms of the manifestos. For almost all of these items, level of disagreement is over 
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90%. Especially concerning independent judiciary, press freedoms and freedom of 
expression there is no variation; almost everyone in the group disagree.  
 High level of disagreement for fair representation, ethnic discrimination, and 
forced migration reflect the salient issues for the party and for its electorate as they have 
been subjected to violations of rights and liberties on these fronts. Different than the other 
groups, the graph below includes responses to the survey items on phone tapping because 
HDP’s manifesto includes pledges against phone tapping and usage of such recording as 
legitimate evidence in court cases. 77% of HDP voters think their phones are illegally 
tapped. Compared to other party groups, this percentage is significantly high.87 This 
specific issue emerges as another instance of correspondence between perceptions of 
HDP voters and their party’s arguments in its most recent electoral manifestos.  
 
                                                 
87 Within CHP group 43% thinks their phones are tapped, while it is 30% and 27% in MHPand AKP groups. 
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Graph 37 Percent of disagreement and strong disagreement in selected civil liberties and 
political rights items within HDP voters in the sample 
 
 
 
 HDP’s perspective in its electoral manifestos is clearly feminist compared to other 
party manifestos. Within these manifestos, women’s individual rights are extensively 
covered in addition to the gendered perspective applied to other categories of rights and 
liberties. Policy proposals are also made through such a perspective. Hence, HDP’s 
manifestos are distinct from other parties’ manifestos. 
 The high level of disagreement on the survey items concerning women’s rights 
may be interpreted as a reflection of the significantly critical position represented by the 
electoral manifestos. Interestingly, for each of these items the level of disagreement is 
higher within men than women in HDP group88.  
                                                 
88 For the first item, 94% of female and 96% of male voters disagree. For the second item 74% of female and 88% of 
male voters disagree. For the third item 91% of female and 97% of male voters disagree. 
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Graph 38 Percent of disagreement and strong disagreement in items on women's rights 
within HDP voters in the sample 
 
 
 For the majority of the survey statements, responses demonstrate similarities with 
the positions presented by their preferred political parties in their most recent electoral 
manifestos. Although it is not clear whether these preferences are affected by the existent 
perceptions or vice versa, this comparison indicates that differences between perceptions 
on civil liberties and political rights correspond to those between electoral manifestos to 
a large extent.  
 
9.5.3 Social Rights in Manifestos and Perceptions 
 
 
 AKP Manifestos and Perceptions of AKP Voters in the Sample 
 
 The amount of references towards social rights is extensive in the section of 
fundamental rights and freedoms. Similar to the civil liberties and political rights, AKP’s 
electoral manifestos focus on policies of past governments on this front. For instance, 
lifting of the ban on headscarf is referred within the context of right to education. There 
are other instances of policies in relation to education but right to education is not 
specifically framed as a social right. Instead, educational policies are portrayed as 
ensuring equality of opportunity. 
 Healthcare is also covered through referring to past policies especially those 
targeting the disadvantaged groups in the society. This emphasis on the disadvantaged 
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groups, including the poor, the elderly and the bedbound also exists in the context of 
social services and social assistance scheme. For both healthcare and social assistance, 
the primary framework is the strong family as social policies are argued to be empowering 
strong family and maintaining its integrity. Since family is the reference point for both 
the conceptualization of social rights and related policies, it is possible to argue that 
AKP’s most recent electoral manifestos do not consider social rights as a dimension of 
citizenship rights.  
 Within the survey there are two sets of items on social rights. While one group 
investigates the normative perceptions, the other group assesses the perceptions of 
government performance in delivering these services. Although the electoral manifestos 
do not frame social services such as education, healthcare or social assistance as social 
citizenship rights, majority of those who support AKP consider public provision of 
healthcare, education, and employment assistance as social rights. While they prefer 
entrenched social rights instead of receiving social aid, less than half of them consider 
distribution of such aid prior to elections as social rights. In fact, the level of agreement 
and disagreement is the same for this statement. Those who think social aid distribution 
prior to elections is a social right constitute the same amount as those who disagree with 
it (37,8% for each of them). This is an interesting divergence of perceptions within the 
AKP group as there are equal number of individuals who consider such aid schemes to 
be social rights and those who do not. It is possible that those who disagree have more 
extensive understanding of social rights but further research is necessary to make such 
inference.  
 When it comes to the evaluations of the performance of related services, 
approximately half of the AKP voters in the sample find those services to be satisfactory. 
Among them, satisfaction with public education and employment assistance in finding 
jobs are not very high. These findings suggest that AKP voters’ perceptions concerning 
social rights and related services are not as similar to the arguments in the electoral 
manifestos of AKP as they are for the case of civil liberties and political rights. In other 
words, although the amount of references to social policies in AKP’s electoral manifestos 
are reflected in the normative perceptions of its supporters in the sample, their perceptions 
on the actual deliverance of social rights diverge from the arguments in the manifestos, 
which depict past policies as accomplishments on this front. Yet, the levels of satisfaction 
with the provision of services are still higher than those of other parties, demonstrating 
the tendency of positive evaluations of their preferred party.   
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Graph 39 Percent of agreement and disagreement in items on social rights within AKP 
group in the sample 
 
 
 CHP Manifestos and Perceptions of CHP Voters in the Sample 
 
 CHP’s electoral manifestos’ approach to the issue of social rights is very 
systematic. The documents frame social rights in an extensive manner to include issues 
such as right to fair minimum wage and right to social security. In addition, it is stated 
that providing economic liberties, that are ensured through realization of social rights, is 
a duty of the state. In addition, the manifesto includes criticisms of the social aid 
mechanisms introduced by the past governments. These criticisms are based on the 
arbitrariness and provisional character of such aid mechanisms. Instead, the electoral 
manifestos pledge to introduce family insurance as an entrenchment of social assistance, 
which would guarantee systematic application of social assistance policies. This 
perspective implies that the party’s stance concerning social rights conceptualizes the 
issue in terms of individual rights and liberties that are guaranteed by the political 
authority.  
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 The perceptions of CHP voters in the sample on the normative statements depict 
a similar outcome to those AKP voters: almost all CHP voters in the sample think public 
education, healthcare, and employment assistance as social rights and they declare their 
desire for entrenchment of social rights instead of receiving occasional social aid. In 
addition, a clear majority disagree with the social aid programs prior to the elections to 
be a social right, which is in line with their desire for entrenched rights. In addition, as 
CHP did not systematically distribute social aid prior to the elections, these voters have 
not been recipient of party-sponsored aid and absence of such experience may lead them 
to disregard aid distribution as a social right. Overall, CHP voters in the sample have 
consistent perceptions regarding the ideal of social rights and they correspond to the 
importance given to social rights in CHP’s electoral manifestos. 
 CHP voters’ evaluations of relevant policies are more negative than those of the 
AKP voters. As it can be observed in the graph below, level of disagreement concerning 
the actual practice of social rights provisions is above 50%. Only for the case of provision 
of occasional social aid, less than half of the group display dissatisfaction89. It is possible 
that these voters are not targeted for such aid provision and thus consider such policies to 
be unsuccessful. In addition, as CHP’s manifestos frame the current social assistance 
policies as arbitrary and inconsistent and have a critical stance towards them, it is also 
possible that CHP voters in the sample generate negative evaluations of social aid 
distribution on the grounds of being in the opposition. The perceptions on the deliverance 
of social aid underline the need for further, in-depth research. 
                                                 
89 For this statement, 43% of CHP voters choose partially agree and partially disagree, which indicate a indecisive 
perception.  
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Graph 40 Percent of agreement and disagreement in items on social rights within CHP 
group in the sample 
 
 
 MHP Manifestos and Perceptions of MHP Voters in the Sample 
 
 MHP’s most recent electoral manifestos include numerous references to social 
policies where specific sections are dedicated to fight against poverty, social protection, 
social security, healthcare and education. There are also pledges of social aid policies 
targeting specifically those in need and the poor. In fact, the term “social right” only 
appears in the context of care for the disabled and social security scheme for the elderly. 
Apart from these groups, there are no other mentions of the term “social right.” Also, 
similar to the AKP manifestos, there are recurring references to the family, its integrity, 
and protection throughout the manifesto including the segments on social policies. Hence, 
normatively MHP’s electoral manifestos do not position social rights in the framework 
of individual rights. 
 Different than the manifestos of other parties, MHP’s understanding on 
citizenship that prioritizes ethnic identity, national security and order, and common 
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morality is reflected in the context of social rights. For instance, right to education is 
mentioned among the social policies with an emphasis on equality of opportunity but 
subsequently the manifesto introduces limits to the actual enjoyment of it. Such limits 
include usage of Turkish as the only language of instruction. Similarly, religious 
education emerges as a pledge, which is justified by the role of religion in sustaining 
national unity and integrity.  
 The normative perceptions of MHP voters in the sample are similar to the other 
groups as they consider healthcare, employment assistance, and public education as social 
rights, while the demand for entrenched social rights is relatively lower than those of 
other parties. Also, there are more individuals within the group that do not consider 
distribution of social aid prior to the elections as a social right, albeit their level of 
disagreement is not as high as other party groups.  
 Perceptions concerning the practice of such rights are similar to the perceptions 
of other oppositional party voters. There are more individuals who are dissatisfied with 
the provision of social services than those who express satisfaction. Only for the cases of 
education and occasional social aid, the level of agreement goes beyond the level of 
disagreement. This distribution of responses demonstrates that MHP voters are happy 
with the education and social aid services, while they display moderate dissatisfaction 
with other services. As the party’s manifesto includes various policy proposals for 
changing social welfare services, the perceptions of MHP voters are not completely in 
line with the arguments in the manifestos since for some policy arenas they are 
moderately satisfied with the status quo. Moreover, the levels of agreement and 
disagreement are closer to each other compared to other party groups, which implies that 
MHP voters are more indecisive than HDP and CHP voters in terms of their perceptions 
regarding performance of the social welfare policies. 
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Graph 41 Percent of agreement and disagreement in items on social rights within MHP 
group in the sample 
 
 
 HDP Manifestos and Perceptions of HDP Voters in the Sample 
 
 The way social rights are covered in HDP’s most recent electoral manifestos is 
similar to the CHP manifestos as the scope of social rights is extensive, albeit being less 
systematic. In some respects, HDP’s manifestos demonstrate an even more expansive 
framework on social rights. For instance, there is a specific subsection titled “Social 
Right, not Social Aid” which interprets social rights as the fundamental rights of all 
citizens. This section includes criticisms of the current social aid framework for being 
derogatory to the dignity of citizens. For that reason, pledges for social assistance target 
all citizens. In addition, all mentions on social rights carry a gender dimension where the 
party pledges to observe women’s and LGBTQ individuals’ specific needs and demands 
while providing social services. Compared to MHP’s and AKP’s electoral manifestos, 
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social rights are not framed to within the context of family, which reflects the feminist 
perspective of the manifesto.  
 While current social welfare policies are criticized, the policy proposals have 
qualities that reflect the party’s understanding of citizenship. For instance, arguments on 
right to education and healthcare include references to service provision in mother tongue, 
while arguments for free healthcare and education are justified through an anti-capitalist 
framework.  
 Perceptions of HDP voters in the sample concerning social rights are internally 
coherent as in the case of civil liberties and political rights. Majority of the group consider 
healthcare, education, and employment assistance as social rights and almost all of them 
want entrenched social rights instead of receiving occasional social aid. Also, they do not 
consider distribution of aid prior to the elections as a social right and disagree with the 
statement on aid reception being impartial towards voting decisions. In addition, the level 
of dissatisfaction with the actual services are as higher than those of MHP voters, reaching 
to a similar level to those of CHP voters. As the party manifestos conceptualize social 
rights and services in an extensive manner, it is possible to argue that there is 
correspondence between perceptions and HDP manifestos.  
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Graph 42 Percent of agreement and disagreement in items on social rights within HDP 
group in the sample 
 
 
 
9.6 Analyses of the Survey Items on the Basis of Political Party 
Preferences 
 
The survey includes questions about three different rights categories, where two of 
them correspond to the Freedom House’s methodology and the third category is inspired 
by T.H. Marshall’s conceptualization of citizenship. These categories are civil rights, 
political rights and social rights. There are 19 questions concerning civil rights, 6 
questions corresponding to political rights, and 10 questions on social rights. The answer 
scale is between 1 to 6, where 1 signifies strongly disagree and 6 signifies strongly agree. 
The questions on civil and political rights are formulated through Freedom House’s 
own methodology, which is used to rate countries in their annual Freedom in the World 
reports. In those reports, civil rights (or liberties) are composed of four subcategories: 
freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law and 
personal autonomy and individual rights. For political rights, there are three 
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subcategories: electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of 
government. These subcategories are used as reference points for the survey questions. 
In other words, these subcategories, which are used as checklist for Freedom House to 
assess the actual situation regarding civil liberties and political rights in a given country, 
are used to create judgments about current state of affairs in Turkey, to which respondents 
can agree or disagree.  
For social rights questions, the starting point is T.H. Marshall’s and Janoski’s 
conceptualizations. Marshall relates social citizenship to certain institutions and services 
that are parts of the welfare state. To ensure survey economy and simplification, these 
welfare state services and social rights are reduced to right to education and right to 
healthcare. In addition to those, Janoski’s conceptualization of social rights as distributive 
rights is applied by designing questions or judgments on unemployment provisions and 
social assistance. Different from the questions on civil rights and political rights, which 
are about judgments concerning actual situation, some questions on social rights are 
normative. In other words, some judgments are about the normative position concerning 
social rights and some are about the state’s role and ability to provide those services. Each 
category and corresponding survey statements will be discussed and analyzed according 
to the political party orientations of the respondents in the following sections. 
 
9.6.1 Statistical Analyses 
 
Before moving into the detailed analyses of survey items on civil liberties, political 
rights and social rights, it is necessary to see the impact of party preferences when 
demographic features of the respondents are controlled for. Instead of summarizing cross 
tabulations of survey items and various demographic variables, such an endeavor will 
provide a coherent picture where the effect of demographic features is presented together. 
In addition, as discussed in the previous chapters, existent studies on citizenship 
perceptions in Turkey consider age, levels of education, and socio-economic status to be 
relevant to the way in which individuals conceptualize citizenship (Caymaz 2007, 
Kardam and Cengiz 2011). Levels of religiosity will also be included to account for the 
arguments on the voting behavior literature on how voting decisions are influenced by 
being religious or secular (Kalaycıoğlu and Çarkoğlu 2009). Lastly, ethnic identity will 
be included to assess the differences between perceptions. The reason is that the cleavage 
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between Turkish and Kurdish identities is considered as important determinants for party 
preference within the literature on voting behavior in Turkey (Kalaycıoğlu 2012).  
Incorporation of these demographic variable will provide the chance for analyzing 
the partial effect of party preference on perceptions and to investigate these effects, 
dummy variables for CHP, MHP, and HDP will be included in the multiple regression. 
Since the sample is composed of equal number of participants from each of the political 
parties in the parliament, AKP identifier will not be included among the independent 
variables90. Not only inclusion of AKP results in perfect multicollinearity, it will also 
prevent comparison between party identifiers. In other words, incorporating the 
identifiers of CHP, MHP, and HDP will allow comparing the partial effect of preferring 
each of these parties over preferring AKP.  
 Instead of conducting separate analyses on every survey item in the questionnaire, 
which will be done in the next sections, the analyses in this section will apply factor 
analyses. The advantage of using factor analyses is reduction of dimensions in a given 
dataset, which helps to analyze complex data. Hence, the data can be analyzed through a 
small number of dimensions. 
Although the questionnaire is designed to incorporate three dimensions of 
citizenship rights and liberties, questions are formatted to analyze perceptions on the 
current state of these rights and liberties, except for four statements among social rights 
which investigate normative perceptions. Hence, intuitively it can be assumed that there 
are two dimensions underlying the survey questions. One of them indicates the 
perceptions on the existent state of citizenship rights and liberties, including civil 
liberties, political rights and social rights, while the second dimension indicates the 
normative perceptions regarding social rights. For that reason, factor analysis is 
conducted by determining two factors.91 The output signifies that the first factor explains 
88% of the variation, while the second factor explains 12%. Even though the first factor 
explains the majority of the variation, variables loaded on the second factor display a 
distinct dimension. That’s why both factors will be utilized. 
The factor loadings on the first factor demonstrate that the survey statements that 
are about the current state of citizenship rights and liberties are loaded in this factor. In 
other words, this specific factor, labelled as “Current State of Citizenship Rights and 
Liberties”, displays the perceptions on the state of these rights and liberties. As the 
                                                 
90 Additional analyses where AKP identifier is used as a dependent variable are in the Appendix. 
91 The results of the factor analysis can be found in Methodology Chapter and in the Appendix. 
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responses are ordered along a Likert scale where 1 denotes strongly disagree and 6 
denotes strongly agree, high scores on the retained factor signify agreement while low 
scores signify disagreement. 
The loadings92 demonstrate that apart from the normative statements on social 
rights, all other survey items load on the first factor, while normative statements load on 
the second factor.93 Hence the first factor is labelled as “Perceptions on the Current State 
of Citizenship Rights”, while the second factor is labelled as “Normative Perceptions on 
Social Rights.” For all of the items loaded on these factors, same scale is used and it 
ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).  Higher values of these factors 
denote agreement with the survey statements. Since the survey items loaded on the first 
factor state that rights and liberties in Turkey are in good shape, agreement with these 
statements imply uncritical, conforming perceptions. Whereas lower values of these 
factors mean disagreement with the statements and hence critical perceptions. 
 After determining the factors, multiple regression analyses are used to investigate 
the relations between these factors and various demographic variables as well as the 
political party preferences. The table below displays the regression results of using the 
factor on perceptions regarding the current state of citizenship rights and liberties as the 
dependent variable, party identifiers and selected demographic variables as covariates.94 
In addition to demographic variables, level of religiosity, left-right self-placement, and a 
dummy variable for being Turkish are added.  The regression results demonstrate that 
opposition party identifiers have negative standardized coefficients, and the sizes of these 
identifiers are larger than other variable in the regression. When demographic variables 
are controlled for, voting for one of the opposition parties instead of AKP is related with 
disagreement with the survey items loaded in the first factor. In other words, voting for 
opposition is associated with critical perceptions concerning citizenship rights and 
liberties. When AKP identifier is used as the main independent variable, its standardized 
coefficient emerges as positive and largest among the other variables, which suggests that 
voting for AKP instead of other parties is associated with agreement on these items.95  
                                                 
92 Different than varimax rotation where loadings are correlation coefficients, in promax rotation the loadings are 
essentially regression coefficients and the default table, the one reported here, is a pattern matrix. 
 
94 Only standardized coefficients without significance levels because the sample is not representative of the 
population so reporting significance levels is meaningless. Instead, standardized coefficients and standard errors are 
reported.  
95 Regressions where AKP identifier is used as the main independent variables are reported in the Methodology 
chapter. 
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 The standardized coefficients of the demographic variables show that, males, 
Turks, those who place themselves on the right, those who are religious and those with 
high income agree with the statements on the current conditions of citizenship rights and 
liberties.  In other words, it is males, devout individuals, right-wingers, ethnically Turks 
and individuals with high income are those who have conformist perceptions. On the 
other hand, older individuals, and those with higher level of education have more critical 
perceptions. The negative coefficient of age is surprising because previous studies have 
found younger individuals to be more rights-oriented (Kardam and Cengiz 2011; Caymaz 
2007). Proportion of MHP group may have influenced the impact of age, as 62% of the 
MHP group are aged between 18 and 28. Yet, the standardized coefficient of education 
confirms the previous studies as those with higher level of education have critical 
perceptions regarding citizenship rights and liberties. Lastly, these studies associate 
higher levels of socioeconomic status with greater awareness of rights and less emphasis 
on duties. Regression results demonstrate that those with higher income agree with the 
statements on the current state of citizenship rights and liberties, which suggest 
unproblematic atmosphere for these rights. In other words, higher levels of income are 
associated with uncritical perceptions. This observation is contrary to the findings of 
previous studies, if income levels are considered as a proxy for socioeconomic status.   
 
Table 11 Determinants of Perceptions on the Current State of Citizenship Rights and 
Liberties 
Determinants of the Perceptions on the Current State of Citizenship Rights and 
Liberties  
  
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Standard 
Error 
   
CHP identifiers -0.61 0.13 
MHP identifiers -0.44 0.10 
HDP identifiers -0.81 0.14 
DV for male=1 0.07 0.06 
Age in years -0.02 0.00 
Education Level (1=no education, 5=uni 
graduate) 
-0.00 0.03 
Left-Right Self-Placement (1=Left 10=Right) 0.13 0.02 
DV for Turkish=1 0.12 0.08 
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Level of Religiosity (1=not religious 4=very 
religious) 
0.14 0.04 
Household income in TL 0.06 0.00 
Constant  (0.24) 
   
N 257 
R squared 0.77 
Degrees of freedom 246 
   
      
 
 Although the first factor explains the majority of the variation in data, the items 
loaded on the second factor point out a distinct feature of citizenship rights. These items 
have normative statements, different than other survey items which are about the current 
state of citizenship rights and liberties. In order to evaluate the effect of demographic 
variables, religiosity, self-position on the ideological spectrum, and political party 
identifiers, a separate simple regression analysis is conducted. This regression uses the 
factor scores for the second factor as the dependent variable. 
 As in the previous regression analysis, standardized coefficients are reported 
along with standard errors. Different than the previous analysis, coefficient of CHP 
identifier is positive, meaning that preferring CHP over AKP results in greater agreement 
with the survey items loaded on to the Factor 2. While voting for MHP or HDP instead 
of AKP means lesser agreement, yet the sizes of their standardized coefficients are 
smaller than that of CHP identifier’s indicating a smaller effect. Males, those with higher 
education, those who chose Turkish as their ethnic origin and those with high level of 
religiosity agree with the statements more, while older respondents, those who place 
themselves on the right and those with higher incomes agree less with the same 
statements.  
 Although the existent studies on citizenship perceptions do not differentiate 
between rights categories, they relate age, socioeconomic status and level of education 
with understandings on citizenship (Kardam and Cengiz 2011; Caymaz 2007). More 
specifically, these studies find out that younger individuals, those with higher levels of 
education and income have more awareness concerning their rights and liberties and put 
less emphasis on duties. There is evidence for level of education having a positive effect 
on the normative perceptions on social rights, if this agreement is considered to signify 
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awareness of rights. The signs of the coefficients of age and income levels, as a proxy for 
socioeconomic status, do not confirm the findings of existent studies on citizenship 
perceptions in terms of perceptions on social rights. Instead of younger respondents, it is 
older respondents who agree with the normative statements on social rights, while those 
with higher levels of income agree less.  
 Since these items are normative, agreement with them suggest awareness of 
fundamental social rights and support for them. Previous studies on attitudes towards 
welfare policies find out that being on the right-wing is associated with acceptance of 
economic inequality (Miller 1999).96 In other words, it is expected from those with right-
wing ideologies to have less support towards entrenchment of social rights and relevant 
policies designed to mitigate the effects of economic inequality. Instead, proponents of 
social rights have more left-wing ideologies. In that sense, negative coefficient of self-
placement on the ideological spectrum confirm this expectation as it suggests that those 
who place themselves on the right are in lesser agreement with the normative social rights 
statements.  
 Religiosity has the largest effect on normative perceptions on social rights. Its 
standardized coefficient means that those with higher levels of religiosity have positive 
normative perceptions towards social rights. Within the literature, there are contrasting 
findings on the effect of religiosity on support for egalitarian policies in countries where 
the majority are Muslim. In general, being religious is associated with values such as 
helping those who are in need and support for redistributive policies (Malka et al. 2011)97. 
Yet Pepinsky and Welborne (2011:503) find little evidence for being pious generating 
support for redistributive policies in countries where Muslims are the majority. In another 
study, authors argue that being religiously orthodox is associated with support for 
government intervention for reducing income inequalities (Davis and Robinson 2006).98 
Within the Turkish contexts, a recent empirical study on Turkish respondents’ attitudes 
towards social policy and redistribution finds out that those who have higher levels of 
religiosity support “government policies that provide social insurance,” while they are 
not necessarily in favor of redistribution (Arıkan 2013 :45).  
                                                 
96 Miller, D. (1999)  Principles of Social Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
97 Malka, A., C.J. Soto, A.B. Cohen, D.T. Miller (2011) “Religiosity and Social Welfare: Competing Influences of 
Cultural Conservatism and Prosocial Value Orientation” Journal of Personality 79:4, pp. 763-792. 
98 Davis, N.J. and R.V. Robinson (2006) “The Egalitarian Face of Islamic Orthodoxy: Support for Islamic Law and 
Economic Justice in Seven Muslim-Majority Nations” American Sociological Review 71:2, pp. 167-190. 
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Since normative perceptions do not grant support for social welfare policies, it is 
difficult to compare findings of previous research with the observation of religiosity 
having a positive association with perceptions on social rights. This observation calls for 
further research to investigate the links between religiosity and normative perceptions. 
  
Table 12 Determinants of the Normative Perceptions on Social Rights 
Determinants of the Normative Perceptions on Social Rights 
  
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Standard 
Error 
 
  
CHP identifiers 0.13 (0.21) 
MHP identifiers -0.08 (0.17) 
HDP identifiers -0.09 (0.24) 
DV for male=1 0.07 0.10 
Age in years -0.02 (0.00) 
Education Level (1=no education, 5=uni graduate) 0.03 0.05 
Left-Right Self-Placement (1=Left 10=Right) -0.14 0.03 
DV for Turkish=1 0.02 (0.14) 
Level of Religiosity (1=not religious 4=very 
religious) 
0.19 0.07 
Household income in TL -0.10 0.00 
Constant - 0.41 
 
  
N 257 
R squared 0,04 
Degrees of freedom 246 
      
 
 
 By applying factor analysis and using the retained factors as dependent variables, 
both the effect of party preferences and selected demographic variables are analyzed. It 
is observed that party preferences have distinct effects on perceptions, especially 
concerning the current state of citizenship rights and liberties. 
 The next sections provide a closer look at the survey items with relation to the 
political party preferences. Since these simple regression results demonstrate the large 
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effect of political party identifiers, the differences in perceptions of the voters of these 
parties must be analyzed further. In addition, as factor analysis collated survey items 
together, it is important to see the distribution of responses along each category of 
citizenship rights and liberties. Hence, the rest of this chapter will be devoted to analyses 
of survey items through each of these categories. 
 The following sections will start with survey items on political rights, then the 
items on civil liberties and social rights will be analyzed. Later, the survey responses will 
be discussed through convergences and divergences between different party groups.  
 
 
9.7 Crosstabs of Survey Responses and Political Party 
Preferences 
 
 
9.7.1 Political Rights 
 
 Political rights constitute an important dimension of citizenship rights. Rather 
than guaranteeing an autonomous sphere for the individual, political rights ensure 
participation of the individual in the decision-making processes. Normatively, political 
rights empower citizens vis-à-vis the state. It is through these rights that citizens can 
challenge the political authority within certain institutional limits. In addition, existence 
of political rights provides the necessary platform for different conceptions of a good 
society to compete. In other words, the existence of political rights means that citizens 
have tools through which they can express their consent or disagreement with the existent 
concept of good society. An underlying assumption of this argument is the inherent 
plurality of conceptions of good society as no society can be completely homogenous. 
This assumption suggests that if this plurality in the political sphere is hindered, 
participation in the decision-making process might not attain its purpose of channeling 
citizens’ demands and interests into the political arena.  
 Since political rights ensure participation in decision-making processes, their 
uninterrupted enjoyment and protection are fundamental for individuals’ empowerment 
vis-à-vis the political authority. This empowerment becomes possible as political rights 
provide grounds for participation beyond voting. Fairness of elections, plurality of 
political representation and monitoring of government are all intrinsic to political 
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participation that is ensured by full enjoyment of political rights. In that sense, claims for 
protection and expansion of political rights can be voiced by those who are unsatisfied 
with the state of these rights.  
 While the emphasis on obedience to state in the official construction of Turkish 
citizenship may lead citizens to disregard their political rights, those who challenge this 
construction can have awareness regarding the state of such rights. Hence, those who are 
excluded from the decision-making processes can demand protection of political rights 
to demand and guarantee their political participation. Specifically, the current hegemony 
of AKP has caused other parties to stay in the opposition with increasingly diminishing 
platforms for political participation. Thus, this hegemony may also influence voters of 
opposition parties to be unsatisfied with their chances of political participation and the 
state of their political rights, while supporters of the incumbent party display satisfaction.  
 This research utilizes Freedom House’s checklist of questions on political 
rights to investigate the implications of the official construction of Turkish citizenship 
and the current state of the political landscape on perceptions regarding political rights in 
Turkey. The relevant survey items that are based on Freedom House’s checklist are about 
electoral process, political pluralism, and functioning of the government. The next 
subsections focus on each of these categories separately. 
 
 Perceptions Regarding Electoral Process  
 
 Voting is not one of the fundamental political rights, but also is essential for a 
democracy to sustain itself procedurally. In that sense, free and fair elections are essential 
for a democratic system to function and right to vote to be meaningful. Vote count is one 
of the aspects of a fair election as fraudulent electoral results render right to vote 
meaningless. One can argue that losers can reject electoral results without a concrete case 
of electoral fraud. Although there is a chance that losers of an election can accuse vote 
count procedures to be dishonest, it is a risky move unless there is a majority believing in 
such accusations. It is not useful for these losers to challenge electoral results in that way 
as they may participate in future elections with the same rules and regulations. Yet, if 
there is a significant majority in the society (across different electorates) that does not 
believe in the honesty of electoral results, then it is possible to argue that there is a lack 
of trust in one of the essential institutions of procedural democracy.  
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 The following graph demonstrates that with the exception of the incumbent 
party voters, the rest of the sample does not believe in the honesty of vote count 
procedures. It can be argued that AKP voters have a significantly different evaluation of 
the electoral results than the others. This significant divide in perceptions regarding one 
of the most important procedural aspects of democracy is problematic because for the 
majority of opposition party voters, right to vote has become futile in practice. More 
specifically, given that international electoral observers, including OSCE, had not 
reported fraud in counting processes in the latest parliamentary elections on November 
1st, 201599, it is interesting to see that MHP, CHP and HDP voters have disbelief in the 
veracity of vote count. They do not believe in this system although the elections are being 
monitored and are certified as genuine. Yet, this perceptual divide is still hazardous for 
the state of right to vote as a citizenship right because for those who do not believe in the 
integrity of vote count, voting itself may become obsolete. In addition, given that this 
divide is not within the voters of opposition parties but between the incumbent party 
supporters and the rest, preferences for opposition parties or incumbent party are related 
with the way these individuals evaluate the electoral process. 
 
 
Perceptions Regarding Political Participation and Political Pluralism 
 Another key aspect of political rights is representation and plurality of options. 
In combination with the actual act of voting, existence of plurality of options (i.e. parties 
or political actors) is fundamentally necessary for representation to attain its purpose. It 
is not enough to have adequate options; channels of political participation should also be 
open for political actors to compete so that voters can have a set of options. In Turkish 
context one major setback against political plurality is the existence of 10% electoral 
                                                 
99 The relevant report can be found at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/219201?download=true. OSCE 
monitoring mission found several irregularities in the April 16th Constitutional Referandum in 2017, which happened 
more than a year later than the November 1st elections.  
70
36
53
1
15
36
17
12
4
11
7
8
7
7
7
15
3
8
10
44
1
2
6
20
0% 50% 100%
HDP
CHP
MHP
AKP
I trust in the honesty of vote counting procedures after elections 
Strongly disagree Disagree Partially disagree Partially agree Agree Strongly agree
 261 
threshold, which happens to be highest among European electoral systems. Implemented 
after the 1980 coup, the threshold acts as a barrier against smaller parties to enter into the 
parliament and thus helps bigger parties to obtain more seats than their vote shares.  
 Theoretically speaking, electoral threshold can act as a cue for the voters to act 
strategically as it gets risky to vote for smaller parties or different actors. As rational 
actors, voters do not want to waste their votes on riskier ventures. Hence, they tend to 
vote for candidates that have considerable chance of passing the threshold. In response, 
political parties adopt “bridging or bonding” strategies to overcome this hurdle (Norris 
2004: 10). 
 According to Norris (2004), existence of an electoral threshold provides 
different incentives for political parties in different systems. In majoritarian systems, 
parties use “bridging” strategies where they aim at representing a broad set of interests in 
the society by forming loose coalitions with them. In other words, electoral thresholds 
create an atmosphere where actors compete for the “middle of the political spectrum.” 
(Norris 2004: 10) Whereas in proportional representation (PR) systems, parties develop 
“bonding” strategies where each political party seeks to maintain its electorate by 
strengthening and mobilizing the social cleavages or identities they claim to represent 
(Norris 2004: 11). Political competition occurs across the political spectrum.  
 In contrast to the arguments suggested by rational choice intuitionalism, 
cultural modernization perspective indicates that electoral rules may fall short of shaping 
behaviors as political beliefs, ideological commitments, partisanship, or identities can 
limit the effect of institutional settings on political behavior (Norris 2004: 21). These 
cultural factors challenge the assumptions of rational choice institutionalism by 
influencing electoral behavior. For instance, strong partisanship may inform the voter 
more than the outcomes of electoral rules. In other words, although rational choice 
institutionalism underlines the importance of electoral rules in shaping electoral behavior, 
cultural factors, including ideological position and partisanship, can have a contrasting 
effect on individuals’ political behaviors. There are implications of both of these 
perspectives in the responses to the survey item on electoral threshold.  
 CHP failed to pass the threshold in the general elections of 1999 and MHP 
experienced the same fate in the snap elections of 2002, when AKP came to power. AKP, 
despite being a first-timer in 2002, managed to obtain 34,28% of the vote in the national 
elections. Because of the threshold, only two parties entered into the parliament in 2002, 
which gave AKP a lot more seats than its vote share. In addition, AKP has never received 
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less than 30% of the votes since 2002. In that sense, AKP supporters have no reason to 
think that electoral threshold has a negative impact on their party’s fate. Hence, they can 
approve (or at least not disapprove) the threshold. In addition, the threshold works 
effectively to suppress potential rivals to AKP and hence entrenches its electoral 
hegemony. In that sense, electoral threshold can be considered as necessary to ensure the 
continuity of this hegemony by the AKP voters in the sample. 
 The contextual aspect of the electoral threshold suggests that it has been 
creating disadvantages especially for the Kurdish political movement, as before June 
elections no Kurdish party had managed to pass it. Hence, it is expected for HDP 
supporters to be critical of the statement stating “the 10% threshold of our electoral 
system is necessary.” Considering cultural factors, the ideological perspective MHP has 
can lead the party’s followers to approve the statement. The reason is that the threshold 
has been an effective tool for blockading Kurdish parties to enter into the parliament. Yet, 
it is possible that MHP supporters fear that their party may fail to pass the threshold as 
the party’s latest vote share was 11,9%. Hence, it can also be expected from the supporters 
of MHP to disapprove of the threshold.  
 CHP, on the other hand, is the oldest party in the parliament with few 
experiences related with the threshold. On the one hand, it can be expected from CHP 
voters to approve electoral threshold as their party is safe in terms of its vote share and 
the threshold itself is not detrimental for old parties with high familiarity among the 
electorate as they can be for newer parties. On the other hand, in CHP manifestos there 
are clear pledges to lower the electoral threshold, which might as well result from the 
changing position of the party on the ideological spectrum or CHP’s strategic 
expectations for potential coalition partners to enter into TGNA. In either case, CHP 
supporters can disagree with the necessity of electoral threshold.  
 The results show that it is mostly AKP supporters that think the threshold is 
necessary, either because of AKP’s high vote share that insures the party against the 
negative effects of the threshold, or the existence of 10% electoral threshold is considered 
to be as an instrument for AKP to maintain its electoral hegemony in the absence of 
challengers from its right or left. In any case, majority of AKP supporters do not consider 
the unusually high electoral threshold to be unnecessary.  
 It is interesting to see that there is a divide within MHP where 37% of them 
disagree and 41% of them agree. MHP’s position in the Turkish vs. Kurdish cleavage 
structure and strategic calculations regarding the threshold seem to be dividing the 
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perceptions of MHP voters. Those who consider Kurdish and other minority 
representation in the parliament to be threatening may agree with the statement, while 
those who are afraid of their party’s electoral performance may disagree.  
 CHP voters predominantly consider the threshold to be unnecessary, being in 
line with the party’s official stand on the subject, albeit being unexpected when the 
official citizenship paradigm is concerned. The reason is that the electoral threshold acts 
as a practical barrier against Kurdish minority’s enjoyment of their political rights and 
hence it is primarily a violation of their rights. That’s why acknowledgment of this 
violation must exist among those who are affected by this practical hurdle and are 
excluded. The high level of disagreement among HDP voters prove this argument. Yet, 
survey responses demonstrate that CHP voters in the sample are against the threshold as 
well although their political rights are not directly influenced by the electoral threshold.  
 
 
 
 Political pluralism requires open channels for participation and representation 
of minorities in the society. From minimalist definitions (Schumpeter 1942, 1962; Dahl 
1971) to more maximalist understandings (Diamond 1999), every account of democracy 
underlines the importance of participation and competition for offices in a polity. As 
discussed above, electoral threshold is an institutional barrier against representation of 
minorities. In Turkish case, the minorities include Kurds, Alevis and non-Muslim 
communities. In order to understand the perceptions regarding the representation of these 
groups, a survey item proposed along this line. The item stating that “the current electoral 
system allows Kurds, Alevis and non-Muslim minorities to be represented fairly” is also 
complementing the statement on electoral threshold. Consistent behavior requires an 
individual who disagree with the necessity of electoral threshold to disagree with the 
statement on fair representation. In fact, correlation coefficient between the responses 
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given to this statement is positive and high, which means that the responses given to are 
positively associated.100  
 The consistency among responses of HDP voters to the statements on 
threshold and fair representation is striking.  AKP and CHP voters are also consistent to 
a certain extent. These individuals’ responses are also consistent with their parties’ stance 
as HDP champions minority rights, especially the Kurdish, CHP pledges to guarantee 
minority rights and AKP elite has boasted about having openly Kurdish and Armenian 
MPs in their parliamentary groups. MHP voters’ perceptions are divided: 41% of them 
consider threshold to be necessary while 40% of them think minorities are represented in 
the current system. Yet, there are more MHP voters who are against the threshold while 
there are fewer of them disagreeing with the fair representation of minorities. More 
specifically, MHP voters were divided in half when it comes to electoral threshold; when 
fair representation of minorities is concerned, they tend to be closer to AKP compared to 
the other opposition party voters.  
 MHP voters’ closeness to AKP voters’ perceptions and CHP voters’ reluctant 
disagreement with the statement, which move them away from HDP voters’ perceptions 
can be linked with the impact of historical cleavages. Advocating for representation of 
minorities in the parliament require an extensive, ethnic-blind understanding of 
citizenship. For MHP voters and the party itself, Turkish citizenship is associated with a 
specific ethnic identity, i.e. Turkishness, which simultaneously excludes Kurds. Hence, 
the MHP voters who display agreement may consider current level of minority 
representation to be fair enough. In other words, MHP voters’ prioritization for national 
unity and security may have influenced their stance towards political pluralism, as their 
disagreement with the statement is less than their disagreement with the necessity of 
electoral threshold. 
                                                 
100  The correlation coefficient is 0.474. The Pearson correlation coefficient, r, can take values between -1 to +1. 0 
signifies no linear association between two variables of interest. Values of r higher than 0 means positive association 
between two variables: when the value of one variable increases so does the value of the other variable. Values of r 
lower than 0 means negative association: when the value of one variable increases, the value of the other variable 
decreases. Values of r that are around .5 are considered as moderate to high correlation. Thus, 0.474 is a moderate to 
high and positive correlation coefficient.  
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 Perceptions Regarding Functioning of the Government 
 
 The last two survey items in the category of political rights are about 
government autonomy and government monitoring. Using right to vote in free and fair 
elections is an important aspect of citizenship rights as it involves deciding about the way 
a polity is governed. In other words, what makes the right to vote a democratic act is its 
role in translating public preferences into actual policies through representatives and 
governments. In that sense, it is fundamental for a government to function autonomously, 
being free from external pressures and threats. In addition, it is also necessary for the 
government to be limited by independent institutions to ensure that power is not abused. 
A government being monitored is essential for a substantively defined democracy 
because mechanisms of checks and balances empower citizens vis-à-vis the government, 
protecting their rights.  
 The first survey item states that “elected governments cannot perform their 
duties because they meet with obstacles.” It is not clear what the respondents think of 
when they see “obstacles.” Obstacles may include the tutelary power of the military over 
politics, as Turkey had experienced military coups and memorandums causing 
governments to resign; role of judiciary exemplified by past experiences in political party 
closure cases; economic hardships created by economic crisis or austerity policies; or 
regular monitoring activities by the parliament or judiciary may be interpreted as 
obstacles by the respondents.  
 It is AKP voters in the sample that consider AKP governments are facing with 
obstacles which constrain them while performing their duties. More than half of CHP and 
HDP voters and almost half of MHP voters disagree. Considering that Turkey is sliding 
into a competitive authoritarian regime (Esen and Gümüşçü 2016), it is hard to argue that 
there are institutional mechanisms to limit government authority. Yet, corruption 
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allegations against the government officials have been framed as external interventions 
by the government. This process may lead AKP supporters to consider their elected 
government being constrained by external actors. In other words, AKP’s depiction of 
politics as a conflict zone between us and them may have influenced perceptions 
concerning the limits on government authority. In addition, Freedom House’s 2016 report 
on Turkey considers functioning of the government as mediocre and it seems those who 
support opposition parties agree with this argument.  
 An important finding is the amount of CHP supporters who agree with the 
existence of such obstacles (21%). This percentage is slightly higher than MHP voters 
who agree (19%). It is interesting to see that one-fifth of CHP voters agree with the 
statement because their current oppositional status and perception of threat should lead 
them to be more critical. Similarly, this survey item is one of the rare cases where HDP 
voters do not have homogenous perceptions as in the other civil liberties and political 
rights items, as 12% of them agree with the statement. This finding require further 
research.  
 
 
 
 When it comes to monitoring activities, the divide between opposition and the 
ruling party supporters is clearer. Although the level of agreement among AKP supporters 
is smaller than the other survey items, it is still clear that for them there is effective 
monitoring mechanisms. Or AKP voters are content with the extensive power of the 
government. In addition, just in any case of majoritarian understanding of democracy, 
external monitoring can be considered as nuisance. Hence, the weakening in the 
institutional checks and balances mechanisms in Turkey may be perceived as adequate 
by the majoritarian perspective promoted and cultivated by AKP. In other words, AKP 
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voters’ perceptions are in line with the expectations emerging from the electoral 
hegemony of the party, as well as its identification of democracy with the national will.  
 CHP voters’ perceptions can also be argued to be in line with historical 
expectations when the party’s and its voters’ association with the secular values of the 
old center are considered. Actors at the old center has always been wary of peripheral 
actors’ political ambitions. Because of that suspicion, the authority of monitoring 
institutions such as the Constitutional Court has been exaggerated. The current imbalance 
between the judiciary and the executive and problems related with the independence of 
judiciary resulting from AKP’s electoral hegemony may have threatened the CHP voters 
and thus prompting them to heavily disagree with the statement.  
 When both functioning of government and monitoring items are considered 
together a disproportionate picture emerges: for those who support opposition parties, the 
government is not being monitored and free from any external pressure while governing. 
For those who support the ruling party, the government is not only being monitored but 
also being challenged by external factors. These results also deserve further investigation. 
 
 
 
 Perceptions regarding the political rights items display the impact of political 
polarization between the governing party supporters and voters of oppositional parties, 
which have been suggested by other empirical studies as well (Erişen 2016). Specifically, 
those who are critical of the current state of political rights are voters of HDP and CHP 
to a certain extent, while MHP voters have fluctuating perceptions. Their perceptions are 
closer to those of AKP voters for issues related with electoral threshold and fair 
representation of the minorities. This proximity suggests that MHP voters in the sample 
do not think there are problems related with political representation. HDP voters display 
the most critical perceptions regarding political rights, which is not unexpected given the 
historical exclusion of the electorate that the party claims to represent. AKP voters seem 
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to be satisfied with the current state of political rights, disregarding the problems related 
with their enjoyment in practice. 
 
9.7.2 Civil Liberties 
 
Civil liberties empower individuals vis-à-vis the political authority in a different 
manner. While political rights provide guarantees for political participation and 
representation, civil liberties ensure protection of the autonomy of the individual against 
intrusions by political authority. This autonomy empowers individuals by recognizing 
them as rational actors, instead of subjects of the political authority.  
The literature on Turkish citizenship suggests that the notion is conceptualized as a 
passive status where relevant rights and liberties did not emerge out of revolutionary 
struggles. This passive status is coupled with a clear emphasis on loyalty and obedience 
to the state and nation, which prioritized duties instead of rights and liberties. As civil 
liberties concern the protection of individual sphere of action from external infringement, 
it assumes the primacy of the individual against the political authority. Yet, within the 
confines of a citizenship conception that prioritizes duties, reacting against violations of 
rights and liberties emerges as an unlikely thing.  
Given that the official understanding of Turkish citizenship leaves certain identities 
and practices out, it also ignores or disregards rights and liberties of individuals with those 
specific identities or practices. Being the target of violations or infringements, I expect 
such individuals to be more aware of the state of their rights and liberties. 
In terms of political party preferences, the electoral hegemony of AKP can cause 
its supporters to be satisfied with the status quo concerning the state of civil citizenship 
liberties. This electoral hegemony has provided AKP the ability to determine the limits 
of the exercise of civil liberties, which may be internalized and affirmed by its electorate. 
If the targets of violations of rights and liberties are outside of these limits, then AKP 
voters may not recognize these violations as such. In response, dismantling of the old 
center may cause CHP voters to experience exclusion, which may prompt them to 
develop an awareness concerning civil liberties and their current state, which has been 
demonstrated in CHP manifestos. A similar reaction may emerge among HDP voters for 
a different reason. The electorate of HDP has been the historical other of the official 
conceptualization of Turkish citizenship and their political mobilization has been 
revolving around demands for rights and liberties. Hence, their stance towards the 
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violation of civil liberties can be clearly critical. MHP voters’ position can be relatively 
more ambiguous because of two contrasting factors. On the one hand, MHP voters’ 
understanding of citizenship that prioritizes Turkish ethnic identity, order, and security 
may lead them to be less critical of violations of civil liberties, unless they are the victims 
of such actions. On the other hand, MHP voters may feel excluded by the hegemony 
established by AKP, which may prompt them to criticize government’s performance in 
terms of protection of civil liberties. If this interpretation is valid, then perceptions of 
MHP voters can be closer to those of AKP voters in the sample.   
The next subsections separately analyze the survey items on civil liberties. The 
bundle of judgments on civil liberties is generally depicting a picture of Turkey where 
civil liberties are protected and respected, except for four judgments: first one states that 
citizenship rights are violated in the cases of arrest and detention; second one states that 
citizens of Turkey have experienced forced migration; third one states that government 
meddles with the number of children a family should have; the last one states that there 
is religious influence over children at curricula101.  Agreement with these four survey 
items demonstrates awareness of violations of these specific rights. Except for these four 
items, agreement with the rest of survey items indicates uncritical perceptions on civil 
liberties in Turkey.  
 
 Perceptions Regarding Freedom of Expression and Belief 
 
Measuring liberal democracy through civil liberties and political rights, Freedom 
House uses four categories to assess the actual enjoyment of these liberties in a given 
setting. Among these categories, the first one is related with freedom of expression and 
belief.  
Normatively, freedom of expression is essential for individual’s maturity. For one 
reason is that individuals’ rational faculties are developed only when one’s thoughts or 
beliefs are challenged and criticized by others (Mill 1859, 1978:19, 61). Liberal political 
                                                 
101 The judgments are:  
Survey item no 37: “Ülkemizde yapılan gözaltı ve tutuklama süreçleri vatandaşlık haklarını ihlal etmektedir.” / 
“Processes of detention and arrest are violating citizenship rights” 
Survey item no 38: “Ülkemizde vatandaşlar zorunlu göçe maruz kalmışlardır.” / “Citizens in our country experienced 
forced migration” 
Survey item no 42: “Ailelerin kaç çocuk yapması gerektiğine hükümetin karıştığına inanıyorum” / “I believe that 
government meddles with the number of children families should have” 
Survey item no 43 “Çocukların okullarda belirli bir din anlayışına yönlendirildiğini düşünüyorum” / “I think children 
are oriented towards a specific understanding of religion in schools” 
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theory assumes that individuals carry rational faculties that delegitimizes any external 
authority to make decisions on their behalf. These rational faculties provide these 
individuals tools for developing their own preferences. Yet existence of rational faculties 
themselves are not enough to ensure individuals are able to develop them. The reason is 
that individuals need to be exposed to the full variety of opinions, lifestyles and 
preferences, in addition to information. Also, freedom of expression is necessary not just 
for letting different opinions to be expressed but also to strengthen one’s own grounds of 
arguments in the face of criticisms through vigorous defense against them (Mill 1859, 
1978: 35).  In other words, freedom of expression is needed for all kinds of opinions, 
except that inciting hate speech.  
Practically, these liberties are essential for all other citizenship rights to be 
exercised. For instance, without freedom of expression, it is not possible to fully enjoy 
right to vote in its full potential. Right to vote assumes that voters have adequate 
information about their options so that they can make informed decisions. In order for 
voters to be exposed to these options, different political views must have channels to 
promote themselves.  
Similarly, freedom of belief can be associated with freedom of expression in the 
sense that it assumes individuals have the ability to pursue their own conception of good 
life. In other words, justification of freedom of expression on the grounds of developing 
and utilizing one’s rational faculties is also valid for freedom of belief. When an external 
authority, be it the state or religious institution, dictates a specific way of belief system 
over the individuals, then they disregard individuals’ own rational capacity to decide on 
the parameters of their own life, i.e. their “conception of the good” (Rawls 1971:433).  
Hence, both freedom of expression and belief are essential to establish a liberal 
democratic order. More importantly, these are essential civil liberties that strengthen the 
individual vis-à-vis the infringements of political authority. Those whose freedom of 
expression and belief is suppressed by the political authority can be more sensitive 
towards the state of these liberties while carrying the potential to demand protection of 
them. In other words, it would be those who are excluded by the political authority to 
have critical perceptions concerning the current state of civil liberties. Keeping this 
premise in mind, survey items regarding these two freedoms can be analyzed. 
The first item under this category is about media broadcasting in the process leading 
to elections. In order to fully enjoy right to vote, freedom of expression and free press are 
required. For these practices to help informing voters, the individuals need to learn about 
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the parties competing in the elections, which requires broadcasting to be unbiased. Yet, 
majority of the sample considers media to be biased in its coverage before the elections. 
Independent electoral observers102 and most recent Freedom House report suggest that 
public broadcasting during electoral campaign period prior to the June 7th election was 
highly favorable for the government. Given that observation, it is no surprising to see that 
the supporters of opposition parties to agree with the statement (85% of CHP voters, 83% 
of HDP voters and 58% of MHP voters agree or strongly agree).  
But there are two interesting results, first of which is the responses of AKP voters, 
66% of whom agree or strongly agree with statement. Considering that media 
broadcasting was in favor of their preferred party, it would be logical for them to be 
against this statement. Current polarized state of the media, as it is argued by public 
opinion research103, where there is high correlation between the news sources individuals 
rely on and their political party preferences, may lead individuals to consider the sources 
that opposite party supporters as biased while considering their preferred news sources as 
honest. The second interesting result is the amount of MHP voters who strongly disagree 
with the statement: 21% of them do not think that media is biased.  
 
 
 
                                                 
102 OSCE electoral monitoring report: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/153211  
103 Bilgi University publishes public opinion survey on polarization each year. In the 2016 wave of this research, the 
primary newspaper preference changes for voters of four political parties. AKP voters prefer Sabah and Posta (10,3% 
each), CHP voters prefer Hürriyet (20,2%), HDP voters prefer Özgür Gündem (17,7%) and MHP voters prefer 
Hürriyet and Posta (13,9% and 13,4%). A follow-up question asks whether newspapers are biased. Among AKP 
voters, Zaman is the most biased (73,6% of them choose Zaman); for CHP voters Zaman (76,9%) and Sabah (73,5%) 
are biased; for HDP voters Sabah (58,9%) is biased; and for MHP voters Zaman (77,2%). In the 2017 wave, the 
polarization emerges as crystallized especially between CHP, MHP and AKP voters. CHP voters prefer Fox TV, 
CNN Türk, Sözcü and Cumhuriyet as their news sources and consider them as unbiased, while AKP voters prefer 
ATV, A Haber, TRT, Sabah as their news sources and consider them as unbiased. 2016 wave was retrieved from: 
http://kssd.org/site/dl/uploads/Kutupla%C5%9Fma-Ara%C5%9Ft%C4%B1rmas%C4%B1-
Sonu%C3%A7lar%C4%B1.pdf 2017 wave was retrieved from: 
https://goc.bilgi.edu.tr/media/uploads/2018/02/05/bilgi-goc-merkezi-kutuplasmanin-boyutlari-2017-sunum.pdf  
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As a follow-up to this statement on biased broadcasting, another statement 
considers journalists and TV channels being free to discuss any topic without limitations 
or censorship. Turkey’s track record concerning press freedom is deteriorating according 
to latest reports of Freedom House and Reporters Without Borders104, while the number 
of journalists in jail as of 2017 has reached to a point where Turkey has become one of 
the worst offenders. 
Evaluating this statement on its own, it is evident that supporters of opposition 
parties are worried about the freedom of press, while more than half of the AKP voters in 
the sample consider press to be free in Turkey. Oppositional voters’ responses are in line 
with their preferred parties’ critical discourse in their most recent electoral manifestos. In 
addition, it is the freedom of oppositional and critical media organs that is being curtailed 
and perceptions of oppositional party voters reflect that. The reaction of AKP voters is 
contradictory to their agreement with the statement of biased media. On the one hand, 
they do not trust in press to be a neutral institution; on the other they consider press to be 
free. Also, the 40% of MHP voters who display varying degrees of agreement with the 
statement reflects the ambiguity in the critical stance of the party to a certain extent. 
Although electoral manifesto of MHP is critical towards the government, as expected 
from an opposition party, its take on rights and liberties is limited with concerns about 
order and national security. This ambiguity may be reflected in its voters as well.  
 
 
 
 These survey items are related with the public dimension of freedom of expression 
as they focus on press. Another aspect of freedom of expression is related with individuals 
themselves and how they enjoy this right in their private lives. Relevant to this aspect of 
freedom of expression, another survey item states that individuals do not feel free to 
                                                 
104https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/turkey  https://rsf.org/en/ranking  
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discuss political matters freely in their phone conversations because they are afraid of 
their phone to be tapped. This statement might have sound familiar to the survey 
respondents because the corruption probes against government officials on December 
2013 were ignited by leaked phone conversations of these officials. These phone 
conversations were illegally wire-tapped by police officers, whom were accused for being 
Gülenist coup-plotters later by the government.  
The results display that it is the HDP supporters who are the most cautious among 
the sample. They are followed by CHP voters (43% agree or strongly agree). Almost 
equal amount of AKP and MHP voters disagree (or strongly disagree) with the statement; 
while a remarkable segment of these groups agrees with the statement. It is one of the 
rare cases where AKP supporters do not respond in unison; there is a significant 
dispersion in their answers. It can be influenced by the contextual issues such as 
Gülenists’ involvement in the illegal tappings which may have caused some AKP voters 
to worry about the privacy of their conversations. In other words, they may consider 
themselves as the targets of rights violations and hence react in this way to this specific 
survey item. Those who disagree with the statement may think that they are not the usual 
suspects for public authorities as their preferred party is at the helm.  
 
 
 
The last item within this category is about freedom of belief. The item states that 
there are not any obstacles for different religions (i.e. the ones that are different from the 
dominant interpretation of Sunni Islam) to be practiced in Turkey. The frequency table 
displays that absolute majority of AKP and MHP voters in the sample identify themselves 
as Sunni Muslim, while 60% of CHP voters consider themselves as such. 62% of those 
who identify themselves as Alevi in the whole sample voted for CHP in November 1st 
2015 elections. 42% of HDP voters in the sample identify their religious identity as 
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“Other”, which can range from being non-Muslim to believing in religions other than 
monotheistic religions or not believing in religion at all. Since the relevant question 
proposes three options (i.e. Sunni Muslim, Alevi or Other), the preference for other 
religious identities or lack of them cannot be entirely known through this question. 
 
Table 13 The distribution of religious convictions on the basis of political party 
preferences. Source: Perceptions Survey 2016 
  Respondent's Preferred Party on Nov 1, 2015 Elections 
Respondent's 
Religious 
Conviction AKP CHP MHP HDP Total 
Sunni Muslim 84 60 90 39 273 
Alevi 0 18 4 7 29 
Other 15 19 2 42 78 
N/A 1 3 4 12 20 
Total 100 100 100 100 400 
 
Yet, this question provides clues about the survey item on freedom of belief. The 
survey item includes “different religious practices” phrase, which may mean practices 
other than those of Sunni Muslims for this sample (majority of whom are self-identified 
as Sunni Muslims). The issue of religious practices revolves around the status of Alevi 
worship places, as non-Muslim minorities are in charge of their own religious 
establishments.105 Hence, this survey item can be considered within a context where 
religious practices and worship places of Alevis are excluded from state-sponsorship. In 
fact, there is negative correlation between religious identification and responses to the 
survey item on the religious practices (-0.3344), signifying that being self-identified as 
Sunni Muslim is associated with agreement to the statement106. 
The distribution of answers display that AKP and HDP voters gave almost opposite 
responses; more than half of AKP voters agree with the statement while a significant 
majority among HDP voters disagree with it. CHP and MHP voters are mirror-images of 
each other.  
                                                 
105 Although these communities have certain legal prerogatives concerning their religious practices, they have been 
facing with difficulties in terms of administering their properties, establishing educational institutions to train their 
own religious officials. 
106 The correlation coefficient is -0.3344. 
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Considering that AKP claims to represent the religious segments of the society, it 
is expected from the party supporters to care about religious liberties. But the distribution 
of responses among AKP and MHP voters display their selective stance towards religious 
liberties. The expectation regarding supporting religious liberties is valid only for Sunni 
Muslim practices, excluding the current state of other religious groups. CHP’s stance is 
partly in line with the expectation emerging from its emphasis on secularism, as the 
statement assumes enjoyment of such liberties in the public. Yet, as Alevis constitute an 
important segment of the CHP’s electorate, its voters in the sample may consider Alevi’s 
religious liberties while responding107. The same argument may be valid for HDP 
supporters in the sample.  
Perceptions regarding freedom of expression and belief reflect a drift between those 
who vote for AKP and CHP and HDP, with significant variations among MHP voters. It 
seems these perceptions do not differ solely on the grounds of historical cleavages; rather 
they reflect whether individuals consider themselves as being the potential targets of 
violations of these liberties or not.  
 
 Perceptions Regarding Freedom to Protest 
 
The second sub category on Freedom House checklist is about associational rights 
and liberties. Within that category, freedom of assembly is chosen as a survey item. The 
survey items related with this category are framed within the context of public protests. 
Protests are important tools for citizens to voice their dissatisfaction with certain issues 
or demands, which can be considered as grounds for freedom of expression and political 
participation.  
                                                 
107 In fact, the 2017 wave of the polarization poll conducted by Bilgi University demonstrates that being Alevi 
corresponds with voting for CHP in a multiple correspondence analysis graph. This graph can be found on page 19 of 
the data presentation. The pdf can be found at: https://goc.bilgi.edu.tr/media/uploads/2018/02/05/bilgi-goc-merkezi-
kutuplasmanin-boyutlari-2017-sunum.pdf 
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On the one hand, protesting provides the interim outlet for citizens to utter their 
complaints outside of the electoral cycle, through which the scope of political 
participation enlarges. In other words, protesting itself is a political act. Protests offer a 
space for various issues to be heard, which may not have access to conventional political 
agenda. Minority rights, including LGBTQ rights and language rights, are among such 
issues. On the other hand, protests are also forms of expression of ideas, thoughts, and 
demands in a collective manner. In that sense protesting is an act of freedom of expression 
and it allows others to be exposed to different opinions and demands. For freedom to 
protest to be effectively enjoyed, there should not be arbitrary restrictions against 
organizing protests. In addition, protestors should not worry about their lives while 
attending protests. In cases of disproportionate use of force by the police, there emerge 
cases where protesters are heavily wounded or sometimes lose their lives. Also, 
protesters’ freedom of expression should be guaranteed; they should not be arrested or 
jailed for attending such demonstrations. 
The current state of freedom to protest in Turkey is problematic. Since Gezi Park 
protests, disproportionate use of force by the police has intensified to an extent where 
there are cases of death or grave injuries. Extending the authorities of the police force 
through legal changes such as permitting police to fire on demonstrators who use 
incendiaries, almost all of the acts of brutality have ended up in impunity (Freedom in 
the World 2016). Moreover, specific demonstrations such as LGBT Pride or May Day 
protests were dispersed by the police, while many attendees were detained, arrested and 
sentenced to jail.  
The distribution of responses to the survey item about organizing protests display 
that it is mostly CHP and HDP supporters that acknowledge various restrictions on this 
front. AKP supporters’ responses show their contrary opinion; only 22% of them disagree 
with the statement. MHP voters in the sample are divided into two camps; while 57% of 
them display disagreement, 18% of them agree and 25% of them are in the middle.  
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The second survey item related with right to protest concerns the bodily integrity 
and livelihood of demonstrators. With the increasing use of disproportionate use of force 
on protestors, cases of grave injuries and even death by the police have increased. These 
cases, most of which ended up without any convictions, send the message to the 
prospective protesters and the public at large that it is not safe to attend demonstrations. 
The survey item states that lives of those who attend protests are secure, painting a 
positive picture. Distribution of the responses are very similar to the previous survey 
statement with CHP and HDP voters’ responses are similar to each other, while those 
who disagree (30%) with the statement is slightly larger than those who agree (29%) 
among the AKP supporters which is unexpected. 
 
 
 
Another survey item states that freedom of expression of those who attend 
demonstrations is guaranteed. The distribution of answers is similar to the previous 
survey item that HDP and CHP voters predominantly disagree with the statement whereas 
only 22% of AKP voters disagree and 35% of the agree. The fact that half of MHP voters 
disagreeing with the statement puts them closer to the other opposition parties but at the 
same time responses of MHP voters are more dispersed than other groups, which signifies 
that there is more variation among them compared to the rest of the sample.  
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 Perceptions regarding the freedom of protest demonstrate the rift between AKP 
and CHP and HDP on the one hand, how MHP voters are torn between these sides on the 
other. The existent violations of this liberty do not exist in the eyes of AKP voters. 
Similarly, ISSP Government data demonstrates that in addition to the self-position on the 
political spectrum, vetoing for AKP is associated with prohibitive perceptions regarding 
protests and protesters, while voting for CHP and HDP is among the determinants of 
permissiveness towards these activities (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2018:41).  
One reason for this differentiation can be the impact of the electoral hegemony of 
AKP in the eyes of its electorate. This hegemony may cause AKP supporters to associate 
their preferred party with the status quo, feel satisfied with it and thus consider protests 
to be disruptive of the status quo instead of free practices of civil citizenship liberties. In 
other words, protests can be perceived as acts against order and authority by these voters. 
A similar logic may also exist for MHP voters, half of whom display agreement with the 
statement, as the party prioritizes order and unity over individual rights and liberties. HDP 
voters’ perceptions are in line with the expectations regarding the excluded identities and 
their rights oriented understanding concerning citizenship.  
Perceptions of CHP voters in the sample are significant in the sense that old center 
that CHP has been situated has also emphasized a passive, duty-oriented understanding 
of citizenship. This passivity was linked with a framework of loyalty to the nation and 
state. Hence, protesting was not one of the fundamental pillars of citizenship according 
to this framework. Yet, the electoral hegemony of AKP and its re-articulation of state and 
society relations may have caused CHP voters to obtain a more critical stance towards 
this framework of loyalty. For them, protesting is a fundamental citizenship liberty now 
as they consider themselves to be the target of government repression. Given that CHP’s 
most recent electoral manifestos criticize the government policies regarding the 
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individual and organizational liberties, its voters’ perceptions can be said to be in line 
with the manifesto as well.  
 
 Perceptions Regarding Rule of Law 
 
Rule of law is an essential aspect of a liberal democracy as it ensures equal 
treatment of all and limiting government’s power. These aspects make a democracy 
liberal mainly because of the protection they grant over individual rights. Procedural 
definitions of democracy do not explicitly refer to rule of law as one of the fundamental 
elements of a democratic polity. Yet, for these accounts elections should be administered 
in a free and fair manner where all the actors abide by the rules of the game. In that sense, 
rule of law as a system of rules and regulations is something inherent in the procedural 
aspect of democracy as well. These rules and regulations, when applied to all individuals 
in an equal manner, function both as a limitation on government’s power and a tool for 
protection individual’s sphere of action from any external interference, including the 
state’s (O’Donnell 1998: 113). Hence, rule of law plays an important role in securing 
individual rights and liberties and as a result preventing a democracy to be reduced to 
majoritarianism.  
Rule of law is one of the subcategories of Freedom House’s checklist of civil 
liberties. Within the survey, perceptions on rule of law were investigated through five 
different items. These items included statements regarding the state of judicial 
independence and discrimination, processes of detention and arrest, and forced migration. 
Statements concerning judicial independence and discrimination by the courts paint a 
positive picture while statements on processes of detention and arrest and forced 
migration state the problems regarding these issues.   
One of these statements is about the independence of judiciary. As stated above, 
rule of law is essential for liberal democracy as it ensures equality before the law and 
restrictions on excessive government power. Yet, without an independent judiciary, rule 
of law cannot carry out these functions effectively. The most recent Freedom House 
report indicates the problems regarding rule of law and specifically independence of 
judiciary in Turkey. The report underlines the processes of appointments, promotions and 
financing of judges as being open to heavy government influence (Freedom in the World 
2016 p.5). In addition, in the aftermath of corruption allegations against government 
officials emerged on December 2013, “thousands of police officers, judges, and 
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prosecutors were reassigned,” while government introduced new regulations enhancing 
its control over the Higher Council of Judges and Prosecutors, which is responsible for 
appointments (Freedom in the World 2016 p.5). As the score for this subcategory is 6 out 
of 16, the report considers the situation of rule of law dire.  
The survey statement, on the other hand, proposes that judicial institutions are 
independent from political influence and those who disagree with this statement can be 
said to have perceptions that are in line with the Freedom House report. The distribution 
of responses show that it is mostly CHP and HDP voters in the sample that consider 
judiciary to be under political influence. Especially the lack of variation within the HDP 
group is very significant. Although more than half of MHP voters disagree with the 
statement, the rest of the group displays variance in terms of responses. 24% of AKP 
voters disagree with the statement but almost half of them consider judiciary to be 
independent. In other words, either AKP supporters do not consider their preferred party 
to be influencing the judiciary or they do not consider government influence to be 
disruptive of judicial independence. The affirmative perceptions regarding the 
independence of judiciary may result from the majoritiarian understanding of democracy 
promoted by AKP. This understanding considers representation of the national will to be 
the ultimate source of legitimacy, which delegitimizes institutional limits on executive 
power. Hence, AKP voters’ agreement with the statement may suggest that recent 
institutional arrangements under AKP governments may be considered as reforms 
securing executive powers instead of jeopardizing rule of law. 
 
 
The second and third survey items are related with the equal treatment of all by the 
judicial institutions. Discrimination is investigated through two separate statements: there 
is no discrimination on the grounds of different religious convictions and different ethnic 
backgrounds.  
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The distribution of the responses to the first item displays slightly more variation 
than the independent judiciary statement. More than half of AKP voters agree and 
majority of HDP voters disagree, but level of disagreement among CHP voters is less 
than the other judiciary related statement. MHP voters display variation once again but 
those who strongly disagree are larger than those among the CHP group. The low level 
of disagreement among CHP voters compared to other civil liberties items is unexpected 
because of their oppositional stance. Disbelief in the independence of judiciary should be 
followed by agreement in discrimination. It might be possible that CHP voters have a 
short-sighted vision concerning religious others as they have never been considered as 
such by the official understanding of citizenship. In addition, the secular 
conceptualization of citizenship suggests religious identities to remain in the private 
sphere. Because of this reason, CHP voters may not consider religious convictions to be 
grounds of discrimination.  
 
 
 
The second item investigates the perceptions regarding discrimination along ethnic 
identity. The correlation between the items on discrimination is high and positive (0.698), 
which suggests that responses to these two statements are positively associated with each 
other, those who agree with one of the statements, also agree with the other. The most 
visible difference is the amount of HDP voters who strongly disagree with the second 
statement. As 74% of HDP voters self-define their ethnicity as Kurdish, it is not surprising 
to see a significant majority of them consider judicial institutions to be discriminating 
against those with different ethnic identities. In addition, being the age-old other of the 
official narrative of citizenship, Kurds may be more aware of and sensitive to 
discrimination on ethnic grounds. The fact that the level of agreement among MHP voters 
is very similar to the previous statement is also interesting because MHP defines its stance 
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as nationalistic, prioritizing Turkishness and MHP group in the sample is predominantly 
Turkish (97%). In fact, 42% of them disagree with the statement, situating them closer to 
CHP and HDP groups.  
Moreover, CHP voters’ relatively reluctant stance towards discrimination against 
different ethnicities compared to the responses to other civil liberties items displays the 
boundaries of their critical stance to a certain extent. As “different ethnic backgrounds” 
can be understood as referring to Kurds, discrimination against them by the courts is not 
as important for CHP voters compared to their perceptions in other civil liberties items. 
In a way, CHP voters’ perceptions reflect the influence of the official understanding of 
citizenship that had been established upon the predominance of a single ethnic identity.  
 
 
 
The remaining two survey items are more specific to the context and they are 
worded to reflect the actual situation instead of indicating a positive scenario. The first 
one is related with the detention and arrest procedures and their impact on individual 
rights. As one of the fundamental functions of rule of law in a liberal democracy is to 
guarantee non-interference to individual rights and equality of all, procedures of detention 
and arrest should be within a clear, open and stable framework of rules and regulations. 
In other words, existence of rule of law requires these procedures to be free from any 
arbitrariness and ensures protection of rights and liberties while carrying out 
investigations. These requirements are related with both implementation of relevant legal 
framework and the relevant laws themselves. For instance, the current anti-terror 
legislation in Turkey leaves room for arbitrary interpretation and has been heavily used 
against critics (Freedom in the World 2016 p. 5).  
A new security legislation adopted in March 2015 has provided a legal framework 
for the extensive police powers utilized in practice in the aftermath of Gezi protests. This 
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legislation provides enhanced authority to the police to “carry out surveillance, searches, 
and detentions without court orders.” (Freedom in the World 2016 p.5) In addition, with 
the Resolution Process (“Çözüm Süreci” in Turkish) halted in the aftermath of June 2015 
elections, the conflict between PKK and the armed forces has resumed while many 
Kurdish civilians and politicians have been detained for helping and promoting terrorist 
discourses (Freedom in the World 2016 p.5).  
The Resolution Process started with then-prime minister Erdoğan’s announcement 
of negotiations with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in December 2012. Parties 
to those negotiations included officials of Turkish Intelligence Agency (MİT) and other 
state organs, as well as parliamentarians of the pro-Kurdish political party of the era, 
BDP. In March 2013, Öcalan’s letter to the armed wing of the Kurdish movement was 
announced during Newroz celebrations in Diyarbakır, where he demanded armed PKK 
guerrilla to leave Turkey. This request was fulfilled and PKK guerilla started to leave 
Turkey in May 2013. Despite the recurring provocations and threats from both sides to 
end peace talks, the Resolution Process obtained legal guarantee when a law passed in 
July 2014. On February 2015, in a joint press conference, government officials and HDP 
members declared that the government would realize the democratization demands 
proposed by Öcalan and in return, Öcalan would call for a disarmament congress. This 
was the peak of the Process, but it was not followed through by both parties. Instead the 
clashes between PKK and the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) started in the summer of 
2015 and marked the end of the Process.108 
 The clashes between PKK and the TAF have restarted in the form of urban warfare 
and most of the urban population in Southeast Anatolia had to leave their houses and 
migrate to different parts of the country. Hence, during the time when the survey was 
conducted, detention and arrest processes were in violation of civil citizenship liberties, 
as they are not in line with principles of rule of law, while numerous Kurdish citizens 
were forced to migrate. The survey items reflect this situation. 
The first item here, “the processes of detention and arrest are in violation of 
citizenship rights”, acknowledges violations in arrest and detention procedures. 4% of the 
sample chose not to respond to this statement. Among those who responded, it is the HDP 
voters overwhelmingly agree with the it. Although CHP voters respond in a similar 
                                                 
108 For a working paper on the chronology of the process see Yeğen, M. (2015) “The Kurdish Peace Process in 
Turkey: Genesis, Evolution and Prospects” Working Paper, retrieved from: 
http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/gte_wp_11.pdf  
 284 
manner to the HDP voters in the sample, only 28% of them strongly agree. The level of 
agreement between AKP and MHP voters are similar (25% and 34% respectively), yet 
level of disagreement is also similar. For both of AKP and MHP groups, there emerge 
two distinct tendencies: on the one hand one-thirds of each group disagree with the 
violations, on the other hand there is a reasonable segment in both groups that 
acknowledge these violations. Especially the MHP group seems to be divided into two. 
Also, MHP group leans slightly closer to AKP for this statement compared to the other 
civil rights items, which is in line with the party’s stance in cases of security and order. 
The most recent electoral manifesto of the party has numerous references to national 
security and importance of order. In that sense, disagreeing segment of the MHP group 
in the sample reflects their preferred party’s position.  
 
 
 
The last item here is about forced migration. Forced migration is not a new issue in 
Turkish political history. In addition to the forced migration procedures during the early 
20th century targeting non-Mulism populations, Kurdish minority has faced with this issue 
throughout the republican history (Kurban et al. 2008). After Sheikh Said rebellion in 
1925, large Kurdish tribes were forced to move to the Western Anatolia to prevent another 
rebellion to be formed. More recently, during 1990s when the armed clashes between 
PKK and the Turkish Armed Forces were intensified, a significant number of Kurdish 
citizens were forced to leave their villages or towns by the security forces. Although the 
previous practices of forced migration were acknowledged by the officials later, 
especially within the context of Resolution Process; reignited clashes between PKK and 
the Turkish army created a very similar phenomenon. As the urban warfare broke out 
between Kurdish insurgency and the armed forces, state of emergency was declared for 
numerous cities, towns and districts, which had caused inhabitants of these areas to 
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evacuate their homes. Human Rights organizations109 estimate that approximately 
400,000 individuals had to migrate. Hence, the survey item implicitly refers both to these 
recent events and those happened in the past.  
Level of agreement among HDP voters is remarkable and not surprising given the 
party’s stance, demographic composition of the group (74% of them identify themselves 
as Kurdish) and theoretical arguments emerging from the literature on Turkish citizenship 
and political landscape which expect those excluded to have critical awareness of their 
rights and liberties.  
One interesting outcome of the distribution of responses is the division within 
MHP: percentages of those who agree (or strongly agree) and those who disagree (or 
strongly disagree) are the same. MHP voters who agree do not seem to share the 
nationalistic stance of MHP. This statement provides another example of the divisions 
within the group and how some MHP voters have diverted from their party’s position.  
Another interesting outcome emerges within AKP group. There is significant 
variance in terms of responses; those who agree with the statement compose almost half 
of the group (48%). This can be a result of AKP’s past efforts in recognizing rights 
violations that Kurdish minority had experienced as well as past discourses devised to 
attract Kurdish vote. In other words, AKP electorate was once exposed to their party’s 
strategic stance towards recognizing past violations of rights, which can lead the more 
AKP voters in the sample to acknowledge rights violations. It is also unexpected from 
CHP voters to have high level of agreement as forced migration is a critical aspect of the 
Kurdish issue, which has not found much room within CHP’s manifestos. In addition, the 
understanding of citizenship of the old center that CHP historically represented has 
denied the civil liberties of the ethnic minorities. The correspondence between the 
perceptions of HDP and CHP voters is not as significant as other civil liberties items, 
which demonstrates that forced migration is not a hot topic in CHP voters’ agenda 
concerning civil liberties.  
                                                 
109 Amnesty International (2016) “Yerinden Edilen ve Mülksüzleştirilenler: Sur Sakinlerinin Eve Dönme Hakkı” 
Retrtieved from: http://hakikatadalethafiza.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/2016.12.06_AmnestyReport_displaced_and_dispossessed_tur.pdf  
Güneydoğu Anadolu Belediyeler Birliği (GABB) (2016) “Hasar Tespit and Zorunlu Göç Raporu: Kent 
Merkezlerinde Gerçekleşen Çatışmalar Sonrası Durum” Retrieved from: http://hakikatadalethafiza.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/2016.06.30-GABB_HasarTespitveZorunluGoc_Raporu_TR.pdf  
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When rule of law is conceptualized as a guarantee against a majoritarian practice 
of democracy, its defense requires a more substantive understanding of democracy that 
protects individual rights and liberties. The current political landscape where AKP has 
established its electoral hegemony and has been promoting a majoritarian vision of 
democracy leads AKP supporters to disregard violations of rule of law. Whereas the 
acknowledgment of the problems related with rule of law is high HDP and CHP voters in 
the sample. HDP voters’ acknowledgment reflects the historical exclusion of the minority 
that the party has represented; their defense of rule of law is the strongest one in the 
sample. CHP voters’ acknowledgment is not as extreme but when the dismantling of the 
old center is concerned, their perceptions as the newly excluded groups are not surprising. 
The recurring reluctance of MHP voters to criticize such violations demonstrate both the 
internal variation within the group and its statist and nationalistic position, which are 
evident in the statements related with ethnicity. 
According to Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu’s (2018:45) analysis where they separately 
investigated determinants of favorable attitudes towards detention without trial, tapping 
phone conversations and stop and search people randomly, voting for CHP decreases the 
likelihood of agreeing with such measures, while voting for HDP does not have 
significant effect in any of them. Voting for AKP is only significant for and supportive 
of stopping and searching people randomly, while voting for MHP has a significant 
impact only on phone tapping where these individuals do not think government should 
be able to tap phones. This finding is controversial because the relevant question uses 
suspicion of a terrorist attack as a condition for authorities to have rights to violate civil 
liberties. Given that MHP manifestos prioritize security and order over rights and 
liberties, it is surprising to see that there is a divergence between MHP voters in ISSP 
Government survey sample and their party’s status concerning civil liberties.  
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 Perceptions Regarding Personal Autonomy and Individual 
Rights 
 
Last subcategory within the battery of civil liberties judgments is about personal 
autonomy and individual rights. This category has a variety of different survey items 
ranging from protection of private property and non-interference to the private sphere of 
the individual to women being able to enjoy their rights autonomously. Although the 
statements bundled in this category touch upon different issues, underlying all of them 
lies the same problem: conditions of the individual’s sphere of action.  
An important issue that falls within this category is related with women’s rights. 
Despite the fact that women’s rights deserve a specific category, Freedom House 
categorizes issues such as violence against women within this subsection. The same 
report points out the increasing levels of violence against women and debates surrounding 
the efficiency of government programs aiming at solving this issue. A more specific take 
on this issue is related with the judicial cases regarding violence against women. The 
relevant survey item states that courts punish those who use violence against women, be 
them their spouses or family members, in an effective and adequate manner. There has 
been a significant increase in the cases of domestic abuse and violence against women110, 
which has sparked public debate around this issue. The public nature of this issue is 
reflected in the distribution of the answers to the related survey item. In addition to the 
overwhelming majority among CHP and HDP voters who disagree with the statement, a 
significant amount of MHP voters (68%) also have a similar tendency. In contrast to the 
other civil rights items, this time more than half of AKP voters (54%) also consider courts 
as not adequately punishing the perpetrators. It is not clear whether AKP and MHP 
supporters share their parties’ conservative take on women’s rights, but violence against 
women emerges as one of the issues where the perceptions of each voter group are closer 
to each other. 
                                                 
110 Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu released a report at the end of 2016, which suggests that the number 
of femicide cases has increased since 2011. The data can be found on: 
https://kadincinayetlerinidurduracagiz.net/veriler/2786/kadin-cinayetlerini-durduracagiz-platformu-2016-yili-raporu  
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A more general take on the issue of women’s rights is about the performance of 
state policies designed to protect individual rights of women. Here, the tendency of AKP 
voters emerge in the responses to the violence against women disappears; similar to the 
other civil rights items, more than half of AKP voters in the sample think state policies 
protect women’s rights. CHP and HDP voters’ responses are similar to each other, while 
MHP voters lean more towards to the rest of the opposition.  
Considering that all of these parties have touched upon the issue of women in their 
latest electoral manifestos, albeit with different perspectives, the variety of responses 
display an interesting link between these individuals’ perceptions and their parties’ 
stances towards the issue. For instance, AKP’s and MHP’s manifestos take on women’s 
issues and rights are more within a framework of family and social unity. The distribution 
of responses show that AKP voters in the sample agree with their party’s position 
regarding this issue as they think that these policies protect women’s rights. In addition, 
individual rights of women are not essential for the self-proclaimed conservative political 
actors, so they can disregard the practical and political aspects of women’s rights. 
Moreover, the hegemonic position of AKP may be causing its supporters to affirm 
government policies as state policies and thus they provide their consent. Whereas the 
disagreement of half of the MHP’s voters show that these individuals may not agree with 
their party’s stance.  
CHP and HDP’s manifestos put clear emphases on women’s issues while explicitly 
criticizing lack of efficient policies. This stance is reflected in the responses of CHP and 
HDP voters in the sample as they considerably disagree with the statement. This 
disagreement is also in line with both parties’ and their electorates’ secular tendencies 
regarding rights of women, as this survey item is positively correlated with religiosity111.  
                                                 
111 The correlation coefficient is 0.406.  
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When these two issues are considered together, it can be argued that perceptions on 
the state’s role in protecting women’s rights reflect the partisan divisions but a more 
specific issue such as violence against women has a wider appeal in the sample that shows 
the issue’s potential to cross partisan boundaries. Moreover, the high level of strong 
disagreement among HDP voters in the sample is striking and calls for further study. It is 
possible that HDP voters are more critical towards women’s rights reflecting the party’s 
position in its June and November 2015 elections.  
Women’s independent sphere of action can also be considered within the umbrella 
of women’s rights. A specific survey item on this issue suggests that women can make 
their voting decision without being under pressure or influence either from their spouses 
or families. The distribution of responses by CHP and HDP voters display their critical 
stance towards this issue. Both as parties of secular opposition, perceptions of their 
supporters demonstrate concern about women’s independence. MHP voters in the sample 
demonstrate the variety of perceptions among themselves; less than half of them disagree 
but the rest of the group have different perceptions. Although more than half of AKP 
voters agree with the statement, it is not an overwhelming majority which suggests that 
AKP voters in the sample have some doubts concerning the individual autonomy of 
women.  
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The last two items within the subsection on personal autonomy and individual rights 
are related with the autonomous decisions of the family in its private sphere. More 
specifically, the survey statements focus on children and their education, as well as the 
family decisions regarding procreating.  
The number of children a family decides to have is a private matter that must be out 
of the range of government intervention. Yet, throughout the world there are various cases 
where governments introduce specific policies designed to promote child birth or regulate 
it. President Erdoğan often makes remarks about promoting child births and advices 
young couples to have more than one children. In fact, the Ministry of Family and Social 
Policies has introduced specific policies that provide payments to women who give birth 
where the amount of payment increases with the number of children112.  
Different in wording than the most of the other civil rights statements, the relevant 
item states that there is government intervention in the family’s private sphere through 
policies promoting child birth rate. Hence, agreement with this statement signifies 
acknowledgment and criticism of the issue. The amount of CHP and HDP voters who 
agree with the statement is in line with these individuals’ overall perspectives concerning 
civil liberties, while MHP voters’ perceptions are also explicitly closer to that of CHP 
and HDP voters. While CHP and HDP voters’ criticism can be explained by their 
preference for modern lifestyle113 to be critical of the interventions, it is counter-intuitive 
to see high level of agreement with the statement among MHP voters in the sample. The 
party represents conservative nationalists with specific emphasis on traditional family and 
loyalty to the state and MHP voters in the sample describe their lifestyles as “traditional 
conservative.”  Half of AKP voters disagree but the dispersion of the rest of the responses 
show that there are various degrees of agreement among them as well. The 24% of AKP 
voters who agree may be interpreted as a sign of disturbance with the government policies 
on family, despite the general tendency to affirm the position of the incumbent party in 
other aspects of civil liberties.  
                                                 
112 http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/3-cocuk-doguran-anneye-1-300-liralik-devlet-destegi-yasalasti-28847165  
113 According to the Perceptions Survey, 74% of CHP voters and 65% of HDP voters describe their lifestyles as 
“modern”, while 55% of AKP and 57% of MHP voters choose “traditional conservative”. 
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The last survey item within this category is about the education of children. 
Education is a public matter but the way it affects children’s outlook also makes it a 
private matter as well. Especially with the ever-changing curriculum, criticized by civil 
society for becoming more religious oriented, there may arise a rift between families’ 
own values and religious convictions and children’s education. In fact, religious 
education has been a subject of debate because of its explicit Sunni Islam reference, which 
was turned into an elective course after a decision by the ECHR114.  
The relevant survey item states that children are being oriented towards a specific 
religious understanding in schools, which is similar to the previous item in terms of its 
wording. Disagreement among AKP voters is not overwhelming, but the fact that almost 
half of AKP voters disagree suggest that their perceptions reflect the dominance of 
religious values in the conceptualization of citizenship115. The dispersion among MHP 
voters is significant because the party appeals to religious voters, hence they are expected 
to support religious orientation at schools. Yet, MHP voters’ perceptions do not confirm 
these expectations.  
HDP voters and CHP voters display a coherent perception regarding this matter, 
where they overwhelmingly agree with the statement. CHP supporters’ perceptions are in 
line with the expectations concerning secular understanding of citizenship. The modern 
secular composition of HDP voters in the sample may have caused these individuals to 
demonstrate concern over religious-oriented education, in addition to their explicit critical 
position regarding government policies. 
                                                 
114 Eylem Zengin v. Turkey (2014) Retrieved from: http://www.aihmiz.org.tr/?q=en/node/94  
115 In 2006, the Ministry of Education censored a citizenship education textbook’s cover for including the 
reproduction of the painting Liberty Leading the People by French painter Eugene Delacroix. The reason for 
censorship was the bare breasts of Liberty in the painting. Retrieved from: http://www.milliyet.com.tr/-ozgurluk-e-
sansur/siyaset/haberdetayarsiv/20.10.2006/174979/default.htm Also discussed by İnce (2012:180-181). 
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It seems that there is a clear divide about the perceptions concerning civil rights 
between the parties. Most of the time AKP and MHP voters perceive the state of civil 
rights in Turkey in the same way, while CHP and HDP voters are close to each other in 
that sense.  
 Turkish citizenship was conceptualized as a passive, duty-laden status with a 
significant emphasis on loyalty to the nation and state. As civil liberties prioritize 
individual sphere of action against the intrusions of the political authority, this construct 
suggests that claiming civil liberties is unlikely for Turkish citizens except from those 
who are excluded from the official definition of citizenship and thus are subjected to 
violations of their liberties. Not being able to fully enjoy their liberties makes such 
individuals to be more aware of the state of civil liberties. Considering this construct of 
citizenship, the target electorate of HDP emerges as the historical other of Turkish 
citizenship and thus their perceptions regarding the current state of civil liberties are 
clearly critical.  
 The current political landscape is dominated by AKP as the party has won the 
elections since 2002. AKP’s hegemony has its reflection on its voters, perceptions of 
whom demonstrate affirmation of the practice of civil liberties. As they are no longer the 
targets of violations of civil liberties, their perceptions do not carry criticism. In addition, 
AKP’s hegemonic power to define the demos and thus the ideal citizen through its 
preferred values has caused CHP to adopt a critical stance concerning citizenship. 
Because of this power discrepancy, CHP voters may consider their civil liberties to be 
ignored or violated and develop similar perceptions to those HDP voters, who have 
experienced violations of such liberties as well.   
 MHP voters’ perceptions are less homogeneous than the voters of other parties 
in the sample. On the one hand supporters of MHP demonstrate critical perceptions 
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concerning civil liberties, on the other hand, their criticisms are not as clear as CHP and 
HDP voters. Although the reasons for such variation require further in-depth studies, one 
can argue that the emphases on security and order in MHP’s citizenship understanding 
have their reflection on perceptions as well. Prioritization of these values may cause MHP 
voters to remain reluctant in criticizing the current state of civil liberties compared to 
voters of CHP and HDP.  
 
9.7.3 Social Rights 
 
The survey items discussed so far are designed via Freedom House’s checklist of 
questions. As the focus of Freedom House reports is about countries’ levels of freedom 
measured through civil liberties and political rights, its checklist does not include social 
rights.  
Yet, Marshallian perspective on citizenship considers social rights as an essential 
part of citizenship rights alongside civil liberties and political rights. Marshallian 
narrative on citizenship identifies social rights as the latest addition to the citizenship 
rights framework. Emerged through grassroots demands of lower classes, especially 
workers, institutionalization of social rights has influenced establishment of welfare state 
and provision of services. 
For Marshall (1950, 1992) social rights and social benefits are important for 
attaining the ideal of equality between citizens who have differences in terms of 
resources. These differences indicate inequality among members of a polity damaging 
the underlying assumption of equality. Social rights and related social benefits help to 
reduce the impact of these inequalities for the disadvantaged citizens. In that sense, social 
rights, such as public education, healthcare or housing indicate claims “to a modicum of 
economic welfare and security.” (Marshall:1950,1992:8)  
 Different from other categories, the contribution of social rights is not about 
guaranteeing the individual’s autonomy from external interventions as in the case of civil 
liberties, or providing channels for the individual to participate in the decision-making 
procedures as in the case of political rights. Rather, the focal point for social rights is to 
mitigate the impact of market capitalism in the society. In response to the market 
capitalism’s atomistic understanding of the individual, a social rights-based perspective 
prioritizes solidarity and equality in the society. This perspective underlines the 
detrimental effects of market capitalism on the social well-being of lower social classes 
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as “the market place is indifferent to the vagaries of life.” (Turner 2009:66) Incorporation 
of social rights into the institutional framework of citizenship means acknowledgment of 
inequalities created by untamed market capitalism.  
 For Marshall (1950: 69), social rights are necessary for ensuring everyone to 
be able to “live the life of a civilized being,” which suggests elevating the material well-
being of disadvantaged groups to the level of the rest of the society. In that sense, 
Marshallian understanding of citizenship incorporates social rights to inject principles of 
equality into a capitalist setting through the provision of services. Receiving services such 
as publicly funded healthcare and education, pensions, job security, housing…etc. puts 
those who are ignored by the atomistic logic of the market at a relatively equal position 
with the rest of the society and ensures that they can enjoy other citizenship rights and 
liberties. Hence, institutionalization of social rights is more related with the principle of 
equality rather than the principle of liberty. Yet, this difference does not create a conflict 
within the Marshallian framework as his conception considers the three dimensions of 
citizenship to be complementing each other.  
When citizenship is considered as a collection of rights, it is important to cover all 
three rights categories corresponding to citizenship. For that reason, a set of statements 
concerning the normative perceptions and perception on the actual state of social rights 
were added in the survey developed for this research. This addition does not only ensure 
a comprehensive look at citizenship rights, it also provides insight into individuals’ 
perceptions on social rights and their practice, which has not been researched adequately 
in Turkish citizenship literature.  
 
 Perceptions and Social Rights 
 
The literature on public opinion provides some insight into the attitudes towards 
social rights and social services. According Hooghe and Oser’s  (2017) study on European 
public opinion on social and political citizenship, the importance that citizens of 29 
countries covered by the European Social Survey 2012 data put on social rights does not 
vary significantly along ideological positions. In other words, respondents positioned at 
right or left consider social rights to be essential for democracy. Those who emphasize 
social rights are relatively more educated and reside in countries where income inequality 
is high.  
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In a more recent article Oser and Hooghe (2018) revisit their earlier finding on the 
relation between income inequality and support for social rights. Their comparison 
between public opinion in European countries and the US demonstrates that even though 
income inequality is high in the US, support for social rights is significantly lower than 
European countries. Authors’ suggested explanation for this exception is the influence of 
market economy on citizenship understandings (Hooghe and Oser 2018:27-28). More 
specifically, in contexts where competitive market economies dominate, citizenship 
attributes are more related with the dynamics of the market, rather than the state’s 
allocation of resources as in the case of social rights. Hence, US citizens living in a market 
economy put less emphasis on social rights. Fraser and Gordon (1992) explain the lack 
of “social citizenship” through the construction of citizenship in American political 
culture, where the notion of “contract” that is intrinsic to civil liberties constitutes the 
foundation of the idea of citizenship. Hence, instead of universal social rights, welfare 
benefits are based on privatized contracts between individuals and companies or specific 
governmental programs. Where such contracts do not exist, the government provides aid 
to the “deserving poor” in a charitable way (Fraser  and  Gordon 1992: 60-61).  
Another study that focuses on Israeli citizens’ perceptions regarding citizenship 
rights suggests that in contexts where there is power discrepancy between dominant 
groups in the society and minorities, rights that can potentially disturb the status of the 
dominant group receive less support (Ariely 2011). More specifically, Jewish citizens of 
Israel support the inclusion of Arab citizens in the sphere of social rights more compared 
to cultural and political rights. Ariely (2011: 256) argues that the reason for this 
discrepancy is that social rights, defined as “universal allocation of rights to welfare” by 
the author, provide less power to the minorities compared to cultural autonomy rights and 
political representation rights. Because of this reason, Jewish citizens, constituting the 
dominant group in Israeli society, are more likely to support extension of social rights to 
Arab citizens than the extension of political representation and cultural autonomy rights.  
In her research concerning the attitudes towards social rights and policies in Turkey, 
Arıkan (2013) investigates the influence of values and religiosity on support for welfare 
policies. The findings demonstrate that having “self-transcendence values” such as 
“concern for the well-being of others, helping those in need and protecting the welfare of 
all people” are associated with support for redistributive policies and government 
responsibility in taking care of disadvantaged groups (Arikan 2013: 36, 42). In addition, 
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being religious increase the support for government responsibility and redistribution 
(Arikan 2013: 45).    
This brief review on existent studies suggest that while individuals display similar 
attitudes towards social rights, level of income inequality and power discrepancy of 
different groups in the society, as well as conservative and religious values can have an 
impact on the levels of support for social rights and welfare policies. 
 
 Welfare State Transformation in Turkey 
 
The early Republican period’s ideal of citizenship with her duties, loyalty and 
belonging to the nation-state had influenced the way in which social rights were 
conceptualized by the new regime. The hegemony of the state had resulted in a corporatist 
understanding of social rights where the provision of services was carried out in order to 
project an image of “a classless nation.” (Kartal 2009:35-36)  
In that sense, similar to the civil and political rights, social rights did not emerge 
out of popular struggles; rather they were provided from above by the state in a selective 
manner. Although it had failed to institutionalize social rights in comparison with welfare 
state regimes, 1961 Constitution opened up new channels for popular demands regarding 
social rights as the constitution was vocal about numerous rights and liberties. 
 Turkish welfare state system before the governments of AKP was established on 
the employment status of the citizens (Powell and Yörük 2017:89). There were different 
healthcare and retirement plans for civil servants, workers, and the self-employed. The 
provision of services was based upon the relative contribution of the employed 
population. Yet, informal employment has always been an issue for the Turkish labor 
market, which had caused a rift among citizens where the unemployed or the informally 
employed did not have access to healthcare services and basic welfare provisions. The 
discrepancies that emerged because of the structuring of the welfare system were 
remedied by extended family networks, agricultural subsidies and tolerance towards 
informal housing in urban areas (Eder 2010: 159).  
Another policy tool was the introduction of the Green Card program in 1992. 
Designed to provide basic health care services to the poor and those who were outside of 
the employment-based welfare system, the Green Card program had been implemented 
by the local administrations through a means-test to ensure that the applicants meet the 
criteria. This program was criticized for its instrumentalization by the AKP governments. 
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Yörük (2012) argues that the Green Card program, which provides free healthcare for the 
poor, has specifically targeted Kurds and Kurdish-populated regions, as the regression 
analyses controlling Green Card eligibility and socioeconomic variables demonstrate the 
significance of ethnic identity in obtaining the Green Card. His explanation for this 
targeting is AKP’s instrumentalization of the Green Card program to contain the potential 
of unrest among poor and internally displaced Kurds as well as generating electoral 
support among them (Yörük 2012:536-538). Yoltar’s (2009:779) ethnographic study 
demonstrates that Green Card-holders are not satisfied with the program because of 
uncertainties and voice their desire for a more structured social security system. The 
program was later incorporated into the General Social Security (GSS) scheme, which 
was introduced in 2012 (Hazama 2015: 37).   
 The economic crisis of 2001 had a huge impact on all economic indicators and 
material well-being of the society. Already being challenged by the neoliberalism of 80s, 
the welfare state system had failed to respond to the deteriorating welfare of the society. 
Hence a reform was necessary and was carried out under AKP government.  
 In the new welfare system (Eder 2010: 167-169; Buğra 2012; Buğra and 
Keyder 2003) many aspects of retirement plans, education and healthcare systems were 
privatized under the large-scale reform package, while state is still involved in these 
services to a certain extent making the social security regime “eclectic.” (Buğra and 
Candaş 2011) The new healthcare system, for instance, has extended state-sponsored 
healthcare services to private hospitals that are contracted with Social Security Institution 
(SGK). This new system had increased the volume of beneficiaries, as it extended the 
provision of healthcare services. But, at the same time, this provision is dependent on co-
payments by the patients to both public and private healthcare institutions which has 
increased the out-of-pocket spending per capita. Increase of the out-of-pocket spending 
has impacted the poor more substantially because of income inequality in the country. 
But, analyses conducted on nationally representative samples display that low-income 
groups are satisfied with the system more than the upper-income groups (Hazama 2015: 
48).  
 Even though overall social security system was partly privatized, state was not 
in retreat in the classical sense. The state now allocates or directs public funds to 
intermediaries for providing social assistance to those in need. This change is interpreted 
as gradual devolution of welfare responsibilities of the state to the local or national 
intermediaries or charity organizations (Bozkurt 2013, Eder 2010, Kaya 2015).   
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 The use of intermediaries and the complex and vague characteristic of by-laws 
have caused a patronage network to emerge within the social assistance scheme. In other 
words, the discretion of the local officials while distributing social assistance goods and 
services, such as the Green Card, have made the system open for abuse in the hands of 
clientelistic networks. In addition, the social assistance programs carried out by 
intermediaries such as municipalities, rely on provision of goods in kind in a non-systemic 
and inconsistent manner that seems to be used for electoral purposes (Eder 2010: 178, 
Yörük 2012, Yılmaz 2015). Hence the social assistance aspect of the new welfare regime 
has not made state disappear altogether but has turned state into a multi-branched machine 
of social assistance provision. Moreover, relying too much on public and private 
intermediaries providing inconsistent and non-systemic social assistance in kind indicates 
that the system is not established upon a rights-based understanding of welfare; rather the 
underlying perspective is more charity based.  
The new welfare system and scheme of social rights have also been criticized by its 
heavy emphasis on family and its function in establishing neoliberal policies. Kaya 
(2015:60-61) underlines the rhetoric of family in party programs replacing state’s 
responsibility in providing social care to the disabled, elderly, and children. Similarly, 
Yazıcı (2012) also points out the function of “family” in disguising the diminishing role 
of state in providing social protection. In fact, the discourse emphasizing family has also 
helped AKP governments to primarily target poor families for cash or in-kind transfers 
and hence establish a relation of indebtedness between the party and the disadvantaged 
segments in the society (Yılmaz 2015). 
Overall the current state of the welfare state in Turkey suggests that policies of 
welfare state and social assistance programs are not implemented through a perspective 
based on social rights. Instead, the new welfare system is eclectic and open to be 
instrumentalized. Hence, designed and implemented by AKP governments, social 
services and assistance programs are utilized to enhance the electoral, and to a certain 
extent discursive, hegemony of the party, which can be received with support by the 
electorate of AKP. Yet, the same strategy can lead opposite attitudes among those who 
vote for other parties, as they may perceive these services to be applied in a biased 
manner. 
The next subsections will focus initially on the normative perceptions regarding 
social rights and then on the perceptions concerning the actual practice of these rights. 
The social rights used in this research are chosen to reflect the basic aspects of welfare 
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state. Specifically, public education, public healthcare, employment assistance, and social 
aid in-kind are chosen as particular social rights to assess the perceptions of the 
respondents.  
 Perceptions Regarding the Ideal of Social Rights 
 
The duty-laden, passive understanding of citizenship in Turkey indicates that 
citizenship rights and liberties did not emerge out of revolutionary struggles, but provided 
by the political authority. Hence, it is not expected from citizens to prioritize their rights 
and liberties over duties.  
 Although this argument also applies to social rights, the survey results on the 
perceptions on social rights suggest a different outcome. Statements on normative 
perceptions include items on public education116, public healthcare117, employment 
assistance118, and aid in-kind119. The responses to the survey items on education and 
healthcare display a clear convergence of perceptions among the survey participants. 
Drastically different from the responses to the items on civil liberties and political rights, 
political party divisions disappear when it comes to perceptions of social rights.  
 
 
                                                 
116 Survey item no 22: “Bence eğitimin her seviyesinin ücretsiz olması sosyal haktır.” / “Free education at every level 
is a social right” 
117 Survey item no 32: “Bence sağlık hizmetlerinin ücretsiz sağlanması sosyal haktır” / “Free healthcare services is a 
social right” 
118 Survey item no 13: “Bence işsiz vatandaşlara iş bulunması sosyal haktır” / “Finding jobs for the unemployed is a 
social right”  
119 Survey item no 25: “Siyasal partilerin seçim öncesinde dağıttıkları yakacak, yiyecek vb. yardımların sosyal hak 
olduğunu düşünüyorum” / “Aid in-kind distributed by political parties prior to elections is a social right” 
Survey item no 23: “Devletin ara sıra yakacak ve yiyecek gibi yardımlar yapması yerine daha kalıcı sosyal haklara 
sahip olmak isterim” / “I would like to have entrenched social rights instead of occasional aid in-kind provided by the 
state” 
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 Similarly, the survey statements on employment assistance and entrenchment of 
social rights also demonstrate the converge of perceptions within the sample.  
 
 
 
 
 
Hence, contrary to the expectation of a passive understanding on rights and 
liberties, the sample of the survey perceive education, healthcare and employment 
assistance to be social rights. A recent survey on government performance120 demonstrate 
                                                 
120 ISSP Government 2016. The survey was administered by Ersin Kalaycıoğlu and Ali Çarkoğlu between August 
and Novermber 2017. Its raw data is not publicly available yet, but the results are presented in a research report by 
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that national security, unemployment, inflation, education and economic instability are 
the most important problems facing Turkey according to the respondents (Çarkoğlu and 
Kalaycıoğlu 2018). Given this picture, it is expected from survey respondents to consider 
education and employment assistance as social rights, albeit the duty-laden and passive 
understanding of citizenship. Moreover, unemployment benefits, education and 
retirement and pension funds are amongst the social policy areas where respondents want 
state to spend more, while providing jobs, healthcare for the sick, and unemployment 
assistance are considered among the responsibilities of the government in Turkey 
(Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2018: 27-29). Although public healthcare was not considered 
among the problematic issues in Turkey, it is also considered as a social right and 80% 
of ISSP Government survey participants want state to spend more money on healthcare 
provisions. 
In addition, these perceptions are very similar amongs different party groups, which 
is also an unexpected finding given the partisan differences emerged in the case of civil 
liberties and political rights. It is possible that the high unemployment levels and issues 
related with education are perceived as non-partisan problems, which contribute to the 
converge of perceptions within the sample. Also, considering that the most recent 
electoral manifestos of all parties have significant emphasis on social rights, despite the 
differences in their frameworks, there is correspondence between the perceptions of 
voters of these parties with the manifestos. 
For instance, according to ISSP Government data presented by Çarkoğlu and 
Kalaycıoğlu’s (2018:18-20) research report, more than 70% of respondents want 
government to finance projects for new jobs and increase its spending for the declining 
industries. In addition, when the authors control for several demographic variables and 
self-positioning on the political spectrum, partisan differences between respondents 
disappear in the case of government spending (Çarkoğlu  and  Kalaycıoğu 2018:26).  
The last item within the normative statements on social rights frames provision of 
aid in-kind prior to elections as a social right. By this framing this statement aims at 
assessing the perceptions regarding social assistance provided by political parties. Such 
provisions generate electoral gains for AKP governments and have been instrumentalized 
accordingly. Thus, this statement investigates whether respondents consider such 
provisions as social rights policies or not. 
                                                 
the authors. These results will be referred to in this chapter. Report can be accessed here: 
http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/CitizenStateInterfaceReport_Kalaycioglu_Carkoglu.pdf 
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The distribution of responses demonstrates a different outcome compared to the 
other normative statements on social rights. Similar to the perceptions on civil liberties 
and political rights, the level of disagreement is high among CHP, MHP and HDP voters, 
while AKP voters are split into two: 37% of them agree (or strongly agree) while 37% of 
them disagree (or strongly disagree) with the statement. This agreement among AKP 
voters echo the arguments in the literature on social assistance. AKP voters in the sample 
consider aid in-kind to be a social right, which is an important part of the social assistance 
scheme developed under AKP governments. Although provision of aid in-kind is 
instrumentalized for vote-maximization or rewarding those who are loyal to the party, it 
is considered as a social right by the incumbent party voters. It is likely that these voters 
think of such provisions as social policies and attach importance to them. 
 
 
 
 
 Perceptions Regarding the Current State of Social Rights 
 
The survey items constructed using Freedom House methodology concern the 
actual state of civil liberties and political rights. To ensure internal consistency of the 
survey, a series of statements regarding the actual state of social rights are included in the 
survey. Addition of these items also provide information about the satisfaction of 
individuals on the policies that they consider as social rights. Moreover, considering the 
increase of the volume of social services and needs of citizens, it is important to 
investigate the perceptions regarding these services.  
As discussed in the previous subsection, several welfare state policies are chosen 
as social citizenship rights. These include employment assistance, public healthcare and 
education services. When asked whether they agree with the item stating that state’s 
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assistance to the unemployed for findings jobs is a social right, a significant majority of 
the sample agreed. When it comes to the performance of the state carrying out this 
function, the results change. CHP and HDP voters disagree with the statement, while 
almost half of the supporters of the government in the sample consider employment 
assistance policies to be satisfactory. MHP voters’ responses show more variation than 
other voter groups albeit almost 50% of them report dissatisfaction. 
 
 
 
The results of the statement on the performance of public education services are 
also different from the normative perceptions. While the respondents display agreement 
over free education being a social right, it is the AKP voters in the sample that are satisfied 
with the actual policies of public education. Opposition voters, except from MHP 
supporters whose perceptions are dispersed, are not satisfied with state’s performance in 
providing free education. Those who agree with the statement among MHP voters (38%) 
are slightly more than those who disagree (31%).  
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Similarly, while the whole sample agrees upon the item stating that free healthcare 
is a social right, only half of the AKP voters are satisfied with the performance of the 
government in providing free healthcare services. While almost all of the HDP voters and 
more than half of the CHP voters state dissatisfaction.  
 
 
 
The perceptions on the actual performance on welfare state policies demonstrate a 
similar outcome to those concerning the actual state of civil liberties and social rights. 
While almost half of supporters of the government are satisfied with the services, CHP 
and HDP voters are not. In fact, the level of disagreement among HDP voters is higher 
than those of CHP voters in the case of performance of welfare state policies. Among 
these items, MHP voters have affirmative perceptions only for the performance of public 
education services; for the rest of the items their perceptions display variation. Çarkoğlu 
and Kalaycıoğlu’s (2018: 29-31) research note on ISSP Government data demonstrates 
that although providing jobs, healthcare for the sick and unemployment assistance are 
considered as responsibilities of the government, AKP and MHP voters are less inclined 
to think these services as government responsibilities compared to other political party 
identifiers. It is possible that these voters have dispersed perceptions due to their low 
inclination towards keeping the government responsible for delivering these services.  
The last two items are about social assistance. As social assistance has become 
prevalent and more diversified under the new welfare system introduced by AKP 
governments, it is included within the scheme of social rights. Although the respondents 
want entrenched social rights instead of occasional social assistance in form of aid in-
kind, they have distinct perceptions concerning the performance of state carrying out this 
function. Half of AKP voters in the sample consider state’s performance in social 
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assistance to be satisfactory, while more than half of HDP voters disagree with the 
statement. CHP voters’ perceptions are not as negative compared to their responses to 
other survey items. MHP voters’ perceptions are almost divided into two: those who agree 
and those who don’t are similar in numbers. 
 
 
  
Related with the previous statement, the last survey item on social rights 
investigates the perceptions on social aid on the basis of political party preferences. The 
literature survey on the transformation of welfare state suggests that the increase of social 
aid mechanisms is instrumentalized for vote maximization. This argument implies that 
social aid is a tool for establishing clientelistic ties between parties and their electorate 
(Eder 2010, Buğra and Candaş 2011, Aybars and Tsarouhas 2010). Even though the 
relevant survey item does not directly measure clientelistic ties, it is included to 
investigate differences in perceptions on social aid between opposition party voters and 
the supporters of the governing party. 
 CHP and HDP voters in the sample have similar perceptions as they disagree with 
the statement on social aid reception. They think that those who receive social aid are 
voters of the incumbent party. 48% of MHP voters also disagree with the statement, 
whereas more than half of AKP voters agree. The responses given to this survey item 
demonstrate that, in the perceptions of opposition parties’ voters, current social aid 
policies are viewed as benefitting the constituency of the incumbent party.   
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The discrepancy between the normative perceptions on social rights and the 
perceptions on the actual state of these rights implies that respondents in the sample have 
a sense of social rights but their satisfaction with the services differ along their party 
preferences. Voters of the incumbent party consider government’s performance in 
providing social services and assistance as successful. This finding echoes Çarkoğlu and 
Kalaycıoğlu’s (2018) analysis of their most recent survey data121. The report argues that 
evaluations of government performance in providing social welfare services are primarily 
shaped by party preferences as supporters of the incumbent party have more favorable 
perceptions whereas voting for opposition parties is associated with lower levels of 
satisfaction (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2018:65-66).  
On other hand, supporters of all opposition parties have somewhat critical 
perceptions regarding the implementation of social rights. Still they have differences 
within themselves. While HDP voters and to a certain extent CHP voters perceive 
implementation of social rights as unsatisfactory, MHP voters’ perceptions are mostly in 
between agreeing with the incumbent party supporters and agreeing with voters of other 
oppositional parties. For Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2018: 16) it might be expected from 
AKP and MHP voters to think similarly considering their increasing rapprochement after 
elections in 2015.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
121 The authors primarily use ISSP Government II survey data and the interviews were conducted between August 
and November 2017. The raw data of this specific survey is not available as of now.  
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9.8 Discussion of the Findings 
 
Existing literature on citizenship rights and liberties in Turkey suggests that the 
official conceptualization of citizenship is a duty-oriented, passive status with emphases 
on loyalty to the nation, state and ethno-religious connotations. Although the survey does 
not focus on this definition particularly, acknowledgment of certain rights by the 
respondents means that citizens do think that they have developed a sense of rights, 
despite the orientation towards duties.  
Majority of the questions in the survey are inspired by the Freedom House checklist. 
Hence if there are responses reflecting the Freedom House reports produced by this 
checklist, it can be said that a segment of the participants has a similar perception 
regarding the state of their rights and freedoms with the Freedom House reports, which 
underline the deterioration of civil liberties and political rights in Turkey.  
The respondents seem to be divided into two camps when it comes to the current 
state of their civil and political rights. For voters of the two opposition parties (CHP and 
HDP) there occurs significant violations of citizenship rights and liberties in Turkey. For 
MHP voters the current state of civil liberties and political rights is not that problematic 
but at the same time, they consider certain rights as being violated to a certain extent. 
Hence perceptions of MHP voters in the sample are dispersed compared to the other voter 
groups. For AKP voters in the sample, civil liberties and political rights are perceived as 
respected and protected.  
The survey items on social rights demonstrate a division in perceptions. Normative 
statements on social rights are agreed upon by the sample to a large extent. The responses 
do not display a variation on the basis of partisan differences. Yet, when it comes to the 
evaluation of the government in providing welfare services, responses start to change in 
accordance with the party preferences of the respondents. While AKP voters’ perceptions 
demonstrate satisfaction with services, other respondents who voted for the opposition 
parties are not satisfied.  
The survey results demonstrate that differences in perceptions on citizenship rights 
and liberties correspond to the party preferences of the respondents. Individuals who 
acknowledge and recognize their political, civil and social rights, as well as their 
violations are CHP and HDP voters in the sample, while AKP voters have opposing 
perceptions. MHP voters are in between the oppositional respondents and the supporters 
of the government. The incumbency advantage of AKP may have influenced the 
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perceptions of its supporters, as they tend to approve status quo. As discussed above, 
those who experience exclusion and violations of their rights and liberties have awareness 
of the state of citizenship rights and liberties. This awareness suggests a potential among 
these individuals for demanding liberalization of citizenship rights and liberties, as well 
as protection of them from infringements.  
In the next section, the findings will be discussed in terms of the convergences and 
differences within the sample. 
 
9.8.1 Convergences of Perceptions within the Whole Sample 
 
 The overall distribution of the responses display contrasting perceptions, yet when 
the normative statements on social rights are concerned, the partisan differences 
disappear. For the respondents, public education, healthcare, and employment assistance 
are social rights, while they demand entrenchment of social rights compared to occasional 
social aid.  
 These responses imply that issues related to social services are not perceived 
through a partisan lens. Given that unemployment, education, and social welfare are 
amongst the most important issues alongside with national security, it is not unexpected 
to see that normative perceptions regarding these issues display convergence (Çarkoğlu 
and Kalaycıoğlu 2018). In other words, for the issues that have an impact on citizens’ 
material well-being, perceptions do not change according to the party preferences. This 
finding is also in line with ISSP Citizenship II survey results. 79% of the respondents in 
the ISSP Citizenship II survey consider healthcare to be a very important citizenship right 
in Turkey. The distribution of responses to this survey item also reveal that respondents 
do not have different perceptions regarding this issue.  
 
Table 14 Percentages of those who consider healthcare "Very Important" and 
"Important"  for democracy (ISSP Citizenship II 2014) 
How important is it that health care be provided for everyone in a democracy (ISSP 
2014) 
Very Important and Important 
BDP CHP MHP AKP 
96,6% 97,1% 95,0% 97,1% 
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 There are also other instances where perceptions display convergence across 
different party supporters. Among the civil liberties items, statements on media 
broadcasting, and judicial decisions concerning violence against women are the ones 
where respondents have similar perceptions. While more than 50% of each group think 
that broadcasts prior to the elections are biased, the level of agreement reaches 60% in 
the statement concerning court decisions concerning perpetrators of violence against 
women. Perceptions on the biasedness of media seem to be influenced by the polarization 
of news consumption that is underlined in public opinion polls. As the sources of news 
change according to the party preferences, it is possible that each group consider their 
preference of TV channels or newspapers to be unbiased while considering others as 
biased. Yet, the convergence of perceptions in this issue suggest that individuals do not 
consider media organs to be broadcasting in an impartial manner. This convergence also 
echoes the low level of confidence that citizens of Turkey have for the press. 
 
Table 15 Trust in the Press (World Values Survey Wave 6 2010-2014) 
 
  
Convergence of perceptions regarding the violence against women and court 
decisions on the perpetrators worth closer attention. The distribution of responses for this 
item shows that for AKP and CHP groups, disagreement is greater among females than 
males, while it is the opposite for MHP and HDP groups. It is possible that the higher 
disagreement among males in latter group is due to the high numbers of males in them122.  
                                                 
122 There are 35 females and 65 males in HDP group and 36 females 63 males in MHP group. 
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9.8.2 Convergences of Perceptions of Opposition Party Voters 
Concerning Political Rights 
 
Within political rights items there are a few instances where CHP, MHP and HDP 
voters’ perceptions converge and differentiate from AKP voters’ perceptions. One of such 
instances is about the accuracy of vote count. When respondents are presented with the 
item stating that they trust the accuracy of the vote count after elections, voters of 
opposition parties in the sample concur in their disagreement with it. In fact, the reactions 
to this survey item present one of the clear cases where the perceptions of voters of 
opposition parties come very close to each other. In terms of percentages, 72% of CHP 
voters, 70% of MHP voters, and 85% of HDP voters disagree (or strongly disagree) with 
the item.  
In another instance, when respondents are presented with an item stating that 
“governments that come to power via elections are not able to carry out their duties 
because of external obstacles,”123 the level of disagreement is over 50% for each 
opposition party group.124 In other words, these individuals in the sample disagree with 
the statement on external obstacles preventing government to do its job. Individuals who 
                                                 
123 “19: Seçimle iş başına gelen hükümetler engeller ile karşılaştıkları için görevlerini yapamıyorlar”.  / “Elected 
governments cannot do their jobs because of obstacles” 
124 53% of MHP, 63% of CHP, and 74% of HDP voters disagree (or strongly disagree) with the statement 
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voted for the incumbent party consider the statement to be agreeable125 compared to the 
rest of the sample.  
A similar convergence of perceptions exists when monitoring the government’s 
actions are concerned. The relevant survey item suggests that the government’s actions 
are being monitored.126 For the opposition voters, such monitoring does not exist127, while 
AKP voters in the sample have a clearly different perception regarding this matter. Hence, 
once again, compared to the voters of AKP, individuals voting for the opposition has a 
clear stance about this issue, which is in line with the findings of Freedom House reports 
stating problems with the excessive power of the government.  
 Within the bundle of political rights, two instances where opposition party voters 
have converging perceptions are related with the functioning of the government. Voters 
of the opposition parties in the sample consider the government to be free of external 
obstacles while carrying out their duty and that their actions are not being monitored. 
Such perceptions imply that voters of opposition parties do not think that government 
power is limited. In fact, the perception of the government as a non-monitored entity 
functioning without any obstacles is in line with the expectations arising from the 
electoral hegemony established by AKP. It is possible that these respondents consider 
themselves vulnerable against the excessive power of the government especially when 
they do not support the incumbent party. For that reason, their critical stance concerning 
their state of political rights is not surprising. In addition, these perceptions on political 
rights are similar to the criticisms made by their preferred parties in their most recent 
electoral manifestos.  
 
9.8.3 Convergences of Perceptions of Opposition Party Voters 
Concerning Civil Liberties 
 
When civil rights and liberties are concerned, the divergences between the 
opposition and the incumbent becomes even clearer. The survey items where opposition 
parties’ constituencies have converging perceptions include those about free media128, 
                                                 
125 48% of AKP voters agree (or strongly agree) with the statement, while 20% of them disagree (or strongly 
disagree) 
126 24: “Hükümetin icraatlarının denetlenebildiğine inanıyorum” / “I believe that government’s actions are 
monitored” 
127 59% of MHP, 86% of CHP, and 95% of HDP voters disagree (or strongly disagree), while 50% of AKP voters 
agree (or strongly agree) 
128 26: “Gazeteciler ve televizyon kanalları her konuda özgürce haber yapabiliyor” / “Journalists and TV channels can 
broadcast freely about any topic” 
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right to protest129, independent judiciary130, and women’s rights131. In the sub sections 
below, each of these instances will be analyzed separately.  
 
 Free Media 
 
 The voters of the opposition parties in the sample have converging perceptions on 
several issues related with civil rights and liberties. One of them is about the current 
condition of media in Turkey. The relevant item states that newspapers and TV channels 
can broadcast about any matter freely. Freedom House’s current rating for press freedom 
in Turkey is “Not Free,”132 where its score is 71 out of 100 (100 signifies the worst 
position). The institution lists “prosecution of prominent journalists,” arbitrariness in the 
“regulations for journalistic accreditation,” “instances of acute violence toward the 
media,” and the changing ownership of various media outlets and resulting change of 
editorial directions favoring the government (Freedom in the Press 2016)133. These 
observations suggest that media is not free in terms of its editorial decisions about 
broadcasting. The relevant item in the survey depicts a completely different picture for 
the respondents. Agreement with it means positive perceptions on the recent conditions 
of media freedom in Turkey, whereas disagreement portrays similar perceptions as the 
Freedom House report suggests. 
The responses given to this item displays convergence among the voters of 
opposition parties compared to the voters of the incumbent party, as at least 50% of the 
CHP, MHP and HDP voters in the sample find this survey item disagreeable. Whereas 
for the voters of the governing party, the media is free as more than half of the agree with 
it.  
 An important point to note here is the conflictual perceptions regarding media. In 
another item that is on media, where it is suggested that media organs broadcast in a 
biased manner,134 there emerges a moderate convergence among the whole sample. More 
than 50% of each party group agree or strongly agree with the statement. Although the 
                                                 
129 18: “Ülkemizde protesto eylemlerinin herhangi bir engelleme ile karşılaşmadan düzenlenebildiğini 
düşünüyorum”, 21: “Protesto eylemlerine katılanların yaşamlarının güvende olduğunu düşünüyorum”, 30: “Protesto 
eylemlerine katılanların ifade özgürlüklerinin güven altında olduğunu düşünüyorum” 
130 31: “Yargı kurumlarının siyasetten bağımsız hareket ettiklerine inanıyorum” 
131 39: “Devlet politikalarının kadınların bireysel haklarını koruduğunu düşünüyorum” 
132 This the score in 2016. The most recent press Freedom score is 76 out of 100, which signifies a decrease in press 
freedoms. 
133 From the report Freedom of the Press. Retrieved from: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/turkey  
134 16: “Basın ve medya kuruluşlarının seçim öncesinde taraflı yayın yaptığını düşünüyorum” / “I think media 
broadcasting prior to elections is biased” 
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responses to this item represents an overall convergence, instead of only among the 
opposition, it also displays a conflictual perception among the voters for the incumbent 
party when it is observed together with the item on free media. It seems AKP voters in 
the sample perceive media to be free and biased at the same time. 
 
 Right to Protest 
 
 Another instance where one can observe convergence of perceptions is about the 
right to protest. Most recent Freedom House report (“Freedom in the World 2016: 
Turkey”) lists the problems related with right to protest in Turkey, including the new 
legislation passed on April 2015 which grants police force the authority to fire on 
demonstrators, as well as ongoing prosecutions of Gezi protesters.135 In other words, 
current state of right to protest in Turkey is not entirely guaranteed and protected.  
 There are two survey items about right to protest in the survey and individuals 
who voted for the opposition seem to have similar perceptions regarding this matter. One 
of the judgments suggest that there are no obstacles for organizing a protest136. More than 
half of each opposition party group disagree with the statement, while almost half of the 
AKP voters display agreement. Although the opposition party voters have clearly 
different perceptions than incumbent party voters, it is important to note that there is 
variation within the former group. For instance, in this statement, level of disagreement 
in CHP and HDP voters137, is a lot higher than the level of disagreement among MHP 
voters138. Such differentiation among opposition party voters is a recurring issue which 
will be discussed at the end of this section.  
 
 Independent Judiciary 
 
 Independent judiciary is one of the tenets of liberal democracy and there have 
been structural issues pertaining to it in Turkey. According to the report of Freedom 
House, changes in the composition of Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors, as 
well as the sudden reassignment of thousands of judges and prosecutors during the 
                                                 
135 Retrieved from: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/turkey  
136 “Protestoların bir engellenme ile karşılaşmadan düzenlenebildiğini düşünüyorum” / “I think protests can be 
organized without any obstacles in Turkey” 
137 90% of CHP and 95% of HDP voters disagree with the statement 
138 57% of MHP voters disagree with the statement 
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corruption allegations in 2013 display problems in terms of the independence of judiciary 
from political power. Given this context, the relevant survey item139 suggests that judicial 
institutions act independently from political power in Turkey. Opposition party voters 
mostly disagree with the judgment: CHP and HDP voters demonstrate a stronger 
disagreement (94% and 99%) while MHP voters are a bit more reluctant to disagree 
(59%). AKP voters, on the other hand, are more confident in the independence of 
judiciary compared to the rest of the group, 47% of them consider judiciary to be 
independent.  
 Women’s Rights 
 The last bundle that the voters of opposition parties seem to have converging 
perceptions concerns the condition of women and their rights in Turkey.  
 The relevant survey item suggests that state policies protect women’s rights140. 
More than half of each of the opposition party voters display clear disagreement with this 
judgment, although there are more individuals who disagree within the HDP group (94%) 
compared to CHP and MHP groups (80% and 54%). More than half of AKP voters agree 
(or strongly agree) with the judgment (53%). 
 The distribution of responses for the first item shows that for each of the 
oppositional party group, females are more dissatisfied with the state policies regarding 
women’s rights. Whereas within AKP group, females demonstrate less dissatisfaction 
than males.  It is possible that incumbency advantage is at work here priming AKP voters 
to have favorable perceptions regarding their preferred party’s policies. 
  
                                                 
139 “Yargı organlarının siyasetten bağımsız karar verdiğini düşünüyorum” / “I think judicial institutions are 
independent from politics” 
140 “Devlet politikalarının kadınların bireysel haklarını koruduğunu düşünüyorum” / “I think that state policies are 
protecting women’s individual rights” 
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9.8.4 Dispersion of Perceptions within the Voters of the Opposition 
Parties 
 
Although the analyses of survey items demonstrate that perceptions of opposition 
party voters are different than those of AKP voters concerning civil liberties and political 
rights, responses of MHP voters display clear variation in a lot of items. HDP and CHP 
voters in the sample have internally coherent perceptions where the majority of the groups 
disagree or agree with a given statement. MHP voters are more reluctant to disagree or 
agree compared to CHP and HDP groups in civil liberties items on freedom of expression, 
protests, religious pluralism, discrimination on ethnic and religious grounds, processes of 
arrest and detention and forced migration. In addition, their disagreement on the necessity 
of electoral threshold and government performance on social welfare services is also less 
significant than CHP and HDP groups. 
When these issues are considered together it seems MHP voters are not as 
dissatisfied as the CHP and HDP voters in the sample concerning the current state of civil 
liberties and political rights. More specifically, the dispersion of their responses to items 
on freedom expression, social and political equality, and violation of liberties by state 
organs (as in the case of forced migration and arbitrary arrest and detention processes) 
indicate that they are reluctant to recognize violations of citizenship rights and liberties 
compared to the voters of CHP and HDP in the sample.  
In addition, some of these survey items where MHP voters have dispersed 
responses compared to HDP and CHP voters are related with protection of civil liberties 
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from the intrusions of political authority. Being able to protest without obstacles, or 
recognition of habeas corpus principle in the processes of attention and arrest are among 
such civil liberties. The reluctance of MHP voters in the sample in defending these civil 
liberties indicates that concerns for order and security might confuse these individuals’ 
perceptions.  
Similarly, perceptions of MHP voters are scattered for the survey items on 
discrimination against different religious and ethnic groups and the necessity of electoral 
threshold compared to CHP and HDP voters. These items are related with different 
aspects of social and political equalities in the society. Those who disagree with these 
items recognize the problems concerning such equalities. Given that the citizenship 
understanding represented by MHP prioritizes a specific ethnic and religious identity, its 
voters may be less inclined to recognize discriminations against other identities. 
 These observed discrepancies carry the potential to be used as potential 
hypotheses in further research. 
 
 
9.9 Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented the data collected through the original survey designed for 
this research. The survey responses to the items on civil liberties, political rights, and 
social rights demonstrate that the perceptions on these items differ along political party 
preferences. More specifically, AKP voters in the sample predominantly agree with the 
survey items, which suggest that these citizenship rights and liberties are not violated in 
the context of survey application. Whereas the voters of opposition parties in the sample 
are generally in disagreement with the same statements indicating that they have critical 
perceptions and more awareness concerning citizenship rights and liberties. 
The difference between perceptions of incumbent party voters and opposition 
party voters is most visible in the items on the current state of civil liberties, political 
rights, and social rights. To put it differently, opposition party voters are critical towards 
the current practice of civil liberties, political rights, and the services related with social 
rights. Normative statements on social rights are the only items where differences in 
perceptions on the basis of political parties disappear. Majority within each group 
display agreement with the items of healthcare, education, employment assistance and 
entrenchment of social rights.  
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Although the differences in perceptions of the voters of the incumbent party and 
voters of the opposition parties are clear, there is also visible variation within the 
opposition as well. Perceptions of MHP voters in the sample are not as internally 
homogeneous as those of CHP and HDP voters. Especially for issues concerning freedom 
of expression and protests, religious pluralism, discrimination against ethnic and religious 
groups, processes of arrest and detention, forced migration, and the necessity of electoral 
threshold, MHP voters are less critical than the other oppositional party voters. 
In the following chapter, which is the conclusion, these findings will be interpreted 
in the light of the arguments developed in the rest of the dissertation.
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 CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
Significance of the Study 
 
 
This research is based on the survey study measuring how citizens with different 
political party preferences perceive their citizenship rights and liberties. The primary aim 
is to uncover the differences in perceptions regarding the current state of civil liberties, 
political rights, and social rights on the basis of one’s political party preferences.  
The literature on political parties identify parties as agents of mobilization 
representing different demands and interests in the society. In other words, parties 
mobilize certain demands or interests of the electorate that they claim to represent. In that 
sense, it is reasonable to expect them to differ from one other while representing and 
mobilizing different groups with distinct demands and interests. 
 The literature suggests a correspondence between political party preferences and 
attitudes on social and political issues. Not only political parties may claim to be the 
representatives of specific issues or ideological positions; individuals may also prefer 
political parties that they find to be close to their positions. Regardless of the causal 
direction, there is a relationship between one’s political attitudes and political party 
preferences. This study investigates whether a similar relationship can be found between 
perceptions of citizenship rights and political party preferences.  
As this study focuses on the perceptions on citizens in Turkey, it is necessary to lay 
out the foundational pillars of official understanding of Turkish citizenship. The literature 
review on Turkish citizenship demonstrates that the official construct of Turkish 
citizenship prioritizes a specific identity, as well as obedience to the state and promotes 
duties instead of rights. In addition, the practice of Turkish citizenship regime has 
promoted a specific ethnic and religious identity where Kurds, Alevis, and non-Muslims 
are constructed as others of Turkish citizenship. Although this idea of citizenship 
envisions a secular individual, it also promotes Sunni Muslim identity practiced within 
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the confines of the private sphere. In short, the ideal Turkish citizen is constructed as 
someone who is either ethnically Turkish or assimilated into the Turkish identity; is a 
Sunni Muslim who refrains from publicly manifesting her religious identity; is passive 
and obedient towards the state while fulfilling her duties towards the state and community 
to be able to enjoy her rights and liberties granted by the political authority. This construct 
has excluded certain identities and practices both in theory and in practice. The 
exclusionary logic and practice of Turkish citizenship has sparked various challenges to 
the official construct. The excluded identities and practices offer alternative accounts of 
citizenship emphasizing rights and liberties as they demand for recognition and 
incorporation. These alternative accounts cannot make an impact unless they are 
politically mobilized. In fact, a brief look into the Turkish political party landscape 
demonstrates that such challenges have been mobilized by outsiders of the political 
system.  
In Şerif Mardin’s terminology, these outsiders or excluded identities are named as 
the periphery, while center constitutes those who have the political power to shape 
society’s central values and institutions. In Mardin’s account center is composed of a 
group of political, military, and judicial elites that have control over the values of the 
society, central institutions, and the distribution of resources. Periphery, in this account, 
is composed of individuals, groups, identities, and practices that are at the receiving end 
of the value transmission controlled by the central actors and institutions.  
Reinterpreting the center-periphery argument in terms of citizenship 
understandings, I consider these excluded identities as the inhabitants of the periphery, 
which is distant to the locus of power that defines the demos, i.e. the center. This 
periphery, with its complexity and plurality, is mobilized by political parties through 
politicizing its demands for recognition and incorporation. For that reason, those who 
prefer peripheral political parties are expected to have a more rights-oriented 
understanding of citizenship, whereas those who prefer parties representing the values of 
the center are expected to be compliant to its projection of citizenship. Survey findings 
are interpreted with these expectations in mind. 
The survey items are composed of positive statements on the current state of civil 
liberties, political rights, and social rights while the annual reports of Freedom House, 
methodology of which has inspired the survey items, demonstrate numerous violations of 
these rights and liberties. Hence disagreement with the survey items indicates awareness 
of such violations and a potential for having a rights-oriented understanding of 
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citizenship. The distribution of the answers to the survey questions on civil liberties and 
political rights demonstrate that differences in political party preferences are reflected in 
the perceptions of the respondents on the current state of these liberties and rights. 
More specifically, respondents who reported that they voted for CHP and HDP in 
the last general elections disagree with the survey items the most. Their disagreement 
suggests that these individuals have more awareness concerning the violations of these 
liberties and rights while carrying the potential for demanding the protection of such 
liberties and rights. On the other hand, individuals in the sample who voted for AKP 
provide contrasting responses; they predominantly agree with the survey items which 
indicate lack of awareness or ignorance concerning rights violations. To put it differently, 
AKP voters’ perceptions on their political rights and civil liberties do not indicate a 
reformist potential that can be mobilized for democratization. Whereas MHP voters’ 
responses to the same survey questions are not homogeneous. While for some survey 
questions the level of agreement within the group is very similar to the level of 
disagreement. That dispersion, and the relatively low level of disagreement compared to 
the voters of CHP and HDP, situates MHP voters somewhere in between those who voted 
for other oppositional parties and those who voted for AKP. For instance, in statements 
on accuracy of the vote count, functioning and monitoring of the government, 
independence of the judiciary and women’s rights, MHP voters have closer perceptions 
to those of CHP and HDP voters albeit with some reluctance as the level of disagreement 
among MHP voters is clearly less than those of CHP and HDP voters. For items on ethnic 
and religious discrimination, religious liberties, processes of arrest and detention, and 
forced migration MHP voters are closer to AKP voters in terms of their perceptions. 
The differentiation between the incumbent party voters and oppositional party 
voters for the survey statements on civil liberties and political rights disappears in ones 
on biased media broadcasting prior to the elections and court decisions concerning the 
cases of violence against women. These two issues emerge as common problems for all 
the sample as in each party group level of disagreement is high.  
There is only one category within citizenship rights and liberties used in this 
research where the differences in party preferences are not reflected in the perceptions. 
This category includes the survey items on the ideal of social rights. Responses to those 
items, which can be called as normative perceptions on social rights, display a consensus 
within the sample. Majority of the sample consider healthcare, education, employment 
assistance, and entrenchment of social rights as social citizenship rights. This consensus 
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on such normative items imply that for issues that have an impact on the material well-
being of citizens, the impact of partisan differences disappears. The partisan differences 
reemerge for the items on the social services and provisions: while AKP voters display 
satisfaction with these services, oppositional party voters have contrary perceptions.  
The findings point out the reflection of political party preferences on the 
perceptions concerning citizenship rights and liberties. While AKP voters’ perceptions 
consider the state of civil liberties, political rights, and provision of social services to be 
unproblematic, voters of CHP and HDP, and to a certain extent MHP, demonstrate 
awareness of the violations of these rights and liberties. In fact, it is mostly CHP and HDP 
voters that display critical perceptions and awareness of citizenship rights and liberties. I 
argue that reinterpretation of center-periphery dichotomy through citizenship 
understandings will help to analyze the differences of perceptions between the incumbent 
party voters and oppositional party voters.  
This reinterpretation of center-periphery dichotomy focuses on citizenship 
understandings and defines center as a locus of power which grants central political actors 
the power to define the ideal citizen at the expense of certain identities and practices. 
Periphery, on the other hand, is composed of excluded and marginalized identities and 
practices. Those in the periphery are expected to have alternative citizenship 
understandings that challenge the ideal citizen projected by the center. Position of AKP 
in terms of citizenship understanding during its early term posed a challenge by 
mobilizing demands of inclusion of previously excluded segments of the society. Yet, 
with the establishment of its electoral hegemony, AKP has become a central actor with 
exclusive political power. In other words, AKP’s current electoral hegemony situated the 
party as the inhabitant of the center, which provides the party the power to delegitimize 
some demands and identities while promoting others (Gümüşçü 2013). Hence AKP now 
can produce, project, and maintain its own understanding of demos.  
In response to this development, the former representative of the center which has 
dismantled with AKP’s electoral hegemony, CHP has relocated to a more excluded and 
peripheral position. CHP voters who identify with the secular old center are marginalized 
due to the new ideal of Turkish citizenship projected by AKP. Experiencing distance and 
exclusion from the new definition of the demos lead to being the inhabitants of the 
periphery in terms of citizenship. Within the new political configuration, CHP voters are 
located in the periphery of the new center that pronounces religious identity. As being in 
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the periphery is expected to be associated with demands for inclusion and recognition, 
CHP voters carry the potential for having a rights-oriented understanding of citizenship.  
Meanwhile, a substantive amount of HDP’s electorate are composed of Kurds, who 
have been the historical others of the official construct of Turkish citizenship. The 
disregard for their demands of recognition and inclusion, except during the era when the 
government was negotiating with PKK in 2013 and 2015, indicates that they have always 
been the inhabitants of the periphery. Given that the party claims to mobilize other 
disregarded groups such as LGBTQ individuals or feminists, it represents a collection of 
peripheral identities. In that sense, individuals preferring HDP have a more rights-
oriented understanding of citizenship, challenging the official construct.  
The analyses on survey data demonstrates that the differences in party preferences 
are reflected in the differences in perceptions. While AKP voters consider citizenship 
rights and liberties in Turkey to be enjoyed without any limitation or violation, CHP and 
HDP voters, and to a certain extent MHP voters, have critical perceptions regarding the 
same issue. The compliant perceptions of the majority of AKP voters in the sample 
indicate that they disregard existing violations of citizenship rights and liberties. In other 
words, they support the status quo. These perceptions of AKP voters in the sample 
establish that AKP’s occupancy at the center has a reflection on its electorate.  
Whereas the majority of CHP and HDP voters in the sample demonstrate clear 
disagreement with the proposition that citizenship rights and liberties are enjoyed without 
any problems. Considering that CHP is the new inhabitant of the periphery, which is 
ensured by AKP’s entrenchment as a central political actor, while HDP (and its 
predecessors) has been mobilizing the historical others in the periphery, the perceptions 
of the voters of these parties in the sample are confirming the expectations. In other 
words, it is those who are excluded have more rights-oriented understanding of 
citizenship and that is reflected in their critical perceptions.  
The survey responses of MHP voters in the sample are not as critical as the other 
opposition party voters, while at the same time the level of agreement among them is not 
as high as AKP voters. Especially in some categories of civil liberties and political rights, 
perceptions of MHP voters are more dispersed compared to the other opposition party 
groups. The detailed analyses on such cases demonstrate that the citizenship 
understanding of MHP which promotes order, security, Turkishness and religious 
conservative values may be related with the ambiguous perceptions among this group. 
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In sum, the empirical analyses on the original survey designed for this research 
maintain that the potential for actively demanding protection and entrenchment of 
citizenship rights and liberties exists among those who are in the periphery, defined as a 
collection of excluded and delegitimized identities and practices. Their dissatisfaction 
with the current state of citizenship rights and liberties and their awareness and 
acknowledgement of violations of these rights and liberties make them more likely to 
demand rights, liberties and democratization. Being positioned at the center seems to lead 
to ignorance of the violations of rights and liberties and a desire to maintain the status 
quo.  Identifying the periphery and its current inhabitants as carrying the potential for 
claiming citizenship rights and liberties is relevant to the Turkish citizenship literature as 
it follows up on the previous arguments about the exclusionary foundations of the official 
construct and the constant challenges against it. This study identifies the segments of the 
electorate that carry the potential for posing such challenges that may lead to the 
recognition and protection of citizenship rights and liberties in the current configuration 
of Turkish politics. 
Moreover, the interpretation of center-periphery as a competition between different 
citizenship understandings offers a new reading of the political party landscape in Turkey. 
The peripheral actors have mobilized demands and interests within the periphery to obtain 
control over the center, which provides political power to define demos. In that sense, 
political competition has been about defining the borders separating us from them 
Different definitions stem from the different positions of political parties. For instance, 
the utilization of national will as a discourse by the peripheral actors starting with 
Democrat Party (DP) is an example of how political parties project their own conceptions 
of citizenship; i.e. those who are included in the definition of demos. 
This research contributes to the citizenship literature by incorporating political 
party preferences as relevant dimensions of citizens’ perceptions on their rights and 
liberties. In addition, it offers a new interpretation of the center-periphery dichotomy from 
a citizenship perspective. This interpretation contributes to the literature on political 
parties in Turkey by offering a reading of the political party landscape in terms of 
citizenship understandings. 
Lastly, the findings of this research indicate that partisan preferences are reflected 
in the perceptions on civil liberties and political rights, while for social rights they do not 
have the same reflection. This discrepancy suggests a break with the existing literature. 
On the one hand, works on Turkish citizenship underline the duty-laden, passive status 
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of citizenship which decrease the potential of Turkish citizens to have a rights-oriented 
citizenship understanding. On the other hand, the consensus that the sample reached for 
the normative social rights items suggests that there is potential for a rights-oriented 
understanding of citizenship to emerge in the case of citizens’ material well-being. In 
other words, duty-laden understanding of citizenship may be challenged via demands for 
institutionalization of social rights. 
   
Limitations of the Study  
 
The interpretation of center-periphery dichotomy in terms of citizenship 
understandings explains the critical perceptions of CHP and HDP voters and the uncritical 
perceptions of AKP voters. Yet, it cannot fully explain the ambiguity of the responses of 
MHP voters. Although they display disagreement with most of the survey items, their 
critical stance is less emphasized than other oppositional party voters situating them in 
between AKP voters and the voters of CHP and HDP. MHP and its electorate have never 
been the others of the official construct of Turkish citizenship, which should lead to 
positive perceptions on the current conditions of citizenship rights and liberties. In other 
words, absence of exclusion means less or no violations of rights, which lead to disregard 
or denial of existent violations. Yet, perceptions of MHP voters display a certain level of 
criticism against the current state of citizenship rights and liberties, albeit it is relatively 
less significant compared to other opposition party voters. In other words, it is not 
possible to situate MHP and its electorate in the periphery, but some of its voters in the 
sample have critical perceptions. At the same time, this criticism is not as significant 
compared to that of CHP and HDP voters, situating MHP voters’ perceptions closer to 
those AKP voters. The argument proposed by this research should be refined through 
further studies to understand the variation within the MHP group. 
Another limitation of this study is contextual. The survey was applied in April 2016, 
almost three months prior to the July 15 coup attempt. The coup attempt became a turning 
point in Turkish political and social context. Although the political atmosphere prior to 
the coup attempt was not very liberal, the aftermath of July 15 has marked a new level of 
authoritarianism in Turkey. The most important change is that Turkey has been under 
state of emergency since July 20, 2016. Providing extraordinary powers to the 
government, the violations of rights and liberties have reached an unprecedented level so 
much so that the latest Freedom House report categorizes Turkey as “not free.”  
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July 15 coup attempt is a critical juncture that has impacted political landscape as 
well. Proving the dynamic character of center and periphery, in the aftermath of the coup, 
the official construct of Turkish citizenship with its emphasis on Turkish ethnicity, 
obedience to the nation and the state, and duties instead of rights seems to be restored. 
Given that Turkish Armed Forces has been involved in the Syrian civil war, the public 
debate is dominated by discourses of Turkish nationalism and patriotism, in addition to 
the current limitations and violations of citizenship rights and liberties. 
This current political atmosphere poses a challenge to the argument defended in 
this research as it has brought conflicting partisans together under the banner of 
nationalism and patriotism. It is possible for the same respondents to have different 
responses if the survey was applied today given this political atmosphere. Yet, this does 
not change the fact that AKP established its hegemony as a central party. In fact, it is 
possible to argue that AKP now strategically utilizes the official construct for maintaining 
its political hegemony as this construct is useful for excluding and delegitimizing 
dissenting identities and practices.  
One important limitation stems from the lack of any discussion concerning the 
grassroots dimension of citizenship and limited review of the gender dimension of 
citizenship. As this study relies on T.H. Marshall’s account in its definition of citizenship, 
these dimensions have remained relatively unexplored apart from the brief discussion on 
Turner’s typology of citizenship that differentiates between grassroots mobilization for 
rights and institutionalization of citizenship rights by the political authority. Investigating 
grassroots dimension would shed light on the potential for demanding rights and liberties 
and the mechanisms through which mobilization of this potential could be realized. In 
fact, the briefly-discussed feminist criticisms concerning citizenship highlight the 
grassroots dimension as they unearth the inequality between men and women in the 
practice of citizenship. These criticisms underline the importance of the active 
participation of citizens in order to guarantee the acquisition of equal citizenship rights 
and liberties irrespective of gender. In that sense, they emphasize the grassroots 
mobilization and its role in expansion of rights and liberties. Although this dimension is 
not included in this research, it is a significant aspect that must be addressed in further 
studies. 
 
Avenues for Further Research 
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The arguments put forward in this research can be treated as potential hypotheses 
that can be tested in different contexts. In that sense, the findings of this research are 
suitable for extension to other cities as well as countries. Further research on citizenship 
perceptions in other contexts where ruling parties or ruling elites develop authoritarian 
and populist practices will illuminate the segments of the society in those contexts who 
carry the potential for democratization and generating demands for protection of rights 
and liberties.  
 An additional avenue for further research is to assess the perceptions on 
citizenship rights and liberties under current conditions. Conducting another survey with 
the same survey statements can offer insights on the potential changes in perceptions but 
due to the nature of the questions, the non-response rate may be higher as it may be 
considered riskier to express true opinions under the state of emergency. 
 Another area that calls for further research is the ambiguity of the perceptions of 
MHP voters in the sample. Their perceptions are in between total compliance and total 
criticism. The determinants of such ambiguity must be investigated in detail to understand 
the peculiarity of these voters.  
 In addition to these arenas of research, the mechanisms through which perceptions 
on citizenship rights and liberties emerge are suggestive for further delineation. The 
existing data only provides information about the perceptions themselves. A more in-
depth research design focusing on the causes or motivations of distinct perceptions on 
citizenship rights and liberties may provide further information on them, as well as acting 
as a test of the argument that suggests a correspondence between political party 
preferences and rights perceptions. Moreover, the tendency of opposition party voters to 
choose “strongly disagree” among response categories may be investigated further 
through such an in-depth study.  
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 APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: Questionnaire Form 
    
İzninizle size akademik bir çalışma için tasarlanan anket soruları soracağım. Akademik çalışma Sabancı 
Üniversitesi öğretim üyesi Ayşe Kadıoğlu tarafından yürütülmektedir. Anketimiz yaklaşık 40 dakikanızı 
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alacaktır. Araştırmamız, tek tek kişilerin değil, genelde kamuoyunun ne düşündüğünü belirlemeyi 
amaçlayan bir çalışmadır. Bu araştırmada isim, soyadı gibi kişisel bilgileriniz kesinlikle 
kullanılmayacaktır.  İncelemeler, bilimsel yayınlarda, kişi düzeyinde değil, katılımcı grubu 
düzeyinde ve istatistik tabloları ile rapor edilecektir. Sorularımızla ilgili samimi fikirlerinizi 
rica ediyoruz. Yardımınız için teşekkür ederiz. 
 
 MK Kodu (Zarfın üzerinde yazılıdır):…………. 
1.  Konuşulan kişinin cinsiyeti          (      )  Kadın             (      )   Erkek      
2.  Kaç yaşındasınız? ……………. 
3.  Eğitim durumunuz, yani son bitirdiğiniz okul nedir? 
 (    )  Okuryazar değil     (    )  Diplomasız okur         (    )  İlkokul mezunu       (    )  İlköğretim / Ortaokul mezunu               
(    )  Lise mezunu          (    )  Üniversite mezunu      (    )  Yüksek lisans / Doktora 
4.  Hangi ilde / şehirde doğdunuz? (ANKETÖRE: İL adını yazınız, İLÇE adı yazmayınız.) 
 
………………………………………………………………….. 
5.  Nerede büyüdünüz? 
(     )  Köy     (     )   Kasaba        (     ) İlçe       (     )  Şehir      (     )  Büyükşehir/Metropol 
6.  Geçen hafta para kazanmak için bir işte çalıştınız mı? Çalıştınızsa mesleğiniz nedir? 
 ÇALIŞIYOR İSE:  ÇALIŞMIYOR İSE: 
(     ) Devlet memuru, şef,  müdür vb. (     ) Doktor, mimar, avukat vs. 
         (Serbest meslek) 
(     ) Emekli 
(     ) Özel sektörde memur, müdür vb. (     ) Ev kadını    
(     ) İşçi (     ) Çiftçi, ziraatçı, hayvancı 
 
(     ) Öğrenci  
 (     ) Küçük esnaf / zanaatkâr /şoför vb. 
 
(     ) Çalışıyor, diğer: …………… (     ) İşsiz, iş arıyor                  
 (     ) Tüccar / sanayici / işadamı  (     ) Çalışamaz halde 
 
7.  Bu evde / hanede kaç kişi oturuyor (çocuklar dahil)?  …………. 
8.  Kendinizi, HAYAT TARZI bakımından aşağıda sayacağım üç gruptan hangisinde sayarsınız?  
(ANKETÖRE: Deneğin söylediği TEK seçeneği işaretleyiniz.) 
 (      )   Modern                        (      )   Geleneksel muhafazakâr                        (      )   Dindar muhafazakâr 
9.  Kendinizi tanımlamak için aşağıdaki hangi SİYASİ kimlikleri/sıfatları kullanırsınız? (En fazla 2 
kimlik/sıfat seçilebilir) 
 
[   ]  Ülkücü         [   ]  Milliyetçi          [   ]  Muhafazakar         [   ]  İslamcı            [   ]  Demokrat  
[   ]  Liberal         [   ]  Atatürkçü          [   ]  Ulusalcı                 [   ]  Sosyal Demokrat    [   ]  Sosyalist 
10.  Türkiye’nin en acil, en önemli sorunlarını hangi parti çözer? 
 
(      ) Parti adı:   ……….……….   (      ) Hiçbiri çözemez, yeni parti lazım   (     ) Bu sorunlar hep sürer, gider 
11.  Kendinizi siyasi yelpazede nereye yerleştirirsiniz? 1 en sol, 10 ise en sağ pozisyondur.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
 
EN SOL                                                                                                                                                                          EN 
SAĞ 
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Şimdi size bir dizi yargı okuyacağım. Bu yargılara  
1 kesinlikle katılmıyorum, 6 kesinlikle katılıyorum aralığında 
olacak şekilde puan veriniz. 
K
es
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 1 2 3 4 5        6 
12.  
Seçimlerden sonra oy pusulalarının doğru 
sayıldığına güvenirim. 
(    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
(    
) 
13.  Bence işsiz vatandaşlara iş bulunması sosyal haktır. (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
(    
) 
14.  
Seçim sistemimizde var olan %10’luk ulusal baraj 
uygulaması gereklidir. 
(    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
(    
) 
15.  
Oy verirken herhangi bir baskı ve yönlendirme 
hissetmiyorum. 
(    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
(    
) 
16.  
Basın ve medya kuruluşlarının seçim öncesinde 
taraflı yayın yaptığını düşünüyorum. 
(    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
(    
) 
17.  
Mevcut seçim sistemi Kürtlerin, Alevilerin ve 
gayrimüslim azınlıkların adil bir şekilde temsil 
edilmelerine olanak vermektedir. 
(    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
(    
) 
18.  
Ülkemizde protesto eylemlerinin herhangi bir 
engelleme ile karşılaşmadan düzenlenebildiğini 
düşünüyorum. 
(    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
(    
) 
19.  
Seçim ile iş başına gelen hükümetler engeller ile 
karşılaştıkları için görevlerini yapamıyorlar. 
(    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
(    
) 
20.  
Vatandaşlar iktidardaki siyasal partilere oy 
vermeseler de gerekli sosyal yardımları alabiliyorlar. 
(    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
(    
) 
21.  
Protesto eylemlerine katılanların yaşamlarının 
güvende olduğunu düşünüyorum. 
(    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
(    
) 
22.  
Bence eğitimin her seviyesinin ücretsiz olması sosyal 
haktır. 
(    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
(    
) 
23.  
Devletin ara sıra yakacak ve yiyecek gibi yardımlar 
yapması yerine daha kalıcı sosyal haklara sahip 
olmak isterim. 
(    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
(    
) 
24.  
Hükümetin icraatlarının denetlenebildiğine 
inanıyorum. 
(    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
(    
) 
25.  
Siyasal partilerin seçim öncesinde dağıttıkları 
yakacak, yiyecek vb. yardımların sosyal hak 
olduğunu düşünüyorum. 
(    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
(    
) 
26.  
Gazeteciler ve televizyon kanalları her konuda 
özgürce haber yapabiliyor. 
(    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
(    
) 
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27.  
Edebiyatçılar, müzisyenler ve sanatın diğer 
alanlarında icraat yapanlar özgürce işlerini 
yapabiliyor. 
(    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
(    
) 
28.  
Ülkemizde farklı dinsel ibadetler özgürce 
yapılabilmektedir. 
(    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
(    
) 
29.  
Telefonumun dinlendiğini düşündüğüm için aile 
üyeleri ve arkadaşlarım ile konuşurken siyasi 
konuları konuşmamaya gayret ederim. 
(    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
(    
) 
30.  
Protesto eylemlerine katılanların ifade 
özgürlüklerinin güven altında olduğunu 
düşünüyorum. 
(    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
(    
) 
 
 
 
 
 
Şimdi size bir dizi yargı okuyacağım. Bu yargılara  
1 kesinlikle katılmıyorum, 6 kesinlikle katılıyorum 
aralığında olacak şekilde puan veriniz. 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 
31.  
Yargı kurumlarının siyasetten bağımsız hareket 
ettiklerine inanıyorum. 
(    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
(    
) 
32.  
Bence sağlık hizmetlerinin ücretsiz sağlanması sosyal 
haktır. 
(    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
(    
) 
33.  
Farklı dinlere mensup vatandaşlara yargı önünde ayrımcılık 
yapılmadığını düşünüyorum. 
(    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
(    
) 
34.  
Devlet sosyal yükümlülüklerinden eğitimin her seviyesinin 
ücretsiz olmasını sağlamaktadır. 
(    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
(    
) 
35.  
Farklı etnik kökene sahip vatandaşlara yargı önünde 
ayrımcılık yapılmadığını düşünüyorum. 
(    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
(    
) 
36.  
Devlet sosyal yükümlülüklerinden sağlık hizmetlerinin 
ücretsiz olmasını yerine getirmektedir. 
(    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
(    
) 
37.  
Ülkemizde yapılan gözaltı ve tutuklama süreçleri 
vatandaşlık haklarını ihlal etmektedir. 
(    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
(    
) 
38.  Ülkemizde vatandaşlar zorunlu göçe maruz kalmışlardır. (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
(    
) 
39.  
Devlet politikalarının kadınların bireysel haklarını 
koruduğunu düşünüyorum. 
(    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
(    
) 
40.  
Ülkemizde kadınların eş veya aile baskısı altında kalmadan 
diledikleri siyasi partiye oy verebildiklerini düşünüyorum. 
(    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
(    
) 
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41.  
Yargı organlarının kadınlara şiddet uygulayanlara yeterli 
hukuki cezaları verdiğine inanıyorum. 
(    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
(    
) 
42.  
Ailelerin kaç çocuk yapması gerektiğine hükümetin 
karıştığına inanıyorum. 
(    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
(    
) 
43.  
Çocukların okullarda belirli bir din anlayışına 
yönlendirildiğini düşünüyorum. 
(    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
(    
) 
44.  
Devlet, sosyal yükümlülüklerinden ara sıra yiyecek, yakacak 
vb. gibi yardımların sağlanmasını yerine getirmektedir. 
(    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
(    
) 
45.  
Ülkemizde kişisel mülkiyetin güvence altında olduğunu 
düşünüyorum. 
(    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
(    
) 
46.  
Devlet, sosyal yükümlülüklerinden işsiz vatandaşlara iş 
bulunması konusunda gerekli yardımı yapmaktadır. 
(    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) (    ) 
 (    
) 
47.  
1 Kasım 2015 tarihinde yapılan genel seçimlerde oyunuzu hangi partiye verdiniz? (ANKETÖRE: Cevap yok, 
diyenlerden olabildiğince cevap almaya çalışınız.)  
 Parti adı:   …………………………………………     (      )   Kararsız            (      )   Oy kullanmaz                
48.  
Bugün bir GENEL MİLLETVEKİLLİĞİ SEÇİMİ yapılsa oyunuzu kime, hangi partiye verirsiniz? 
(ANKETÖRE: Cevap yok, diyenlerden olabildiğince cevap almaya çalışınız.)  
 
Parti adı:   …………………………………………     (      )   Kararsız            (      )   Oy kullanmaz                
49.  Eşiniz veya siz, sokağa çıkarken başınızı örtüyor musunuz? Nasıl örtüyorsunuz?(ANKETÖRE: Seçenekleri 
deneğe okuyunuz ve deneğin kendi verdiği cevabı işaretleyiniz.) 
 (      ) Örtmüyor     (      ) Başörtüsü     (      ) Türban        (      ) Çarşaf, peçe   (      ) Görüşülen kişi bekâr erkek 
50.  Hepimiz Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşıyız, ama değişik etnik kökenlerden olabiliriz; Siz kendinizi, 
kimliğinizi ne olarak biliyorsunuz veya hissediyorsunuz? 
 (      ) Türk          (      ) Kürt           (      ) Zaza          (      ) Arap         (      ) Diğer (Yazınız): ……………….. 
51.  Kendinizi ait hissettiğiniz dininiz ve mezhebiniz nedir? 
 (      ) Sünni (Hanefi veya Şafii) Müslüman         (      ) Alevi Müslüman   (      ) Diğer (Yazınız): ………… 
52.  Dindarlık açısından kendinizi aşağıda okuyacaklarımdan hangisiyle tarif edersiniz? (ANKETÖRE: Aşağıdaki 
cevapları okuyunuz, deneğin söylediği ilkini işaretleyiniz) 
 (      ) Dinin gereklerine pek inanmayan biri 
(      ) İnançlı ama dinin gereklerini pek yerine getiremeyen biri 
(      ) Dinin gereklerini yerine getirmeye çalışan dindar biri 
(      ) Dinin tüm gereklerini tam yerine getiren dindar biri 
53.  Son olarak, bu evde yaşayanların aylık toplam geliri ne kadardır? Herkesin her türlü kazancı dahil evinize 
ayda ortalama kaç para giriyor? 
 ………………………… Türk Lirası 
 
 
 
 
54.  ANKETİ BİTİRME SAATİ .…. : ….. (Boş bırakmayın, ama unuttuysanız da sonradan doldurmayın.) 
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 ANKETÖRE NOT: Ankette görüşülen kişiler arasından bazılarıyla, kabul ederlerse daha sonra derinlemesine 
görüşmeler yapmayı planlıyoruz. Derin görüşmeler 30 ila 45 dakika sürer. Şu anda görüştüğünüz kişi böyle bir 
görüşmeyi kabul ederse lütfen aşağıdaki bilgileri alınız. Görüşme kabul etmezse boş bırakınız. 
55.  Görüşülen kişi adı / soyadı (Söylemek istemezse boş bırakın): ……………………... 
56.  Kendisiyle iletişim kurulabilecek telefon numarası: ……………………… 
 
 
 
 
 
57. Oturulan evin tipi: (ANKETÖRE: Aşağıdaki şıklardan birisini, deneğe sormadan, siz işaretleyiniz.) 
 
(      )   Gecekondu / Dış sıvasız apartman                 (      )   Müstakil, geleneksel ev       
(      )   Apartman          (      )   Site içinde                 (      )   Çok lüks bina, villa 
 
Anketörün ADI, SOYADI : ……………….……………….. 
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Appendix B: Profile of the Sample  
 
Gender HDP CHP MHP AKP 
Female 35 55 36 53 
Male 65 45 63 47 
Age HDP CHP MHP AKP 
18 - 28 29 19 58 27 
29 - 43 41 29 26 29 
44+ 30 51 9 44 
Education Levels 
(Categories) 
HDP CHP MHP AKP 
Below Highschool 
39 30 26 63 
Highschool 26 33 45 24 
University and 
above 
35 37 29 9 
The place where 
respondent grew 
up 
HDP CHP MHP AKP 
Village 20 12 9 28 
Town 3 3 4 4 
County 13 16 17 12 
City 27 9 19 21 
Metropolitan 37 60 50 35 
Lifestyle HDP CHP MHP AKP 
Modern 65 74 19 6 
Traditional 
Conservative 
19 21 57 55 
Religious 
Conservative 
3 3 20 37 
Preferred Political 
Identities 
HDP CHP MHP AKP 
Idealist (Ülkücü ) 
0 0 62 6 
Nationalist 2 10 74 19 
Conservative 1 6 2 52 
Islamist 0 1 15 19 
Democrat 34 20 1 3 
Liberal 4 3 0 1 
Kemalist (Atatürkçü) 
4 63 15 8 
Neo-Nationalist 
(Ulusalcı) 0 1 1 1 
Social Democrat 
14 26 0 1 
Socialist 56 4 0 1 
Self-positioning on 
the ideological 
spectrum 
(averages) 
HDP CHP MHP AKP 
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1-Left 10- Right 
2,11 2,83 7,28 7,85 
Self-positioning on 
the ideological 
spectrum 
HDP CHP MHP AKP 
1 - Far-Left 50 28 0 0 
2 21 14 2 0 
3 14 18 6 0 
4 5 10 1 0 
5 2 9 7 14 
6 1 3 23 8 
7 1 3 13 10 
8 1 0 8 19 
9 0 1 12 15 
10 - Far-Right 2 0 23 20 
Ethnic Identity 
HDP CHP MHP AKP 
Turkish 14 81 95 69 
Kurdish 74 5 0 16 
Zaza 2 6 0 2 
Arab 0 0 1 7 
Other 9 7 2 6 
Total 99 99 98 100 
Religious Identity 
HDP CHP MHP AKP 
Sunni Muslim 39 60 90 84 
Alevi Muslim 7 18 4 0 
Other 42 20 2 15 
Total 88 98 96 99 
Religiosity HDP CHP MHP AKP 
Non-believer 41 14   
Believer 28 35 21 8 
Religious 21 47 60 70 
Devoutly religious 
2 2 17 21 
Total 92 98 98 99 
Household Income 
(Monthly) 
HDP CHP MHP AKP 
700 TL and below 
0 0 0 1 
701 - 1200 TL 8 4 1 10 
1201 - 2000 TL 
32 24 22 37 
2001 - 3000 TL 
17 24 33 19 
3001 - 5000 TL 
26 30 26 15 
5001 TL and above 
6 8 7 8 
N/A 11 10 11 10 
Total 100 100 100 100 
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Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics 
 
  
Factor 1 
        
          
 
  
  
 
 Percentiles Smallest   
 
1% -1.327367 -1.375602   
 
5% -1.286889 -1.375602   
 
10% -1.199827 -1.344303  Obs 323 
25% -.8769139 -1.327367  Sum of Wgt 323 
 
  
  
 
50% -.0828545 
 
 Mean 1.47e-09 
 
 Largest  Std. Dev. .9814137 
75% .6928139 2.050973   
 
90% 1.44757 2.070081  Variance .9631728 
95% 1.725583 2.147248  Skewness .3852586 
99% 2.050973 2.205171  Kurtosis 1.99729 
 
  
  
 
  
Factor 2 
        
          
 
  
  
 
 Percentiles Smallest   
 
1% -3.725535 -4.937155   
 
5% -1.357569 -4.871637   
 
10% -.8814635 -4.001929  Obs 323 
25% -.2983661 -3.725535  Sum of Wgt 323 
 
  
  
 
50% .0571351 
 
 Mean 4.80e-10 
 
 Largest  Std. Dev. .8624 
75% .4867675 1.676916   
 
90% .869904 1.755904  Variance .7437338 
95% 1.087073 1.776504  Skewness -1923631 
99% 1.676916 1.953744  Kurtosis 11.3103 
 
  
  
 
  
Age (in years) 
        
          
 
  
  
 
 Percentiles Smallest   
 
1% 18 18   
 
5% 20 18   
 
10% 22 18  Obs 392 
25% 25 18  Sum of Wgt 392 
 
  
  
 
50% 36 Mean  Mean 38.21429 
 Largest Std.  Std. Dev. 14.67046 
75% 48 78   
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90% 60 78  Variance 215.2225 
95% 66 78  Skewness .6870567 
99% 78 89  Kurtosis 2.702636 
 
  
  
 
  Male=1 (dummy 
variable) 
        
          
 
  
  
 
 Percentiles Smallest   
 
1% 0 0   
 
5% 0 0   
 
10% 0 0  Obs 399 
25% 0 0  Sum of Wgt 399 
 
  
  
 
50% 1 
 
 Mean 551378 
 Largest Std.  Std. Dev. .4979777 
75% 1 1   
 
90% 1 1  Variance .2479818 
95% 1 1  Skewness -.2066075 
99% 1 1  Kurtosis 1.042687 
 
  
  
 
  
Level of Education 
        
          
 
  
  
 
 Percentiles Smallest   
 
1% 1 1   
 
5% 2 1   
 
10% 2 1  Obs 396 
25% 2 1  Sum of Wgt 396 
 
  
  
 
50% 4 
 
 Mean 3.573232 
 Largest Std.  Std. Dev. 1.225134 
75% 5 5   
 
90% 5 5  Variance 1.500953 
95% 5 5  Skewness -.42617 
99% 5 5  Kurtosis 1.965029 
 
  
  
 
  Turkish=1 (dummy 
variable) 
        
          
 
  
  
 
 Percentiles Smallest   
 
1% 0 0   
 
5% 0 0   
 
10% 0 0  Obs 400 
25% 0 0  Sum of Wgt 400 
 
  
  
 
50% 1 
 
 Mean .6475 
 352 
 Largest Std.  Std. Dev. .4783469 
75% 1 1   
 
90% 1 1  Variance .2288158 
95% 1 1  Skewness -.6174795 
99% 1 1  Kurtosis 1.381281 
 
  
  
 
  
Level of Religiosity 
        
          
 
  
  
 
 Percentiles Smallest   
 
1% 1 1   
 
5% 1 1   
 
10% 1 1  Obs 387 
25% 2 1  Sum of Wgt 387 
 
  
  
 
50% 3 
 
 Mean 2.586563 
 Largest 
 
 Std. Dev. .8635541 
75% 3 4   
 
90% 4 4  Variance .7457257 
95% 4 4  Skewness -.4254848 
99% 4 4  Kurtosis 2.488518 
 
  
  
 
  Self-Placement on 
the Left-Right 
Spectrum (Left=1 
Right=10) 
        
  
  
    
  
 
  
  
 
 Percentiles Smallest   
 
1% 1 1   
 
5% 1 1   
 
10% 1 1  Obs 364 
25% 2 1  Sum of Wgt 364 
 
  
  
 
50% 5 
 
 Mean 4.986264 
 Largest 
 
 Std. Dev. 3.199919 
75% 8 10   
 
90% 10 10  Variance 10.23948 
95% 10 10  Skewness .1907948 
99% 10 10  Kurtosis 1.626597 
 
  
  
 
  
Household Income 
        
          
 
  
  
 
 Percentiles Smallest   
 
1% 900 500   
 
5% 1000 750   
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10% 1300 800  Obs 357 
25% 2000 900  Sum of Wgt 357 
 
  
  
 
50% 2700 
 
 Mean 3174.342 
 
  
 Std. Dev. 2149.485 
75% 4000 10000   
 
90% 5000 15000  Variance 4620285 
95% 7000 15000  Skewness 3.057384 
99% 10000 20000  Kurtosis 18.33142 
 
  
  
 
            
      
 AKP Identifier     
            
      
 Percentiles Smallest   
 
1% 0 0   
 
5% 0 0   
 
10% 0 0  Obs 400 
25% 0 0  Sum of Wgt 400 
 
  
  
 
50% 0 
 
 Mean .25 
 
  
 Std. Dev. .433555 
75% .5 1   
 
90% 1 1  Variance .1879699 
95% 1 1  Skewness 1.154701 
99% 1 1  Kurtosis 2.333333 
      
            
      
 CHP Identifier     
            
      
 Percentiles Smallest   
 
1% 0 0   
 
5% 0 0   
 
10% 0 0  Obs 400 
25% 0 0  Sum of Wgt 400 
 
  
  
 
50% 0 
 
 Mean .25 
 
  
 Std. Dev. .433555 
75% .5 1   
 
90% 1 1  Variance .1879699 
95% 1 1  Skewness 1.154701 
99% 1 1  Kurtosis 2.333333 
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 MHP Identifier     
            
      
 Percentiles Smallest   
 
1% 0 0   
 
5% 0 0   
 
10% 0 0  Obs 400 
25% 0 0  Sum of Wgt 400 
 
  
  
 
50% 0 
 
 Mean .25 
 
  
 Std. Dev. .433555 
75% .5 1   
 
90% 1 1  Variance .1879699 
95% 1 1  Skewness 1.154701 
99% 1 1  Kurtosis 2.333333 
      
            
      
 HDP identifier     
            
      
 Percentiles Smallest   
 
1% 0 0   
 
5% 0 0   
 
10% 0 0  Obs 400 
25% 0 0  Sum of Wgt 400 
 
  
  
 
50% 0 
 
 Mean .25 
 
  
 Std. Dev. .433555 
75% .5 1   
 
90% 1 1  Variance .1879699 
95% 1 1  Skewness 1.154701 
99% 1 1  Kurtosis 2.333333 
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Appendix D: Results of the Factor Analyses 
 
Iterated Principal Factors with Promax Rotation 
 
 The table below displays the results of the iterated principal factor analyses with 
promax rotation and two factors retained. These results are reported and used in the 
research. It does not include variables vote_pressure and biased_media. 
 
Variables (excluding vote_pressure and biased_media) Factor 1 Factor 2 
Uniqueness 
I believe in the honesty of vote count after elections 
0.6600 -0.1087 0.5485 
10% electoral threshold is necessary 0.6082 0.2173 0.5904 
I think the current electoral system allows Kurds, Alevis and 
non-Muslims to be represented fairly 
0.6645 0.2847 0.4882 
I think protests can be organized without any repression 
0.6738 -0.1507 0.5175 
Governments cannot do their jobs because of obstacles 
0.4609 -0.0898 0.7772 
Citizens can receive social aid even if they do not vote for the 
incumbent party 
0.6834 0.1769 0.5086 
I think protesters's lives are protected 0.6013 -0.0825 0.6288 
I believe that government's actions are monitored 
0.7774 -0.3218 0.2777 
Journalists can publish stories about every subject freely  
0.7800 -0.1536 0.3612 
Artists, musicians, literati can freely express themselves 
through their art  
0.7999 -0.0531 0.3550 
Different religious practices can be carried out freely in 
Turkey 
0.7758 0.2463 0.3483 
I try not to talk about political issues on the phone because I 
think my phone is tapped 
0.4174 0.1527 0.8061 
Freedom of expression of protesters is protected 
0.7143 -0.2228 0.4310 
I think judicial institutions are independent of politics 
0.7119 -0.3150 0.3811 
I don't think individuals with different religious convictions 
are discriminated against by the courts 
0.6655 0.1852 0.5298 
State fulfills its job to provide free education 
0.6129 0.0500 0.6236 
I don't think individuals with different ethnicities are 
discriminated against by the courts 
0.7399 0.1660 0.4320 
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State fulfills its job to provide free healthcare 
0.6814 0.0743 0.5330 
Processes of detention and arrest violate citizenship rights 
0.4903 -0.0037 0.7594 
Citizens in Turkey experienced forced migration 
0.4964 0.0247 0.7537 
I think state policies protect women's individual rights 
0.7898 -0.0680 0.3685 
I think women can vote freely without pressure from their 
spouses or families 
0.6853 -0.1592 0.4988 
I believe that judicial organs punish perpetrators of violence 
against women adequately 
0.5134 -0.3244 0.6217 
I think government meddles with the number of children 
families will have 
0.4836 0.0575 0.7644 
I think children are steered towards a specific religious 
understanding in schools 
0.5601 0.0985 0.6797 
State fulfills its job to provide occassional aid in kind 
0.6416 0.1111 0.5800 
I think private property is secure  0.7385 -0.0684 0.4471 
State fulfills its job to find jobs for the unemployed 
0.7178 -0.2038 0.4348 
I consider aid in kind distributed by political parties prior to 
elections as a social right 
0.5352 -0.0915 0.7024 
I think public education free of cost at every level is a social 
right 
-0.1126 0.4378 0.7928 
I think finding jobs for the unemployed is a social right 
-0.1018 0.3073 0.8934 
I consider free healthcare as a social right -0.0436 0.5460 0.6986 
I want entrenched social rights instead of receiving 
occassional aid in kind 
-0.1709 0.4669 0.7482 
  
% of variance 88,16% 12,08%   
Extraction Method: Iterated principal factor with two factors 
Rotation Method: Promax Rotation 
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Appendix E: Results of the Additional Factor Analyses 
Iterated Principal Factor Analyses with Varimax Rotation 
 The table below displays the results of iterated principal factor analyses with 
varimax rotation. Again, two factors are retained and vote_pressure and biased_media are 
left out. The loadings are very similar to the promax rotation. The only significant 
difference is the loading of gov_monitored, which loads in the second factor with varimax 
rotation. 
Variables (excluding vote_pressure and biased_media) Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness 
I believe in the honesty of vote count after elections 0.6620 -0.1149 0.5485 
10% electoral threshold is necessary 0.6040 0.2115 0.5904 
I think the current electoral system allows Kurds, Alevis and 
non-Muslims to be represented fairly 0.6590 0.2784 0.4882 
I think protests can be organized without any repression 0.6767 -0.1571 0.5175 
Governments cannot do their jobs because of obstacles 0.4626 -0.0941 0.7772 
Citizens can receive social aid even if they do not vote for the 
incumbent party 0.6800 0.1704 0.5086 
I think protesters's lives are protected 0.6028 -0.0881 0.6288 
I want entrenched social rights instead of receiving 
occassional aid in kind 0.7836 -0.3291 0.2777 
I consider aid in kind distributed by political parties prior to 
elections as a social right 0.5369 -0.0965 0.7024 
Journalists can publish stories about every subject freely  0.7829 -0.1609 0.3612 
Artists, musicians, literati can freely express themselves 
through their art  0.8008 -0.0606 0.3550 
Different religious practices can be carried out freely in 
Turkey 0.7711 0.2390 0.3483 
I try not to talk about political issues on the phone because I 
think my phone is tapped 0.4144 0.1488 0.8061 
Freedom of expression of protesters is protected 0.7186 -0.2295 0.4310 
I think judicial institutions are independent of politics 0.7180 -0.3217 0.3811 
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I don't think individuals with different religious convictions 
are discriminated against by the courts 0.6619 0.1789 0.5298 
State fulfills its job to provide free education 0.6119 0.0442 0.6236 
I don't think individuals with different ethnicities are 
discriminated against by the courts 0.7367 0.1590 0.4320 
State fulfills its job to provide free healthcare 0.6800 0.0679 0.5330 
Processes of detention and arrest violate citizenship rights 0.4904 -0.0083 0.7594 
Citizens in Turkey experienced forced migration 0.4959 0.0200 0.7537 
I think state policies protect women's individual rights 0.7911 -0.0754 0.3685 
I think women can vote freely without pressure from their 
spouses or families 0.6883 -0.1657 0.4988 
I believe that judicial organs punish perpetrators of violence 
against women adequately 0.5196 -0.3292 0.6217 
I think government meddles with the number of children 
families will have 0.5582 0.0932 0.6797 
I think children are steered towards a specific religious 
understanding 0.4824 0.0529 0.7644 
State fulfills its job to provide occassional aid in kind 0.6395 0.1051 0.5800 
I think private property is secure  0.7398 -0.0753 0.4471 
State fulfills its job to find jobs for the unemployed 0.7217 -0.2106 0.4348 
I think finding jobs for the unemployed is a social right -0.1077 0.3082 0.8934 
I think public education free of cost at every level is a social 
right -0.1210 0.4388 0.7928 
I believe that government's actions are monitored -0.1799 0.4684 0.7482 
I consider free healthcare as a social right -0.0541 0.5464 0.6986 
        
% of variance 0.8816 0.1184   
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Iterated Principal Factor Analyses with Varimax Rotation 
 The table below displays the results of the iterated principal factor analyses where 
all survey items are included. The low loadings of vote_pressure and biased_media can 
be seen in the bottom of the table. Their uniqueness are also very high.  
Variables (all) Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness 
I believe in the honesty of vote count after elections 
0,6627 -0,0787 0,5547 
10% electoral threshold is necessary 0,6043 0,2192 0,5868 
I think the current electoral system allows Kurds, Alevis and 
non-Muslims to be represented fairly 
0,6580 0,2780 0,4897 
I think protests can be organized without any repression 
0,6773 -0,1330 0,5235 
Governments cannot do their jobs because of obstacles 
0,4616 -0,0794 0,7807 
Citizens can receive social aid even if they do not vote for the 
incumbent party 0,6873 0,1867 0,4927 
I think protesters's lives are protected 0,6024 -0,0839 0,63 
I want entrenched social rights instead of receiving 
occassional aid in kind 0,7847 -0,3035 0,2921 
I consider aid in kind distributed by political parties prior to 
elections as a social right 0,5356 -0,0906 0,7049 
Journalists can publish stories about every subject freely  
0,7842 -0,1633 0,3584 
Artists, musicians, literati can freely express themselves 
through their art  0,8050 -0,0530 0,3492 
Different religious practices can be carried out freely in 
Turkey 0,7731 0,2227 0,3526 
I try not to talk about political issues on the phone because I 
think my phone is tapped 0,4181 0,1442 0,8044 
Freedom of expression of protesters is protected 
0,7175 -0,2436 0,4258 
I think judicial institutions are independent of politics 
0,7180 -0,2873 0,4018 
I don't think individuals with different religious convictions 
are discriminated against by the courts 
0,6617 0,1933 0,5248 
State fulfills its job to provide free education 
0,6084 0,0058 0,6298 
I don't think individuals with different ethnicities are 
discriminated against by the courts 
0,7366 0,1561 0,433 
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State fulfills its job to provide free healthcare 
0,6783 0,0627 0,5359 
Processes of detention and arrest violate citizenship rights 
0,4893 -0,0443 0,7586 
Citizens in Turkey experienced forced migration 
0,4942 0,0062 0,7558 
I think state policies protect women's individual rights 
0,7912 -0,0715 0,369 
I think women can vote freely without pressure from their 
spouses or families 0,6895 -0,1534 0,501 
I believe that judicial organs punish perpetrators of violence 
against women adequately 
0,5194 -0,3205 0,6276 
I think government meddles with the number of children 
families will have 0,5560 0,0472 0,6886 
I think children are steered towards a specific religious 
understanding 0,4794 0,0050 0,7701 
State fulfills its job to provide occassional aid in kind 
0,6387 0,1077 0,5805 
I think private property is secure  0,7386 -0,071 0,4494 
State fulfills its job to find jobs for the unemployed 
0,7219 -0,2086 0,4354 
I consider free healthcare as a social right -0,0552 0,5584 0,6851 
I think public education free of cost at every level is a social 
right -0,1229 0,4200 0,8085 
I believe that government's actions are monitored 
-0,1786 0,4985 0,7196 
I don't feel any pressure or influence while voting 
0,1088 0,2732 0,9135 
I think press makes biased broadcasts before elections 
-0,1884 0,2451 0,9044 
I think finding jobs for the unemployed is a social right 
-0,1057 0,3443 0,8703 
% of variance 0,8747 0,1253   
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Iterated Principal Factors with Varimax Rotation and Three Factors 
 To check whether the data has three underlying factors reflecting the questionnaire 
design (i.e. civil liberties, political rights, and social rights), an additional analysis with 
three factors was run and the results are rotated with varimax method. The results of this 
factor analysis are on the table below. 
Variables (All)  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Uniqueness 
I believe in the honesty of vote count after elections 0,7511 -0,0423 0,0810 0.4274 
10% electoral threshold is necessary 0,4996 0,3334 0,2262 0.5881 
I think the current electoral system allows Kurds, Alevis and non-
Muslims to be represented fairly 0,5043 0,4512 0,2548 0.4771 
I think protests can be organized without any repression 0,6702 0,1717 -0,0611 0.5176 
Governments cannot do their jobs because of obstacles 0,4922 0,0358 0,0040 0.7565 
Citizens can receive social aid even if they do not vote for the 
incumbent party 0,6173 0,2759 0,2354 0.4874 
I think protesters's lives are protected 0,5370 0,2840 -0,0728 0.6257 
I believe that government's actions are monitored 0,8399 0,0777 -0,1838 0.6825 
I consider aid in kind distributed by political parties prior to 
elections as a social right 0,5298 0,1342 -0,0322 0.7003 
Journalists can publish stories about every subject freely  0,7429 0,2751 -0,1129 0.3597 
Artists, musicians, literati can freely express themselves through 
their art  0,7270 0,3490 -0,0217 0.3492 
Different religious practices can be carried out freely in Turkey 0,5926 0,5479 0,1854 0.3143 
I try not to talk about political issues on the phone because I think 
my phone is tapped (reverse coded) 0,3213 0,2886 0,1248 0.7979 
Freedom of expression of protesters is protected 0,6661 0,2967 -0,2215 0.4192 
I think judicial institutions are independent of politics 0,7610 0,0877 -0,1818 0.3801 
I don't think individuals with different religious convictions are 
discriminated against by the courts 0,6156 0,2168 0,2644 0.5041 
State fulfills its job to provide free education 0,4822 0,4169 -0,0318 0.5927 
I don't think individuals with different ethnicities are discriminated 
against by the courts 0,6637 0,2965 0,2056 0.4294 
State fulfills its job to provide free healthcare 0,5943 0,3219 0,0823 0.5364 
I think state policies protect women's individual rights 0,7442 0,2773 -0,0154 0.3690 
I think women can vote freely without pressure from their spouses 
or families 0,6907 0,1582 -0,0753 0.4922 
I believe that judicial organs punish perpetrators of violence against 
women adequately 0,5805 0,0089 -0,2288 0.6106 
I think government meddles with the number of children families 
will have (reverse coded) 0,3711 0,3485 -0,0333 0.5220 
State fulfills its job to provide occassional aid in kind 0,5789 0,2523 0,1502 0.5786 
I think private property is secure  0,7361 0,1675 0,0197 0.4298 
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State fulfills its job to find jobs for the unemployed 0,7321 0,1516 -0,1237 0.4258 
I think children are steered towards a specific religious 
understanding (reverse coded) 0,3534 0,5908 -0,0636 0.7398 
Processes of detention and arrest violate citizenship rights (reverse 
coded) 0,3190 0,5106 -0,1509 0.6148 
Citizens in Turkey experienced forced migration (reverse coded) 0,3633 0,4055 -0,0507 0.7010 
I consider free healthcare as a social right -0,1355 0,0990 0,5346 0.6861 
I think finding jobs for the unemployed is a social right -0,1344 -0,0013 0,3421 0.8649 
I don't feel any pressure or influence while voting 0,1089 -0,0139 0,3245 0.8827 
I think press makes biased broadcasts before elections -0,1087 -0,2575 0,3387 0.8072 
I think public education free of cost at every level is a social right -0,2044 0,1066 0,3708 0.8093 
I want entrenched social rights instead of receiving occassional aid 
in kind -0,1954 -0,0648 0,5245 0.2547 
% of variance 0.7071 0.1848 0.1081   
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Appendix F: Additional Regression Analyses 
 To assess the impact of variables with a lot of missing values, several regression 
models are estimated. The models below use the scores of Factor 1 (with promax rotation) 
as dependent variable and omit those variables one by one. These models helped to 
determine the main model to be reported in the dissertation text. Only standardized 
coefficients and standard errors are reported. 
Determinants of Perceptions on the current state of citizenship rights (civil, political, social) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  beta/se beta/se beta/se beta/se beta/se 
            
CHP identifiers -0.59 -0.59 -0.68 -0.59 -0.60 
  (0.14) (0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) 
MHP identifiers -0.43 -0.44 -0.46 -0.43 -0.44 
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
HDP identifiers -0.73 -0.74 -0.83 -0.73 -0.75 
  (0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) 
DV for male=1 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Age in years -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education Level (1=no education, 
5=uni graduate) 
0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Respondents Lifestyle 
(1=modern, 2=traditional 
conservative, 3=religious 
conservative) 
0.04 0.04 0.07 0.04   
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)   
Left-Right Self-Placement (1=Left 
10=Right) 
0.16 0.17   0.16 0.17 
  (0.02) (0.02)   (0.02) (0.02) 
DV for Turkish=1 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Religious Conviction (1=Sunni, 
2=Alevi, 3=Other) 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.02   -0.01 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)   (0.05) 
Level of Religiosity (1=not 
religious 4=very religious) 
0.12 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.13 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Household income in TL 0.06   0.06 0.06 0.06 
  (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
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Constant           
  (0.29) (0.29) (0.28) (0.27) (0.28) 
            
N 237.00 237.00 237.00 237.00 237.00 
Adjusted R square 0.76 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.76 
degrees of freedom 224.00 225.00 225.00 225.00 225.00 
 
The table below displays the models using Factor 2 (with promax rotation) as the 
dependent variable. 
Normative Perceptions on Social Rights 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  beta/se beta/se beta/se beta/se beta/se 
            
CHP identifiers 0.18 0.18 0.22 0.17 0.18 
  (0.24) (0.24) (0.20) (0.23) (0.24) 
MHP identifiers -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 -0.09 -0.08 
  (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
HDP identifiers -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 
  (0.27) (0.27) (0.23) (0.26) (0.27) 
DV for male=1 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
  (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Age in years -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education Level (1=no 
education, 5=uni 
graduate) 
0.04 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Respondents Lifestyle 
(1=modern, 
2=traditional 
conservative, 
3=religious 
conservative) 
0.01 0.02 -0.00   0.01 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.11)   (0.11) 
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Left-Right Self-
Placement (1=Left 
10=Right) 
-0.08 -0.08   -0.07 -0.07 
  (0.03) (0.03)   (0.03) (0.03) 
DV for Turkish=1 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
  (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Religious Conviction 
(1=Sunni, 2=Alevi, 
3=Other) 
-0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04   
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)   
Level of Religiosity 
(1=not religious 4=very 
religious) 
0.15 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.16 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
Household income in TL -0.11   -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 
  (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant           
  (0.50) (0.50) (0.48) (0.48) (0.47) 
            
N 237.00 237.00 237.00 237.00 237.00 
Adjusted R square 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
degrees of freedom 224.00 225.00 225.00 225.00 225.00 
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Appendix G: Cross tabs 
 Cross tabulations of all survey items measuring perceptions with political party 
preferences, which report percentages can be seen below. 
16 I think media organs are 
biased while broadcasting 
before elections 
AKP CHP MHP HDP 
Strongly Disagree 3,0% 3,0% 21,2% 11,0% 
Disagree 4,0% 3,0% 6,1% 3,0% 
Partially Disagree 8,1% 3,0% 6,1%   
Partially Agree 18,2% 6,0% 8,1% 3,0% 
Agree 47,5% 53,0% 17,2% 25,0% 
Strongly Agree 19,2% 32,0% 41,4% 58,0% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
18 I think protests can be 
organized without any 
obstacles in Turkey 
AKP CHP MHP HDP 
Strongly Disagree 3,1% 43,4% 35,0% 85,0% 
Disagree 19,8% 46,5% 22,0% 10,0% 
Partially Disagree 12,5% 3,0% 8,0%   
Partially Agree 21,9% 2,0% 17,0% 2,0% 
Agree 38,5% 5,1% 10,0% 1,0% 
Strongly Agree 4,2%   8,0% 2,0% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
21 I think right to life of 
those who attend protests 
is guaranteed 
AKP CHP MHP HDP 
Strongly Disagree 6,4% 38,8% 30,9% 79,6% 
Disagree 25,5% 46,9% 18,6% 15,3% 
Partially Disagree 10,6% 6,1% 16,5% 1,0% 
Partially Agree 26,6% 1,0% 12,4% 1,0% 
Agree 26,6% 5,1% 12,4%   
Strongly Agree 4,3% 2,0% 9,3% 3,1% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
26 Newspapers and TV 
channels can broadcast 
about any matter they like 
freely 
AKP CHP MHP HDP 
Strongly Disagree 3,1% 57,0% 50,5% 90,0% 
Disagree 13,3% 34,0% 10,1% 9,0% 
Partially Disagree 6,1% 3,0% 12,1% 1,0% 
Partially Agree 20,4% 4,0% 6,1%   
Agree 41,8% 2,0% 7,1%   
Strongly Agree 15,3%   14,1%   
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Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
27 Literati, musicians and 
other artists can freely 
produce their works 
AKP CHP MHP HDP 
Strongly Disagree 2,2% 55,0% 23,7% 85,0% 
Disagree 8,7% 25,0% 14,4% 14,0% 
Partially Disagree 7,6% 7,0% 21,6% 1,0% 
Partially Agree 20,7% 11,0% 17,5%   
Agree 46,7% 2,0% 9,3%   
Strongly Agree 14,1%   13,4%   
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
28 Different religious 
communities can carry out 
their worship freely 
AKP CHP MHP HDP 
Strongly Disagree 2,1% 26,0% 7,1% 75,8% 
Disagree 1,0% 29,0% 5,1% 14,1% 
Partially Disagree 4,1% 9,0% 12,2% 6,1% 
Partially Agree 16,5% 14,0% 17,3% 2,0% 
Agree 55,7% 16,0% 24,5% 2,0% 
Strongly Agree 20,6% 6,0% 33,7%   
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
29 I try not to talk about 
politics with friends and 
family on my phone 
because I think it is tapped 
AKP CHP MHP HDP 
Strongly Disagree 16,3% 16,2% 34,3% 6,1% 
Disagree 29,6% 21,2% 12,1% 4,0% 
Partially Disagree 9,2% 4,0% 10,1% 5,1% 
Partially Agree 17,3% 15,2% 13,1% 7,1% 
Agree 19,4% 29,3% 10,1% 31,3% 
Strongly Agree 8,2% 14,1% 20,2% 46,5% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
30 I think freedom of 
expression of those who 
attend protests is 
guaranteed. 
AKP CHP MHP HDP 
Strongly Disagree 4,5% 42,0% 33,3% 88,9% 
Disagree 20,2% 46,0% 16,2% 7,1% 
Partially Disagree 7,9% 7,0% 13,1% 1,0% 
Partially Agree 28,1% 3,0% 14,1% 1,0% 
Agree 33,7% 1,0% 10,1%   
Strongly Agree 5,6% 1,0% 13,1% 2,0% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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31 I think that judicial 
institutions are 
independent from politics 
AKP CHP MHP HDP 
Strongly Disagree 7,4% 59,0% 45,0% 86,0% 
Disagree 18,1% 34,0% 14,0% 13,0% 
Partially Disagree 14,9% 1,0% 10,0%   
Partially Agree 12,8% 3,0% 16,0%   
Agree 40,4% 2,0% 7,0%   
Strongly Agree 6,4% 1,0% 8,0% 1,0% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
33 I don’t think individuals 
with different religious 
convictions are being 
discriminated against by 
the courts 
AKP CHP MHP HDP 
Strongly Disagree   21,2% 33,3% 69,0% 
Disagree 6,4% 32,3% 10,1% 17,0% 
Partially Disagree 8,5% 17,2% 11,1% 5,0% 
Partially Agree 19,1% 10,1% 17,2% 1,0% 
Agree 46,8% 15,2% 12,1% 3,0% 
Strongly Agree 19,1% 4,0% 16,2% 5,0% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
35 I don’t think individuals 
with different ethnic 
backgrounds are being 
discriminated against by 
the courts 
AKP CHP MHP HDP 
Strongly Disagree   20,4% 35,0% 80,0% 
Disagree 6,5% 34,7% 7,0% 13,0% 
Partially Disagree 4,3% 13,3% 14,0% 2,0% 
Partially Agree 21,5% 14,3% 11,0% 1,0% 
Agree 49,5% 15,3% 17,0% 2,0% 
Strongly Agree 18,3% 2,0% 16,0% 2,0% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
37 Processes of custody 
and detention in this 
country are violating 
citizenship rights  
AKP CHP MHP HDP 
Strongly Disagree 8,7% 1,0% 24,7% 8,1% 
Disagree 29,3% 6,2% 13,4% 2,0% 
Partially Disagree 16,3% 7,2% 9,3%   
Partially Agree 18,5% 10,3% 17,5% 1,0% 
Agree 20,7% 46,4% 12,4% 12,1% 
Strongly Agree 6,5% 28,9% 22,7% 76,8% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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38 Citizens of this country 
have experienced force 
migration 
AKP CHP MHP HDP 
Strongly Disagree 9,2% 3,1% 26,3% 5,1% 
Disagree 17,3% 10,2% 9,1%   
Partially Disagree 14,3% 1,0% 11,1%   
Partially Agree 10,2% 19,4% 18,2% 2,0% 
Agree 34,7% 40,8% 15,2% 7,1% 
Strongly Agree 14,3% 25,5% 20,2% 85,7% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
39 I think that state policies 
are protecting women’s 
individual rights 
AKP CHP MHP HDP 
Strongly Disagree 2,1% 39,0% 33,3% 88,9% 
Disagree 11,3% 41,0% 21,2% 6,1% 
Partially Disagree 12,4% 5,0% 8,1% 2,0% 
Partially Agree 19,6% 9,0% 11,1% 2,0% 
Agree 41,2% 4,0% 13,1% 1,0% 
Strongly Agree 13,4% 2,0% 13,1%   
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
40 I think that women in our 
country can vote freely 
without being pressured by 
their spouses or families 
AKP CHP MHP HDP 
Strongly Disagree 4,1% 37,4% 31,0% 69,0% 
Disagree 9,2% 33,3% 10,0% 14,0% 
Partially Disagree 6,1% 13,1% 16,0% 4,0% 
Partially Agree 27,6% 9,1% 16,0% 5,0% 
Agree 39,8% 6,1% 11,0% 6,0% 
Strongly Agree 13,3% 1,0% 16,0% 2,0% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
41 I think that courts 
penalize women abusers 
satisfactorily 
AKP CHP MHP HDP 
Strongly Disagree 15,3% 54,5% 58,0% 85,0% 
Disagree 39,8% 35,4% 10,0% 10,0% 
Partially Disagree 10,2% 4,0% 7,0% 1,0% 
Partially Agree 8,2% 3,0% 7,0% 1,0% 
Agree 20,4% 2,0% 10,0% 2,0% 
Strongly Agree 6,1% 1,0% 8,0% 1,0% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
42 I think that government 
is interfering with the 
number of children a family 
can have AKP CHP MHP HDP 
Strongly Disagree 10,2% 3,1% 16,0% 3,0% 
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Disagree 39,8% 15,3% 7,0% 2,0% 
Partially Disagree 10,2% 4,1% 3,0% 2,0% 
Partially Agree 15,3% 7,1% 10,0% 5,0% 
Agree 13,3% 36,7% 12,0% 36,0% 
Strongly Agree 11,2% 33,7% 52,0% 52,0% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
43 I think that children are 
being oriented towards a 
specific religious 
perspective in schools 
AKP CHP MHP HDP 
Strongly Disagree 10,5%   23,0% 5,1% 
Disagree 34,7% 3,1% 12,0% 1,0% 
Partially Disagree 14,7% 4,2% 12,0%   
Partially Agree 15,8% 16,7% 13,0% 3,0% 
Agree 21,1% 37,5% 20,0% 21,2% 
Strongly Agree 3,2% 38,5% 20,0% 69,7% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
45 I think right to private 
property is guaranteed in 
this country. 
AKP CHP MHP HDP 
Strongly Disagree 5,2% 24,5% 26,3% 70,0% 
Disagree 11,5% 28,6% 17,2% 18,0% 
Partially Disagree 8,3% 9,2% 14,1% 5,0% 
Partially Agree 17,7% 17,3% 24,2% 3,0% 
Agree 45,8% 19,4% 10,1% 3,0% 
Strongly Agree 11,5% 1,0% 8,1% 1,0% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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GEREKÇESİ yapılacaktır. 
PROJENİN  YÖNTEMİ Araştırmada, siyasal haklara ve sivil özgürlüklere ilişkin 
algılar 7 ölçüt ile araştırılacaktır.  Siyasal haklar:  
1. seçim süreci 
2. siyasal çoğulculuk ve katılım 
3. hükümetin işleyişi 
 
Sivil özgürlükler: 
4. ifade ve inanç özgürlüğü 
5. örgütlenme hakları 
6. hukuk devleti 
7. kişisel otonomi ve bireysel haklar ölçütleri ile 
tanımlanacaktır.  
 
Araştırmanın önemli bir değişkenini oluşturan 
siyasal parti eğilimleri ise deneklerin kendilerini 
sağ-sol arasındaki bir yelpazede nereye 
yerleştirdikleri, geçmişte ve gelecekteki oy 
tercihleri, kendilerini hangi siyasal partiye yakın 
hissettikleri gibi çoklu sorular ile anlaşılmaya 
çalışılacaktır. Siyasal parti eğilimleri konusunda 
daha önce yapılan çalışmalarda kullanılan sorular 
çalışılarak anket soruları oluşturulacaktır (örneğin 
Ersin Kalaycıoğlu’nun 2008 tarihli “parti tutma” 
kavramını açımladığı çalışması, Kalaycıoğlu’nun 
2010 tarihli siyasal eğilimleri tespit etmeye yönelik 
yelpaze çalışması, Eurobarometer anketlerinde 
bulunan siyasal eğilimlere ilişkin sorular). 
 
Siyasal yelpazeyi temsil eden İstanbul ilinde 400 kişi ile 
mülakat yapılması hedeflenmektedir. Örneklem içinde 
seçmenlerin yanı sıra siyasal parti çalışanlarının olması da 
hedeflenmektedir. 
ETİK İLE İLGİLİ 
KULLANILACAK BİYOLOJİK, 
PSİKOLOJİK VE TEKNİK VB 
TÜM YÖNTEMLER 
Anket çalışması, Anket Formu üzerinde cevapları 
işaretlemek ve notlar almak yolu ile uygulanacaktır. 
Araştırma sonuçlarının yazılım aşamasında zaman zaman 
not alınan ifadelere başvurulacaktır. Bu durumlarda 
mülakat yapılan kişilerin isimleri kesinlikle 
kullanılmayacaktır. 
ETİK İLE İLGİLİ 
KULLANILACAK PROSEDÜR VE 
İLGİLİ RİSKLER YA DA 
TEHDİTLER 
Araştırmaya katılım tamamıyla gönüllülük esasına 
dayanacaktır. Mülakat yapılacak kişilere anketin içeriği, 
nasıl bir araştırma için yapılmakta olduğu ve anketin süresi 
hakkında bilgi verilecek, uygulamaya yönelik olarak 
onayları alınacak ve anket uygulaması sırasında istedikleri 
noktada sorulara cevap vermekten vazgeçebilecekleri 
bilgisi verilecektir. 
RİSKLER YA DA TEHDİTLERİ 
ENGELLEYECEK ÖNLEMLER 
NELERDİR? 
Katılımcıların kişilik haklarının korunması kapsamında, 
mülakat sorularına verdikleri cevaplar gizli tutulacak ve 
yalnızca araştırma ekibi tarafından değerlendirilecektir. 
Mülakat sırasında elde edilecek formlar ve alınan notlar 
güvenli bir ortamda saklanacak; paylaşılan bilgiler, bilimsel 
etik çerçevesinde, araştırma ekibinin bu araştırma ile ilgili 
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GÖNÜLLÜ KATILIM FORMU 
 
Değerli Katılımcı,  
 Bu araştırmanın amacı Türkiye’de siyasi parti eğilimleri ile siyasal haklar ve sivil özgürlüklere 
ilişkin vatandaşlık algısı arasındaki ilişkileri incelemektir. Bunun için sizden bir anket kapsamında 
bulunan sorulara yanıt vermeniz istenmektedir. Çalışmaya katılımınızın çalışma kapsamında incelenen 
konuya katkı sağlayacağı düşünülmektedir. Sonuçlarının yalnız bilimsel amaçlarla kullanılacak olan 
bu çalışmaya katılımınız tamamen sizin isteğinize bağlıdır. Çalışmaya katılımınız için size para 
verilmeyecek ya da karşılığında herhangi bir şey istenmeyecektir. Anket kapsamında vereceğiniz 
bilgiler güvenli bir ortamda saklanacak ve tamamen gizli kalacaktır. Mülakat sırasında kullandığınız 
ifadeler sonuç raporlarında ve araştırma ile ilgili yayınlarda kullanıldığı takdirde kesinlikle isminiz 
gizli tutulacaktır.  Çalışmadan elde edilen veriler yalnızca bu çalışma kapsamında kullanılacaktır.  
Tüm soruların yanıtlanması yaklaşık olarak 30-40 dakika sürmektedir. Anketlerde yer alan 
sorular için doğru ya da yanlış cevap yoktur. Genel olarak görüşme kişisel rahatsızlık verecek soruları 
içermemektedir. Ancak, sorulan sorulardan ya da herhangi başka bir nedenden ötürü rahatsız olunması 
durumunda katılımcı görüşmeyi istediği zaman yarıda bırakıp çıkmakta serbesttir. Araştırma 
sonuçlarının sağlıklı olması için soruları eksiksiz ve içtenlikle, sizi tam olarak yansıtacak şekilde 
cevaplamanız çok önemlidir. Katkılarınızdan dolayı teşekkür ederim. 
  
                                                                            Uygulayıcının Adı:  
                                                                                    Email Adresi:  
                                                                         
Katılımcının beyanı 
 Yukarıda okuduğum çalışma ile ilgili bilgiler bana sözlü olarak da iletildi. Bu çalışmaya 
gönüllü olarak katılmayı kabul ediyorum.  
Katılımcının (dolduracağınız formlarda isminiz alınmayacak, gizliliğiniz korunacaktır) 
Adı soyadı ve imzası ……………………………………………………………………………. 
Uygulayıcının  
Adı soyadı ve imzası…………………………………….… 
 
 
